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Document 1107 27th July 1987 
DRAFT SUPPLEMENTARY BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EX(PENDITURE 
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1987 1' 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 2 
by Mr. Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur 
APPENDICES 
I. Revised estimates under Head I of the operating budget of the Assetnbly for 
1987 
11. Revised estimates in the pensions budget for 1987 
Ill. Revised budget estimates of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 
l. Adopted in committee by 11 votes to 0 with 1 abstention. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Linster (Chairman); Mr. Sinesio, Mrs. Pack (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Beysen, Mrs. Blunck, 
MM. Bohl (Alternate: Hunault), Chartron, Declercq, Dhaille, Ferrari Aggradi, Freeson (Alternate: Wooda(l), Mrs. Herfkens, MM. 
Klejdzinski, Morris, Oehler, Pollidoro, Rauti, Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Stokes, van Tets (Alternate: van der Werjj), Zierer. 
N.B. The names of those takmg part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
1. According to Rule 48 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly: 
" 1. Each year, following a report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
drawn up in collaboration with the Presidential Committee, the Assembly shall approve a provi-
sional statement of its expenditure, divided into heads and sub-heads. 
2. The Assembly may, if necessary, approve supplementary estimates of expenditure. " 
2. In accordance with this provision, the present report sets out the Assembly's additional require-
ments, resulting mainly from the application of the 223rd report of the Co-ordinating Committee. 
3. The salary scales given in that report are higher than the estimates made in summer 1986 when 
the 1987 budget was prepared, so that a supplementary budget is necessary in order to have enough 
money available in Head I of the operating and pensions budgets to cover expenditure until the end of 
the year. 
4. Appendix I gives details of the new estimates under Head I, including the financial implications 
of the 223rd report for the salaries of permanent staff for 1987 and the second half of 1986 (back-dated 
increase). 
These estimates also take account of: 
- foreseeable increases as at 1st July 1987 which it has been agreed with the ministerial organs of 
WEU to estimate at 5%, i.e. 2.5% of total annual salaries; 
- the installation allowance and reimbursement of travelling and removal expenses paid to two 
officials who resigned before reaching the age limit for retirement; 
- the reimbursement oftravelling expenses paid to a candidate who was interviewed for a vacant 
post. 
5. Appendix 11 gives details of the new estimates in the pensions budget based on the scales laid 
down in the 223rd report. It also includes: 
- an estimate of the increase in pensions as from 1st July 1987 effected in accordance with the 
criteria in paragraph 4 above; 
-the cost of two new pensions payable as from 1st July 1987 and 1st September 1987 respec-
tively. 
6. As a result of the abovementioned additional amounts, the budgets of the Assembly for 1987 will 
be modified as follows: 
Operating Pensions 
budget budget 
(F) (F) 
Initial ................................................. . 16 964 375 1 351 000 
Supplementary ......................................... . 466 600 135 050 
--------------------------
17 430 975 1 486 050 
7. Appendix Ill gives a breakdown by heads and sub-heads of the Assembly budgets resulting from 
the new estimates set out above. For the pensions budget, the increase in income corresponding to the 
increase in contributions by permanent staff is also shown. 
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APPENDIX I 
Revised estimates under Head I of the operating budget of the Assembly for 1987 
Revised estimates on Back-dated Sub-heads the basis of increase for 1986 Increase for 1987 Total 1987 budget Difference the 223rd report 
1. Basic salaries ............ 6 965 000 41000 174 000 7 180 000 6 830 000 350 000 
2. Allowances .............. 1 292 000 7 900 30000 1 329 900 1 300 000 29 900 
-w 3. Social charges ........... 1 345 000 1100 33 600 1 379 700 1 318 000 61 700 
4. Expenses relating to the 
recruitment and departure 
of permanent officials .... 25 000 1 25 000 25 000 
5. Medical examination ..... 8 000 8 000 8 000 
9 635 000 50000 237 600 9 922 600 9 456 000 466 600 
1. Installation allowance for a new official. 
Reimbursement of travelling expenses of a candidate for a vacant post. 
Reimbursement of travelling and removal expenses of an official leaving the Office of the Clerk. 
-0 
-..J 
Revised estimates 
Sub-heads on the basis of 
the 223rd report 
-
"""' 1. Pensions and leaving 
allowances .............. 1 278 000 
2. Familly allowances ...... 75 000 
3. Supplementary insurance . 31000 
1 384 000 
APPENDIX 11 
Revised estimates in the pensions budget for 1987 
Back-dated 
increase for 1986 Increase for 1987 New pensions 
8 000 31000 56 000 
250 1 900 3 500 
- - 1 400 
8 250 32 900 60 900 
Total 1987 budget 
1 373 000 1 249 000 
80 650 74000 
32400 28 000 
1 486 050 1 351 000 
Difference 
124 000 
6 650 
4400 
135 050 
g 
!"') 
c::: 
3:: 
!'T1 
z 
-1 
APPENDIX IIJ 
APPENDIX Ill 
Revised budget estimates of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 
Heads and sub-heads 
Head I - Permanent staff 
SuB-HEAD: 
1 - Basic salaries .......................... . 
2 - Allowances ............................ . 
3 - Social charges ......................... . 
4 - Expenses relating to the recruitment and 
departure of permanent officials ......... . 
Budget 
for 1987 
(initial) 
6 830 000 
1 300 000 
1 318 000 
-
Supplementary 
budget 
350 000 
29900 
61 700 
25 000 
DOCUMENT 11 07 
Budget 
for 1987 
(revised) 
7 180 000 
1 329 900 
1 379 700 
25000 
5 - Medical examination .................... 1----~...:....:....~-------+-----.:=----=--~-1 8 000 - 8000 
Total ................................. . 
Head /I- Temporary staff 
Sua-HEAD: 
6 - Staff recruited for sessions .............. . 
7 - Interpretation staff required for Assembly 
9 456 000 466 600 9 922 600 
2 111 875 2 111 875 
work between sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 456 000 - 456 000 
8 - Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk 50 000 - 50 000 
9 - Social charges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 000 - 87 000 
~-------~~----~------~ 
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 704 875 - 2 704 875 
Head Ill - Expenditure on premises and 
equipment 
SuB-HEAD: 
10 - Share of joint expenditure on the Paris 
premises .............................. . 
11 - Hire of committee rooms ............... . 
12 - Technical and other installations for 
Assembly sessions ..................... . 
13 - Various services for the organisation of ses-
sions ................................. . 
14 - Maintenance of the premises of the Office of 
the Clerk .............................. . 
15 - Purchase or repair of office furniture .... . 
16 - Purchase of reproduction and other office 
equipment ............................ . 
17 - Hire and maintenance of reproduction and 
450 000 - 450 000 
15 000 - 15 000 
345 000 - 345 000 
45 000 - 45 000 
18 000 - 18 000 
28 000 - 28000 
32 300 - 32 300 
other office equipment .................. 1----'---------11--------!------'---1 366 700 - 366 700 
Total ................................. . 1 300 000 - 1 300 000 
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Budget Supplementary Budget Heads and sub-heads for 1987 for 1987 
(initial) budget (revised) 
Head IV- General administrative costs 
SuB-HEAD: 
18 - Postage, telephone, telex and transport of 
documents 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 480 000 - 480 000 
19 - Duplication paper, headed writing paper 
and other office supplies ................ 258 000 - 258 000 
20 - Printing and publication of documents 0 0 0 1190 000 - 1190 000 
21 - Purchase of documents 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 60000 - 60000 
22 - Official cars 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 115 000 - 115 000 
23 - Bank charges 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 500 - 500 
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 103 500 - 2 103 500 
Head V- Other expenditure 
SuB-HEAD: 
24 - Travelling and subsistence allowances and 
insurance for the President of the Assembly, 
chairmen of committees and rapporteurs 0 0 130 000 - 130 000 
25 - Expenses for representation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 200000 - 200 000 
26 - Committee study missions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 000 - 5000 
27 - Official journeys of members of the Office 
of the Clerk 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 350 000 - 350 000 
28 - Expenses of experts and the auditor 0 0 0 0 0 0 70000 - 70000 
29 - Expenditure on information ............. 311 000 - 311 000 
30 - Expenses for political groups 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 311 000 - 311 000 
31 - Contingencies and other expenditure not 
elsewhere provided for 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3000 - 3000 
32 - Non-recoverable taxes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20000 - 20000 
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 400000 - 1 400 000 
OPERATING BUDGET o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 16 964 375 466 600 17430975 
RECEIPTS ............................... 310 000 - 310 000 
16 654 375 466 600 17 120 975 
PENSIONS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 351 000 135 050 1486 050 
RECEIPTS ............................... 409 000 20000 429 000 
NET TOTAL PENSIONS BUDGET o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 942 000 115 050 1 057 050 
NET TOTAL BUDGET o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 17 596 375 581 650 18 178 025 
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Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly 
for the financial year 1986 
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to the Auditor submitting the accounts 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1986 
(b) Statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits 
(Appendix II): 
3rd April 1987 
Sir, 
In accordance with Article 13 of the 
Financial Regulations of the WEU Assembly, I 
have the honour to submit to you the accounts 
for the financial year 1986 in accordance with the 
statements attached hereto which refer to: 
1. (a) Summary of income and expenditure 
financial position as at 31st 
December 1986 (Appendix I): 
(c) Contributions (Appendix Ill}; 
(d) Provident fund (Appendix IV). 
As is customary, after being audited these 
tables will be signed by the President of the 
Assembly, the Clerk of the Assembly and the 
Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration l!>efore being sub-
mitted to the Assembly. · 
2. The statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits shows a 
saving ofF 241 257, whereas the final statement 
of income and expenditure shows a credit 
balance of F 20 731. The difference between 
17 i 
DOCUMENT 1108 
these two figures, i.e. F 220 526, represents the 
deficit of receipts over estimates: 
- Bank interest 
- Sundry receipts 
- Sale of publica-
tions 
- Levy on the sala-
ries of grade A 
staff 
- Contributions 
7% 
- Receipts for 1986 
estimated in the 
budget 
F F 
129 456 
3 055 
30 512 
32 912 
407 839 
603 774 
824 300 
- 220 526 
3. Excess expenditure under Heads II and IV 
of the operating budget and under Head I of the 
pensions budget amounting to F 163 629 has 
been met by transfers from other heads of the 
budget. 
4. All contributions for the financial year 
1986 (1986 revised budget) have been received 
from the Secretary-General of WEU London. 
5. Amounts in the Assembly's provident 
fund are incorporated with those of the other 
organs of WEU and the joint fund is adminis-
tered by the Secretary-General in consultation 
with the Clerk of the Assembly. 
On 31st December 1986, these amounts 
totalled F 3 826 415 as shown in Appendix IV. 
On that date there remained two loans to two 
staff members amounting to F 365 808. 
The Secretary-General has continued to 
receive advice from the advisory panel set up 
within WEU and from outside bankers on the 
investment of these funds. On 31st December 
1986, the fund was held by Montagu Investment 
Management Limited in London. 
Mr. J. VAN DE VELDE 
I have the honour to be, 
Sir, 
Your obedient Servant, 
J.-M. CARO 
President of the Assembly 
Premier President de la Cour des Comptes 
Rue de la Regence 2 
B - lOO BRUXELLES - Belgique 
18 
Sir, 
Letter from the external Auditor 
to the President of the Assembly 
submitting the accounts of the Assembly 
for the financial year 1986 
16th June 1987 
I have the honour to submit the accounts 
of the Assembly of Western European Union for 
the financial year 1986 together with my opinion 
and report thereon. 
I have the honour to be, 
Sir, 
Your obedient Servant, 
JEROOM VAN DE VELDE 
The President of the Assembly 
of Western European Union, 
43, A venue du President Wilson 
75775 PARIS Cedex 16 
Report of the external Auditor to the 
Assembly of Western European Union on the 
accounts for the financial year 1986 
16th June 1987 
I have audited the accounts of Western 
European Union for the financial year 1986 in 
accordance with Article 14 of the Financial Reg-
ulations of the Assembly in order to appraise the 
correct management of the budget and book-
keeping. 
The final statement of income and 
expenditure shows a credit balance ofF 20 731 
whereas the statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits shows a 
saving of F 241 257. The difference, i.e. 
F 220 526, stems from a deficit in sundry 
receipts (F 603 774 instead of the estimated 
F 824 300). 
The total saving in the budget may be 
summarised as follows: 
F 
Head I 
Permanent staff + 170 505 
Head II 
Temporary staff - 76 282 
Head Ill 
Expenditure on premises 
and equipment + 114 803 
Head IV 
General administrative costs - 73 956 
Head V 
Other expenditure + 119 578 
Head I 
Pensions, allowances and 
social charges 13 391 
Total + 241 257 
As my predecessor mentioned in his report 
on the accounts for the financial year 1985, I 
would point out that the Financial Regulations 
do not provide for transfers between heads of 
expenditure. 
However, I have also noted that the 
Council of Western European Union, which 
approves the budget of the Assembly, was 
notified of these transfers in April 1987 in 
accordance with the usual procedure. 
I thank the President and staff of the 
Assembly for the willingness with which all 
requests for explanations were met and for their 
co-operation and assistance in the exercise of my 
duties as auditor. 
J. VAN DE VELDE 
(Premier President de la 
Cour des comptes de Belgique) 
Commissaire aux Comptes 
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Financial statements of the Assembly of 
Western European Union for the financial year 
1986 
Certificate of the A1uditor 
16th June 1987 
In application of Article 15 of the 
Financial Regulations of the Assembly of 
Western European Union, I have examined the 
appended financial statements (Appendix I) of 
the Assembly of Western European Union com-
prising the summary of income and expenditure 
and the statement of assets and liabilities for the 
financial year 1986. My examination included 
verification of the books and other relevant doc-
uments that I deemed necessary. As a result of 
this examination, my opinion is that these state-
ments are a correct record of tqe financial opera-
tions conducted during the 1986 financial year, 
that these operations were in conformity with the 
budget estimates, the Financial Regulations, the 
financial instructions and other decisions of the 
legislative authority, and that they are a correct 
record of the financial situation for the year 
ended 31st December 1986. 
J. VAN DE VELDE 
(Premier President de la 
Cour des comptes de Belgique) 
Commissaire aux Comptes 
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APPENDIX I 
Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1986 
(in French francs) 
Per attached statement 
Assessments of member states (see Appendix Ill) 
Miscellaneous 
(A) Sundry receipts 
Bank interest ............................................... . 
Sundry receipts ............................................. . 
Sale of publications ......................................... . 
Levy on salaries of grade A officials ......................... . 
(B) Pensions 
Contributions (7%) ......................................... . 
Expenditure under budget authorisation ...................... . 
Expenditure in excess of budget authorisation on Heads 11, IV and I 
of the pensions budget .................................... . 
Total expenditure (see Appendix 11) .......................... . 
Excess of income over expenditure ........................... . 
129 456 
3 055 
30 512 
32 912 
407 839 
17 118 700 
603 774 
17 722 474 
17 538114 
163 629 
17701743 
F 20 731 
Financial position as at 31st December 1986 
Assets 
Cash at bank ............................................... . 
Sundry advances ........................................... . 
Accounts receivable ......................................... . 
Liabilities 
Accounts payable ........................................... . 
Excess of income over expenditure ........................... . 
Jean-Marie CARO 
President of the Assembly 
Certified correct: 
Georges MouuAs 
Clerk of the Assembly 
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26 600 
298 554 
351 044 
F 676 198 
655 467 
20 731 
F 676 198 
Dudley SMITH 
Chairman of the Committee 
on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration 
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APPE 
STATEMENT OF BUDGET AUTHORISATIONS, EXPENDITUJ 
(in Fre~ 
PART I: OPERATING BUDGET Total budget for 1986 1 
HEAD I - PERMANENT STAFF 
Sub-Head 1 Basic salaries 6 877 800 
Sub-Head 2 Allowances 
2.1. Expatriation allowance 605 000 
2.2. Household allowance 280 000 
2.3. Allowance for children and other dependent persons 227 900 
2.4. Rent allowance 42000 
2.5. Education allowance 90000 
2.6. Allowance for language courses 2 000 
2.7. Overtime 50 000 
2.8. Home leave 35 000 
Sub-Head 3 Social charges 
3.1. Social security 919 000 
3.2. Supplementary insurance 261 400 
3.3. Provident fund 130 000 
Sub-Head 4 Expenses relating to the recruitment and departure of 
permanent officials 
4.1. Travelling expenses of candidates for vacant posts 15 000 
4.2. Travelling expenses on arrival and departure of per-
manent officials and their families 15 000 
4.3. Removal expenses 80000 
4.4. Installation allowance 70000 
Sub-Head 5 Medical examination 8 000 
Total of Head I 9 708 100 
I. Documents 1030, 1071 and 1071 Addendum. 
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lX II 
~D UNEXPENDED CREDITS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1986 
ncs) 
Transfers Total after 
+ - transfers 
10 753 6 867 047 
605 000 
280 000 
227 900 
42000 
90000 
532 2 532 
10 221 60 221 
35 000 
4023 914 977 
1 217 262 617 
2 806 132 806 
15 000 
15 000 
80 000 
70000 
8 000 
14 776 14 776 9 708 100 
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Total Unexpended 
expenditure credits 
6 863 397 3 650 
581 797 23 203 
257 461 
I 
22 539 
218 586 9 314 
29 628 12 372 
83 535 6 465 
2 532 -
60 221 -
20 847 14 153 
886 838 28139 
262 617 -
132 806 i -
I 
I 
I 
821 14 179 
1 669 13 331 
74 298 5 702 
54402 15 598 
6 140 1 860 
9 537 595 170 505 
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PART I: OPERATING BUDGET Total budget for 1986 
HEAD 11- TEMPORARY STAFF 
Sub-Head 6 Staff recruited for sessions of the Assembly 
6.1. Sittings service 950 000 
6.2. Interpretation service 340 000 
6.3. Translation service 620 000 
6.4. Other services 40000 
Sub-Head 7 Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between 
sessions 400000 
Sub-Head 8 Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk 80000 
Sub-Head 9 Social charges 
9.1. Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters 3 000 
9.2. Provident fund for interpreters 75000 
9.3. Insurance for interpreters 3000 
Total of Head 11 2 511 000 
HEAD Ill - EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT 
Sub-Head 10 Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises 430 000 
Sub-Head 11 Hire of committee rooms 15 000 
Sub-Head 12 Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions 340 000 
Sub-Head 13 Various services for the organisation of sessions 45 000 
Sub-Head 14 Maintenance of the premises of the Office of the 
Clerk 15 000 
Sub-Head 15 Purchase or repair of office furniture 25 500 
Sub-Head 16 Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment 94800 
Sub-Head 17 Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other office 
equipment 390 800 
Total of Head Ill 1 356 100 
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Transfers Total after Total Unexpended 
+ - transfers expenditure credits 
23 755 973 755 973 755 -
17 302 322 698 322 698 -
22 315 597 685 597 685 -
5 547 34453 34453 -
5 360 405 360 481 642 I 76 2821 
9 448 89 448 89 448 i -
! 
I 
535 3 535 3 535 ! -
6 363 81 363 81 363 -
297 2 703 2 703 -
45 461 45 461 2 511000 2 587 282 I 76 2821 
35 128 394 872 389 788 5 084 
15 000 - 15 000 
10 397 350 397 350 397 -
45 000 43 514 1 486 
15 000 1 242 I 13 758 I 
5 860 31 360 31 360 -
18 871 113 671 113 671 -
390 800 311 325 79 475 
35 128 35 128 1 356 100 1 241 297 114 803 
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PART 1: OPERATING BUDGET Total budget for 1986 
HEAD IV - GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS 
Sub-Head 18 Postage, telephone, telex and transport of documents 480 000 
Sub-Head 19 Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other 
office supplies 250 000 
Sub-Head 20 Printing and puplication of documents 1 150 000 
Sub-Head 21 Purchase of documents 50000 
Sub-Head 22 Official cars 100 000 
Sub-Head 23 Bank charges 500 
Total of Head IV 2 030 500 
HEAD VI - OTHER EXPENDITURE 
Sub-Head 24 Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance 
for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of corn-
mittees and rapporteurs 150 000 
Sub-Head 25 Expenses for representation 170 000 
Sub-Head 26 Committee study missions 3 300 
Sub-Head 27 Official journeys of members of the Office the Clerk 350 000 
Sub-Head 28 Expenses of experts and the auditor 70 000 
Sub-Head 29 Expenditure on information 300 000 
Sub-Head 30 Expenses for political groups 300 000 
Sub-Head 31 Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere 
provided for 3000 
Sub-Head 32 Non-recoverable taxes 20000 
Total of Head V 1 366 300 
Total f6 972 000 
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Transfers Total after Total Unexpended 
+ - transfers expenditure credits 
25 836 505 836 505 836 -
324 250 324 252 899 I 2 5751 
25 872 1 124 128 1 124 128 -
50000 51 320 I 1 3201 
100 000 170 061 I 70 0611 
288 212 212 -
26 160 26 160 2 030 500 2 104 456 I 73 9561 
20740 129 260 81 797 47 463 
15 823 185 823 185 823 -
4 108 7 408 7 408 -
350 000 315 378 34 622 
70 000 56 403 13 597 
300 000 278 126 21 874 
300 000 300 000 -
3 000 978 2 022 
809 20 809 20 809 -
20740 20740 1 366 300 1 246 722 119 578 
142 265 142 265 16 972 000 16717352 254 648 
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PART 11: PENSIONS BUDGET Total budget for 1986 
HEAD I - PENSIONS, ALLOWANCES AND SOCIAL CHARGES 
Sub-Head 1 Pensions and leaving allowances 
1.1. Retirement pensions 645 700 
1.2. Invalidity pensions 198 000 
1.3. Survivors' pensions 45 500 
1.4. Orphans' or dependants' pensions 
1.5. Leaving allowances 
Sub-Head 2 Family allowances 
2.1. Household allowances 27 900 
2.2. Children's and dependants' allowances 24100 
2.3. Education allowances 10 400 
Sub-Head 3 Supplementary insurance 19 400 
Total of Head I 971 000 
Total 17 943 000 
The expenditure figures include charges for goods delivered and services rendered by 31st December 1986, and paid for up to 31st Ma 
Jean-Marie CARO 
President of the Assembly 
28 
Geoq 
Clerk oft 
Transfers Total after 
+ - transfers 
1 431 647 131 
5 198 005 
306 45 194 
44 27 944 
176 24276 
3 378 7 022 
2 028 21428 
3 684 3 684 971 000 
145 949 145 949 17 943 000 
87, m accordance with the Financial Regulations of the Assembly. 
[OULIAS 
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Total Unexpended 
expenditure credits 
660 522 I 13 3911 
198 005 -
45 194 -
27 944 -
24276 -
7 022 -
21 428 -
984 391 I 13 3911 
17 701 743 241 257 
Dudl{)y SMITH 
Chairman of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs I and Administration 
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APPENDIX Ill 
STATEMENT OF SUMS RECEIVED FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL 
OF WEU LONDON IN RESPECT OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WEU ASSEMBLY 
BUDGET FOR 1986 
Contributions Budget deficit Budget Budget Net Member states 600ths overpaid 1985 for 1986 for 1986 contributions in 1985 (Revised) required 
F F F F F 
Belgium 59 (-) 16 539 14 894 1 652 973 30 365 1 681 693 
France 120 (-) 33 638 30293 3 361 980 61 760 3 420 395 
Federal Republic of 
Germany 120 (-) 33 638 30 293 3 361 980 61 760 3 420 395 
Italy 120 (-) 33 638 30 293 3 361 980 61760 3 420 395 
Luxembourg 2 (-) 560 504 56034 1 030 57 008 
Netherlands 59 (-) 16 539 14 894 1 652 973 30 365 1 681 693 
United Kingdom 120 (-) 33 638 30293 3 361 980 61 760 3 420 395 
600 (-) 168 190 151 464 16 809 900 308 800 17 101 974 
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PROVIDENT FUND 
ACCOUNT FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 1986 
in French francs 
F F 
Balance brought forward: 
Accounts of staff members as at 1st January 1986 3 222 858 Withdrawals 8 500 
Contributions of staff members and of the 
Assembly of Western European Union 207 262 Management fee 14 487 
Repayments of loans by staff members 87 336 
Interest received during the year 220 984 
Gain on valuation at 31st December 1986 110 962 Accounts of existing staff members as at 31st 
Jean-Marie CARO 
President of the Assembly 
December 1986 
3 849 402 
Georges MouLIAS 
Clerk of the Assembly 
3 826 415 
3 849 402 
Dudley SMITH 
Chairman of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
I have examined the foregoing account. In my opinion the account presents fairly the financial position of the provident fund at 31st December 1986. 
16th June 1987 
Jeroom VAN DE VELDE 
Premier President de 
la Cour des Comptes de Belgique, 
Commissaire aux Comptes 
..... 
0 
00 
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Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly 
for the financial year 1986 
27th July 1987 
MOTION TO APPROVE THE FINAL ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1986 1 
The Assembly, 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 2 
by Mr. Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur 
Having examined the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1986, together with the 
auditor's report, in accordance with Article 16 of the financial regulations, 
Approves the accounts as submitted and discharges the President of the Assembly of his financial 
responsibility. 
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Linster (Chairman); Mr. Sinesio, Mrs. Pack (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Beysen, Mrs. Blunck, MM. 
Bohl (Alternate: Hunault), Chartron, Declercq, Dhaille, Ferrari Aggradi, Freeson (Alternate: Woodall), Mrs. Herfkens, MM. Klejd-
zinski, Morris, Oehler, Pollidoro, Rauti, Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Stokes, van Tets (Alternate: van der Werjj), Zierer. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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Sir, 
29th September 1987 
Communications from the Chairman-in-Office of the Council 
concerning the meetings of senior officials from 
the ministries for foreign affairs and defence 
of WEU member states on the situation in the Gulf 
held in The Hague on 20th August and 15th September 1987 
The Hague, 31st August 1987 
In view of the interest often expressed by the Assembly in the implications that crises occurring in 
other regions may have for Europe and bearing in mind our discussions in The Hague on 7th July 1987, 
I wish to inform you personally as follows. 
On 20th August, the presidency convened a group of senior officials from the ministries for 
foreign affairs and defence of the member states ofWEU to consider the situation in the Gulf. The presi-
dency acted in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty and the decision taken in 
Rome in October 1984 to hold consultations whenever necessary on the implications for Europe of 
crises in other regions of the world. To my knowledge, this is the first time such a me~ting has been held. 
We agreed to consider these matters in more depth in order to bring about greater co-operation. 
I 
For your information and that of the Assembly, I enclose the guidelines for the press agreed upon 
at the close of the meeting on 20th August. 
Mr. Charles Goerens, 
President of the Assembly 
of Western European Union 
Guidelines for the press 
I have the honour to be, 
Sir, 
Your obedient Servant. 
Hans van den Broek 
1. At the invitation of the Netherlands, which chairs the Western European Union, high officials 
from the ministries for foreign affairs and defence of the member states met in The Hague on 20th 
August 1987 to consider the different aspects of the situation in the Gulf area in lhe context of the 
current efforts of the United Nations to bring an end to the Iraq-Iran conflict. Thi~ meeting was held 
pursuant to Article VIII of the WEU treaty and, more recently, to the decision takien by ministers in 
Rome in October 1984 to consider whenever appropriate the implications for Eurolt of crises in other 
regions of the world. : 
2. We had a thorough and useful exchange that contributed to a harmonisatiop of views. It was 
agreed to continue this process of concertation. 
3. It was stressed that Security Council Resolution 598 should be fully implemenled forthwith so as 
to bring the conflict between Iraq and Iran to an end. Member countries of WEU will continue to 
support all efforts aimed at achieving this. In this context they reiterated their support for the efforts of 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
4. Europe's vital interests require that the freedom of navigation in the Gulf be assured at all times. 
The member states strongly condemned all actions contrary to that principle. 
5. Participants took note of the measures already undertaken or envisaged by individual member 
countries. They agreed to continue to consult each other and exchange information in order to further 
develop their co-operation. 
* 
* * 
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The Hague, 18th September 1987 
Sir, 
By letter of 31st August, I drew your attention to the fact that a group of senior officials from the 
ministries for foreign affairs and defence had met for the first time in The Hague on 20th August to 
discuss the situation in the Gulf region. In accordance with the decision taken at that meeting and on the 
initiative of the presidency, a further meeting of members ofWEU was held in The Hague on 15th Sep-
tember. 
The exchange of views proved very useful and will be continued. I think that in this way a process 
of consultation on problems relating to crises in other regions will gradually emerge. 
I enclose the guidelines for the information of the press issued by the presidency on 15th Sep-
tember. 
Mr. Charles Goerens, 
President of the Assembly 
of Western European Union 
Guidelines for the press 
I have the honour to be, 
Sir, 
Your obedient Servant, 
Hans van den Broek 
At the invitation of the Netherlands, which chairs Western European Union, and pursuant to the 
decision they took at their meeting of 20th August 1987 to continue to consult each other and exchange 
information in order to further develop their co-operation, high officials of the ministries for foreign 
affairs and defence of the member states met in The Hague on 15th September 1987. 
They had a thorough exchange of views on recent developments in the Gulf and the efforts being 
undertaken by the United Nations to bring to an end the conflict between Iraq and Iran. They again 
stressed that Security Council Resolution 598 should be fully implemented forthwith. They will con-
tinue to support the efforts of the Secretary-General and of the Security Council. 
They underlined the importance they attach to the principle of freedom of navigation. They noted 
the decisions taken by some member countries since the last meeting to commit naval forces to the Gulf 
regwn. 
Participants reiterated their decision to continue the process of concertation. It was agreed that 
representatives of the member countries ofWEU will continue to meet to exchange information and to 
discuss related issues. 
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Revision and interpretation of the 
Rules of Procedure 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges 2 
by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Chairman and Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFT DECISION 
on the revision of Rules 7, 8, 12 and 48 of the Rules of Procedure 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Chairman and Rapporteur 
1. Adopted unanimously in committee. 
lOth September 1987 
2. Members of the committee: Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (Chairman); MM. van der Werff, Lacour (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Andre 
(Alternate: Bohl), Antoni, Antretter, Bordu, Cerexhe, Coleman (Alternate: Parry), Corrie (Alternate: Jessel), Eysink, Gorla, Mrs. 
Hennicot-Schoepges (Alternate: Goerens). MM. Marchio, Pecriaux, Rodota, Scheer, von Schmude, Sirgue, Unland, Woodall. 
N.B. The names of those taking part m the vote are printed in italics. 
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Draft Decision 
on the revision of Rules 7, 8, 12 and 48 of the Rules of Procedure 
The Assembly, 
DECIDES 
To amend Rules 7, 8, 12 and 48 as follows: 
1. Rule 7 
Add the following sentence at the end of paragraph 3: 
"An alternate must be of the same nationality as the titular member he may be asked to replace." 
Replace paragraph 4 by the following text: 
" Any titular member of a committee who is prevented from attending a meeting shall arrange to 
be replaced by a representative or substitute appointed for the purpose. If the latter is unable to 
attend, the chairman of the committee must be informed of the name of the other member of his 
national delegation who is authorised to take his place. " 
2. Rule 8 
Replace paragraph 1 by the following text: 
" The term of office of representatives and substitutes shall take effect from the date of the com-
munication of the statement of the ratification of the credentials by the President of the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe or, if the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe has been unable to ratify the credentials, from the date of the ratification of their creden-
tials by the WEU Assembly in accordance with Rule 6, paragraph 2. " 
3. Rule 12 
Add the following sentence at the end of paragraph 1: 
"A Vice-President may not replace the President during a debate in which he has taken part nor 
speak in a debate over which he has already presided. " 
4. Rule 48 
Replace paragraph 2 by the following text: 
" The Assembly or, in between sessions or part-sessions, the Presidential Committee, in appli-
cation of Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure, may, if necessary, approve supple-
mentary estimates of expenditure, but if the latter so acts it shall submit its decision to the next 
sitting of the Assembly for ratification. " 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
Interpretation of Rule 7 
1. Like the appointment of substitutes in the 
Assembly, the appointment of alternates in com-
mittees is designed to assist in obtaining a 
quorum in spite of the many commitments of 
parliamentarians. 
2. The status of Assembly substitutes and 
committee alternates is similar. Just as a sub-
stitute exercises his duties only if he signs the 
register of attendance in the place of a represent-
ative, so an alternate exercises his duties only if 
he replaces a titular member who is absent. It 
should be added that substitutes may attend 
Assembly debates even if they are not replacing a 
representative but then they do not have the 
right to vote and consequently will not be given a 
voting card. Similarly, the alternate of a titular 
member present may attend a committee 
meeting but is not entitled to vote, but both a 
substitute and an alternate may speak, the 
former in the Assembly and the latter in com-
mittee. 
3. It must be borne in mind that under Rule 
38(6), proposals for the composition of com-
mittees, taking into account the representation of 
political tendencies, are submitted to the 
Assembly which " shall decide by secret vote dis-
puted nominations for one or more seats in a 
committee ". Thus, the composition of a com-
mittee is determined in the last resort by the 
Assembly; in practice candidatures have always 
been submitted by national delegations, and 
there appears to be no precedent for a disputed 
candidature being settled by the plenary 
Assembly. Rule 38 makes no provision for the 
appointment of alternates to committees. The 
practice of delegations submitting and the 
Assembly ratifying an alternate member as well 
as a titular member for each national seat on a 
committee appears to be a matter of usage, 
designed to facilitate the application of Rule 7 
which alone makes specific reference to alternate 
members. 
4. When a titular member is replaced by an 
alternate therefore the presumption, in the light 
of Rule 38(6), is that the replacement should 
respect the principles underlying the compo-
sition of the committee as approved by the 
Assembly. 
5. A titular member unable to attend a 
meeting arranges to be replaced by the alternate 
appointed for this purpose. The names of alter-
nates are therefore listed opposite the titular 
37 
committee members they are required to replace. 
The priority of the alternate appointed over any 
other alternates should be specified in the Rules 
of Procedure of the WEU Assembly as it is in the 
Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the 
Council of Europe. 
6. Nevertheless, some flexibility is customary 
in designating alternates. When his titular 
member is present, an alternate may replace 
another titular member who is absent if that 
member's alternate is also absent. 
7. In this connection, the committee 
chairman merely ensures that replacements 
conform with the Rules of Procedure and, in par-
ticular, that the alternate is of the same nation-
ality as the titular member. 
8. So that the notification of alternates is 
always clear, it is proposed that the replacement 
be notified to the chairman and the committee 
by being entered on the list of committee 
members kept by the secretariat at the entrance 
to the committee room, the name of the titular 
member replaced being shown. It goes without 
saying that if the titular member concerned 
arrives later his alternate will stand down at least 
as long as the latter is present. 
9. A special case exists when an alternate is 
taken from outside the committee. Obviously, 
the alternate must be of the same nationality. 
The political aspects of choosing alternates, 
should be settled within each national dele-
gation. Whilst it is for the titular member to 
inform the chairman which other member of his 
national delegation is authorised to take his 
place, he may do so through the medium of the 
member of the Assembly who is to take his place. 
The chairman will take note of this after ensuring 
that it conforms with the Rules of Procedure. 
10. To sum up, the wording of Rule 7 of the 
Rules of Procedure might be made clearer and 
more precise if it followed closely the wording of 
Rule 45, paragraph 13, of the Rules of Procedure 
of the Assembly of the Council of Europe. This is 
proposed in the amendment included in the pre-
liminary draft decision above. 
Rule 8 
11. The term of office of a representative or 
substitute implies the right to sit and exercise all 
responsibilities in accordance with the Rules of 
Procedure. The exercise of this right depends on 
the ratification of credentials. 
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12. If the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe has not been able to effect this 
ratification, it is for the WEU Assembly to ratify 
them in accordance with Rule 6, paragraph 2, 
" on the basis of the official documents sup-
plied... by the parliaments or governments of 
member states subject to conformity with the 
subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe". The term 
of office of representatives and substitutes 
cannot therefore take effect from the date oftheir 
nomination by the member states but only from 
the date of ratification of credentials attested by 
this act. For that reason it is proposed to draft 
Rule 8, paragraph 1, as follows: 
" The term of office of representatives and 
substitutes shall take effect from the date 
of the communication of the statement of 
the ratification of the credentials by the 
President of the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe or, if the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe has been unable to ratify the cre-
dentials, from the date of the ratification 
of their credentials by the WEU Assembly 
in accordance with Rule 6, paragraph 2. " 
Rule 12 
13. The purpose of the proposed amendment 
is to extend to Vice-Presidents the restrictions 
imposed on the President of the Assembly by the 
new provisions of Rule 11, paragraph 2, 
regarding participation in a debate. It would be 
wholly improper to preside over one's own case, 
i.e. to be the impartial chairman of a debate or 
part of a debate and take part in it oneself. 
14. The amendment proposed is therefore to 
add the following sentence at the end of Rule 12, 
paragraph 1: 
"A Vice-President may not replace the 
President during a debate in which he has 
taken part nor speak in a debate over 
which he has already presided. " 
Mandate of the Presidential Committee 
for approving provisional statements 
of expenditure (Rule 48, paragraph 2) 
15. The conditions for drawing up the budget 
are set out in Article VIII of the Charter and 
Rule 48, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Procedure. 
The Assembly's responsibility is necessarily 
engaged in this process and is expressed in its 
approval of a " provisional statement of expend-
iture " or " draft budget " set out in a report by 
the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Admin-
istration prepared in co-operation with the Presi-
dential Committee. Rule 48, paragraph 2, states 
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that it may also approve supplementary esti-
mates of expenditure. 
16. However, it should be stipulated that, in 
this specific case, it is possible to apply the pro-
cedure set out in Rule 14, paragraph 2, on the 
action the Presidential Committee is authorised 
to take in between sessions or part-sessions to 
allow the Assembly's work to be properly carried 
on. It may on occasion be necessary to adopt a 
draft supplementary budget as a matter of 
urgency. This happened at the beginning of 1986 
after a decision by the Council in December 1985 
to increase certain salaries to take account of 
inflation. The resulting supplementary expend-
iture could no longer be included in the draft 
budget as it had already been adopted by the 
Assembly at its session which had just been con-
cluded. The revised draft budget adopted by the 
Assembly for the financial year 1986 therefore 
included an amount to offset part of the back-
dated salary increases which could not be met 
from the budget for the financial year 1985 and 
consequently had to be charged to the budget for 
the financial year 1986. The Council had agreed 
to this procedure. 
17. However, comments were made about the 
procedure by the Auditor who, after auditing the 
accounts for the financial year 1985, considered 
it was not entirely in accordance with good 
accounting practice. 
18. The Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration examined this matter and felt the 
Rules of Procedure should be made more flexible 
so as to allow the Presidential Committee, 
subject to subsequent ratification by the 
Assembly, to adopt a draft supplementary budget 
in the context of its responsibilities under Rule 
14, paragraph 2, for ensuring that the Assembly's 
activities between sessions are properly carried 
on. 
19. It is therefore proposed to amend Rule 48, 
paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure by 
replacing Rule 48, paragraph 2, by the following 
text: 
" The Assembly or, in between sessions or 
part-sessions, the Presidential Committee, 
in application of Rule 14, paragraph 2, of 
the Rules of Procedure, may, if necessary, 
approve supplementary estimates of 
expenditure, but if the latter so acts it shall 
submit its decision to the next sitting of 
the Assembly for ratification. " 
Procedure applicable in plenary sitting 
to amendments withdrawn 
by their authors (Rule 29) 
20. The problem has arisen several times as to 
whether an amendment withdrawn by its author 
could be moved by another representative. 
Although the Rules of Procedure say nothing 
about this possibility, the presidency has always 
considered that any member of the Assembly 
was entitled to take over an amendment thus 
withdrawn. 
21. It should be pointed out that an 
amendment withdrawn by its author has been 
tabled within the time limit prescribed in the 
Rules of Procedure. Having been distributed to 
all members of the Assembly, it is not therefore a 
new text which could be opposed for not having 
been tabled in time and there should be nothing 
to prevent a member of the Assembly taking 
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over such an amendment which has been tabled 
and then withdrawn. 
22. It should be made clear that the original 
member who tabled the amendment is either 
absent or, if present, is seeking leave from the 
Assembly to withdraw it and what actually 
happens in the case under consideration is that 
another member is refusing to permit such leave 
to be granted or the item to be lost through the 
absence of the original mover. 
23. It might therefore be specified in the future 
handbook on procedure that an amendment 
withdrawn by its author may be taken over and 
moved by another representative. 
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Amendment 1 
Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure 
AMENDMENT 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Pannella 
30th November 1987 
1. Add the following new text at the beginning of paragraph 4 of the draft decision proper: 
" Replace paragraph 1 by the following text: 
The draft budget of the Assembly shall be drawn up by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration in consultation with the Presidential Committee. 
This draft budget shall be submitted to the Council which may make comments in the form of 
amendments thereto. 
Thus amended, the draft budget shall be re-examined by the Assembly in accordance with the fol-
lowing procedure: 
- if the Council has not amended the draft budget, it shall be agreed to by the Assembly by simple 
majority; 
- if the Council has amended the draft budget, the Assembly may ratify it by simple majority or 
itself amend the draft budget as amended by the Council. Any amendment to the Council's 
amendments to the draft budget must be approved by an absolute majority. 
The budget thus adopted shall be proclaimed adopted by the President, who shall communicate it 
to the Council. " 
Signed: Pannella 
I. See 6th sitting, 30th November 1987 (amendment ruled out of order). 
40 
Document 1111 
Recent developments in Soviet external policy 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee 2 
by Mr. Pecriaux, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
on recent developments in Soviet external policy 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Pecriaux, Rapporteur 
I. Introduction 
11. The ideological dimensions of the problem 
Ill. Internal reforms 
IV. European questions 
15th October 1987 
(a) Soviet policy in regard to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA) 
(b) Security and co-operation in Europe 
(c) Economic relations 
V. Outside Europe 
(a) The Middle East 
(b) The Far East 
VI. Conclusions 
1. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Ahrens (Chairman); MM. Close, Burger (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts, Bassinet, Baumel 
(Alternate: Seitlinger), Bianco, Dejardm, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Hardy, Hlll, Koehl, Lord Mackie of Benshie, MM. Martino, 
Masciadri, Mechtersheimer, du Monceau de Bergendal (Alternate: Pecriaux), Muller, Pontillon, Reddemann, Ruet (Alternate: 
Chenard), Rumpf, van der Sanden, She/ton, Spitella (Alternate: Amadei), Stoffelen, Vecchietti (Alternate: Antoni). 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
41 
DOCUMENT 1111 
Draft Recommendation 
on recent developments in Soviet external policy 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering that, if confirmed and pursued, the policy of reform and openness undertaken by the 
Soviet Union opens the way for a far-reaching change in relations between Eastern and Western Europe, 
important disarmament measures and a consolidation of international peace; 
(ii) Noting that the prospects for "reality and guarantees for a secure world" expressed by Mr. 
Gorbachev on 17th September 1987 very largely respond to Western Europe's aspirations, but consid-
ering that Soviet practice should correspond more to these words; 
(iii) Considering that the CSCE is the framework in which the conditions for new relations between 
the two parts of Europe can be worked out, provided adequate progress is accomplished in each of the 
three baskets; 
(iv) Welcoming the progress achieved in the limitation of medium-range nuclear weapons but noting 
that Western Europe's security also requires agreements on the verified limitation of strategic weapons, 
on a balance of conventional weapons and on banning the use of chemical weapons with the progressive 
destruction of existing stocks; 
(v) Noting that the principal threats to international peace now originate in regions outside the area 
covered by the North Atlantic Treaty; 
(vi) Stressing that a concern ofthe WEU Council should be to concert the action of member countries 
to restore peace by the application of United Nations Security Council Resolution 598 and to ensure 
freedom of navigation in the Gulf; 
(vii) Welcoming the fact that the Assembly has been able to start a dialogue with the Supreme Soviet of 
the Soviet Union on the conditions of European security and hoping that it will be possible to continue 
these exchanges of views, 
REcoMMENDs THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Examine regularly the evolution of relations between Eastern and Western Europe; 
2. Urge both the United States and the Soviet Union to implement any Soviet-American agreements 
on the limitation of medium-range nuclear weapons, while assuring Europe that there will be a deter-
mined and vigorous effort to achieve an early, satisfactory outcome to negotiations on other categories 
of weapons; 
3. Through close consultations, seek to uphold joint positions in all meetings held in the framework 
of the CSCE in order to obtain substantial, balanced results in negotiations held in the context of each of 
the three baskets, including: 
(a) the early conclusion of an agreement on the limitation of conventional weapons restoring the 
balance of forces in Europe and including a satisfactory system of verification; 
(b) the liberalisation of exchanges of ideas and the free movement of persons between Eastern 
and Western Europe; 
(c) the definition of the obligations of each country taking part in the conference, particularly in 
regard to human rights and the environment; 
(d) the development of economic, scientific and cultural relations between the two parts of 
Europe; 
(e) respect for the sovereignty and independence of all states. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Pecriaux, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. Whereas until 1984 a feature of Soviet 
external policy had been its remarkable conti-
nuity, or, one might even say, extreme caution 
and slow development, the arrival of Mr. 
Gorbachev as General Secretary of the Soviet 
Communist Party was followed by many initia-
tives in particularly fast succession which forced 
the western countries, and probably other coun-
tries including members of the Warsaw Pact, to 
embark upon unaccustomed intellectual and dip-
lomatic exercises in order to respond to them. 
Two years later, the purpose of the present report 
is first to consider to what extent changes in the 
style of Soviet diplomacy also relate to its aims 
and methods and second to study how WEU, 
and the member countries of the Atlantic 
Alliance in general, can and must react to the 
new Soviet external policy. 
2. The Assembly has a particular obligation 
to do this since it was the subject of a special 
approach by the Soviet Union, which invited a 
delegation of parliamentarians to visit Moscow 
in April 1987. This was something quite new 
since the Soviet Union had hitherto condemned 
the very existence of WEU, which, as the 
Brussels newspaper Le Soir recalled, the Soviet 
press considered to be a mainstay of NATO and 
had, from the very outset, accused of supporting 
a warmongering policy. As certain Soviet author-
ities made clear to your Rapporteur, there is no 
doubt that the reactivation of WEU led the 
Soviet Union to take a second look at the present 
and future of the organisation. They made no 
secret of the fact that, while considering it was 
for the Western European countries to consult 
each other as they thought fit on economic 
matters that concerned them, and that political 
co-operation was natural, provided it was not 
directed against the Soviet Union, they felt the 
Soviet Union could not remain indifferent to the 
creation of any new military grouping because 
this would affect its security. Consequently, 
should it seem that WEU was about to have its 
own armed forces, the Soviet Union would 
reserve the right to express a critical opinion. 
3. Experience derived from exchanges of 
views by certain members of the Assembly with 
Soviet authorities exercising considerable 
responsibility in foreign policy matters could but 
lead to the presentation of reports and it is the 
task of the General Affairs Committee to present 
to the Assembly the political conclusions drawn 
from these exchanges. However, these conclu-
sions cannot be limited to purely diplomatic con-
siderations and it is essential to place the Soviet 
43 
Union's external action in a wider context. The 
seriousness and permanency of Soviet initiatives 
can be assessed only by examining the reasoning 
behind them. Your Rapporteur will therefore 
pay particular attention to recent ideological and 
economic developments in the Soviet Union and 
will not confine himself to examining under-
takings that directly concern Europe or the 
western world but will assess the country's 
overall external policy. Conversely, in accor-
dance with the decision taken by the Presidential 
Committee of the Assembly on 27th July 1987, 
he will leave it to the Rapporteur of the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments to 
study in depth the question of disarmament, 
which is the responsibility of that committee. 
4. The forty-two years which have elapsed 
since the end of the European aspect of the 
second world war have been marked by the dis-
covery and development of nuclear weapons and 
the start of man's mastery of space. At the same 
time, the two great powers, the United States and 
the Soviet Union, have taken on new dimensions 
giving them a considerable lead in these two 
areas and thus a prime position in terms of mil-
itary power. For the first time in history, 
therefore, hostilities between the two great 
powers could lead to worldwide disaster. Nuclear 
fire-power has a decisive impact as a factor of 
balance and consequently of peace between the 
powers. However, to quote the French political 
economist, Jacques Vernant, "nuclear potentials 
do not cancel each other out like two terms in an 
equation that equal zero: even if they are never 
to be used, which is the aim, they nevertheless 
exist. Conventional warfare below the nuclear 
threshold is difficult to imagine, if not impos-
sible, for those who have nuclear fire-power". 
5. Yet the caution imposed by the enormous 
risks involved and fear of the unknown estab-
lishes only a fragile form of peace. Only the dia-
logue and the agreements to which it must lead 
can avert the danger of a war which is still a 
threat, less because of direct clashes between the 
two great powers or European matters than 
because of the innumerable crises throughout the 
rest of the world where the deterrent effect of 
nuclear weapons is not so strong. 
6. Present military and strategic parity 
remains the decisive factor in war not being 
started, but the question is whether raising the 
level of parity enhances or, on the contrary, 
threatens world security. According to Mr. 
Gorbachev, disarmament is of historic impor-
tance and, today, the eastern and western coun-
tries have no choice otlaer than to reach 
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agreement on a radical reduction in the levels of 
military confrontation. He links the consoli-
dation of peace closely with the reduction of 
these levels, particularly those of nuclear 
weapons, but it is evident that reductions have to 
be a consequence of a more global development 
of detente and must concern all armaments, 
including conventional and above all chemical 
weapons whose early, total and verified elimi-
nation is an important aim for the West. 
7. However, until 1984 negotiations to 
determine the conditions for a parity offorces on 
each side produced only very limited results, 
whether in nuclear or conventional weapons. In 
the conventional area, it was on 14th February 
1985 that the Soviet Union proposed basic pro-
visions for an agreement of three years' duration 
on initial reductions by the Soviet Union and the 
United States of forces and weapons in the 
central region of Europe and on a subsequent 
no-increase commitment to be applied to the 
levels of armed forces. 
8. On 5th December 1985, NATO accepted 
these basic provisions as a starting point for 
negotiations. But for the West confidence is a 
prior condition for progress in any subsequent 
negotiations towards the agreed goal of parity 
and, to ensure this, verification is the key factor 
in any agreement on the control of armaments. 
But on 20th February 1986 the Soviet Union, 
while maintaining its proposal for agreement on 
armaments, recalled its reservations on the 
question of verification. 
9. On 28th and 29th May 1987, the member 
countries of the Warsaw Pact met in the German 
Democratic Republic at the conference of the 
Political Consultative Committee ofthe Warsaw 
Treaty Organisation. This meeting started by 
analysing the situation in the world and in 
Europe. Noting an evolution in the international 
situation, the existence of growing interdepen-
dence of states and technical and scientific 
progress leading towards particularly powerful 
weapons of destruction, these countries con-
cluded that there would be no victor in a nuclear 
war and proposed denouncing the concept of 
nuclear deterrence and seeking a new political 
line of thought and a new approach to the 
problems of war and peace. In the words of the 
conference, the fundamental goal is to prevent 
war and hence to promote disarmament. For this 
purpose, there must be a climate and rela-
tionship of confidence between states, particu-
larly those with different social systems. The 
member states of the Warsaw Pact thus stressed 
the defensive nature of their military doctrine. 
The points of view of the member countries of 
the Atlantic Alliance are certainly not very dif-
ferent, which opens the door to agreements 
between the two great powers on the reduction of 
nuclear weapons and wider negotiations on other 
aspects of disarmament. 
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10. The measures proposed by the Warsaw 
Pact countries for attaining this aim are: 
- an agreement between the United States 
and the Soviet Union on medium-range 
missiles; 
- a reduction in strategic weapons; 
- a total ban on nuclear tests; 
- strengthening the ABM treaty provi-
sions; 
- eliminating chemical weapons. 
On the basis of bi- or multilateral negotiations, 
agreements would be concluded on disarm-
ament, ranging from the process of reducing 
armed forces and armaments to appropriate 
reductions in military expenditure by states and 
the creation of zones free of nuclear and 
chemical weapons in Central Europe. But the 
question of verification has never led to firm 
proposals. 
11. The stated aim of the Warsaw Pact coun-
tries was improved confidence and the devel-
opment of relations between states parties to the 
conference on security and co-operation in 
Europe on political, economic and humanitarian 
matters, excluding any activities deemed to be 
anti-communist. This would therefore imply 
determination to set up a global system of inter-
national peace and security and to promote eco-
nomic, scientific and technical co-operation ben-
eficial to all states. This initiative, aimed inter 
alia at bringing about an atmosphere of confi-
dence and openness, would in the long run lead 
to a worldwide security system guaranteed by the 
United Nations if the international community 
managed to define and have adopted a system of 
verification and implementing measures accep-
ted by all. In a particularly remarkable article 
published in Pravda and Izvestia on the occasion 
of the forty-second session of the United Nations 
General Assembly on 17th September 1987, Mr. 
Gorbachev reviewed all these ideas, associating 
closely, in the context of this worldwide security 
system, disarmament, the promotion of human 
rights, the development of ecological security, 
the transformation of the third world and 
strengthening the authority of the United 
Nations. 
12. This attitude on the part of the member 
countries of the Warsaw Pact, and more specifi-
cally the Soviet Union, expressed among others 
by the General Secretary of the Soviet Com-
munist Party, raises a whole series of questions 
that Europe must answer if it wishes to guarantee 
its democracy, preserve its security and protect 
its culture. 
13. In particular, it must ask itself whether the 
Soviet Union is sincere in its proposals, whether 
aims other than disarmament, especially in 
political, economic and ideological matters, are 
hiding behind these proposals, whether the 
Soviet Union has the wherewithal to follow up 
this new course, whether Europe can count on a 
substantial, lasting change in the Soviet Union 
and whether disarmament is really the key to 
greater security in the world or whether it might 
not aggravate other problems, such as that of the 
underdeveloped countries, since the East-West 
dialogue does not necessarily solve North-South 
problems. 
14. To understand the scope of these pro-
posals, the present situation in the Soviet Union 
and the Eastern European countries must first be 
analysed in order to determine all the pros and 
cons of this new course. Consideration will then 
be given to the extent to which the policy effec-
tively pursued by the Soviet Union in the last 
two years has conformed to this proclaimed 
course and facilitated an agreement on disarm-
ament. 
II. The ideological dimensions of the problem 
15. While, when the Third International was 
founded, the Soviet Union considered itself to be 
the country whose main vocation, having suc-
ceeded a revolution, i.e. power having been 
taken over by the Communist Party, was to 
spread this revolution throughout the world, the 
question today is whether worldwide revolution 
is still its aim, at least in the reasonably long 
term. During the seventy years which have 
elapsed since the Bolshevik revolution Soviet 
ideology has indeed evolved, taken shape and 
changed so that it has often been wondered 
whether the underlying Marxist philosophy was 
still its real basis or whether history had not 
imposed a new ideology for which Marxism 
proper was no more than a label giving only a 
very approximate definition of the contents. 
16. To keep to questions offoreign policy, it is 
clear that until the death of Stalin in 1953 the 
Soviet Union considered its relations with the 
capitalist world had to be warlike because the 
relationship between middle classes and prole-
tariat and hence between socialist and capitalist 
states was based on an irreconcilable struggle. 
Admittedly, in this struggle every kind of tactic 
was allowed: the other side could be divided, the 
so-called socialist side materially strengthened 
and the capitalist world's grasp on the " colonial 
or semi-colonial countries " broken. An armed 
confrontation seemed inevitable but it was to be 
delayed until the Soviet Union could launch it 
with every chance of success. This made the 
Soviet Union develop a very pacifist way of 
speaking, while devoting all its efforts to building 
up military power which was to become the 
strongest in the world. At home, it also pursued a 
policy of constraint and repression to make the 
population accept the sacrifices necessary for the 
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salvation of the motherland of revolution and 
abroad it pursued a policy of isolation to spare 
the Soviet public any contamination by capi-
talism and also any possibility of comparing its 
standard ofliving with that of the western demo-
cratic nations. 
17. The period dominated by the personality 
of Nikita Khrushchev marked the first step in 
the evolution of this ideology: there was certainly 
no question of abolishing the dogma according to 
which the class struggle was
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inevitable and led 
only to the victory of the proletariat, i.e. the 
Soviet Communist Party and its allies taking 
power throughout the world. However, the 
Soviet leaders then admitted that this struggle 
did not have to be military: it could also take the 
form of peaceful competition between the capi-
talist and communist worlds. The expression 
" peaceful coexistence " c~vered this new 
concept of international relations; it meant that 
war would continue but by means other than 
force. In fact, it was a tacit tribute to the policy of 
deterrence pursued by the Atlantic Alliance since 
1949 whose aim was to convince the Soviet 
Union that any attack on Euriope would result in 
its vital forces being destroyed by nuclear fire-
power. 
18. The competition between the two great 
powers was to be pursued in other ways, 
including a comparison between the economic 
and social achievements of the Soviet Union and 
those of the capitalist countries, and particularly 
the United States. The com~ng of " socialism " 
was therefore no longer postponed to the distant 
future when communism wol!lld have triumphed 
over capitalism but became a short-term 
objective that could be attained even before the 
communist parties had taken power throughout 
the world. Communism was to become a means 
of economic development allowing faster 
progress than capitalism coijld offer and satis-
fying the requirements of the individual in his 
everyday life. The negotiated limitation of arma-
ments then became foreseeable and desirable 
because it was a means of making the investment 
necessary for redirecting agricultural and indus-
trial production for the benefit of Soviet society 
as a whole. 
19. However, it soon beqtme clear that, in 
spite of the opening of the first United States-
Soviet negotiations on the limitation of strategic 
armaments, the Soviet Union was, on the one 
hand, making no serious cuts in its military 
expenditure and, on the other, not managing, 
economically, to catch up witjh the United States 
or even, in many fields, with Western Europe. 
The policy of opening and liberalisation pursued 
by Mr. Khrushchev encountered various diffi-
culties and aroused internal opposition which 
considerably limited its impact and finally led to 
the fall of the General Secretary and the aban-
donment of most of his initiatives. 
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20. It becomes far more difficult to discern the 
trend of Soviet ideology in foreign policy during 
the years between the fall of Mr. Khrushchev and 
the advent of Mr. Gorbachev. The policy 
pursued by Mr. Andropov in particular gave rise 
to very different interpretations, some observers 
considering it to be a second step towards 
liberalisation of the regime while others held that 
continuity then constantly triumphed over the 
desire for reform. There is no doubt, however, 
that the Soviet Union spent two decades building 
up a first-class military force, both nuclear and 
conventional, which meant that it still felt 
threatened by the capitalist countries. The major 
effort it made to build up a powerful naval force 
that could operate on all the oceans of the world 
with nuclear-missile submarines, attack subma-
rines, aircraft-carriers and land or sea-going 
naval bases on all the oceans is probably the 
most significant aspect of this policy. But it 
requires serious analysis. 
21. Was the Soviet Union's aim to extend the 
boundaries of its domination in Asia, Africa and 
Latin America at a time when expansion in 
Europe had become risky and dangerous? Not 
without reason, the invasion of Afghanistan in 
December 1979 has been quoted in support of 
this possibility, as well as the deployment of 
Soviet forces or forces of some of its allies, par-
ticularly Cuba, and above all the development of 
national armed forces with Soviet support in 
North Africa, the Middle East, Southern and 
Eastern Africa and several Central American 
countries. Conversely, other observers stress the 
meagre Soviet economic commitment in these 
areas, its ill-adapted attempts to encourage their 
development and the cautious part it played in 
internal conflicts, except in the case of Afghan-
istan which, it is true, is a particularly sensitive 
matter for the Soviet Union because of the links 
between certain Soviet Asian peoples and those 
of Afghanistan. 
22. What makes it particularly difficult to 
assess the ideological reasons for Soviet external 
policy during that period is the fact that the 
country's leaders probably did not hold identical 
views on this point. The Soviet political system 
has never allowed those who are not in 
command to express their views freely, as can be 
done in the western democracies, where peri-
odical changes in the teams in power allow those 
who have exercised responsibilities to explain 
their reasons for acting as they did. What Soviet 
leaders say is always linked with political action, 
with all the constraints that this implies. 
23. It is also difficult to discern to what extent 
the policy then pursued by the Soviet Union 
stemmed from ideological considerations or 
from purely national concerns. Soviet inter-
vention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the pressure 
brought to bear on Poland to make its gov-
ernment repress unrest among the trade union 
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opposition and the very expression " Brezhnev 
doctrine " , according to which the Soviet Union 
would accept no infringement of communist 
domination in Eastern Europe, can just as easily 
be explained in ideological terms, according to 
which there can be no going back on the taking of 
power by the proletariat, as in entirely traditional 
strategic terms in view of the situation of Poland 
and Czechoslovakia at the heart of Europe on 
lines of communication that open up Western 
Europe to Soviet armies and Soviet territory to 
western armies. 
24. Mr. Gorbachev has certainly removed 
none of these ambiguities. It must not be for-
gotten that he did not come to power because he 
had beaten his political opponents in a battle of 
ideas but because he seemed to be the man of the 
new generation who was the closest to power at 
the right time. This situation should logically 
lead him to lay greater stress on continuity than 
on the novelty of his policy as compared with 
that of his predecessors. However, as the Finnish 
Ambassador, Max Jakobson, pointed out in two 
articles in the International Herald Tribune of 
17th and 18th September 1987, conflicts between 
generations have played a vital role throughout 
Russian history and, after the twenty years of 
conservatism which marked Mr. Brezhnev's gov-
ernment, the advent of a new generation may 
lead to speedy and far-reaching changes. Insofar 
as this analysis is accurate, it leaves little doubt 
about the future of the present conflicting forces. 
A British writer and journalist, Mr. Brian May, 
drew attention in an article in Le Monde 
Diplomatique of June 1987 to an important 
section of Mr. Gorbachev's speech to the twenty-
seventh congress of the Soviet Communist 
Party: 
"The course of history, of social progress, 
requires ever more insistently that there 
should be constructive and creative inter-
action between states and peoples on the 
scale of the whole world. Not only does it 
so require, but it also creates the requisite 
political, social and material premises for 
it. 
Such interaction is essential in order to 
prevent nuclear catastrophe, in order that 
civilisation could survive. It is essential in 
order that other worldwide problems that 
are growing more acute should also be 
resolved jointly in the interests of all con-
cerned. The prevailing dialectics of pres-
ent-day development consists in a combi-
nation of competition and confrontation 
between the two systems and in a growing 
tendency towards interdependence of the 
countries of the world community. This is 
precisely the way, through the struggle of 
opposites, through arduous effort, groping 
in the dark to some extent, as it were, that 
the controversial but interdependent and 
in many ways integral world is taking 
shape. " 
25. This is indeed an entirely new concept of 
relations between capitalist and communist 
countries: hitherto the only solution considered 
for the inevitable opposition between countries 
representing fundamentally antagonistic social 
classes was the assumption of universal power by 
the proletarian state. To admit that " social 
progress requires ever more insistently that there 
should be constructive and creative interaction " 
between all concerned and that "the prevailing 
dialectics of present-day developments consists 
in a combination of competition and confron-
tation between the two systems and in a growing 
tendency towards interdependence of the coun-
tries of the world community " gives an entirely 
new dimension to Soviet foreign policy. In these 
conditions, peaceful coexistence would in effect 
stop being a transitional stage in the conquest of 
world power by the proletarian power and 
become an aim in itself through recognition of 
the " interdependent and in many ways integral " 
nature of the" contradictory" world that is being 
formed. 
26. This obviously does not mean that the 
Soviet Union is renouncing its positions of force, 
its domination of the people's democracies, its 
action on the world stage or even its propaganda 
operations against the capitalist world. On the 
one hand, its security concerns are not thereby 
changed. Second, its will to play a role as world 
power, backed up by its nuclear and conven-
tional military force, is not in question. Again, 
even assuming that Mr. Gorbachev cherishes 
profoundly different views on this subject from 
those of his predecessors, he cannot, if he wishes 
to remain in power, allow his policy to result in a 
reduction of Soviet power, of its direct or 
indirect influence in Eastern Europe and the 
world or an increase in what the Soviet Union 
considers to be threats to its security. 
27. Finally, in view of the influence the 
administration must inevitably exert on Mr. 
Gorbachev, particularly in areas in which his 
personal experience is short, his undeniable 
Russian patriotism and his attachment to 
Marxism-Leninism, it is very unlikely that he 
will be able to escape from the suspicion of the 
West's aims and methods that has predominated 
among Soviet leaders since 191 7. How could he 
not think that the aim of the capitalist world is to 
ruin communism and his homeland? This may 
moreover lead him to seek a true balance of 
forces, meeting the wishes of the West which 
cannot agree either to place its fate in the hands 
of the Soviet Union, however pacifist the words 
of its leaders may be. This mutual mistrust 
makes negotiations arduous but helps to make 
them serious, since each side knows how neces-
sary it is to reach a compromise acceptable to all. 
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28. Thus, the new course laid down for Soviet 
foreign policy by Mr. Gorbachev must not be 
neglected, but its impact must not be exaggerated 
either. It merely expresses a reality that the 
Soviet Union has been facing for many years 
without having thitherto been able to draw the 
consequences, i.e. the failure of a plan to conquer 
the world by the country which wishes to be the 
privileged representative of the world proletariat. 
However, it opens up very significant prospects 
for peace when it proclaims not only that the 
opposition between capitalism and communism 
cannot be solved by recourse to force but also 
that this opposition is in itself beneficial and 
must be preserved. With this in mind, disarm-
ament, the call for human rights and exchanges 
of all kinds between countries with different 
regimes take on a very new meaning: the purpose 
would no longer be to use peaceful coexistence to 
prepare for war but to use it to organise peace. At 
a time when the West is trying to develop its 
relations with the Soviet Union and its allies, 
these very relations are becoming, at least 
according to the principal Soviet leader, a factor 
of peace and no longer of confrontation. 
29. These are the reasons1 why your Rap-porteur considers the ideologi(:al factor makes a 
major contribution to explaining Mr. 
Gorbachev's initiatives, to placing international 
peace on sounder bases and to opening the door 
to disarmament. Naturally, the West cannot base 
its own security policy solely on what the Soviet 
leaders say. It must consider tlite underlying real-
ities if it is not to be the dup~ of propaganda or 
fall victim to a change in the leadership of the 
Soviet state. 
Ill. Internal reforms 
30. In an interesting article published in the 
February 1987 issue of the NATO Review, Mr. 
Mackintosh, consultant on Soviet affairs to the 
IISS in London, points out that on taking up his 
post as General Secretary of the party Mr. 
Gorbachev had little experience of foreign affairs 
and only fragmentary experience of economic 
affairs, apart from agricultural matters for which 
he had already exercised major responsibilities. 
This probably explains some of the fluctuations 
in the impetus he gave during his first two years 
of government to what he himself called 
perestroika, i.e. restructuring. This inexperience 
may also explain certain diffenences between the 
words, admittedly logical and coherent, of the 
General Secretary and the Illractice of Soviet 
diplomacy which on the one hand refers con-
stantly to his speeches but on the other hand 
often clings to traditional practice and the 
defence of past positions. Mr. Gorbachev's 
advisers in this field had necessarily held posts of 
responsibility before he came . to power and can 
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hardly betray themselves in the opinions they 
give him or the actions they direct. 
31. A German expert in Soviet questions, 
Boris Meissner, pointed out in the issue of 
Aussenpolitik for the third quarter of 1987 that 
the extent of the planned reforms emerged only 
in his 27th January 1987 address at the start of 
the Party Central Committee plenum. Previ-
ously, he had spoken only of the" acceleration of 
the country's socio-economic development on 
the basis of scientific and technical progress" (at 
the plenum in April 1985) and of a " strategy of 
acceleration" in Leningrad on 15th May 1985. 
The word perestroika appears only in a proposal 
relating to limited reforms made at the twenty-
seventh party congress in February 1986. 
32. There are two possible explanations for 
the progressive nature of this definition of the 
extent of the planned reforms and, far from being 
contradictory, they can well complement each 
other. The first is that Mr. Gorbachev initially 
considered that the economic policy pursued by 
his predecessors was right and that they had just 
not been energetic enough in applying it. It was 
simply difficulties encountered in the sought-for 
acceleration which made him realise the mag-
nitude of the obstacles and the radical nature of 
the measures that must be taken to overcome 
them. The other explanation is that Mr. 
Gorbachev, aware from the outset of the mag-
nitude of the task to be accomplished, but just as 
aware of the opposition that would be raised by 
any serious policy of reform, wished to spare the 
party aristocracy and the conservative elements 
of Soviet society by divulging his intentions only 
progressively to an administration which was 
already being purged. Whichever interpretation 
is chosen, it raises the question whether he has 
completed an evolution in his campaign or 
whether he will further direct his language 
towards a fuller revision of the Soviet system 
than has so far been the case. 
33. The fact is that for several years the Soviet 
economy had been showing signs of deficiency, 
but it was particularly difficult to interpret them 
since the most prosperous western economies 
showed similar symptoms. Moreover, Mikhail 
Gorbachev came to power at a time when the 
team ofleaders and the elite of the country were 
running out of breath because of their age and 
above all their concepts of economic and social 
facts: there was a huge gap between their per-
ception of problems and the general trend of 
society, and the team had to be renewed. 
34. The Soviet Union was burdened by a 
stagnant economy, cumbersome party and gov-
ernment administration and deep-rooted cor-
ruption and apathy in most branches of the 
country's economy. Workers' productivity was 
scandalously low. Generalised corruption was 
making itself felt and there was a considerable 
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growth in delinquency, drunkenness, drug-taking 
and a return to individualism. The gap was 
growing between public authorities and society. 
The sense of social interest was giving way to 
attachment to individual interests. Demographic 
statistics in particular were affected by this. 
35. The death rate, particularly for children, 
was relatively high. The population, unequally 
spread over the country, showed a downward 
trend mainly noticeable among the European ele-
ments of the population. From an economic 
point of view, growth was declining, there were 
energy problems and investment for con-
sumption was lagging behind - marked infla-
tionary phenomena since production was not 
managing to follow wage increases granted in 
principle to raise the standard of living of the 
workers. The unduly high level of military 
expenditure was putting a brake on growth and 
the priority given to heavy industry was too 
great. Planning was too centralised and authori-
tarian and the economy was suffering from a lack 
of autonomy and stimulus at the level of pro-
duction units. The country's economic self-
sufficiency was an obstacle to performance and 
the share oftrade in its economy was very low. 
36. Aware of these facts, Mr. Gorbachev pre-
sented a programme at the twenty-seventh com-
munist party congress and a first glimpse of the 
party's tasks in restructuring the economy. While 
showing his deep-rooted Marxist-Leninist con-
victions, the General Secretary expressed the 
feeling that the party and government adminis-
trations should be cut back, rationalised and 
modernised and advocated economic "yield". 
The main lines of his economic views were the 
need to adopt dynamic methods, concentrate 
efforts on technology and resource and energy 
economy, speed up the rate of scientific and tech-
nological progress, improve the quality of 
products, increase investment in equipment and 
give priority to the production of machinery. He 
approved the self-financing experiments under 
way and reaffirmed the need to reorganise the 
system of prices in order to give them an active 
role in economic stimulation. He also stressed 
the interest of authorising certain firms to adjust 
their own supplies and sales thanks to the cre-
ation of horizontal links between them. But the 
principle of planning and central controls 
remained a political necessity and it may be 
wondered to what extent this can be reconciled 
with recipes for economic reforms. 
37. However, while affirming the absolute 
need for fundamental modernisation, Mr. 
Gorbachev seemed to be aiming above all at 
short-term results in order to enhance his 
authority. He showed himself to be a firm, deter-
mined, modem and original leader who under-
stood the wishes and problems of the Soviet 
people, but while the rhetoric was new the 
content was less so. The influence of the personal 
factor did not affect the logic of the system, to 
which Mr. Gorbachev proposed no remedy. This 
logic, which justifies the system and the powers 
of the leadership, remains political. 
38. In fact, it was in his speech to the Central 
Committee plenum on 27th January 1987 that 
Mr. Gorbachev revealed the true extent of the 
reforms he was proposing to carry out, under-
lining the "revolutionary" character that he 
intended to give them. On that occasion, he 
made it quite clear that the measures already 
taken were but a beginning because " changes for 
the better occur only slowly ". He even noted 
that " restructuring is proving more difficult and 
the reasons for the problems which have accu-
mulated in society more deeply rooted than we 
initially assumed ". Since then, Mr. Gorbachev 
has said in several speeches that his reform pro-
gramme would not relate only to the economy 
but to the entire policy for transforming life in 
society, the expression " strategy of acceler-
ation " has given way to that of " strategy of 
renewal " and the goal of democratisation has 
been clearly stated. 
39. In fact, on 30th June 1987 the Supreme 
Soviet adopted unanimously, on a report by Mr. 
Andrei Gromyko, who can hardly be said to rep-
resent the new generation, the texts of three par-
ticularly significant laws. The first sought to free 
firms from the authority of the central planning 
services. The second made it possible for citizens 
to appeal against decisions taken by police 
authorities or tribunals. The third laid down 
methods for discussions on major aspects of the 
state's activities, i.e. made possible a true 
political debate on large-scale industrial or 
urbanisation projects, legislation relating to 
everyday life, and respect for the rights, freedoms 
and duties of the citizen. Of course, the mainte-
nance of a single party still seriously limits 
democracy and habits and fears stemming from 
seventy years of dictatorship do not make it easy 
to apply the new legal provisions, but these laws 
nevertheless show intentions which go much 
further than the mere rectification of economic 
practices. 
40. This evolution in official statements and 
the scale of the planned reforms may of course 
reflect the simple observation that after two 
years' experience touching up the economic 
organisation of the country was not enough to 
give the new impetus to the economy that the 
new generation of Soviet leaders seems, not 
without reason, to consider indispensable. In this 
case, it would be purely technical considerations 
that led Mr. Gorbachev to embark upon far more 
radical, extensive reforms than those he envi-
saged in 1984 in order to solve problems viewed 
initially from an economic standpoint. However, 
Mr. Gorbachev's statements leave room for 
quite another interpretation, i.e. that he was 
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always determined to carry out these deep-rooted 
reforms but was prevented from doing so by the 
existence and maintenance in leading posts of 
representatives of the previous generation, radi-
cally hostile to any serious reform relating to 
political or social matters, i.e. to their power and 
privileges. Thus, the incomplete, limited nature 
of the initiatives taken in 1985 and 1986 was a 
sign of political caution, to which less attention 
can henceforth be paid because of the widespread 
purge of state and party officials in the last two 
years. 
41. Your Rapporteur obviously has no means 
of giving a verdict in this debate and even less of 
determining whether the Soviet administration is 
now prepared to follow loyally the orders of Mr. 
Gorbachev and his friends. Nor can he know 
how far Mr. Gorbachev can g~ in implementing 
a policy of liberalisation o\ter a very broad 
spectrum without running the risk of giving 
opponents of his policy argum~nts and means to 
bring about his own fall, as was the case for Mr. 
Khrushchev. The fact that the new Soviet lead-
ership is trying to situate its action in direct line 
with Lenin's 1921-24 N~P is extremely 
ambiguous since Lenin himself often indicated 
that recourse to capitalist methods, which he 
then advocated, was a provis~onal measure and 
should not prevent the state retaining real 
control over the economy. No one can say what 
Lenin's true intentions were qor a fortiori what 
Mr. Gorbachev's are. Mr. Gbrbachev told the 
trade union congress in February 1987, which 
was not very much in favqur of the reform 
policy, that Lenin had said 1 it was absolutely 
necessary to make a clear distinction between the 
vital interests and the immediate interests of the 
working class. Restructuring ijarmed immediate 
interests but met the vital long-term interests of 
the working class. This gives a fairly clear indi-
cation of the scope he attributes to the reforms 
undertaken. 
42. Real developments in the Soviet Union 
can be assessed not on the ba.Sis of what is said 
but on continuing political action, not limited to 
doctrinal, constitutional or legislative texts, that 
evolves over a long enoughl period for it to 
become irreversible, and there is no doubt that 
many westemers, whose work consists of 
observing what is happening illl the Soviet Union 
or who have everyday contacts with representa-
tives of that country, for instance in the 
framework of the conferenc~ on security and 
co-operation in Europe, are, to say the least, cau-
tious, if not sceptical, about the extent of 
liberalisation in the Soviet Union. They willingly 
recall the failure of the reforms undertaken by 
Khrushchev between 1956 and 1965. They also 
note that the words of the General Secretary are 
not quickly translated into a1 policy effectively 
applied by many services. Finally, they stress 
that the Central Committee negatived or diluted 
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many proposals submitted by Mr. Gorbac~ev at 
the plenum in January 1987. Yet the meetmg of 
the plenum, initially planned fo~ October 1 ~85, 
had had to be postponed three tlmes to av01d a 
more obvious setback. 
43. Boris Meissner, in the abovementioned 
article in Aussenpolitik, points out that when 
Mr. Gorbachev came to power he had no team 
or following in the machinery of government. 
While he has managed to find allies, they are not 
unconditional. The promotions made at the 
twenty-seventh congress concern only one-third 
of the members of the Central Committee and 
far from all the new members are in favour of 
reforms. This would largely explain the diffi-
culties and delays encountered in working out 
and implementing the policy advocated by the 
new General Secretary. 
44. In order to overcome this opposition and, 
in particular, that clearly expressed by t~e trade 
unions, Mr. Gorbachev appealed to society as a 
whole and first and foremost intellectuals, who 
can exercise an influence on it. He therefore con-
siders democratisation of the Soviet system to be 
a means of imposing his policy. He expressed 
himself most clearly on this point on 26th Feb-
ruary 1987, as follows: 
"To make restructuring an irreversible 
process and to ensure that what happened 
in the past does not happen again, every-
thing must be placed under the control of 
the people. There is only one voice, th<~t of 
a broad democratisation of Soviet society. 
We need strong, biting democratic forms, 
openness, criticism and self-c~ticism in 
order at last to bring about radical trans-
formations throughout the sphere of social 
life." (Quoted by Ignacio Ramonet in Le 
Monde Diplomatique of July 1987) 
45. Even the notion of glasnost, constantly put 
forward by Mr. Gorbachev's supporters, is not 
without ambiguity: is it a principle which should 
lead to real democratisation of society, or only a 
means of fighting the administration's open or 
masked opposition to the policy of reform? The 
word appears to have been used to designate two 
distinct practices. One is an authorisation to 
speak accorded by the pa~y . and conce~i~g 
internal affairs alone, to cntiCise the admmis-
tration and social practices in order to justify 
steps taken to remove opponents or promote 
greater efficiency. The desire for open!l~ss 
seemed very real in matters where admmis-
trative routine was at stake, particularly during 
the Chernobyl affair and other accidents which 
were more technical than political, even though 
the verdict of the trial of the Chernobyl officials 
does not appear to have been announced in !he 
Soviet press. It was a means of overcommg 
administrative sluggishness and removing 
certain opponents of reforms. It does not seem to 
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play the same role in II?-ore ~e!lsitive ~atters such 
as those relating to natwnahtles. For mstance, no 
real information was given to the public about 
the bitter disturbances in Kazakhstan in Decem-
ber 1986 and no one was able to assess the 
magnitude of the problems raised by the T~tars 
in the Crimea, known only because of qmckly 
quelled public demonstrations in Moscow in 
August 1987. The.sam~ was true ?fcertai~ nati<;>-
nalist demonstratiOns m the Baltic repubhcs this 
summer. However, the deportation of the local 
inhabitants and the immigration of Russians 
now seems to have brought the latter into the 
majority in the former Baltic states. These devel-
opments were recognised quite late, the Soviet 
press said nothing about them and the absence of 
western journalists in these areas prevented. the 
public being properly informed. There was httle 
respect for " openness " in this matter. 
46. The other concept covered by the word 
glasnost is believed !O corre~pond ~ore to . the 
notion of openness, I.e. to gtve the ImpressiOn, 
above all to foreigners, that the regime has 
become less secretive and less intolerant. Thus, 
many literary, cinematographic or artistic works, 
hitherto banned have been circulated among the 
Soviet and foreign public. The rehabilitation of 
fifteen scientists who had been victims of Sta-
linist purges was agreed by the Soviet Supreme 
Court on 16th July 1987. They included Nikol~i 
Kondratiev author of the theory of economic 
cycles, Ale~ander Chainov, organi~er of . the 
co-operative movement in the Sovtet Umon, 
Alexander Chelnitsev, theoretician of the 
division of agricultural production, and Leonid 
Iuroski monetary expert. All had worked out 
and pr~pagated theories considered dangerous 
for the dogma of the communist economy and 
their rehabilitation seems particularly character-
istic. 
47. Similarly, on 13th February 1987, Mikhail 
Gorbachev accomplished a revolutionary act by 
calling on intellectuals "to see histo~ as it i~ ". 
In a country where ideology led to history bemg 
considered from the sole point of view of the 
struggle of the proletariat, where falsification of 
the past had forged the greater part of a dogma 
that no one could call in question, such a 
statement was of very special importance. The 
history of the Soviet Union, as written, is too 
marked by justification of the worst excesses for 
its revision not to be explosive. Moreover, the 
search for historical truth affects the Soviet 
Union's relations with the people's democracies. 
Thus, in August 1986 General Jaruzelski see!Ds 
to have convinced Mr. Gorbachev to re-examme 
the Katyn file. A joint Soviet-Polish committee 
of historians was set up in April 1987 to examine 
this subject, which has embittered relations 
between the two countries since 1941. 
48. However although criticism of the admin-
istration's exce;ses is now commonplace and it is 
evident that Mr. Gorbachev is seeking the 
backing of the intellectuals, freedom is never-
theless not complete. Even if Mr. Gorbachev is 
proving responsive to the demands of the press, 
much information, particularly from abroad, is 
still carefully censored. 
49. Whatever uncertainty there may still be 
about the true nature of the new Soviet policy, 
however fragile the reform team led by Mr. 
Gorbachev, it is probable that several elements 
of these reforms will remain: it is not possible -
unless there is a return to Stalin-type terror- to 
go back on a certain degree of liberalisation of 
the economy, for fear of stagnation or recession. 
Nor is it possible to deprive the people of advan-
tages they have gained in their standard ofliving 
or freedom without risk of serious disturbances. 
It is no less difficult to consider as established a 
policy which cannot be expressed clearly and 
whose implementation seems to be encountering 
so many difficulties. 
50. These considerations are far from negli-
gible for the West, not only because cohabitation 
in Europe with countries whose regime is still 
dictatorial and where freedoms of all kinds are 
not guaranteed has drawbacks that we have 
experienced since the iron curtain was lowered 
and the Berlin wall built, but also because, as 
long as the Soviet Union does not base the sta-
bility of its regime and hence of its external 
policy on the will of the people, guaranteed by 
democratic practices, changes that are as quick as 
they are unforeseeable will remain possible. 
Some observers, for instance, are wondering 
whether Mr. Gorbachev is not liable to find 
himself forced to provoke an outbreak of 
Russian nationalism in order to mobilise public 
opinion, and in particular that of the younger 
generations, in support of his reforms so as to 
overcome his opponents. This would obviously 
jeopardise the course, on the whole moderate 
and favourable to detente and disarmament, 
along which he has so far guided Soviet external 
policy. It is certainly not in the West's interest to 
counter Mr. Gorbachev's attempts or to weaken 
his position in the Soviet Union. But nor is it in 
its interest to sacrifice the guarantees of its 
security and international peace in response to 
appeals by the new Soviet leaders. 
IV. European questions 
51. It is in relation to European matters that 
Soviet diplomacy has been most active in recent 
years. One of its aims is obviously to avert any 
risk of conflict in an area that is particularly sen-
sitive and essential for its security while it trav-
erses a period of economic and political change. 
A halt to the arms race, or even real disarm-
ament, is probably necessary if investments are 
to be redirected in the Soviet Union. Moreover, 
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if it wishes to develop its external trade, Europe 
- Eastern but also Western - is an essential 
partner for it. This is particul'lrlY so if it needs 
credits or foreign investment. Illowever, it is not 
out of the question that in order to attain these 
results it may try on the one hand to separate 
Western Europe from the United States in order 
to weaken it and make it eas~er to impose its 
views and, on the other, through propaganda to 
promote the spread of pacifist, neutralist or even 
nationalist movements capable of weakening the 
will ofthe European nations to resist. It must not 
be forgotten that the Sovie1 leaders - and 
probably the whole population - are still con-
vinced that the capitalist West is trying to squash 
the homeland of socialism. There can be no 
doubt that even if the Soviet disarmament pro-
posals are perfectly sincere ~hey are also an 
instrument of propaganda intended to weaken 
western cohesion. 
(a) Soviet policy in regard to the Council 
for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) 
52. Eastern Europe plays an' essential role for 
the Soviet Union. Its domination brings obvious 
strategic advantages, sheltering the Soviet Union 
from any attack in Europe and providing it with 
a ramp, largely occupied by the Red Army, from 
which it could rapidly reach the vital centres of 
Western Europe. Secondly, annexing these coun-
tries to form part of the Soviet economic area has 
allowed their economies to bi turned towards 
production useful to the So vie Union and they 
form a protected market sine their currencies 
are linked to the rouble and, not being con-
vertible, the countries concerned are closed to 
free trade. It should be addeq that a not very 
firmly established Soviet regiJille would find it 
difficult to give up this domination because 
public opinion would not accept it. 
53. In April 1986, NATO organised a collo-
quium on " The economies of Eastern Europe 
and their foreign economic reliations " the texts 
of which have been published and allow the 
position of CMEA when Mr. Gorbachev came to 
power to be reviewed. Since that date, the 
Council for Mutual Economic A-ssistance, which 
groups all the countries with communist regimes 
allied with the Soviet Union, has been unusually 
active, holding four sessions - of which two 
extraordinary - between June ~ 984 and Decem-
ber 1985. 
54. In a paper submitted to the NATO collo-
quium, Mrs. Anita Tiraspolsky pointed out that 
there had been a CMEA sumtnit meeting each 
time the Soviet Union was confronted with 
uncontrolled movements in Eastern Europe 
because this gave it an opportunity to reassert its 
authority, while Robert Wielemans considered 
that the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe cons-
titute an averagely-developed economic entity 
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with an autarkical vocation and rather mediocre 
performances. He said this entity was out of date 
and applied imperialist strategy because the 
socialist countries seem to conduct their eco-
nomies by doing the reverse of what would seem 
rational on the basis of experience accumulated 
by the West. 
55. The most frequently-quoted problems 
are: 
- the lack of modem technology; 
- the lack of adaptation of co-operation 
and specialisation among the CMEA 
member countries in relation to the 
requirements of modem economic 
management; 
- the fact that industries are not managing 
to limit their consumption of raw mate-
rials and energy; 
- a simultaneous deterioration of the 
energy situation in all the eastern coun-
tries since the 1973 oil crisis and the 
considerable increase in the price they 
pay for the oil they import from the 
Soviet Union; 
- an agricultural situation which causes 
shortages of foodstuffs; 
- the flagrant inefficiency of industrial 
production due to inadequate orga-
nisation; 
- the absence of co-ordination in external 
economic relations. 
56. These shortcomings have led to tension in 
CMEA in various areas: tension due to the lack 
of resources needed for growth, tension in sup-
plies and prices, operational tension, differences 
of views on the theory and ideology of economic 
co-operation, financial tension. In fact, such 
tension is due to the fact that Eastern Europe is 
paying for a political course imposed on it by the 
Soviet Union. To escape from this situation, the 
eastern countries as a whole are trying to speed 
up their entry to the world economic and mone-
tary system. In recent years, these countries have 
therefore become far more vulnerable to the ups 
and downs of the international economy, while 
remaining less well-equipped than the Soviet 
Union to face up to the consequences of the 
world recession, mainly because they lack oil. 
57. Everyone is aware of the serious crisis now 
facing Poland and Romania. The situation seems 
little better in Bulgaria and the rapid progress 
made by the Hungarian economy in the previous 
decade, thanks to the development of co-
operatives with fairly wide freedom to invest, 
direct their work and fix prices and profits, has 
been slowing down since 1980. Czechoslovakia, 
where the situation is better, has been forced to 
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increase its trade with the Soviet Union beyond 
reason, thus running heavily into debt and 
becoming extremely dependent. Finally, the 
GDR, which was heavily indebted to the West 
and had a large trade deficit with the Soviet 
Union, made considerable savings in energy and 
raw materials in 1986, with very little loss of eco-
nomic growth. These results were obtained 
thanks to major reorganisational changes in 
industry, the imposition of binding obligations 
on production units, financial incentives and 
enhanced control mechanisms. All these reforms 
were called "perfecting the existing order". But 
there is grave anxiety for the future: the GDR 
has only a narrow range of products exportable 
to the West and its investment rates are falling. 
Furthermore, to be able to pay its debt in strong 
currencies it has replaced its imports from the 
West by goods from the East and its external 
trade has stopped being a growth sector, just 
when fulfilment of its obligations to the Soviet 
Union had to be postponed. 
58. To examine the situation of CMEA as a 
whole, it was designed originally as an 
instrument of harmonisation and political and 
economic integration. Forty years later, it has 
become an institutional mechanism for tight-
ening the close special relationship between each 
of its members and the Soviet Union. This evo-
lution was accompanied by a constant increase 
in structural difficulties in the economies of the 
countries concerned to such an extent that the 
question now is whether the reforms undertaken 
will be successful or even whether it will be pos-
sible to make real reforms. In the foreseeable 
future, economic integration and specialisation 
in CMEA will continue at the level of countries 
rather than industries, and the Soviet Union will 
remain the cornerstone of the system. Eastern 
Europe has never been so dependent on the 
Soviet Union for its trade as it is today, particu-
larly as it has to meet increasingly tough compe-
tition from the Far East and it largely lacks the 
will to reform itself. These are, at least, the con-
clusions of the NATO colloquium. 
59. It was in the framework of the Political 
Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty 
Organisation, meeting on 28th and 29th May 
1987, that the solution to these problems was 
envisaged by Mr. Gorbachev, who proposed a 
more dynamic approach to co-operation in eco-
nomic policy matters within CMEA and per-
fecting the system thanks to a true price mech-
anism, considered henceforth to be a vital 
instrument of economic and social policy. 
60. But the CMEA summit meeting in June 
1984 had already been the result of a new way of 
thinking which had been pursued since 1980, 
and hence prior to the election of Mr. 
Gorbachev, about intra-CMEA co-operation. 
The new leadership has merely continued and 
spelled out this re-examination. Its main 
intention is obviously to maintain unity in the 
bloc by restricting margins for deviation and 
interlinking the socialist economies more closely. 
The determination of the Soviet authorities may 
give the impression that the revival of activity in 
CMEA will be a turning point in community life. 
This is expressed mainly in a text entitled 
" Complex programme for scientific and tech-
nical progress " adopted in December 1985. 
61. Although following up a first programme 
of co-operation and integration dating back to 
1971, the complex programme really came into 
being on 29th December 1981, the date of the 
American embargo on transport and energy 
transformation equipment for the Soviet Union 
following the introduction of martial law in 
Poland on 13th December 1981. Mr. Brezhnev 
was its initiator and according to the Soviet 
leaders this programme was a riposte to the 
West's scientific programmes. It consists of an 
industrial policy relating to five priority areas: 
data-processing, nuclear energy, robotics, bio-
technology and composite materials. It seemed 
to be basically a formal document confirming 
tasks previously assigned by the Soviet Union to 
its partners for future years. Economic inte-
gration thus took a resolutely structural turn with 
the Soviet Union more than ever at the heart of 
the system. The cohesion of the community 
should emerge strengthened in the nineties. The 
feasibility of the programme nevertheless raises a 
problem, particularly in view of lower oil prices 
which hinder Soviet exports and consequently 
the earning of hard currency, essential for the 
acquisition of new technologies. 
62. In any event, there is no reason to expect 
that the complex programme will lead to the 
harmonisation of national positions and the spe-
cific interests of each participant with those of 
the Soviet Union. The only alternative seems to 
be between the introduction of true prices and 
currencies, still far from existing in the Soviet 
Union itself, leading to integration through the 
market which, as in the Soviet Union, raises the 
question of whether it is possible to change 
behaviour and management methods without 
jeopardising the whole system, or the mainte-
nance of forced co-operation with no real joint 
industrial policy or reconciliation of the interests 
of each party. In other words, it is hardly possible 
to consider a noticeable change in the system of 
Soviet domination over Eastern Europe as long 
as the Soviet Union has not itself completed a 
deep-rooted reform that Mr. Gorbachev has so 
far merely announced and set in motion. 
(b) Security and co-operation in Europe 
63. Since the Helsinki conference in 1975, the 
conference on security and co-operation in 
Europe has been extended considerably, at least 
in regard to the number of meetings and confer-
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ences held under its aegis, although it is to be 
deplored that application of the measures in the 
Helsinki final act is still fragmentary and very 
insufficient. It will be remembered that it was a 
Soviet initiative that gave rise to the CSCE: an 
all-European conference was to be convened to 
organise peace and to develop exchanges in 
Europe and, under this pretext, the Soviet Union 
sought to have all the European countries 
recognise the states and frontiers resulting from 
the second world war. The Western European 
countries agreed to take part ,only subject to a 
number of conditions, i.e. that their United 
States and Canadian partners could take part, 
that exchanges of information and persons 
would be considered and above all that the 
question of human rights woqld be included in 
the agenda of the conference. Id these conditions, 
the final act represented a balanced set of mutual 
concessions. However, application of the deci-
sions relating to human rights and the exchange 
of goods and persons was a ~ong-term process 
and the Helsinki conference was to be followed 
by so-called verification conferences to ascertain 
what action had been taken by each participant 
on the final act, to go into the provisions in 
greater detail and to extend them. 
64. While in the field of confidence-building 
measures, i.e. mainly the observation of military 
manreuvres of some magnit~de, the Helsinki 
final act was fairly satisfactorily applied, the pro-
visions relating to individual rights and 
exchanges of all kinds have raised considerable 
difficulties, particularly as in the Soviet Union 
and the Eastern European countries opponents 
of the prevailing regimes were able to invoke the 
commitments entered into by their countries to 
call for freedoms denied to them, including, in 
many cases, the right to emigrate. When Mr. 
Gorbachev came to power, it was to be wondered 
whether the process started in Helsinki would be 
pursued. As recently as 1985 and 1986, meetings 
of experts held in Ottawa and Bern on human 
rights, as well as the Budapest cultural forum, 
were a failure. 
65. However, it very soon became clear that 
the new Soviet leaders would 
1
give new impetus 
to the CSCE. They were bound to do so for 
several reasons. The disarmament undertaking 
on which they were relying in order to develop 
their economic programme seemed to have little 
chance of succeeding if not ~ccompanied by a 
true policy of detente, linked in western eyes 
with the application of all the principles defined 
in Helsinki. Secondly, Mr. Gorbachev could 
count on the commitments ep.tered into by his 
predecessors to promote, in ~he Soviet Union 
itself, the policy of liberalisation that he con-
sidered essential. 
66. The Stockholm conference held from 17th 
January 1984 to 22nd September 1986 led to the 
adoption of a major text on confidence- and 
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security-building measures which lists ten prin-
ciples showing a commitment to refrain from the 
threat or use of force and recognising the sov-
ereign rights of each state. In accordance with 
these principles, the participating states adopted 
a series of measures which may be grouped 
under three heads: 
(a) First, the undertaking to give prior notifi-
cation of military activities above a certain level. 
This was to be done in two ways; 
(i) by publishing an annual calendar of 
planned exercises exceeding certain 
levels ( 13 000 troops or 300 tanks or a 
parachute drop of 3 000 troops). Exer-
cises involving more than 40 000 
troops must be notified at least two 
years in advance; 
(ii) by communicating details of these 
exercises to all the other signatory 
states at least forty-two days before the 
start of military activities. 
(b) The second series of provisions includes 
the obligation to invite observers from the other 
signatory states to attend these manreuvres when 
certain thresholds are exceeded ( 1 7 000 troops or 
the amphibious landing or parachute drop of 
5 000 troops). This measure was to allow it to be 
observed that such large-scale exercises were not 
a threat to other states and that their aim was 
really limited to training. 
(c) The third series concerns on-the-spot 
inspection in the event of a state having doubts 
whether another state is complying with the mea-
sures. A state asking for an inspection must state 
the reasons for such a request and should receive 
an answer - in principle positive - within 
twenty-four hours. It may start thirty-six hours 
later and the inspection may not last more than 
forty-eight hours. Refusal is permitted only in 
the event of the state in question having already 
been the subject of an inspection by the same 
state or at least three inspections in the same 
year by signatory states. 
67. In fact, this Stockholm document has been 
applied satisfactorily. Calendars of exercises were 
communicated for the first time at the end of 
1986. Since then, prior notifications (forty-two 
days) of such exercises have become routine. On 
each side, both the Warsaw Pact countries and 
the NATO countries as well as non-aligned coun-
tries have invited the other states to send 
observers to large manreuvres. The most recent 
were the Reforger exercises and NATO autumn 
manreuvres in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
So far, observation is still considered to be in the 
trial stage. Very open or very restrictive appli-
cation is indeed possible. The practice of obser-
vation should lead to a general consensus on the 
interpretation of certain provisions. Finally, 
inspections are still in a very early stage since to 
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date only the United States and the United 
Kingdom have asked the Soviet Union and the 
German Democratic Republic respectively to 
carry out inspections on their territory as pro-
vided for in the Stockholm document. It is still 
too early to draw conclusions. 
68. A general verification conference has been 
under way in Vienna since 4th November 1986. 
It should have been concluded on 31st July 1987, 
but the slowness of its work made it necessary to 
arrange a further session from September to 
December. This slowness was due to the particu-
larly large number of proposals tabled at the con-
ference - about 140 - which was an encouraging 
factor. Another reason was the fact that NATO 
members had to agree on conditions for negotia-
tions on conventional disarmament and they 
managed to do this only at the meeting of the 
North Atlantic Council held in Reykjavik in 
June 1987. It was indeed essential for the West to 
be able to make serious concessions on this 
question if it wished to obtain concessions on 
human rights from the other side and achieve 
balanced progress in the three different baskets 
defining the scope of the CSCE, this being the 
very principle of the negotiations. 
69. For the first basket, NATO's proposal for 
a conference of the twenty-three members of the 
two alliances on the reduction of conventional 
forces in connection with the CSCE, which 
would have to fix the mandate, should give new 
breadth to negotiations which had hitherto been 
limited to the application and extension of 
confidence-building measures agreed upon in 
Stockholm. Conventional stability must be 
sought through equal ceilings achieved by the 
progressive elimination of present disparities. In 
view of the Warsaw Pact's superiority in conven-
tional forces, the balance will have to be sought 
through asymmetrical reductions. In Vienna, the 
eastern countries have continuously raised the 
question of nuclear disarmament, although the 
West holds that this is not on the agenda of the 
CSCE. It is clear that the success of the bilateral 
negotiations between the United States and the 
Soviet Union in Geneva is a prior condition for 
discussion of this aspect of disarmament in the 
context of the CSCE. 
70. The second basket is probably the one 
where there are the least difficulties. Everyone 
seems to recognise the importance of ecological 
questions in Europe and considerable progress 
seems possible in this field. Moreover, the Italian 
proposal to hold a conference of scientists in 
Erice in the framework of the CSCE at which 
diplomats would no longer have the lead seems 
likely to be followed up with the result that the 
CSCE would give its direct patronage to non-
governmental exchanges, i.e. it would practise 
the openness that it preaches. Conversely, the 
Spanish proposals for a conference on specifi-
cally Mediterranean problems raises objections 
from those who consider these matters should 
not be brought into East-West discussions. 
Finally, the East's proposals relating to economic 
co-operation are arousing many objections in the 
West, both from those who think states should 
not intervene too much in this field and those 
who fear the growth of eastern countries' exports 
resulting from their eo-production with western 
firms, or even those who are mainly afraid of the 
transfer of technology to a competitor at military 
level. 
71. The third basket concerning information, 
contacts between persons, cultural exchanges and 
education is the one in which there are the 
greatest difficulties. It continues to embarrass the 
Soviet Union. In a pre-electoral period, it is 
mobilising the Americans, very sensitive to the 
problem of refuzniks, i.e. Soviet Jews who, for 
various reasons, are refused the right to emigrate 
to the state of Israel. It concerns the Federal 
Republic very directly, as it wishes inter alia to 
ensure respect for the right to have contacts 
between families and to obtain favourable mea-
sures for the many Germans who still live in the 
East, without necessarily seeking their repatri-
ation to the Federal Republic. It is the main 
point for all who see in the CSCE a chance of 
returning to a Europe based on respect for 
freedom. 
72. In fact, the organised groups of partici-
pating countries have been somewhat overtaken 
by the reality of the interests of all concerned. 
Those who have bilateral problems to settle in 
regard to persons see the conference as an oppor-
tunity to tackle them discreetly on a bilateral 
level. The threat of exposing them in public if 
they are not settled in this way is in many cases 
enough to ensure their success. It is impossible to 
list all the bilateral problems solved in this way, 
but they seem to be numerous. There are also 
certain differences of views between the Western 
European delegations and an American policy of 
trying to obtain authorisations to emigrate for 
the largest possible number of refuzniks but 
which does not seem to believe very strongly in a 
serious transformation of the living conditions of 
Europeans nor is it very much in favour of devel-
oping East-West exchanges. The United States 
delegation is under constant pressure from 
American circles concerned by the question of 
refuzniks and, in the view of its partners, it mea-
sures its successes too much in terms of sta-
tistics. 
73. Most western and neutral countries are 
trying above all to obtain the effective recog-
nition of human rights for all the peoples of 
Europe, which they consider implies radical 
changes in the practices of the Soviet Union and 
its allies. They wish to be satisfied neither with 
individual concessions nor with legislative mea-
sures whose application is not verified. They are 
anxious to avoid any formula which would 
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jeopardise what seemed to have been gained in 
the Helsinki final act. They are trying to confirm 
rights already recognised, obtain undertakings on 
how to respect them and org(lnise verification of 
this by various means, . including further 
meetings of verification conferences, in short the 
pursuit and extension of the process set in 
motion since Helsinki, although the Soviet 
Union says this is too cumbersome. 
74. A most delicate question is that of reli-
gious freedom, and the proposal by the Holy See 
on this matter seems to be encountering many 
objections in the East, particularly in regard to 
the right of communities to give religious 
teaching, the freedom they might be given to set 
up ecclesiastical authorities or structures and 
their right to address states, to circulate printed 
matter and to have free relations with the outside 
world. The Soviet Union does not seem prepared 
to make major concessions in regard to religious 
freedom so as not to lay itself open to internal 
opposition which first has to be made to accept 
other aspects of Mr. Gorbachev's policy, particu-
larly the economic parts. Nor can it overlook the 
resistance to Soviet domina'tjion of certain reli-
gious forces, especially the <Catholic Church in 
Poland. 
75. Proposals relating to economic and social 
human rights emanating from eastern countries 
(right to work, housing, health, food) are under-
stood by the other participan~s to be attempts to 
weaken western positions on! human rights and 
seem to have little chance of being considered. 
This is a fortiori the case of the proposal to create 
a right to immigrate which seems to be merely a 
challenge designed to offset the West's claims to 
the right to emigrate, although there is no pos-
sible parallel between the obligation to allow 
anyone who wants to leave to do so and the obli-
gation, unacceptable for any ~tate, particularly in 
a time of economic recession, to allow free 
entrance. 
76. A senior Soviet official told your Rap-
porteur that the Soviet Union was prepared to 
discuss human rights on condition all rights were 
discussed, i.e. civil and political rights but also 
economic, social and cultural rights. It would be 
prepared to consider two separate negotiations, 
one on civil and political rights and the other on 
economic and cultural rights, but certain western 
countries seemed to be refusing negotiations on 
the two aspects and wished them to be limited to 
political and civil rights. He believed the Soviet 
Union preferred to have seripus discussions not 
only on the economic and sodial aspect of human 
rights but on all rights, since a human being 
should enjoy all rights, although this did not 
prevent the matter being divided between two 
working groups. It had made a step forward by 
accepting the western concept of human rights. 
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77. It is essential for the West to be quite clear 
about what it expects of the CSCE. When a dele-
gation from the Assembly's Presidential Com-
mittee visited Moscow, the people it met under-
lined the European nature of the Soviet Union, 
using expressions such as " we all live in the 
same house". If such remarks were aimed at sep-
arating Western Europe from its American allies, 
they would be dangerous if they were not in vain. 
If, on the contrary, they indicate that the Soviet 
Government wishes to find support among the 
Western Europeans for a policy of far-reaching 
reforms, which concern the Eastern European 
countries as much as the Soviet Union itself, 
they are worthy of consideration. It would be 
particularly absurd to reject without thorough 
study proposals relating to the economic and 
social rights of human beings since in all proba-
bility the Western European countries generally 
have little to envy the communist states where 
medical or family assistance are concerned, or 
even unemployment assistance. Admittedly, the 
proclamation of the right to work - of which the 
West had an experience with the French consti-
tution of 1848 and the unfortunate attempt at 
national workshops - should not hold sway over 
economic efficiency and the Soviet Union 
should take account of this in its own reform 
policy. But if the CSCE could bring about an 
improvement in certain aspects of social welfare 
throughout Europe, who could complain? 
78. Finally, the impressive number of pro-
posals for further specialised conferences in the 
framework of the CSCE, from both East and 
West, and which often seem to be well-received, 
indicate that the process will develop and break 
up into a large number of separate, limited nego-
tiations which will perhaps prove to be more 
effective than large-scale conferences. It is 
perhaps in this way that, very progressively and 
slowly, the most tragic aspects of the division of 
Europe might find a solution. If it seems that the 
Vienna conference is to have clearly positive 
results, it would seem that they should be sit-
uated in such a context. Thus, it may be hoped 
that a Europe will be progressively built up 
which, from the Atlantic to the Urals, will benefit 
from the renaissance of the solidarities that were 
broken in 1945. 
79. Some Western Europeans thought they 
held a lever when the Soviet Union proposed 
holding the next conference on the third basket 
in Moscow. Anxious not to give the Soviet 
Union any sign of satisfaction without real con-
cessions on its part, they decided to insist that in 
any event the conditions prevailing at previous 
conferences, including their being open to the 
public and the media, must also apply at the 
Moscow meeting. They also wish to avoid the 
principal aspects of human rights being left on 
one side to make way for less essential questions 
covered by the term humanitarian co-operation, 
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such as education, information, culture and con-
tacts between persons which would unduly limit 
the impact of the question of human rights and 
indicate the abandonment of the seventh Hel-
sinki principle relating to freedoms. The solution 
might be to hold the conference on human rights 
elsewhere and one on less sensitive subjects in 
Moscow (information, education and culture, for 
instance). 
80. At the centre of European concerns, after 
security, is the reconstitution of a Europe that 
respects and propagates to the world a number of 
universal values such as human rights, demo-
cracy or freedom, which implies freedom of 
movement of persons and circulation of infor-
mation and ideas that the Soviet Union is still 
far from putting into practice. Nevertheless, the 
West has no interest in giving the Soviet Union 
the impossible choice between denying its own 
history or renouncing a policy of reforms. The 
values the West upholds can be introduced 
through Mr. Gorbachev's reforms. The CSCE 
should therefore encourage them, even if they 
seem insufficient, provided Western Europe's 
security is not thereby jeopardised. 
(c) Economic relations 
81. Mr. Gorbachev's manifest desire to give 
priority to the requirements of economic trans-
formation in the Soviet Union, the adoption of 
the complex programme by CMEA in December 
1985, laying down five areas whose development 
was to be given priority, and also the realisation 
that the Soviet Union was lagging behind the 
western countries in regard to defence-applied 
technology can but encourage the Soviet Union 
to develop not only its trade but also, as far as 
possible, economic co-operation with the more 
developed countries, mainly the United States, 
Japan and Western Europe. Thus, the Soviet 
Union has made it clear that it wished to develop 
East-West co-operation in science, technology, 
transport, energy and agriculture and has shown 
its interest in the Eureka programme. 
82. In addition to the United Nations Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe which, for more 
than forty years, has been conducting work that 
is effective but not widely known in defining 
technical standards allowing such co-operation 
to be promoted, the CSCE provides a framework 
in which more general problems can be usefully 
raised. Furthermore, the Secretary-General of 
CMEA, Mr. Sytchev, has started to negotiate the 
establishment of official relations been CMEA 
and the EEC in order to move towards the defi-
nition of areas in which co-operation might be 
envisaged, while Romania and Hungary are 
increasing their activities in Brussels and Luxem-
bourg and support the idea that there is some 
degree of economic complementarity between 
Eastern and Western Europe, suggesting to the 
West that Eastern Europe could form a vast 
market for EEC investors, which at least would 
be very probable if the necesssary guarantees for 
their investments were granted by the CMEA 
member countries. 
83. More and more, the Soviet authorities are 
now seeking to increase the number of joint ven-
tures to ensure the participation of western 
capital in the development of their economy and 
probably also to promote their own exports to 
the West. Their appeals are not addressed only to 
Europeans: on 24th August 1987 they published 
six pages of publicity in the New York Wall 
Street Journal inviting American investors to 
help to finance joint ventures. Furthermore, 
action by the Soviet Union and its allies at the 
CSCE is aimed at encouraging sales of licences 
and exchanges of technology, an increase in 
which would help to promote detente. In 1986, 
the Soviet Government set up a State Commit-
tee for External Trade whose Director, Mr. 
Kamentsev is Deputy Prime Minister, thus 
showing th~ importance the Soviet Union now 
attaches to the promotion of trade with capitalist 
countries. Soviet legislation will, however, have 
to be modified to allow the development of joint 
ventures and the proposal to introduce a con-
vertible rouble seems to be the subject of serious 
study. 
84. However desirable it may be, there are two 
obstacles to the development of such co-
operation. One is the extra-legal methods syste-
matically used by the Soviet Union and its allies 
over a long period to gain knowledge of foreign 
technology in other words economic espionage, 
which is a~ important part of the activities of the 
KGB and the GRU. The Soviet Union cannot 
hope to play the game of loyal economic 
co-operation and at the same time resort ~ys~e­
matically to such methods. Europe must msist 
that it radically change its habits, which cause 
mistrust and tension and are absolutely contrary 
to the aims of detente called for by the Soviet 
Union, before starting a true policy of 
co-operation with it. Furthermore, as long as 
military-related activities continue to play a 
major role in the Soviet economy, it is inevitable 
that NATO should be careful to do nothing to 
contribute to the growth of Soviet power. The 
Soviet Union is complaining with increasing fre-
quency about Cocom obstacles to the devel-
opment of trade relations between the two parts 
of Europe. The activities of that body and t~e 
length of the list of products that Atlantic 
Alliance countries may not export to the East 
depend very largely on internal developments in 
the Soviet Union. 
85. Mr. Honecker's visit to the Federal Repub-
lic as from 7th September 1987 is of some 
interest. The reasons for it admittedly remain 
ambiguous: economic and commercial rap-
prochement, which is of the utmost interest to 
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the GDR and the eastern countries, certainly, 
and probably also true detente in relations 
between the two German stat~s. _If it is_ recalled 
that until now it was the Sbviet Umon that 
opposed such an .approach, ~he f~ct that it is no:w 
taking place is an encouragmg sign of a real wtll 
to restore confidence and develop East-West 
co-operation. However, it is also likely that the 
visit is intended to convince t:he West Germans 
that they should support Soviet views on disarm-
ament matters and Mr. Honecker's fairly vague 
allusions to a more permeable demarcation line 
between the two German slates reveals this 
concern rather than that of a rapprochement 
between Germans. 
V. Outside Europe 
86. For geographical reasons, the Soviet 
Union has to have an Asian as well as a 
European policy. Communist ideology has given 
this policy a world dimension which is enhanced 
by the very strength acquired by the Soviet 
Union which was acknowledged when the 
United Nations was set up by its being immedi-
ately made a permanent mem~er of t~e Security 
Council. It was therefore logtcal for It, once It 
had nuclear weapons, to start developing means 
of intervening in any point whatsoever ~f t~e 
globe by building up a large naval force whic~ m 
turn required bases and means of defendi_ng 
them and for it to use these means to exercise 
and extend its influence throughout the world. 
87. Conversely, becoming involved in interna-
tional affairs increased the vulnerability of the 
Soviet Union: although nuclear weapons guar-
anteed the security of its own. territory, they no 
more guaranteed the ma~ntenance of its 
influence than those of certain western powers 
saved their empires from decolonisation or pro-
tected their interests in large areas of the world. 
However the Soviet Union has constantly 
managed' to avoid becoming irreversibly 
involved in regions where it had no .~eans. of 
controlling local developme~ts. The cnsis ~h~ch 
compelled it to withdra~ Its nuclear ~Iu~slles 
from Cuba in 1962 made I~ m~asure the lu~uts ~f 
its power and, although It has been active m 
Africa and Latin America, it has always ensured 
that it was in a position to avoid a show of force. 
It should be added that since Mr. Gorbachev 
came to power it has t~ken practically. no n~w 
initiatives in these reg~ons whereas, m Asia, 
certain facts allow a better understanding of the 
nature of Soviet action. This action has not been 
of the same type in Central a~d Eastern Asia as 
in the Middle East. ' 
(a) The Middle East 
88. Soviet interests in th~ Middle East are 
quite different from those ofthe West. Bein~ a 
large-scale oil exporter, not otllly does the Soviet 
DOCUMENT 1111 
Union have no need to draw upon reserves in 
that area but on the contrary has every 
advantage in ensuring that there is not over-
production and that oil prices remain high. Fur-
thermore, it is well aware that almost a third of 
its population is Moslem and feels some soli-
darity with the peoples of the Middle East, espe-
cially since certain ethnic groups are to be found 
both in the Soviet Union and in Afghanistan, 
Iran or Turkey. The Soviet Union can derive 
considerable advantage from this, particularly 
because some of its leaders are very sensitive to 
the reactions of communities in the region and 
can save it making the kinds of blunder that are 
frequent in the policies of western countries. 
89. Conversely, the Afghanistan affair has 
shown that this solidarity can lead to the Soviet 
Union becoming dangerously involved. Fur-
thermore, its freedom of action is limited by the 
possible reactions of the Moslem section of 
Soviet society among whom certain western 
observers have in recent years noted a consid-
erable growth in Islamic fundamentalism and 
secret societies designed to spread it. It is impos-
sible to give an exact idea of these influences in 
the light of current information but there is no 
doubt that Soviet policy has to take account of 
them. 
90. Since the Red Army invaded Afghanistan 
in December 1979, the Soviet Union's influence 
in the Middle East, which reached its height at 
the time of the Suez crisis in 1956 and again at 
the time of the break with the state of Israel in 
1967, has been singularly diminished and 
threatened. Millions of Afghan refugees, princi-
pally in Pakistan and Iran, are denouncing the 
methods used against the resistance movement 
and the civilian population in their country. The 
Soviet air force has been known to bomb Paki-
stani or Iranian territory where fighting on the 
ground has also occurred on several occasions. 
Since President Sadat broke off military 
co-operation between Egypt and the Soviet 
Union, only Iraq, Syria and South Yemen have 
had close relations with the Soviet Union, which 
supplies most of their armaments. This helped to 
prevent any great improvement in Soviet posi-
tions in Iran after the fall of the Shah and the 
outbreak of the Gulf war. The Tudeh Com-
munist Party failed to share power with the 
Shiite fundamentalists and was severely repres-
sed. For all these reasons, by the time Mr. 
Gorbachev came to power the Soviet Union was, 
to all intents and purposes, excluded from 
Middle East affairs. 
91. Without wishing to break with the policy 
of his predecessors, Mr. Gorbachev made a 
number of changes one obvious aim of which 
was to take advantage of all steps to restore peace 
in both Palestine and the Gulf area in order to 
re-establish Soviet influence. He well realised, 
however, that such efforts could not progress sig-
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nificantly as long as the Afghanistan war con-
tinued and he is clearly looking for an hon-
ourable way out by attempting to negotiate with 
at least some of the resistance movements in 
order to include them in a government coalition 
at the side of the two Afghan Communist Parties 
and announcing the withdrawal - far from com-
plete - of six Soviet regiments from Afghanistan. 
In August 1987, the General Secretary of the 
Soviet Communist Party had to admit that in 
these areas he had encountered far greater diffi-
culties than he had expected: on the one hand, 
the Afghan communists were showing little 
enthusiasm for such a compromise and, on the 
other, a large fraction of the resistance move-
ments rejected it and were pursuing their struggle 
with renewed energy, particularly in the region 
near the Soviet frontier. 
92. It now seems that the Soviet Union has 
renounced the political and strategic objectives 
which led to the invasion of Afghanistan in 
December 1979 and because it is finding the con-
tinuing war with that country too costly in men, 
equipment and political influence. The aim 
pursued seems to be limited to the search for a 
compromise freeing it from the hornets' nest of 
Afghanistan at least expense to Mr. Gorbachev's 
prestige and personal authority. However, some 
committee members stressed that the fine words 
of Mr. Vorontsov had led Pakistan to change its 
attitude towards the Afghan Government 
although they had not been carried into effect. 
They interpreted these statements, therefore, as a 
tactical means of weakening the adversary and 
not as the expression of a true will to restore 
peace. Even if such a will does effectively dom-
inate Mr. Gorbachev's policy in Afghanistan, 
this goal is still far from having been achieved, 
however, and the Soviet Union's freedom of 
action in the Middle East and, to some extent 
also, the Far East, will probably be shackled for a 
long time to come. 
93. In regard to other current affairs in the 
region, the Soviet Union's approach seems to 
have been to move away from its privileged cus-
tomers - Iraq and Syria in particular - in order 
to take advantage of the difficulties of the 
western powers in Iran and the Gulf and give the 
impression that it is a power interested but not 
committed in the region. Thus, without halting 
arms supplies to Iraq, the Soviet Union, in 
summer 1987, appears to have resumed deliv-
eries to Iran and, above all, negotiated with the 
latter for converting into an oil pipeline the gas 
pipeline which carries part of Iran's production 
to Batumi on the Black Sea. By thus allowing 
Iran to transport its oil outside the dangerous 
war zone, the Soviet Union's action is not 
entirely to its own advantage since it is helping to 
keep the price of oil down by encouraging one of 
its oil-exporting rivals. On the other hand, it is 
thus gaining considerable means of economic, 
and hence political, pressure on Iran. 
94. However, it is not possible to speak in this 
connection of a reversal of alliances, the Soviet 
Union having associated itself with all the 
members of the Security Council in adopting, on 
20th July 1987, Resolution 598 on the re-
establishment of peace in the Gulf which it is 
known met the wishes of Iraq in particular and 
has not been accepted by Iran, which continues 
to refuse any peace that does not include the 
overthrow of the government in Baghdad. But 
the Soviet Union, by playing no part in any mil-
itary measures to ensure the security of navi-
gation in the Gulf and not agreeing to impose 
sanctions on Iran if it refuses to apply Resolution 
598, is leaving itself a free hand to play a major 
role in settling the conflict. 
95. The Soviet Union was even more cautious 
in the Palestinian affair. However, it seems to 
have made a major contribution to bringing 
about the reunification of the various Palestinian 
movements around Mr. Yasser Arafat at the 
meeting in Algiers in April 1987, which hardly 
pleased his Syrian ally. It is also being less hostile 
towards Israel with which it has admittedly not 
re-established the diplomatic relations broken off 
in 1967 but to which it sent a consular mission in 
July 1987 to settle a few problems of limited 
scope. In October 1985, Mr. Gorbachev, during 
his visit to Paris, recalled that the Soviet Union 
had taken part in the creation of the state of 
Israel in 1948, and affirmed his wish for a 
normalisation of the situation in the Middle 
East. The Soviet Union has since proved more 
flexible than in the past over matters relating to 
the emigration of Soviet refuzniks. It has in any 
event been very favourable to holding a large-
scale conference with a view to finding a set-
tlement to the Palestinian question on the basis 
of United Nations Resolution 242 which would 
be attended by Israel, the PLO, Palestine's neigh-
bouring countries, the United States and the 
Soviet Union. This is not a new proposal since it 
was opposed by Mr. Brezhnev in 1981 at the 
Camp David negotiations that established sep-
arate peace between Egypt and the state of Israel. 
But in 1987 it has been well received by the 
majority of the international community. In 
April 1987, the representatives of the five per-
manent members of the Security Council took 
part in a preparatory meeting, in spite of Israeli 
opposition, and the Soviet Union is making the 
holding of this conference a condition for 
resuming its diplomatic relations with Israel. 
96. It is therefore through a moderate, peace-
ful and balanced policy that the Soviet Union is 
trying to re-establish its influence, or at least to 
regain a foothold, in Middle East affairs, even 
before reaching a settlement in Afghanistan. This 
seems to be causing some uncertainty and con-
troversy in the West and your Rapporteur had 
the feeling that the meeting of political directors 
of the WEU member countries in The Hague on 
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20th August 1987 was not alien to these con-
cerns. The question seems to be whether it is in 
the interest of the western allies to help the 
Soviet Union to return to M~ddle East affairs or 
to avoid this as far as possible. 
97. In the immediate future, the intervention 
of the Soviet Union will not help the western 
powers to make their interests and views prevail, 
particularly in regard to freedom of navigation in 
the Gulf or measures to be taken to combat ter-
rorism. However, consideration of longer-term 
interests may suggest that the participation of the 
Soviet Union in the settlem~nt of the Gulf war 
and the Palestinian conflict is essential if those 
who might feel injured by such a settlement are 
not to find, in the Soviet Union, encouragement 
and assistance in opposing t~e achievement and 
application of these settlements. 
98. Soviet interest in slowing down the spread 
of Moslem fundamentalism and calming pas-
sions unleashed in the M~ddle East is clear 
enough for it to be considered that beyond any 
tactical advantages it may derive from its return 
to Middle East affairs the Soviet Union can 
provide powerful assistance to the restoration of 
peace in the area. Again, its participation in this 
is an essential condition for its maintenance. 
(b) The Far Etut 
99. Throughout its existence, the Soviet 
Union has been interested in the Far East, like 
the Tsars before it. The P\JfPOSe was to find 
outlets on the Pacific Oceart and to ensure the 
security of very sparsely-populated Soviet Asia 
vis-a-vis China and Japan. In spite of efforts to 
attract people to the region, willingly or by force, 
the Soviet Far East still has only about ten 
million inhabitants, while Chinese Manchuria 
alone has almost 120 million. In other words, 
whatever the policy of the Chinese Government, 
the Soviet Union will be concerned about the 
region. Moreover, at the endlofthe second world 
war, the Soviet Union seized the Japanese part of 
the island of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands and 
these annexations have not yet been recognised 
by Japan in a peace treaty or by any other means. 
This issue has been embittenng Soviet-Japanese 
relations since that time, just as the division of 
Korea into two states, one of which is protected 
by the Soviet Union, is a constant threat to sta-
bility in the area. 
100. However, since 1960 Soviet policy in the 
Far East has been dominated by the conse-
quences of the split betweep. the Soviet Union 
and China. There have since I been many crises in 
relations between the two countries. Although at 
present the relationship seems calmer, the crises 
caused deep-rooted mutual mistrust which 
makes settlement of the prol!>lems and definition 
of conditions for disarmament difficult and slow. 
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It is clear, however, that since 1980 the two 
countries have been trying to reduce tension and 
restore normal relations. The coming to power of 
Mr. Gorbachev and his disarmament proposals 
have also encouraged the restoration of some 
degree of confidence and the holding of negotia-
tions between the two countries on specific, 
limited subjects. 
101. Addressing the twenty-seventh party con-
gress in February 1986, Mr. Gorbachev said he 
considered that - together with Europe - Asia 
and the Pacific were his main external policy 
concerns because of the growing importance of 
the region. But it was in July 1986, in his Vladi-
vostok speech, that he defined his policy for Asia 
and the Pacific region, announcing his intention 
to give new dynamism to the Soviet Union's 
relations with all countries of the region 
"without exception". The purpose was to take 
advantage of the extremely fast economic ex-
pansion of these countries in order to improve 
Soviet trade and develop the Soviet Far East, 
hoping to attract Japanese capital for co-
operative ventures in the region and also to 
avoid excessive Japanese and United States 
domination of the countries concerned. In 
November 1986, the Soviet Union took part for 
the first time in the conference on Pacific eco-
nomic co-operation in Vancouver as an 
observer. It has since asked to play a full part in 
this conference and proposed that its 1990 
meeting be held in Vladivostok. Finally, Mr. 
Gorbachev proposed increasing economic and 
technical assistance to the Soviet Far East by 
45% during the five-year period 1986-90, com-
pared with an increase of only 25% between 1981 
and 1985. 
102. On 7th June 1969, Mr. Brezhnev had pro-
posed setting up a collective security system in 
Asia, aimed primarily at isolating China and sec-
ondarily at keeping American influence out of 
Asia. But he had no success, even among coun-
tries favourable to the Soviet Union such as 
India, North Korea, Vietnam and Laos. In 1985, 
Mr. Gorbachev abandoned this concept and pro-
posed the creation of an all-Asian forum, 
including China on this occasion, but this too 
gave rise to many reservations, thus leading Mr. 
Gorbachev, particularly in Vladivostok, to stress 
the development of bilateral relations. He also 
proposed holding a Pacific conference on the 
lines of the CSCE and a conference on 
confidence-building measures and renunciation 
of force in the Pacific, dealing inter alia with the 
security of sea lanes. These proposals were again 
given a fairly cold reception by many countries 
in the region and rejected by China and Japan, 
which meant they had no chance of success. 
103. China has constantly laid down three prin-
cipal conditions for normalising relations with 
the Soviet Union: the reduction of Soviet forces 
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deployed next to its territory, the withdrawal of 
Soviet armed forces from Afghanistan and the 
restoration of independence in Cambodia. So far, 
none of these conditions has been met. However, 
China must consider encouraging the Soviet 
attempt to find a solution to the Afghan affair 
and Mr. Gorbachev's acceptance of the principle 
that all Soviet nuclear weapons, and not only 
those stationed in Europe, would be taken into 
account in the Soviet-American negotiations on 
medium-range weapons. 
104. In fact, there have been periodic talks 
between the two countries on the development of 
their bilateral trade, which increased eightfold 
between 1981 and 1985, without reaching any 
great volume since in 1985, at $1,900 million, it 
was still only 3.2% of China's trade and 1.1% of 
that of the Soviet Union. Moreover, negotiations 
were started on settling the vast problem of the 
alignment of frontiers. A compromise therefore 
seems to have been found between the Chinese 
claim for recognition of the" unequal" nature of 
the treaties which laid down these frontiers at the 
end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the 
twentieth centuries and the Soviet Union's wish 
to consider these treaties as the legal basis for its 
presence in Central and Eastern Asia. Recent 
information indicates that in August 1987 the 
Soviet Union accepted, for the eastern part ofthe 
immense common frontier, the principle upheld 
by the Chinese that the thalweg of the Amur and 
the U ssuri formed the frontier in a region where 
armed clashes have been particularly serious in 
the last twenty years. A commission is at present 
studying a plan for the joint exploitation of the 
hydroelectric resources of the Amur, and the 
Soviet press has reported demonstrations of 
fraternisation along the frontier. However, your 
Rapporteur has been told by some Chinese that 
they thought it would be particularly difficult to 
fix frontiers in Mongolia and Turkestan and that 
the negotiations would be very lengthy. The 
WEU Assembly delegation which visited Sin 
Kiang in October 1985 was indeed able to note 
that the frontier dispute related to a length of 
thousands of kilometres and considerable depths 
and caused frequent, often bloody, incidents. 
105. It is more difficult to understand why 
Soviet diplomacy, which is now fairly flexible in 
other respects, is doing little to encourage 
Vietnam to evacuate Cambodia as it has more-
over undertaken to do. Yet it has considerable 
means of bringing pressure to bear on that 
country, to which it supplies much financial 
assistance. In December 1986, it promised to 
double this by supplying between $12 000 and 
$13 000 million during the period 1986-90. 
China on the one hand and the ASEAN countries 
on the other support the four-party coalition 
opposition to the regime installed and supported 
by the Vietnamese. Even if there still seem to be 
differences between them on the respective 
importance of these parties within the coalition, 
China upholding the Khmer rouge, whom it 
arms and who exercise the strongest military 
action, the ASEAN countries giving more 
support to the other coalition parties, in view of 
the murderous tyranny exercised by the Khmer 
rouge prior to the Vietnamese intervention. 
Moreover, China was very reserved about the 
Indonesian proposal defended in Beijing in 
August 1987 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
of Thailand on the so-called cocktail procedure, 
which was to bring the four coalition parties 
together to define the fate of Cambodia and then, 
at the last moment, to introduce Vietnam into 
the negotiations already started. 
106. In this affair, the Soviet Union's aim, for 
which the Cambodian question is probably not 
essential, is perhaps the maintenance of its rela-
tions with Vietnam, where it has obtained the 
use of naval bases at Da Nang and Cam Ranh, 
the only bases it has in South-East Asia. The 
growing importance of the Far East and the 
Pacific in international life, from an economic 
standpoint and also in political and military 
terms, can but encourage the Soviet Union to do 
its utmost to retain Vietnam's support which is 
essential for the maintenance of its presence in 
the South Pacific, close to the Strait of Malacca 
through which passes most of the external trade 
of Japan and the Far East. 
107. Considered as a whole, Soviet policy in the 
Far East does not seem to have changed radically 
since Mr. Gorbachev came to power but it has 
been diverted in a more moderate direction, the 
real aim of which may be to bring about 
generalised detente as well as to improve Soviet 
positions which have been threatened since the 
split with China. It faces serious difficulties as 
long as Mr. Gorbachev cannot allow himself to 
break away from the initiatives or positions of 
his predecessors, particularly in regard to Japan, 
Cambodia and Afghanistan. If he manages to 
obtain a freer hand, this policy might cause an 
upheaval in international relations in the Far 
East. It is already noticeable that trade with 
China, and above all with Japan, which is more 
than ever anxious to diversify its outlets, has 
increased considerably. The accession of the 
Soviet Union, the first nuclear power to do so, to 
the Pacific denuclearisation treaty has consid-
erably increased the Soviet Union's prestige in 
the area. 
VI. Conclusions 
108. The interpretation of Mr. Gorbachev's 
policy of reforms, on the one hand, and the 
guidelines he has laid down for Soviet external 
policy, on the other, are still the subject of keen 
discussion among western experts on the Soviet 
Union. The method that consists of separating 
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the problems in order to study the evolution of 
each one generally leads to scepticism and 
emphasises the differences bftween words and 
deeds. The very nature of diplomatic work 
means that many of those who have to deal with 
each of these problems, for instance in the 
framework of specialised conferences, see above 
all the continuity of Soviet positions and are 
far from convinced of the exteqt of their evolution. 
Those who, on the contrary, llttach more impor-
tance to an overall picture ofl Soviet history are 
generally - with notable exc((ptions - far more 
convinced of the existence of a radical desire for 
change within the country, ; which necessarily 
implies considerable reorientation of foreign 
policy. Conversely, they see ~ome political fra-
gility among the reform team that has been in 
power for two years. They believe this fragility 
explains the progressive or mctandering course of 
the government approach inl several areas and 
the gap between Mr. Gorbachev's words and the 
practice of an adminstration that changes only 
slowly. 
109. It is obviously still impossible to take 
stock of what Mr. Gorbachev has achieved in 
such a short period, but it already seems from his 
words alone that he has released a desire for far-
reaching changes which had . existed for a long 
time in Soviet society and tlltat he has made it 
impossible for himself or his successors to revert 
to the situation as it was before. The priority they 
must give to reforms should logically lead them 
to pursue the search for peace and disarmament. 
However, it is well known that logic does not 
always prevail in politics and it is always possible 
that internal disappointments will lead to the 
search for success abroad, i.e. the use of interna-
tional tension to mobilise ene):"gy - practices very 
different to what the Soviet leaders proclaim 
today. The history of the Soviet Union provides 
many examples of this. 
110. It is clear that at the present stage Mr. 
Gorbachev is trying to rely qn outside successes 
to assert his internal positiolll, but that the suc-
cesses he is aiming at are in disarmament, the 
development of co-operation in Europe and set-
tlement of Asian problems. lA priori, the West 
has no interest in denying him satisfaction or in 
backing those who, in the Soviet Union, are 
opposed to the policy of refotp1s. But it must not 
forget that in acting in this way it is taking 
certain risks, for instance that the success of Mr. 
Gorbachev's policy may, i!n future, allow a 
stronger Soviet Union, more sure of itself, to 
modernise its military power and use it to 
increase its influence or evem as a threat. 
111. For these various reasons, therefore, the 
new Soviet policy should not be accorded blind 
confidence. In each sector, Western Europe must 
energetically defend its own interests and in par-
ticular ensure that the negotiations on disarm-
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ament do not lead to its security being dimin-
ished, that the development of economic and 
trade relations does not foster a policy of further 
improvements in armaments and that detente 
sought through the CSCE is based on a true 
balance between confidence-building measures 
and disarmament, the development of co-
operation and progress in regard to freedom. It 
must also attach the greatest importance to 
ensuring that Soviet participation in the set-
tlement of the problems splitting the Middle East 
does not lead to a heightening oftension or to the 
internationalisation of conflicts. The caution and 
moderation shown by the Soviet Union in these 
matters offer reasonable hope of this. Whatever 
importance is attached to Mr. Gorbachev's new 
policy, each question must be tackled on its own 
merits and a satisfactory solution found. 
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112. Current changes in the Soviet Union offer 
hope of a far-reaching transformation of East-
West relations, a major development in disarm-
ament, more exchanges between the two parts of 
Europe, a noticeable evolution in the regimes in 
the people's democracies and a much greater role 
for the United Nations in promoting peace. In 
his article in Pravda on 17th September 1987, 
Mr. Gorbachev brings out most pertinently the 
link between these various aspects of his policy. 
However, this logic is not enough to assure the 
West that the economic transformation of the 
Soviet Union will lead to these changes. The 
West must therefore continue to seek balanced 
concessions in every field and not lower its guard 
until agreements have been concluded on the 
limitation of armaments subject to the necessary 
verification guarantees. 
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Amendment 1 
Recent developments in Soviet external policy 
AMENDMENT 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Rubbi 
1. In the draft recommendation proper, redraft paragraph 2 as follows: 
30tl November 1987 
"Urge the United States, after the Soviet-American agreement on the eliminaltion of medium-
and short-range nuclear weapons, to bring negotiations on other categories of weapons to an early, 
satisfactory conclusion, always bearing in mind Europe's security interests;" 
Signed: Rubbi 
1. See lOth sitting, 2nd December 1987 (amendment withdrawn). 
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The Assembly, 
Recent developments in Soviet external policy 
DRAFT ORDER I 
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee 2 
by Mr. Pecriaux, Rapporteur 
4th November 1987 
(i) Recalling that the goal of the reactivation of Western European Union is to strengthen the 
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance; / (ii) Considering that the close association of Western Europe and the United States in the Atlantic ( 
Alliance is the essential basis of Europe's security; ' 
(iii) Considering that any Soviet-American agreement on the limitation of armaments must give ~ 
Western Europe the guarantees necessary for its security; 
(iv) Noting with interest the initiative taken by the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union to invite a 
delegation from the Presidential Committee of the WEU Assembly to visit Moscow in April 1987 for an 
exchange of views on the requirements of European security, 
INSTRucrs THE PRESIDENTIAL CoMMITTEE 
1. In order to avoid the reactivation of WEU adding to "transatlantic misunderstandings", to 
promote a regular dialogue between the Assembly and the United States Congress covering inter alia the 
consequences for Europe's security of any American-Soviet agreements on the limitation of armaments, 
on the aims to be pursued in the CSCE and on threats to international peace which may arise outside the 
area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty; 
2. To invite members of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union to pursue the exchange of views 
started in April 1987 on the limitation of armaments with a view to achieving a balance of conventional 
forces acceptable to both parties and on the three baskets of the CSCE in order to contribute to the 
maintenance of international peace. 
l. Adopted in committee by 16 votes to 3 with 0 abstentions. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Ahrens (Chairman); MM. Close, Burger (Vice-Chairmen): MM. Aarts (Alternate: van der 
Werjf), Bassinet, Baumel, Bianco, Dejardin (Alternate: Pecriaux), Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Hardy, Hill, Koehl, Lord Mackie of 
Benshie, MM. Martino, Masciadri, Mechtersheimer, du Monceau de Bergendal, Muller, Pontillon, Reddemann, Ruet (Alternate: 
Chenard), Rumpf, van der Sanden, She/ton, Spitella (Alternate: Amadel), Stoffelen (Alternate: Eisma), Vecchietti (Alternate: 
Pollidoro). 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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Document 1112 
Public information activities on security and defence matters 
in WEU member countries 
REPORT' 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations 2 
by Mr. Burger, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
15th October 1987 
DRAFT RESOLUTION 
on public information activities on security and defence matters in1 WEU 
member countries 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Burger, Rapporteur 
I. Introduction 
11. Parliamentary activities 
(i) Interparliamentary meetings 
(ii) Action taken in national parliaments on texts adopted by the 
Assembly 
Ill. Public relations activities of the WEU Council and its ministerial organs 
IV. How the governments of the WEU member countries keep the 1public 
informed 
(i) Technical instruments set up by governments 
(ii) Contacts with the younger generation 
(iii) Free publications and their circulation to the general public 
(iv) Other means of information 
(v) Principal topics of information 
V. Conclusions 
APPENDIX 
Questionnaire for preparing the report on public information activities on 
security and defence matters in WEU member countries 
1. Adopted unanimously in committee. 
2. Members of the committee: Lady Jill Knight (Chairman); Mr. Tummers, Mr. Giust (Vice-Chairmen); MJM. Buchner, Burger, 
Cavaliere (Alternate: Antom), de Chambrun, De Bondt, De Hoop Scheffer, Mrs. Fischer, Mr. Frasca, Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, 
Dr. Miller (Alternate: Parry), MM. Noerens (Alternate: Pecriaux), Seitlinger (Alternate: Chenard) 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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The Assembly, 
l>ra;ft llesolution 
on public information activities on security and defence matters 
in WEU member countries 
(i) Anxious to make public and parliamentary opinion more aware of the European dimension of 
security and the specific aims of WEU in this context; 
(ii) Stressing that it is of the utmost importance for more members of the Assembly to intervene in 
their national parliaments on the basis of texts adopted in order to draw the attention of government 
authorities and public opinion to the work of the WEU Assembly; 
(iii) Welcoming the initiative taken by the Netherlands Government in communicating to the Second 
Chamber of the States-General its position on the future prospects of WEU under Netherlands presi-
dency; 
(iv) Regretting nevertheless that the remarkable efforts made by certain member governments to keep 
the public - and in particular the younger generation - in their countries informed of security and 
defence problems only exceptionally give adequate information on the role of WEU, 
INVITES NATIONAL DELEGATIONS 
1. To ensure that debates on defence and security in parliaments, in the political groups and with 
governments and the public are organised so as to bring the greatest possible attention to the work of the 
WEU Assembly; 
2. To urge governments to improve the co-ordination, with the appropriate WEU bodies, of their 
national activities in keeping the public informed, and in particular the younger generation. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Burger, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. Indubitably the problem of making 
Western European public opinion aware of the 
state of security and western defence must 
remain high on the list of concerns of political 
leaders. 
2. All the organs ofWestern European Union 
have responsibilities in this connection. 
Members of the Assembly, as representatives of 
the people, must report to their member coun-
tries on the work and actions of the Assembly. 
Chapter II below will therefore cover parlia-
mentary activities. 
3. Furthermore, the WEU Assembly has con-
tinuously recalled that it is incumbent upon the 
Council to inform public opinion of its own 
activities (Recommendation 442). Consequently, 
the report will then examine the section of the 
annual report of the Council on informing the 
press and public. 
4. Finally, as suggested in the last report, 
your Rapporteur will consider practice adopted 
by governments of member countries for keeping 
the public informed. In order to make a compar-
ative study, a questionnaire was sent to the min-
istries for foreign affairs and defence of WEU 
member countries. Your Rapporteur attaches 
particular importance to this study since the gov-
ernments have absolute sovereignty in regard to 
security policy and the way they explain it to the 
public. Their responsibilities in this connection 
are therefore of special importance. 
II. Parliamentary activities 
(i) Interparliamentary meetings 
5. The last information meeting organised by 
the Committee for Parliamentary and Public 
Relations was held in Luxembourg on 28th April 
1987. It was attended by members ofthe Foreign 
Affairs Committee of the Luxembourg Chamber 
of Deputies and Luxembourg members of the 
North Atlantic Assembly. 
6. The briefings by Mr. de Bondt on reacti-
vated Western European Union, Mr. Terlezki on 
the duties of the WEU Assembly and Lady Jill 
Knight, Chairman of the committee, on the role 
of WEU in its relations with NATO and the 
other Western European organisations and coun-
tries aroused keen interest among the Luxem-
bourg parliamentarians and led to a lively dis-
cussion at the close of the briefings. 
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ort the following 7. The meeting brought 
points in particular: 
- The public and politiqal circles too are 
apparently generally ul).aware of the spe-
cific aims of WEU ancjl its reactivation. 
Furthermore, there is still not enough 
basic information on the existence of 
this organisation. 
- It is essential to intensify efforts to 
inform the younger generation of 
security and defence matters. 
- Views converge on the fact that any 
reactivation of WEU must enhance the 
cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance. 
- Rules now governing the membership 
of the WEU Assembly do not seem sat-
isfactory. The search• for a solution 
which would make the 
1
Assembly's work 
more effective must . remain on the 
agenda. 
8. At its meeting in Luxem)bourg, the Com-
mittee for Parliamentary and ~ublic Relations 
discussed how the abovementi~ned impressions 
might be communicated to the nelevant bodies of 
the organisation and member countries but no 
definite decision was taken. Your Rapporteur 
therefore proposes to assess the results of the 
Luxembourg information meeting in his report 
since most of them fit perfectly into the context 
of his principal subject. 
9. The question of the membership of the 
Assembly is outside the responsibilities of the 
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
tions. However, it is in its interest to convey the 
message to the relevant Assembly bodies. To 
date, at least three main proposals have been 
made: 
- the proposal by Mr. Ahrens to appoint 
two substitutes in natipnal delegations, 
one of whom would be available only 
for the WEU Assembly; 
- the proposal by Mrs. Hennicot-
Schoepges to link the : mandate of the 
WEU Assembly with *at of the North 
Atlantic Assembly; 
- the proposal made in the European Par-
liament on 24th June 1~87 for the WEU 
Assembly to be composed of representa-
tives of the WEU member states to the 
European Parliament as from 1989. 
10. Since there has recently been animated 
discussion on this matter and the solutions pro-
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posed would have very different consequences 
for the future development of the organisation as 
a whole, it is time for it to be raised in the 
Assembly's steering body, i.e. the Presidential 
Committee. 
11. In regard to other meetings with national 
parliaments, it should be noted that on 22nd 
June 1987 a delegation from the Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the Second Chamber of the Neth-
erlar;tds States-General, led by its Chairman, was 
recetved by Mr. Goerens, President of the WEU 
Assembly, for an exchange of views and to be 
given information on the current work of the 
Assembly and the reactivation ofWEU.It would 
be desirable for such meetings to be organised 
with other committees of national parliaments. 
(ii) Action taken in national parliaments on texts 
adopted by the Assembly 
12. At its meeting at the close of the extraor-
dinary session held in Luxembourg on 27th and 
28th April 1987, the Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations selected from 
among the texts adopted Recommendation 442 
on the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance -
Part I: The reactivation ofWEU, for transmission 
to and discussion in national parliaments. 
13. . During the first part of the thirty-third 
sessiOn of the Assembly, the committee met at 
the seat of the Assembly, Paris, on 3rd June 1987 
and selected the following texts for transmission 
to the parliaments of member countries: 
- Recommendation 446 on the European 
pillar of the Atlantic Alliance - Part 11: 
Political activities of the Council; 
- Recommendation 448 on European 
space policy until 2000. 
14. Except for written questions put in the 
Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies on 16th July 
1987 by Mr. Goerens and Mr. Hengel on Recom-
mendations 442 and 446, your Rapporteur has 
receiv~d no information on the use made by 
com~uttee me.mbers of the draft questions 
relatmg to subjects dealt with in these recom-
mendations which were sent to them on 2nd July 
198?. However this may be, it is evident from 
parhamentary texts received by the Office of the 
Clerk of the Assembly that a number of matters 
debated during the Assembly's spring session 
have been raised in the parliaments of several 
member countries. 
15. In the Belgian Senate, during the debate on 
the budgets of the Ministries for Foreign Affairs 
and Defence on 5th and 17th June 1987 several 
parliamentarians raised matters rel~ting to 
European security. Mr. du Monceau de 
Bergendal endorsed Mr. Jacques Delors's pro-
posal to convene a meeting of the European 
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Council in the framework of the European Com-
munity to discuss current defence problems 
while Mr. De Decker said he was disappointed 
that the government had taken no action on his 
suggestion to convene a summit meeting of 
heads of state or of government of the seven 
WEU member countries. 
16. Answering speakers, Mr. Tindemans Min-
ister for External Relations, said: ' 
" The ground has been explored by asking 
the other six partners whether they agreed 
to convene a meeting of heads of gov-
ernment to draft a joint answer to Mr. 
Gorbachev. To date, there have been four 
answers from states which refuse to take 
part in such a meeting. " 
17. Speaking on the same subject on 16th June 
1987 during the debate in the French National 
Assembly on th~ gove~me~t foreign policy 
statement, Mr. Gtscard d Estamg, Chairman of 
the Foreign Affairs Committee, said: 
" The first European reaction to future 
Soviet initiatives should be to announce 
that they are concerting their approach 
and the natural framework for this might 
be the WEU Council of Ministers. " 
He continued: 
" It is essential for Europe to examine 
strategy since it has specifically European 
aspects.... I consider the natural 
framework for this to be not that of the 
Twelve, who have no psychological or 
political unity on such a subject, but that 
of the states participating in Western 
European Union. " 
18. On the preparation of a European security 
charter, Mr. Raimond, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, said in answer to a statement by Mr. 
Baumel in the same debate that: 
" Striking progress has been recorded on 
the basis of this initiative. On the one 
hand, the experts have prepared a report 
on Eur~pe's strategy which includes many 
of our tdeas and therefore deals with all 
the problems raised by Mr. Gorbachev's 
initiatives. This report was submitted too 
recently for the ministers to be able to 
approve it, but it was agreed that at the 
next WEU meeting it would be finalised 
and that the ministers would try to prepare 
a text on the principles of European 
security. " 
19. However encouraging this information 
may be, it leaves open the question of how much 
parliamentarians and the public will learn about 
the contents of such a document. 
20. Speaking in the Belgian Senate on 17th 
June 1987, Mr. Pecriaux deplored "the little 
information Belgian representatives agreed to 
circulate in WEU on the results of their 
meetings ". He also affirmed that the WEU 
Assembly, through its specialised committees, 
continuously produced work of a high standard 
on European defence which might be used regu-
larly or considered attentively by government 
authorities. This remark should be repeated in 
the parliaments of all member countries. 
21. Where the information of the public is 
concerned, the Assembly again asked the Council 
in Recommendation 442 to act without delay on 
its document " WEU and public awareness " so 
as to inform public opinion of all its activities. In 
the House of Commons on 14th May 1987, Mr. 
Murphy took the opportunity of asking the Sec-
retary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs to " make a statement regarding the level 
of support in the United Kingdom for the work 
of Western European Union in terms of pub-
licity ". 
22. In his answer, Mr. Eggar, Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Com-
monwealth Affairs, said: " The WEU Secretary-
General has responsibility for publicising 
Western European Union activities. British Min-
isters keep parliament and the public informed 
on a regular basis. " He then referred to the 
answer given by Mrs. Chalker, Minister of State, 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, on 30th 
April 1987 to a question put by Mr. Hanley on 
the meeting of the WEU Council held in Luxem-
bourg on 27th April 3• 
23. It emerged from the previous report of the 
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
tions on the voice of Europe after Reykjavik -
debates in national parliaments, that certain 
governments still consider that the vital role of 
keeping the public informed is incumbent upon 
the WEU Assembly. For instance, Mr. Poos, 
Luxembourg Minister for Foreign Affairs, said 
on 26th March 1986 in answer to a question put 
by Mr. Hengel that: 
" Inter alia, governments inform the 
public through the dialogue with the 
Assembly, which plays a particularly 
important role in this connection. " 
24. Similarly, the Netherlands Government 
confirmed in the memorandum of 18th June 
1987 that one of WEU's future aims was: 
" encouraging public support for joint security 
requirements. The WEU Assembly plays a major 
role in this area which the government will will-
ingly encourage during its chairmanship-in-
office. " 
25. These examples show that the sharing of 
responsibility for information requires greater 
3. See Collected Texts 45, page 45. 
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thought and Chapters Ill and IV below deal with 
this matter. 
26. In regard to initiatives to set up a 
European centre for strategic studies, note should 
be taken of an answer by Mr. Giraud, French 
Minister of Defence, on 24th August 1987 to a 
question put by Mr. Bernard-Reymond. The 
Minister said initiatives in the form of joint deli-
berations by European military authorities had 
recently been taken: 
"In particular, a first Franco-German 
seminar bringing together officers from the 
three armed forces and the police force of 
the two countries was h~ld in Paris from 
6th to lOth July 1987, when the Minister 
of Defence specified that this step came 
within the same context 1as the important 
decision taken at the ministerial meeting 
of Western European Union in November 
1986 that will be impl~mented in 1988 
with a European meeting of the lnstitut 
des hautes etudes de la defense nationale, 
the nucleus of a Elitropean defence 
institute". 
27. The discussion on the 'role of WEU in 
European security matters was intensified during 
the year in both chambers of tj:le States-General 
with the participation of several members of the 
Assembly: Mr. van der Werff and Mr. Eysink in 
particular, during a debate in the First Chamber 
on 19th May 1987, referred ;inter alia to the 
question of a single seat for WEU and the 
accession of Portugal and Spain. 
28. In response to an initiative by Mr. de Boer 
and Mr. Engwirda, the Netherlands Government 
sent a detailed memorandum to the President of 
the Second Chamber of the States-General on 
18th June 1987 on the Netherlands chair-
manship of Western European Union from 
mid-1987 to mid-1988. The interesting point 
about this memorandum is tHat it gives a very 
useful summary of the positions of the new 
chairmanship on relations between WEU and 
NATO, the aims and principles of WEU, struc-
tural aspects and problems of enlargement. It is a 
kind of programme of wolf<: for the WEU 
Council for the duration of the Netherlands 
chairmanship. The Netherlands Government is 
to be heartily congratulated on this useful initi-
ative. 
29. In regard to parliamenlfiry activities as a 
whole, your Rapporteur has the impression that 
there were fewer interventions either because of 
parliamentary recesses or because of elections in 
Italy and the United Kingdom. However, it 
would be desirable for represf;:ntatives to make 
greater use of the texts ado~ted by the WEU 
Assembly in their dialogues with governments in 
national parliaments. 
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Ill. Public relations activities of the WEU 
Council and its ministerial organs 
30. On 4th June 1987, the Presidential Com-
mittee instructed the Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations to study the 
section of the annual report concerning infor-
mation given to the press and public. The first 
part of the thirty-second annual report contains 
no information on this subject but in the second 
part there are a few indications under the 
heading" Press and information". 
31. The Council first recalls" the contribution 
that WEU could make to achieve a wider con-
sensus among public opinion on the defence 
effort being made by the European countries". 
But it says nothing about basic measures to 
attain this aim or action to be taken on its 
document " WEU and public awareness ". Its 
answer to Recommendation 442, which stressed 
the need for early action in this connection, is 
not mentioned in this part of the annual 
report. 
32. It is gratifying that a unit responsible for 
relations with the press and information was set 
up in the political division of the Secretariat-
General in September 1986. However, this infor-
mation does not answer the question of the fate 
of the public relations unit which was specially 
set up - outside the political division - and 
which is included in the organogram of the 
Secretariat-General appended to the first part of 
the thirty-second annual report. 
33. The half-yearly report of the Federal 
German Government on the activities of WEU 
during the period 1st October 1986 to 31st 
March 1987, prepared for the information of 
members of the Bundestag, gives further infor-
mation on this subject, specifying that the post of 
counsellor for press and public relations has not 
yet been filled, that his work is being carried out 
partly by the Secretary-General himself and that 
an official from the political and analysis section 
has been made responsible for relations with the 
press. Moreover, on 22nd December 1986, in 
answer to a question put in the Bundestag by Mr. 
Antretter, the German Government stated that 
the Secretary-General ~ad given an assurance 
that he would ensure that this post was filled as 
soon as possible and in the prescribed form. 
34. However, the post is still vacant and one 
may wonder about the Council's real intentions 
in this connection since the transitional period 
for the restructuring of the ministerial organs is 
to be concluded at the end of 1987. 
35. While, according to the annual report, the 
unit responsible for relations with the press has a 
secondary role of providing information and 
documentation for the permanent representa-
tives in London, what are its principal activities? 
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It is satisfying to learn that the Secretariat-
General answers many requests for information 
from the public about the activities ofWEU as a 
whole and that the number of requests has 
increased considerably in recent months. 
36. This information is very interesting and 
raises a number of questions. Which persons or 
institutions are asking for information? How are 
they informed? What practical lessons have the 
Council and the Secretary-General learned from 
this trend in regard to information policy in 
general? There is no denying that the Secretary-
General himself is very active where public rela-
tions are concerned, but this can nevertheless not 
replace the definition and implementation of an 
information policy emanating from the Council. 
The memorandum from the Netherlands Gov-
ernment to the President of the Second Chamber 
of the States-General on 18th June 1987 is a good 
example in this connection. However, it is a 
purely national text and in no way commits the 
Council. 
37. The new Netherlands chairmanship made 
a further firm, positive gesture by issuing guide-
lines to the press at the close of the meetings held 
in The Hague on 20th August and 15th Sep-
tember 1987 of a group of senior officials from 
the ministries for foreign affairs and defence of 
the WEU member states to consider the situ-
ation in the Gulf. This was the first time the 
Council had informed the press immediately of a 
non-ministerial meeting and it would be 
desirable for this to become normal practice. 
38. Tribute should also be paid to the initi-
ative taken by Mr. Poos, Luxembourg Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, who reviewed the Luxem-
bourg chairmanship-in-office of the Council in 
1986-87 in an article entitled " The prospects for 
the WEU " in the August 1987 issue of the 
NATO Review, thus ensuring its distribution 
throughout the countries of the Atlantic 
Alliance. 
39. However, these are isolated acts. Infor-
mation in the annual report that efforts made to 
strengthen co-operation " between existing 
European academic and research institutions in 
the field of security and defence ... forms part of 
the process of increasing public awareness of 
European security requirements " is too vague to 
throw light on the Council's intentions in this 
connection. Admittedly, it would be useful for 
these institutions to be made aware of WEU 
problems but they cannot replace the 
organisation in propagating its aims or 
explaining its action to the public. 
40. Nothing is learned about the role of the 
agencies in regard to information. However, in 
the document entitled " WEU and public 
awareness " the duties of the agencies in this area 
were described as follows: 
" The Council may commission the Paris 
agencies of WEU to contribute to infor-
mation activity in the following ways: 
(i) preparing material specifically for 
public relations use; such material 
could be distributed as directed by the 
Permanent Council through the secre-
tariat unit in London. If budgetary 
resources permitted, the Council 
might request preparation of small 
publications about the work of WEU 
in pamphlet or brochure form for dis-
tribution; 
(ii) preparing material of topical interest 
for publication and dissemination to 
the press. A list of press contacts 
should be drawn up and kept with the 
new unit in the Secretariat-General in 
London." 
41. Why has none of these intentions been fol-
lowed up, although the Council has noted that 
the number of requests for information from the 
public has increased considerably? What role 
does the Council assign to national governments 
in this connection? In the abovementioned doc-
ument, the Council stressed that the European 
governments" should focus the attention of their 
publics on the central importance of deterrence 
in maintaining peace and security". After 
stressing the importance of public statements by 
politicians and ministers, the Council considered 
" other national information channels should 
also be used more effectively to generate greater 
public awareness of policies which the alliance 
and WEU members follow". 
42. Furthermore, in its reply to Recommen-
dation 441, communicated to the Assembly on 
20th May 1985, the Council considered that the 
effort to keep the public informed about security 
and defence policy was " essentially the responsi-
bility of each member state which provides 
regular information using the methods that it 
considers the most appropriate". Furthermore, 
the Council had also announced in its document 
on " WEU and public awareness " that it would 
be possible to ensure that national information 
activities were co-ordinated in order to give 
them greater impact. In this context, the commit-
tee's decision to consider in greater detail the 
practice followed by the governments of the 
seven WEU member countries in keeping the 
public informed can provide the Council with 
useful indications. 
IV. How the governments of the WEU 
member countries keep the public informed 
43. In order to make a comparative study, on 
21st July 1987 your Rapporteur sent a question-
naire to the ministries for foreign affairs and 
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defence of the seven WEU member countries 
(see appendix). Although only five governments 
have as yet answered, this has allowed interesting 
conclusions to be drawn. ; 
(i) Technical instruments set liP by governments 
44. It is worth noting that several member 
governments have set up large structures and 
bodies to develop contacts with the public on 
security policy matters. 
45. This has been done, for instance, in one of 
the smaller member countries, Belgium, where 
the 1985 defence white paper issued by the 
private office of the Minister qf Defence devotes 
a chapter to information policy. It is learned 
from this white paper that in May 1984 the Min-
istry of Defence issued an order defining struc-
tures designed to allow the pursuit of an infor-
mation policy " better suited to basic 
information and improving its propagation, 
while taking account of the limits which, for 
security reasons, stand in the way of the dis-
closure of military information ". 
46. The Ministry of Defence set up an infor-
mation service which is the main executive body 
for information on the armed forces. It has 
several specialised departmen•s for contacts with 
the press and broadcasting spelcial television pro-
grammes. There is also a defence study centre 
dependent on the Institut royal superieur de 
defense, which pays close atlention to defence 
information policy and is ab~ve all responsible 
for giving clarification and details on defence 
matters. It organises discussions, seminars and 
colloquies which are open to all who are inter-
ested in security questions. According to the 
white paper, " it can rely on the regular partici-
pation of members of parliament and representa-
tives of political research bodies, political parties 
and university, trade union and religious 
circles". 
47. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
1985 white paper on the situation of and devel-
opments in the federal armed forces also devotes 
a chapter to public relations.! Responsibility for 
information is shared between the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the 
Federal Government Press and Information 
Office. When planned public ,relations measures 
relating to security policy concern several minis-
tries, co-ordination of the relevant action is 
ensured by the Press Office in close co-operation 
with the ministries concerned. 
48. The Ministry of Defenc!:e itself has a press 
and information office and a public relations 
office responsible for supervising and guiding 
youth officers and non-commissioned officers 
and all other officers and qfficials responsible 
solely for public relations work. It is responsible 
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for informing the population by publishing docu-
ments, advising publishers of works on security 
policy and assisting producers or actors in the 
preparation of ftlms, television programmes or 
plays dealing with problems relating to security 
policy. 
49. In the United Kingdom, the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office has set up a special Arms 
Control and Disarmament Research Unit 
responsible inter alia for informing the public 
about matters relating to the limitation of arma-
ments and disarmament. There is also the 
Central Office of Information which produces 
booklets for the Ministry of Defence or the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 
50. In France, the Ministry of Defence has set 
up an armed forces information and public rela-
tions service which has a vast role to play in 
ensuring real-time information for the defence 
authorities and those responsible for relaying 
information to the public, keeping the general 
public informed and helping to train those 
responsible for relaying information to the 
public. 
51. In Italy, it appears from the 1985 white 
paper on defence that in 194 7 a single press 
office for the Ministry of Defence was set up 
which has been known since 1967 as the Servicio 
Pubblica Informazione della difesa (public 
defence information service). It is responsible 
for: 
- issuing communiques and information 
relating to the Ministry of Defence and 
the armed forces; 
- supplying continuous information on 
institutional military activities; 
- co-ordinating information on com-
pulsory military service and voluntary 
service; 
- maintaining contacts with the media 
and corresponding services of the Presi-
dency of the Republic, the private office 
of the Prime Minister, parliament, other 
ministries, public institutions and inter-
national organisations of which Italy is 
a member. 
Inter alia, the white paper advocates wider circu-
lation of news and improved co-ordination. 
52. It is interesting to study how the govern-
ments use the means available to them. Since the 
attitude of the younger generation in Europe 
towards the security problems of our continent is 
a crucial factor for the fate of our nations, the 
Rapporteur proposes to consider first of all how 
governments maintain contacts with the younger 
generation. 
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(ii) Contllda with the younger generation 
53. The governments of five countries -
Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Luxembourg and the United 
Kingdom - have given useful information on 
this subject. 
54. In Belgium, 2 200 copies of a document 
entitled " Initiation to defence problems " were 
published in 1985 and circulated in 1986 by the 
education authorities to all teaching establish-
ments at every level. It was intended for sec-
ondary schools and published on the initiative of 
the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of 
Defence on a proposal by the Army-Youth Com-
mittee. A similar publication is now being pre-
pared in co-operation with the Flemish-speaking 
department of the Ministry of Education. 
55. The 177-page publication, accompanied 
by separate documentation, is quite remarkable 
in that it gives basic information on the his-
torical evolution of the role of the armed forces 
in society right up to the present position of 
Belgium in East-West relations and the Atlantic 
Alliance. 
56. It is therefore particularly regrettable that 
this publication says absolutely nothing about 
Western European Union either in its historical 
section or in its description of the present situ-
ation. It would perhaps be useful for our Belgian 
colleagues to use their contacts with their gov-
ernment to ensure that any future edition takes 
account of the role of WEU in European security 
policy. In any event, the Belgian Government's 
initiative in publishing this text should be 
encouraged. 
57. In the United Kingdom, schools receive 
information on defence and security matters, 
usually on request. Moreover, the British 
Atlantic Committee, a non-governmental 
organisation that works in co-operation with the 
government and NATO, arranges vast educa-
tional programmes on which it concentrates 
most of its activities. 
58. In February 1987, the Ministry of Defence, 
with the assistance of the Foreign and Common-
wealth Office, produced a film entitled " Keeping 
the peace " intended specially for school 
children. Your Rapporteur does not know 
whether information thus given to young people 
in the United Kingdom includes the role of 
WEU. Where booklets are concerned, the Min-
istry of Defence has said that WEU was men-
tioned in a number of publications, but only 
briefly. According to an answer given on 9th 
April 1987 to a question by Mr. Terlezki the 
United Kingdom Government has no plans to 
take steps to ensure that school children have 
access to information on the role played by the 
United Kingdom in WEU. It hopes, however, 
" that where opportunity to do so arises in the 
school curriculum, pupils' understanding of the 
United Kingdom's relationships with its 
European neighbours including the functions 
and work of... Western European Union will be 
developed as part of the process of learning 
about political processes ... ". 
59. Although in the Federal Republic of 
Germany education is the responsibility of the 
Under, the Federal Government plays a small 
part in drafting school textbooks. It distributes 
information to primary and secondary school 
teachers. In January 1987, for instance, the Min-
istry of Defence published a booklet entitled 
" Elements for civic education " (Materialien fiir 
den Staatsbiirgerlichen Unterricht) containing 
texts on peace and security policy. There was 
only one sentence on WEU which unfortunately 
gave no basic information. 
60. Special action has been taken in Germany . 
with the presentation throughout the country of 
plays on security-related subjects. This initiative 
is intended specially for school children and 
other young people. 
61. The 1985 white paper on the situation of 
and developments in the federal armed forces, 
issued by the Federal Ministry of Defence, paid 
special attention to relations with the younger 
generation. It considered that the scholastic com-
munication of information on security policy 
must become an international political reality 
and allow future conscripts to form opinions on 
the need to safeguard peace. In this context, the 
white paper asserted that " schools, as public 
institutions designed to ensure that the younger 
generation is educated and instructed, play an 
important role ". 
62. Moreover, the white paper said that " for 
relations with young people, the Bundeswehr has 
665 'youth officers' 65 of them working full-time 
and 600 part-time for this purpose. There are 
also more or less the same number of non-
commissioned youth officers. At the invitation 
of teaching establishments and youth associa-
tions they discuss with adolescents matters 
relating to security policy and inform them about 
military service, thus making a major contri-
bution to civic education. 
63. In France, the Societe d'etudes et de 
realisations techniques pour !'image et le son 
(society for audiovisual technical studies and 
projects) prepared in March 1984 under the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Defence a very 
detailed document entitled " Thoughts on 
defence " aimed at assisting history and geog-
raphy teachers wishing to make their classes 
think about the subject of defence. A section on 
alliances and negotiations describes historical 
developments from the conclusion of the 
Brussels Treaty on 17th March 1948 to the cre-
ation of WEU and concludes that " WEU is the 
only European institution responsible for 
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debating defence matters, but its vocation goes 
beyond that of a military alliance alone: it has to 
promote the unity and encourage the progressive 
integration of Europe". 
64. On the role of schools, the situation is dif-
ferent in Luxembourg, where there is no pro-
vision for schools to be given information from 
the government on security and defence ques-
tions in the context of the school curriculum. 
However, it must be borne in mind that the Lux-
embourg public in general ben~fits from a broad 
spectrum of information on vatious security and 
defence questions simply because it usually has 
access to all the media of neighbouring and more 
remote countries, particularly the press, radio 
and television of France, the Federal Republic of 
Germany and Belgium. 
(iii) Free publications and tlleir circulation 
to the general public 
65. When answering the questionnaire, four 
countries - Belgium, France, the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the !United Kingdom 
- appended their recent J?Ublications and 
booklets to show their efforts to keep the public 
informed. 
66. In Luxembourg, security and defence 
matters and problems linked with the operation 
of WEU are dealt with at length in the memo-
randum prepared by the Miqister for Foreign 
Affairs at the beginning of e~ch year on gov-
ernment activities in the pre'Vious year. This 
memorandum is transmitted to the Chamber of 
Deputies and made public, so that it is available 
to anyone interested in the government's foreign 
policy. 
67. In Belgium, the booklet Ion "Initiation to 
defence problems " intended f<i>r teaching estab-
lishments was described in the previous section. 
15 000 copies of the 1985 white paper on defence 
were distributed as follows: to the Flemish exec-
utive, the executive of the French community, 
the Walloon executive, the executive of the 
German-speaking community, members of both 
houses of parliament, the bure~ux of the various 
Belgian political parties, study centres, public 
libraries, scientific foundations, communal and 
provincial administrations and the media. It 
included a relatively short paragraph on efforts 
to reactivate WEU but no basic information on 
the organisation. 
68. Also in 1985, the infon)lation service of 
the Ministry of Defence published 15 000 copies 
of a "Defence manual". This vast document 
gives 207 pages of very detailed, useful infor-
mation on all the political and military aspects of 
defence and Belgian policy in this area. Western 
European Union is mentioned in the historical 
part of the document but the 'basic description 
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consists of one small paragraph indicating that 
"WEU is the only collective Western European 
security system having an adequate legal basis 
which might therefore allow future develop-
ments. This can be seen from recent efforts to 
reactivate WEU ". This manual was distributed 
to members of the defence committees but not to 
public libraries. 
69. In 1983, the Ministry for External Rela-
tions and the Ministry of Defence produced a 
pamphlet entitled " Peace with freedom " 
showing how the partners of the Atlantic 
Alliance had safeguarded peace in freedom and 
describing their future role. It is not known 
whether this pamphlet is to be reissued. 
70. In the United Kingdom, the Ministry of 
Defence distributes a number of publications, 
mainly on request. Among the most recent, 
mention should be made of the booklet " British 
defence policy 1987 " (85 000 copies), the pam-
phlet "Britain in NATO" (30 000 copies) and 
the booklet " Keeping the peace " , published in 
1987, the number of copies of which your 
Rapporteur does not know. Another pamphlet 
published in 1987 contains twenty questions and 
answers on defence matters. In none of these 
publications is there any information on WEU. 
71. Under the responsibility of the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office, the Arms Control 
and Disarmament Research Unit is responsible 
for issuing a number of booklets and pamphlets 
giving information on problems of and negotia-
tions on the limitation of armaments and dis-
armament. 
72. A quarterly review prepared by this unit 
reports regularly on parliamentary debates, state-
ments by ministers and the progress of negotia-
tions. About 5 000 copies are printed of this 
review. No. 5 for this year gives extracts from a 
speech by Sir Geoffrey Howe, Secretary of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, to the 
Royal Institute of International Relations, 
Brussels, on 16th March 1987. Alas, all the parts 
of the speech calling for a stronger role for WEU 
have been omitted. To sum up, your Rapporteur 
found no trace of WEU in the free British publi-
cations. Only the defence estimates for 1987 pre-
sented to parliament by the Secretary of State for 
Defence include a special chapter on WEU 
giving useful information. 
73. Where France is concerned, the armed 
forces information and public relations service 
circulates many publications on the subject, 
including" Weapons in France", No. 83, August 
1986, which mentions WEU in the chapter on 
international meetings in the context of 
co-operation in armaments matters and 
"France's defence policy", an information doc-
ument published in October 1984 and containing 
extracts from speeches by members of the French 
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Government which mentions WEU in the 
context of an interview granted to the newspaper 
La Croix by the Minister for External Relations 
on 11th July 1984. 
74. Another document entitled "The pro-
gramme law relating to military equipment for 
the years 1987-91 ", published in April 1987, 
contains inter alia the full text of the address by 
Mr. Giraud, French Minister of Defence, to the 
National Assembly and extracts from the address 
by Mr. Chirac, Prime Minister, to the WEU 
Assembly on 2nd December 1986 concerning the 
European security charter. 
75. Where free publications are concerned, the 
Federal German Government has an impressive 
record. The German authorities have trans-
mitted for information no less than forty recent 
booklets and other publications of which 
between 50 000 and one million copies have 
been printed (white paper: 150 000 copies, pam-
phlets: 100 000 to 500 000 copies) designed to 
inform the public. A few examples are given 
hereafter. 
76. The German Government is the only gov-
ernment of a WEU member country to publish a 
half-yearly report on the activities of the 
organisation for the information of parliamen-
tarians. It is to be noted that the standard of 
these reports has further improved in recent 
years and the most recent, covering the period 
1st October 1986 to 31st March 1987, contains 
much useful information. Nevertheless, these 
reports, which are printed solely by the Bun-
destag services, do not go much further than par-
liament itself. 
77. Another useful document is the annual 
report by the Federal Government on progress 
with disarmament and the control of armaments 
and the trend of the balance of forces. This text, 
also designed primarily for the information of 
parliamentarians, is reissued in another booklet 
by the Press and Information Office of the 
Federal Government so as to reach a wider 
public. 
78. In September 1984, this office published a 
roneoed version of a document entitled " The 
reactivation of WEU " which contained basic 
information on the WEU organs and the 
Assembly. Although this text preceded the Rome 
declaration and has not been updated, it should 
be stressed that it is the only basic national publi-
cation on WEU that your Rapporteur has 
seen. 
79. In regard to the activities of the Ministry 
of Defence, the white paper on the situation of 
and developments in the federal armed forces, 
last issued in 1985, when it had 434 pages, gives 
the fullest information on every aspect of defence 
policy. There are a few paragraphs on the reacti-
vation of WEU in the chapters entitled " The 
bases of security " and " The transatlantic part-
nership and the strengthening of the European 
pillar of the alliance". 
80. Useful basic information is also given in 
this white paper. It quotes commitments 
stemming from Article V of the modified 
Brussels Treaty and decisions taken in the Rome 
declaration. It also contains a table showing the 
structure of the organisation. It then sums up the 
German Government's position as follows: 
" The Federal Government considers that 
the reactivation ofWEU constitutes a con-
siderable progress in European co-opera-
tion which has already proved itself in the 
Eurogroup and the IEPG. Co-operation at 
WEU level must strengthen the European 
pillar of the alliance, open up a new 
dimension in the process of European uni-
fication and contribute to the harmoni-
sation of positions in every area in which 
Europe should speak with a single voice. 
The member countries of the alliance 
which do not belong to WEU are informed 
in detail of the activities of the organi-
sation in security policy matters. 
A single European will is now more 
important than ever if Europe is to remain 
a respected partner of the United States of 
America." 
81. It is therefore gratifying that the white 
paper gives the necessary information about 
WEU. It is merely to be regretted that this is 
rather " drowned " in the text and that WEU 
does not appear in the table of contents. 
82. The Ministry of Defence has recently pub-
lished a number of booklets designed primarily 
to inform the man in the street. Thus, the 
booklet entitled '' What does the enemy look 
like?- Facts and arguments about the East-West 
conflict ", 150 000 copies of which were pub-
lished in 1987, aims to give younger readers a 
better grasp of the origins and consequences of 
the East-West conflict and make them more 
aware of the facts. The alliance systems are 
explained at length, but WEU is mentioned only 
very briefly in the descripton of post-war events 
and only in regard to the arms restrictions 
imposed on the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Developments since 1984 are not mentioned. 
83. Among the other publications, mention 
may be made of the booklet entitled " Strategy 
versus arms control " published in 1986 and 
intended to give the reader basic knowledge of 
security policy and arguments for discussions on 
security and peace questions (WEU is referred to 
only very briefly), the booklet entitled " An 
alliance, defence and arms control so that we 
may live in peace", published in March 1986, 
and the pamphlet entitled " Two unequal alli-
ances", published in October 1986, in which 
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WEU is mentioned in one seqtence on the very 
last page. 
84. "The army in the alliance", a booklet 
published in October 1986, gives information on 
the security policy of the Fedetal Republic in an 
international context, on the German army and 
on the place of the army in society. 
85. The present state of security in the interna-
tional context, threat assessm~nt, the alliances 
and German security policy are analysed in a 
booklet entitled "Being a soldier today", pub-
lished in January 1987. 
86. The thirtieth anniversa~ of the Bundes-
wehr in 1985 provided an oppdrtunity to publish 
a booklet summing up the evolution of German 
rearmament. None of these latter publications 
refers to WEU. 
87. In addition, the Ministry of Defence pub-
lishes each month in a magazine entitled " Argu-
ments relating to security policy" statements 
and positions adopted by politicians on current 
events in this connection antl the Press and 
Information Office of the Federal Government 
distributes each month a document entitled 
"Notes on security policy" wQich reports on all 
the most recent events and ,statements. Fur-
thermore, booklets from the Mibistry for Foreign 
Affairs give information on developments in 
East-West relations and the CSCE process. 
88. Your Rapporteur has rec~ived no publica-
tions from Italy, but the 1985 white paper shows 
that the Ministry of Defence publishes many per-
iodicals including "Quadrante ", "Informazioni 
della difesa ", " 11 carabiniere " and " N otiziari " 
(chronicles). 
89. In the Netherlands, the government 
attaches special importance to a study published 
in June 1987 by the provisional consultative 
council on peace and security entitled" Western 
European co-operation in security matters - an 
Atlantic necessity", which gives an important 
place to the future role of WEU. 
(iv) Other means of information 
90. It is clear that all the governments use the 
media in one way or another to [put their policies 
over to the general public. The media for their 
part often take the initiative of questioning gov-
ernments. 
91. In Luxembourg, for instance, the media, 
and particularly the radio, frequently question 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister 
of Defence on their views on security and 
defence questions. 
92. In Belgium, the principal means of distri-
bution used by the government is through the 
press, television or radio. At the beginning of 
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May 1987, the Belgian Minister of Defence 
launched a campaign in several newspapers 
under the heading " In peacetime, too, our army 
fights every day", aimed at explaining defence 
problems. According to the answer given on 5th 
June 1987 to a question put by Mr. Daras in the 
Chamber of Representatives, the interest of this 
special action was to make public opinion more 
aware of the various tasks Belgium gives its army 
which it carries out competently and with 
devotion. 
93. There is no particular production of 
special films in Belgium. However, there is 
co-operation between the information service of 
the armed forces and the television channels for 
producing programmes on the armed forces. To 
date, these merely concern the operational 
aspect. At a later stage, it is hoped to tackle 
defence policy in these programmes. 
94. In the United Kingdom, the Ministry of 
Defence, in co-operation with the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, produced a film in Feb-
ruary 1987 on " Keeping the peace ". This pro-
duction was intended mainly for schools and 
other institutions concerned. 
95. In the Federal Republic of Germany, there 
is inter alia a film entitled" Security for peace in 
freedom", produced in 1985, which explains the 
aims of security policy. Over the years, the Min-
istry of Defence has also produced a considerable 
number of films including one entitled" Defence 
plus detente equals security " and another 
entitled "NATO today", which gives infor-
mation on security policy. These information 
films are loaned free of charge to institutions, 
organisations, groups and associations for the 
information of their members. 
96. In regard to the organisation of confer-
ences and debates in special frameworks, in 
Luxembourg the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
encourages the organisation of conferences on 
security and defence matters. Thus, it promoted 
a lecture by Mr. Alfred Cahen, Secretary-General 
ofWEU, to the Luxembourg Society for Interna-
tional Affairs. There are regular relations with 
representatives· of various organisations in the 
field of action ofthe Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 
If necessary, they are given financial assistance. 
In this context, special mention should be made 
of the "Jeunesse atlantique luxembourgeoise ". 
97. In Belgium, the Ministry of Defence 
organises various kinds of lectures and discus-
sions: 
- seminars organised by the defence study 
centre; 
- a pool of military lecturers speaking on 
request to various audiences. 
98. In the United Kingdom, the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office finances seminars on spe-
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cific subjects in co-operation with non-govern-
mental organisations. The Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs holds 
regular meetings with non-governmental 
organisations, universities and those responsible 
for information. On request, officials receive 
various groups, research workers and visitors to 
the Central Office of Information. 
99. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
corresponds with the public and keeps non-
governmental organisations informed of current 
developments in arms control matters. The 
counsellor responsible for disarmament ques-
tions makes information tours throughout the 
United Kingdom and attends all public meetings 
at which a government spokesman is required. 
100. At the Ministry of Defence, press corre-
spondents are informed once a month of current 
events at a high level. Every two or three 
months, information meetings on defence and 
disarmament are organised for groups of under-
graduates. Exhibitions and information visits are 
also organised in the country. 
101. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
government organises seminars for the press, 
including the foreign press, and military infor-
mation courses for managerial staff in industry, 
the public administration and the press. 
102. The Press and Information Office and the 
Ministry of Defence receives about 70 000 vis-
itors each year. They organise information visits 
to NATO headquarters in Brussels and seminars 
for allied military forces stationed in Germany. 
M Principal topics of information 
103. It would be premature to give a final 
opinion on the essential elements of information 
in the member countries solely on the basis of 
the answers by the four governments which have 
given information on this subject. 
104. While Luxembourg refers to " security and 
defence matters " in general and to " problems 
linked with the operation of WEU ", the main 
subjects to which the Belgian Ministry of 
Defence pays attention are Belgium's defence 
effort, military service, East-West relations and 
disarmament problems. 
105. In the United Kingdom, the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office concentrates on infor-
mation on matters relating to the control of 
armaments and disarmament. The Ministry of 
Defence endeavours to circulate information on 
its policy as a whole, on the role of NATO and 
on the United Kingdom's contribution to the 
Atlantic Alliance and, in this context, on the nec-
essary defence measures, East-West relations and 
disarmament problems. 
106. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs gives information 
on security policy, East-West relations and dis-
armament problems. The Ministry of Defence 
gives information on everything relating to the 
armed forces and the Press and Information 
Office of the Federal Government is responsible 
for explaining the government's basic positions 
in three ways: 
- in the long term, by circulating basic 
information on the meaning and aims 
of the government's security policy; 
- in the medium term, by preparing the 
public for decisions and measures to be 
taken (e.g. extending military service, 
introducing new weapons systems, 
etc.); 
- in the short term, by giving information 
on current events. 
107. Most of the information documents 
studied by your Rapporteur show that the funda-
mental role of the Atlantic Alliance in European 
security is explained in great detail and all gov-
ernments have confirmed that they have more or 
less close contacts with the NATO information 
service. This is in close keeping with the Rome 
declaration and the Council's document on 
WEU and public awareness, which underlines 
the need to inform the public of" the importance 
of the North Atlantic Treaty as the foundation of 
our security". 
108. However, this represents only part of the 
necessary information. Where WEU is con-
cerned, the initiative of explaining its role and 
the aim of its reactivation is apparently left 
mainly to ministers, heads of government and 
other politicians. But in view of the fact that 
their speeches concentrate on topical questions, 
the public receives very little basic information. 
Among the many documents and publications 
from governments consulted by your Rappor-
teur, only the German 1985 white paper on the 
situation of and developments in the federal 
armed forces and the statement to parliament by 
the United Kingdom Secretary of State for 
Defence on the defence estimates for 1987 
explain the importance of Article V, the corner-
stone of the modified Brussels Treaty, which 
obliges WEU member countries to afford auto-
matic aid and assistance by all the means in their 
power in the event of an armed attack. 
109. For the rest, it must be noted that the great 
majority of publications available to the public 
do not give enough information on the aims of 
our organisation and there may be many reasons 
for this. Perhaps some governments, fearing that 
they may give the impression of no longer con-
sidering the Atlantic Alliance to be decisive for 
Europe's security, hesitate to give too many 
details about WEU. However, there seem no 
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grounds for such fears provided they follow the 
guidelines given by the Council in its document 
on WEU and public awareness. 
110. Another reason might be uncertainty or 
even ignorance about the precise aims of WEU 
and its reactivation in the offi4:es responsible for 
public information in the ministries concerned. 
Difficulties may also stem from possible uncer-
tainty about the sharing of responsibilities 
between the ministries conqerned and, even 
more serious, from misunderstanding between 
the national authorities and WEU organs about 
task -sharing. 
V. ConclusiotJs 
111. Assuming that all the WEU organs wish 
the public to be better informed about the 
European dimension of security, the above study 
shows there are encouraging signs but also 
serious shortcomings in the implementation of 
this aim. One can be particularly grateful to the 
Netherlands Government for having sent the 
Second Chamber of the States-General a memo-
randum on the Netherlands chairmanship-in-
office of the Council from mid-1987 to mid-
1988. The text of this memorandum is parti-
cularly useful because it meets the concerns 
expressed by parliamentarians at the information 
meeting organised by the Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations1in Luxembourg on 
28th April1987 about ignorance and uncertainty 
about the precise aims of WEU and its reacti-
vation. 
112. In regard to the Council's relations with 
the press, it is gratifying that guidelines were dis-
tributed to the press at the cl~se of the meetings 
in The Hague on 20th August and 15th Sep-
tember 1987 of a group of senior officials from 
WEU member countries to examine the situ-
ation in the Gulf. Conversel}j, the section of the 
thirty-second annual report concerning infor-
mation given to the press a~d public is hardly 
likely to give any hope that the active, per-
manent information of the public will become 
one of the Council's primary concerns. 
113. As for government public relations activ-
ities, the comparative study, although incom-
plete, allows it to be concludf!d that efforts made 
by some governments to attract the attention of 
the younger generation and the public in general 
are noteworthy. However, national publications 
are still very far from assigning due importance 
to the role and tasks of WEU. Moreover, there 
seems to be no co-ordination between member 
countries. 
114. To improve this situation, action seems 
necessary at several levels: · 
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115. At the level of parliaments, members of 
the Assembly must be urged to speak more often 
on the basis of texts adopted by the WEU 
Assembly. In this way, they can draw the 
attention of governments and the public to the 
work ofthe Assembly. In drawing up the order of 
business of plenary sessions of the Assembly, 
greater importance should be accorded to rela-
tions with parliaments and the public. Indeed, it 
is difficult to arouse interest in these problems if 
the debates on the relevant reports are always 
held on the last day of the session. 
116. At the level of governments, it would be 
useful for them to concert their public relations 
work and - even more important - ensure 
co-ordination with the public relations office in 
the Secretariat-General in London. A regular 
exchange of publications and booklets, as is the 
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practice of most governments with the NATO 
information service for instance, would already 
be a useful first step. 
11 7. At the level of the Council and Secretariat-
General, it would be important to work out an 
active information policy taking account of the 
growing number of requests for information on 
the activities of WEU as a whole. If the budg-
etary situation does not allow booklets to be pro-
duced under the responsibility of the Council or 
the Secretariat-General, advantage must be taken 
of instruments and means available in member 
governments. The Council must really ensure 
that national information activities are co-
ordinated and make appropriate suggestions and 
recommendations for including WEU in the sub-
jects on which information is given. For this 
purpose, it is essential for an efficient unit in the 
Secretariat-General to concentrate on this area. 
APPENDIX 
APPENDIX 
Questionnaire for preparing the report on public information activiti,!s 
on security and defence matters in WEU member countries 
(sent to the ministries for foreign affairs and defence of the WEU member countrie~ 
by Mr. Burger, Rapporteur, on 21st July 1987) ! 
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1. What are the principal means used by your government for informing the public about defence 
and security? 
(a) Are publications (booklets, periodicals, leaflets, etc.) issued free of charge by the ministry? 
If so, please send us the latest relevant publications. 
(b) How many copies of these publications are printed and how are they circulated to the public? 
(c) How does the government use the information media to propagate its security and defence 
policy? 
(d) Does the ministry arrange for specialised films to be produced? 
If so, please quote titles and describe the way in which they are used. 
(e) Does the ministry organise conferences and discussions in special forums? 
If so, please give details. 
(f) Are groups of visitors received and briefed at the ministry and/or headquarters? 
If so, how often and how are such groups formed? 
(g) What other mehods of informing the public are used? 
2. What are the main subjects on which the government informs the public? 
(for instance: the government's security and defence policy; threat assessment; necessary defence 
measures; the system of alliances in the East and West; Europe's identity irl security matters; 
East-West relations and disarmament problems; co-operation in armaments; military service, 
etc.) 
3. In what way does your government participate in NATO's information service? 
4. How does the government inform the public of the activities of Western European Union? 
5. Is governmental information directed mainly towards: 
(a) special groups, for instance young people? 
If so, what approach is adopted? 
(b) schools - to what extent do schools receive government information - possibly in the 
framework of educational programmes from the ministry for national education - and how 
do schools make use of it? 
(c) the media? 
(d) parliamentarians? 
(e) political parties? 
(f) the population in general? 
(g) other groups? 
6. Is there a special authority responsible for co-ordinating the information policy of your gov-
ernment in these matters? 
If so, please give the name and address. 
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ORDER OF BUSINESS 
of the second part of the thirty-third ordinary session 
Paris, 30th November-3rd December 1987 
MONDAY, 30th NOVEMBER 
Morning 
Meetings of political groups 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. Opening of the second part of the thirty-third ordinary session. 
2. Examination of credentials. 
3. Address by the President of the Assembly. 
4. Adoption of the draft order ofbusiness ofthe second part of the thirty-third ordinary session. 
5. Action by the Presidential Committee: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Valleix, Vice-President of the Assembly. 
6. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU. 
7. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure: 
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on behalf of the Committee on Rules 
of Procedure and Privileges. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft decision. 
8. Political activities of the Council - reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. van der Sanden on behalf of the General Affairs Com-
mittee. 
Debate. 
TUESDAY 1st DECEMBER 
Morning 10 a.m. 
lla.m. 
1. Political activities of the Council - reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council: 
Resumed debate. 
2. Presentation of the first part of the thirty-third annual report of the Council by Mr. van den 
Broek, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. Political activities of the Council - reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council. 
Resumed debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
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2. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1988: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Linster on behalf of the Commit~ee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft budget. 
3. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986 - the 
auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts. 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Linster on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration. 
Debate. 
Vote on the motion to approve the final accounts. 
4. Disarmament - reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Scheer on behalf of the Committee @n Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments. · 
Debate. 
5. Address by Mr. Raimond, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France. 
WEDNESDAY 2nd DECEMBER 
Morning 10 a.m. 
1. Disarmament - reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council: ' 
Resumed debate. 
11.30 a.m. 
2. Address by Mr. Melior, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs ofthe United 
Kingdom. 
3. European armaments co-operation - reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Bassinet on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
Debate. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. European armaments co-operation- reply to the thirty-second annual report ofthe Council: 
Resumed debate. 
3.15p.m. 
2. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands. 
3. Disarmament - reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council. 
' 
European armaments co-operation - reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council. 
Votes on the draft recommendations. 
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3. Recent developments in Soviet external policy: 
presentation ofthe report tabled by Mr. Pecriaux on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
Debate. 
THURSDAY, 3rd DECEMBER 
Morning 10 a.m. 
1. Recent developments in Soviet external policy: 
Resumed debate. 
Votes on the draft recommendation and draft order. 
2. Threat assessment: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Stokes on behalf of the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. Public information activities on security and defence matters in WEU member countries: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Burger on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary 
and Public Relations. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft resolution. 
2. Military use of computers - towards a joint European defence research programme. 
presentation ofthe report tabled by Mr. Fourre on behalfofthe Committee on Scientific, Tech-
nological and Aerospace Questions. 
Debate. 
Votes on the draft recommendation and draft order. 
CLOSE OF THE THIRTY-THIRD ORDINARY SESSION 
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The Assembly, 
Replies of the Council to Recommendations 442 to 448 
RECOMMENDATION 442 1 
on the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance -
Part I: The reactivation of WEU 2 
30th October 1987 
(l) Considering that the proposals by the French Government, and particularly the one to draw up a 
European security charter, provide an opportunity for a fundamental re-examination of the require-
ments of that security; 
(ii) Considering that the policy of deterrence pursued by the Atlantic Alliance rema1ns the guarantee 
of that security; 
(iii) Considering that the main threats to international peace now arise in areas not covered by the 
alliance; 
(iv) Considering that European co-operation in armaments matters has become essential for the 
security of Europe; 
(v) Considering that the search for disarmament or the limitation of armaments is essential for the 
maintenance of peace and should continue to be given priority but that this search must not jeopardise 
the security of Europe; ' 
(vi) Considering that the recent development of chemical weapons constitutes a particularly serious 
threat for all mankind; ' 
(vii) Welcoming recent measures taken by the Council to increase its activities in order to meet the 
requirements of European security but regretting that information on these activities communicated to 
the public and to the Assembly is still far from adequate; 
(viii) Considering that it is still essential to bring the requirements of European securiW to the attention 
of the public; 
(ix) Deeply regretting the continuous failure of the Council of Ministers to inform 1)he Assembly in a 
proper way; 
(x) Considering that new governmental activities in WEU must allow the Assembly to exercise to the 
full its responsibilities under Article IX of the treaty; 
(xi) Noting in particular that the replies to Assembly recommendations and written questions relating 
to the Council's activities, the Standing Armaments Committee and the Independent European Pro-
gramme Group seriously distort the Council's commitments to the Assembly, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Study closely the proposals made by the French Government for drawing up a European security 
charter with a view to: 
(a) defining Europe's security requirements, acquainting its American allies with them and 
ensuring that current negotiations on the limitation of nuclear and conventi<>nal weapons lead 
to substantial reductions without compromising Europe's security based on a policy of deter-
rence; 
' (b) reaffirming member countries' continuing concern not to compromise the cohesion of the 
alliance and to include the strengthening of the European pillar in the context of the alliance; 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 27th April 1987 during the extraordinary session in Luxembourg (1st sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Ahrens on behalf of the General Affairs Committ~e (Document 1089). 
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(c) averting a chemical arms race by calling upon the United States and the Soviet Union to seek 
an agreement ensuring the complete elimination of such arms and promoting the extension of 
this agreement to all countries; 
(d) including in the charter a commitment to ensure reciprocal exchanges of information and con-
sultations in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty in regard to any 
threat to international peace; 
(e) also including an expression of the joint will to remove obstacles still obstructing the devel-
opment of European co-operation in armaments matters; 
2. To this end, direct the measures taken to give new work to WEU so as to ensure that the appli-
cation of the modified Brussels Treaty contributes to the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance and the con-
solidation of peace by: 
(a) keeping the political committee on European security in the framework of WEU; 
(b) considering how the treaty should be applied to ensure that it meets present European security 
requirements and allows WEU to be enlarged to include Western European countries wishing 
and able to take part; 
(c) ensuring that these countries are kept informed of the activities of WEU and allowing the 
countries concerned to take part henceforth iri. some of these activities, particularly in 
co-operation in armaments matters; 
(d) giving the necessary impetus to European co-operation in armaments matters, inter alia by 
adapting its decision of7th May 1955 setting up a Standing Armaments Committee to present 
facts of such co-operation; 
(e) acting without delay on its document" WEU and public awareness" so as to inform public 
opinion of all its activities in accordance with the principles set out in the Rome declaration, 
including the issue of communiques at the close of meetings of the political committee on 
European security; 
{f) ensuring co-ordination of member countries' participation in the course to be organised by the 
French lnstitut des hautes etudes de defense nationale in 1988 and of the development of sub-
sequent courses so as to promote public awareness of European security requirements in all 
member countries; (1) for this purpose by instructing the Secretary-General to play an active 
part in organising the first course and to promote the formation of an association of former 
participants of which he would ensure the secretariat; (2) by asking the French institute to 
invite Spain and Portugal to send participants to this course; 
(g) developing exchanges of views with the United States authorities so as to enhance the 
cohesion of the alliance; 
(h) applying in full Article IX of the treaty under which it has an obligation to report to the 
Assembly on its activities and on the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, even when 
pursued in frameworks other than WEU. 
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to Recommendation 442 
1. The proposals put forward by Prime Minister Jacques Chirac in his addrdss to the WEU 
Assembly in December 1986 have been the subject of detailed examination by the Council and the 
special working group. An interim report on European security interests was presented to ministers at 
their meeting on 28th April 1987. On the basis of this interim report, a common document is to be 
drawn up with a view to its examination, possible adoption and publication, at the ministerial meeting 
in The Hague. 
2. At their April meeting, ministers examined the latest proposals tabled at the Geneva negotiations 
on nuclear arms control between the United States and the Soviet Union. In particular, they affirmed 
their support for the efforts being made by the United States to reach an agreement. On the same 
occasion, they reitrated that reductions in nuclear weapons would increase the importance of removing 
the conventional superiority ofthe Warsaw Pact and eliminating chemical weapons, given the need for a 
stable balance at all times. 
3. The Council recognises that improved European arms co-operation can increase~ the effectiveness 
of the European defence effort, promote a better balance within the Atlantic Alliance and thus con-
tribute to an all-round strengthening of the western security system. 
4. In their exchanges of views, WEU member states take account of tensions and' conflicts outside 
Europe insofar as they may affect their security. In this context, the political directors of the Seven met 
on 20th August 1987, at the invitation of the Netherlands presidency, to consider the situation in the 
Gulf. There was a further high-level meeting on 15th September. 
5. There is no political committee on European security as such. It is the responsibility of the Per-
manent Council to co-ordinate all the organisation's activities. In the context of improved co-operation 
between the seven capitals, meetings of the enlarged Council take place with the participation of the 
political directors and representatives from the defence ministries. In particular, these councils prepare 
for the ministerial meetings. The political directors of the Seven also have opportunities to meet, for 
example, in the margins of meetings of the political committee of the Twelve. In the special working 
group, representatives of both the foreign and defence ministries, meeting either jointly or separately, 
study subjects as directed by the Council such as European security interests, security in the Mediter-
ranean, SDI and resources management. 
6. On the question of enlargement, the Council would reiterate the position it adopted in its replies 
to Written Questions 265 and 272. 
7. At their meeting of 21st May in London, representatives of the national armaments directors of 
the Seven agreed that their work should be on an ad hoc basis. The Council would also like to point out 
that WEU has a conceptual and not an operational role and that all duplication with the IEPG and the 
CNAD should be avoided. Responsibility for promoting and monitoring specific European co-operation 
projects lies with the IEPG. 
8. The Council is prepared to offer the French Institut des hautes etudes de defense nationale, and 
any bodies which may follow its example, every encouragement in organising courses on European 
security. The precise organisational arrangements for such courses will of course depend on the expe-
rience gained. 
9. Prior to the ministerial meeting of April 1987, the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Mr. 
Jacques Poos, and the United States Secretary of State, Mr. George Shultz, exchanged letters. This 
exchange confirmed that the United States supported the revitalisation of WEU in the broader 
framework of the Atlantic Alliance and that they were convinced that WEU could provide a means of 
strengthening Europe's contribution to the common defence. 
10. As in the past, the Council will endeavour to report fully on its activities to the Assembly not only 
through the six-monthly reports and the meetings with official representatives of the Assembly but also 
via addresses to and discussions with the parliamentarians during Assembly sessions. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 22nd September 1987 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 25th September 1987. 
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RECOMMENDATION 443 1 
on the ministerial meeting of the Counci/ 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering that the diplomatic/press offensive of Mikhail Gorbachev, who is multiplying pro-
posals for nuclear disarmament, calls for a co-ordinated response from the Atlantic Alliance; 
(ii) Aware that these proposals, which affect first and foremost European security, should lead to 
European interests being defined in WEU, the only European organisation with responsibilities in this 
area; 
(iii) Encouraged by the call to the European members of the Atlantic Alliance by George Shultz, 
United States Secretary of State, following his recent visit to Moscow, requesting their opinion on these 
proposals, 
URGES THE CoUNCIL 
1. To make known its collegiate point of view on the Gorbachev proposals through the intermediary 
of its Chairman-in-Office, Mr. Jacques Poos, in his statement to the Assembly on Tuesday, 28th April 
1987; 
2. To instruct its Chairman-in-Office to give the Council's point of view on the Soviet proposals at 
the meetings of the North Atlantic Council to be held on 11th and 12th June 1987. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 27th April 1987 during the extraordinary session in Luxembourg (2nd sitting). 
2. Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure tabled by Mr. Goerens and others (Document 1094). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 443 
1. Addressing the Assembly at the end ofthe Council meeting on 28th April1987, the Chairman-in-
Office of the Council, Mr. Jacques F. Poos, reviewed the discussions which had focused on the various 
proposals on arms reduction in Europe. 
2. On 6th May 1987, the Political Director from the presidency paid a visit to the NATO Permanent 
Council to appraise the alliance of the Council's discussions on 28th April. 
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 2nd September 1987 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 7th September 1987. 
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RECOMMENDATION 444 1 
replying to the thirty-first annual report of the Counci/ 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Regretting the serious delay in the communication of the Council's annual report in 1986, the 
omission of information concerning one important meeting, and considering that the absence of 
agreement on certain matters should not prevent the Council from presenting the rest of its report on 
time; 
(ii) Welcoming, however, the communication in October 1986 of the first part of the report for that 
year, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Ensure that in future the whole of the annual report on its activities reaches the Assembly before 
the end of February ofthe following year and that it contain a·complete account of activities arranged by 
the Council; 
2. Take into consideration both the strategic and political aspects when discussing the enlargement 
ofWEU. 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 27th April 1987 during the extraordinary session in Luxembourg (2nd sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Amadei on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments (Document 1090). 
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1. The Council will send the report on its activities as soon as possible to the Assembly. It should, 
nevertheless, be borne in mind that the drafting of this report and its approval by the seven member 
states require a certain amount of time. 
2. In its reflections on possible enlargement the Council, aware of the fundamental implications of 
this issue, will take into account all relevant aspects as it has indicated in its reply to Written Question 
265. 
• I l. Communicated to the Assembly on 21st September 1987 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 25th September 1987. 
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The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDATION 445 1 
on principles applicable in preparing the budgets 
of the WEU ministerial organs and the Assembly 2 
Fully endorsing the proposals made by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, for putting an end to WED's budgetary difficulties, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
Implement without delay the three principles defined by the Chairman-in-Office: 
- application to the operating budgets of the ministerial organs and of the Assembly of WEU of 
the growth rate defined in the European Communities; 
- establishment of a separate budget for pensions; 
- recognition of the Assembly's freedom to manage its budget within the limits of the appropria-
tions thus calculated. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 28th April 1987 during the extraordinary session in Luxembourg (3rd sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration (Document 1095). 
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to Recommendation 445 
1. The Council considers that, when all the budgets ofWEU are prepared, the gni>wth rate applicable 
should remain at zero in real terms, based on the rates of inflation in France and the United Kingdom, 
as officially forecast. 
2. On the issue of pensions and budgetary autonomy, the Council would like to draw the Assembly's 
attention to the letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Assembly dated 15th July 1987 
(see annex). 
ANNEX 
The Secretary-General 
15th July 1987 
Dear President, 
Thank you for your letter of22nd June 1987 enclosing a note on the applicatiqn of the principle of 
the Assembly's budgetary autonomy. The Council notes that the funds available to WEU come from 
contributions by member countries. It has to take account of the fact that in attributing financial means 
to international organisations, the governments of member countries have a degree of responsibility 
regarding supervision of the management of resources. 
Bound by this principle, the Council read with the closest attention this note. which very usefully 
clarifies a number of questions. It was taken especially into account in the deliberations of the Council 
on the implementation of the conclusions reached by the Ministers on 28th Aprill~st on separating the 
pensions budget from the operating budget of the Assembly as well as the latter's budgetary autonomy. 
On this question, the Council agrees that, for the management of its future budgets, the Assembly 
may transfer funds between Heads Il, Ill, IV and V without the prior agreement of the Council being 
necessary. Such agreement will be necessary, however, for any transfer concerning Head I. All the other 
procedure relating to the establishment of the budget and its management remai~ unchanged. 
The overall budget of the Assembly, without pensions, will of course have to take account of the 
growth rate accepted by the seven member countries. ' 
In this light, the presentation by the Assembly of detailed draft budgets remains as before and it is 
consequently more than desirable for a representative of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly to be 
able to continue to take part in meetings of the Budget and Organisation Committee when these drafts 
are examined. 
Supplementary budgets are necessarily subjected to the same procedures as ordinary budgets. 
Mr. C. Goerens 
President 
Assembly of Western 
European Union 
43, avenue du President Wilson 
75775 Paris Cedex 16 
France 
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 23rd October 1987 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 30th October 1987 
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The calculations made by the Council allow it to note that the separation of the pensions budget 
from the operating budget would release an amount which, for 1987, might allow it to consider agreeing 
to a supplementary budget of not more than F 250 000. 
The restructuring of the Office ofthe Clerk ofthe Assembly- which had already been set out in a 
letter and a memorandum from your predecessor - falls within the context of Head I of the budget. 
Having examined these documents, the Council decided " that the proposals contained in the document 
(memorandum) need to be considered as part of the review, during the transitional period, of the 
structure of the whole organisation, and cannot therefore be tackled separately". I had the honour to 
inform Mr. Jean-Marie Caro of this in a letter dated 23rd February and to specify, in another dated 28th 
May, that" this decision remains fully valid for all the governments and was in no way modified at the 
lunch of the Ministers on 28th April". 
In these conditions, the possible creation of new posts can be contemplated only in the framework 
of the structure of the whole organisation. Likewise, pending a decision on the new table of establish-
ment, all the promotions made must be considered as measures taken in a personal capacity. 
The Council keenly hopes that these clarifications will allow a harmonious application ofthe con-
clusions reached by the Ministers on 28th April, and this to the satisfaction of the Assembly, and will 
allow the positive nature of its relations with the latter to be strengthened. 
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Alfred CAHEN 
The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDATION 446 1 
on the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance -
Part II: Political activities of the Counci/ 2 
DOCUMENT 1114 
(i) Protesting against the fact that the thirty-second annual report of the Council reached it only on 
27th April 1987; 
(ii) Noting that at the ministerial meeting on 28th April no action was taken on the proposal to draw 
up a European security charter; 
(iii) Noting and regretting that no effective decision has yet been taken on the Assembly's budgetary 
requests and that the words used by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council need clarification; 
(iv) Noting that the Council has taken no practical action on its intentions to reorganise the WEU 
services; 
(v) Noting and regretting that the Council has given no answer to the countries which have applied 
for membership of WEU and Portugal in particular; 
(vi) Noting that the absence of effective and adequate information given to the public on the Council's 
activities leaves considerable doubt about its intention to set up a European pillar of the Atlantic 
Alliance, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Convene as swiftly as practicable a conference of heads of state and of government of the 
signatory countries of the modified Brussels Treaty and of countries effectively determined to take part 
in a European security organisation in the context of the Atlantic Alliance in order to define jointly 
security requirements for the next ten years and the role to be attributed to WEU to this end; 
2. Respond favourably to Portugal's application before the end of the year. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd June 1987 during the first part of the thirty-third ordinary session (2nd sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Ahrens on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document I 099). 
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1. The convening of a conference of heads of state and/or of government is at present not under con-
sideration. The Council considers that the joint ministerial meetings held twice a year since 1984 
provide the necessary political impetus for the organisation's work. As indicated in the Luxembourg 
communique, the Council is currently finalising its report on European security interests in the present 
strategic context which will serve as a basis to draw up a common document identifying the principles of 
European security with a view to its examination, possible adoption and publication, at the next minis-
terial meeting in The Hague. 
2. In considering Portugal's application to join WEU, the Council will have to take account of the 
interest expressed by other European countries. On the general issue of enlargement, the Council's 
position has been stated on several occasions, most recently in its replies to Recommendations 442 and 
444. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th September 1987 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 29th September 1987. 
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on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union 
for the financial years 1986 (revised) and 1987 2 
The Assembly, 
DOCUMENT 1114 
(i) Noting that, in communicating the budgets of Western European Union for 1986 (revised) and 
1987, the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter; 
(ii) Considering that: 
(a) the presentation ofthe budgets for 1986 (revised) and 1987 has been simplified by reducing 
the number of sub-heads and grouping all social charges under one sub-head and all expend-
iture on staff under one head but that ordinary expenditure has not been separated from 
extraordinary expenditure as recommended by the Assembly in Recommendation 433; 
(b) consequently, because of the effect of extraordinary expenditure, the growth rate of these 
budgets cannot be accurately compared with the rate of inflation fixed for applying the zero 
growth criterion; 
(c) furthermore, the evolution of budgets since 1985 shows an increase above the zero growth rate 
since the requirements of reactivating WEU - including the restructuring of the ministerial 
organs - have been taken into account in this budget; 
(d) in addition, the payment of pensions to newly-retired officials could no longer be included in 
the operating budget without jeopardising the activities of the various organs; 
(e) the zero growth rate obviously no longer being of any value, the Council should establish a 
more objective and effective criterion for preparing WEU budgets; 
(f) analysis of the various categories of expenditure in the budgets of the ministerial organs of 
WEU shows that expenditure on staff alone represents about 90% of total operating expend-
iture; 
(g) this percentage could be improved considerably and amounts under Head I " Permanent 
staff" could be used for other operating expenditure if the two seats in London and Paris were 
combined to allow their now separate services to be merged; 
(iii) Regretting that: 
(a) three posts assigned to the Secretariat-General remained vacant throughout 1986 whereas the 
Council refused the creation of new posts in the WEU Assembly; 
(b) the Council has given a new interpretation of criteria for dual grading which entirely ignores 
the wishes of the staffto achieve career prospects subject to certain conditions of seniority; 
(iv) Welcoming the fact that at the close of the ministerial meeting on 28th April 1987 Mr. Poos, 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, informed the Assembly that the Council of Ministers had decided to 
agree to a separate budget for pensions and to recognise the Assembly's budgetary independence within 
the limits of agreed appropriations, this decision to take effect immediately, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Apply the same criterion for increasing WEU budgets as is applied by the EEC in establishing its 
budget; 
2. Apply to the operating budget ofthe Assembly for 1987 the growth rate of2.79 f!o agreed upon for 
its budget as a whole, including pensions, i.e. an increase ofF 379 983; 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd June 1987 during the first part of the thirty-third ordinary session (4th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the reports tabled by Mr. Linster on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Admin-
istration (Documents 1088 and 1105). 
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3. Examine the possibility of: 
(a) uniting the ministerial organs of WEU in a single seat and preparing one table of estab-
lishment integrating the services now divided between the two seats; 
(b) establishing dual grading at every level of the hierarchy to improve the staffs career possibil-
ities. 
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1. After due consideration, the Council has concluded that the criteria for determining the budgets 
of the European Communities should not be applicable to WEU. 
2. When the Council agreed to a growth rate of 2. 79% for the 1987 Assembly budget, which was 
above the anticipated rate of inflation of 2% for France, it did so in order to compensate partially for the 
high pension budget (Part 11 of the budget). Because of this high pension expenditure, the increase ofthe 
operating budget (Part I of the budget) was only 0.49%. 
When the Council of Ministers decided on 28th April 1987 that the pension budget of the 
Assembly should, with immediate effect, be separated from the operating budget, the result was that: 
- the pension budget would be determined in accordance with the legal obligations resulting from 
the application of the pension scheme rules; 
- the operating budget would be determined according to the zero real growth principle. 
In the light of this decision, the Council would refer the Assembly to the Secretary-General's letter 
dated 15th July 1987, a copy of which is annexed hereto. (See annex to reply ofthe Council to Recom-
mendation 445). 
3. (a) The possibility of collocating the ministerial organs is part of the current deliberations on the 
reorganisation of WEU. 
In examining collocation, the Council is mindful, amongst other considerations, of the overall 
increase in efficiency which could result. 
(b) As stated in its reply to Recommendation 433, the Council recalls that the general principle of 
dual grading is that the higher of the two grades represents the approved position in the establishment 
table. The lower of the two grades is added to enable the organisation to recruit staff'who are judged to 
possess the basic qualifications called for but may not have had previous experience. 
Dual grading, therefore, is not intended to create promotion possibilities over and above the 
approved establishment table, but to facilitate recruitment. 
The Council also recalls that the marked difference of 30 to 33% between tre minimum and 
maximum salaries in a grade (seniority steps) exists, amongst other things, to compensate financially for 
limited career possibilities in international organisations. The Council also takes the view that the 
common grading and salary system, as well as the common pension scheme, for the co-ordinated 
organisations encourage job mobility. 
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RECOMMENDATION 448 1 
on European space policy until 2000 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Aware that a resolute space policy helps the development of pioneering technology by fostering 
progress in advanced industrial sectors and intellectual, cultural and human resources in Western 
Europe; 
(ii) Convinced that such a space policy can, in the long run, provide solutions to problems of energy 
and raw material supplies, the pollution of the biosphere and also famine, poverty and illiteracy in the 
third world, while fostering day-to-day progress and a better standard ofliving for the populations of our 
own countries; 
(iii) Determined that Western Europe, through ESA, should be fully independent in space matters 
before the end of the twentieth century; 
(iv) Considering that to enhance scientific capability and make optimum use of relatively limited 
intellectual and financial resources every possibility of European co-operation in both civil and military 
space research must be exploited; 
(v) Anxious to back up the already considerable results achieved by ESA's Ariane programme and 
confirmed by Arianespace in the commercial market; 
(vi) Stressing the urgency of establishing space co-operation for the security ofthe Western European 
countries, particularly in activities recognised to be stabilising, such as monitoring and communica-
tions, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Support the aim of the European Space Agency (ESA) to make Europe independent in space 
before the end of the century by ensuring that it has all the means necessary, which may mean doubling 
the present budget in the next decade; 
2. Encourage the establishment of liaison between ESA and the authorities responsible for space 
policy in each country of the agency to ensure that all European bodies handling space research are kept 
mutually informed of current or planned civil and military programmes in order to avoid any pointless 
waste of intellectual and financial resources and better prepare for the difficult choices which will inevi-
tably have to be made in the future; 
3. Facilitate as far as possible operations by the European Ariane launcher to ensure that it has at 
least a half share of the market for commercial launches, inter alia by: 
- concluding without delay an agreement with the United States Government defining principles 
according to which the cost of commercial launches should take account of the costs borne by 
governments, particularly those relating to launching sites; 
- making arrangements to avoid having western satellites placed in orbit by Soviet launchers pro-
posed in the world market if such offers continue to be made without reciprocity and at a cost 
which does not respect commercial principles; 
4. Endeavour to conclude as early as possible an intergovernmental agreement with the United 
States on the space station in order to bring it into being more quickly while consolidating western 
co-operation, this being an opportunity for Europe, with its partners, to take part in technological 
progress linked with this programme and to advance towards independence; 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd June 1987 during the first part of the thirty-third ordinary session (5th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Valleix on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions (Document 1098). 
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5. With the assistance of the WEU agencies for security questions, examine the repercussions of 
establishing a European military programme for communications, navigation, observation and recon-
naissance satellites; 
6. Systematically strengthen European space co-operation which has already made, Europe the third 
space power in the world and encourage the space dialogue with the United States each time it may lead 
to balanced solutions for the future. 
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1. The Council has noted with interest the Assembly's report entitled " European space policy until 
2000 " and considers that it represents a useful contribution to the member states' reflection on this 
subject. The Council points out that WEU has no role in the organisation and development of civil or 
military programmes. However, those WEU member states which are members of the European Space 
Agency have extended co-operation within the framework of Europe's present and future space pro-
grammes such as the Ariane launcher programme. 
They are continuing to strengthen European co-operation in this sphere. 
2. As far as activities of the agencies for security questions are concerned, the Council would like to 
point out that the agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions has been asked to 
study possibilities for verification measures with regard to different arms control forums. 
In this context, space technology, satellites for example, may offer possible means of verification 
that merit careful examination. 
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 12th October 1987 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 16th October 1987. 
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l. Adopted in committee by 15 votes to 0 with 4 abstentions. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Klttelmann (Chairman); MM. Cifarelli, Fourre (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alloncle (Alternate: 
Jeambrun), Amadei, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. de Beer, De Decker (Alternate: Close), Edwards (Alternate: Cox), Giust, 
lrmer, Jung, Konen, de Kwaadsteniet (Alternate: De Hoop Sche.ffer), Mrs. Lalumiere, MM. Lemmrich, Matraja (Alternate: Bichet), 
Dr. Miller, MM. Pecchioli (Alternate: Pollidoro), Ramaekers, Sarti, Scheer, Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Speed, Steiner, Steverlynck 
(Alternate: Declercq), Stokes. 
N.B. The names of those takzng part zn the vote are printed in italics. 
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VI. Sources of information 
VII. Chemical weapons - A specific case 
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I. A. United States and Soviet Union - historical levels of strategic nuclear 
weapons 
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defence district and Spain) 
C. NATO and Warsaw Pact: Force comparisons 1984 -Regional compar-
isons in Europe 
D. NATO and Warsaw Pact maritime forces 
(a) in North Atlantic and seas bordering Europe 
(b) total including United States, Canadian and Soviet Pacific fleets 
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V. United States and Soviet Union; NATO and Warsaw Pact 
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Introductory Note 
In preparing this report the Rapporteur had interviews as follows: 
IISS, London, 26th August 1986 
Mr. Robert Elliot, Information Officer. 
Ministry of Defence, London, 26th August 1986 
Mr. David Nicholls, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Policy and Programmes; 
Brigadier the Hon. T.P.J. Boyd-Carpenter, Director of Defence Policy; 
Miss G.L. Franklin, Head of Secretariat (Policy Studies). 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 12th September 1986 
Mr. David Ratford, Assistant Under-Secretary of State; 
Mr. John Barrass, Defence Department; 
Mr. Martin Nicholson, Research Department. 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Bonn, 29th September 1986 
Dr. von Plotz, Political Director for European, North American and Atlantic Alliance Affairs; 
Dr. von Kitlitz, NATO Affairs. 
Ministry of Defence, Bonn, 29th September 1986 
Colonel Pohlmann, German Army, Intelligence Division; 
Colonel Farwick, German Army, Public Information, Planning Staff; 
Captain Gunther, German Navy, Military Relations NATO/WEU; 
Lt. Col. Meyer, German Air Force, Military Relations NATOjWEU; 
Lt. Col. Keller, German Air Force, Military Policy, Eurogroup and European Affairs; 
Mr. Y sker, National Defence Staff, Economic Affairs. 
NATO, Brussels, 30th September 1986 
Maj. Gen. Christie, UK Army, Assistant Director, Plans and Policy Division, International 
Military Staff; 
Rear Admiral van Idsinga, RNLN, Assistant Director, Intelligence Division; 
Colonel Malcolm Hunt, Royal Marines, Plans and Policy Division; ' 
Colonel Harry Sloan, UK Army, Public Information Adviser; 
Dr. Murray Feshbach, Sovietologist-in-residence, International Staff; 
Mr. Simon Lunn, Head of Plans and Policy Section, Defence Planning and Policy Division of 
International Staff; 
Mr. Jean-Claude Renaud, Director, Economic Directorate; 
Mr. Brian Field, Assistant Director, Political Affairs Division, International Staff. 
The committee as a whole met in Washington DC and Norfolk, Virginia, from 16th to 20th June 
1986, when it was addressed by or met with: 
16th June 1986 
State Department, Washington DC 
Ms. Rozanne Ridgway, Ambassador, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian 
Affairs; 
Mr. Charles Thomas, Ambassador, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, for European and 
Canadian Affairs; 
Mr. John Hawes, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political Military Affairs; 
Mr. Edward Rowny, Ambassador, Special Representative for Strategic Arms Negotiations; 
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Congressional Research Service, Washington DC 
Mr. Stanley Sloan, Specialist in US Alliance Relations; 
Mr. Paul Gallis, Analyst in West European Affairs; 
Mr. Charles Gellner, Senior Specialist, International Affairs; 
Mr. Stuart Goldman, Analyst in Soviet Affairs; 
Mr. Steven Hildreth, Analyst in National Defence; 
Mr. Francis Miko, Specialist in International Relations; 
Mrs. Charlotte Preece, Specialist in West European Affairs; 
Mr. Dagnija Sterste-Perkins, Foreign Affairs Analyst; 
Mrs. Jeanette Voas, Arms Control Analyst; 
Mr. Paul Zinsmeister, Specialist in National Defence. 
Brookings Institution, Washington DC 
Mr. Joshua Epstein, Research Associate in the Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Programme. 
17th June 1986 
Department of Defence, Washington DC 
Mr. Fred Ikle, Undersecretary of Defence for Policy; 
Dr. Winfred Joshua and Colonel Don Scott, Defence Intelligence Agency; 
Mr. Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defence; 
Mr. Frank Gaffney, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Nuclear Forces and Arms Control 
Policy; 
Mr. Douglas Feith, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Negotiations Policy; 
Mr. Frank Cevasco, Director NATO Affairs, Defence Research and Engineering; 
Mr. Robert Mullen, Assistant Deputy Undersecretary for Trade Security Policy. 
18th June 1986 
United States House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services 
Mr. Samuel Stratton, Representative of New York, and members of the committee: 
Democrats 
Mr. Melvin Price; 
Mr. Charles E. Bennett; 
Mr. G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery; 
Mr. Earl Hutto; 
Mr. Ike Skelton; 
Mr. Thomas M. Foglietta; 
Mr. Richard Ray; 
Mr. Solomon P. Ortiz; 
Mr. Albert G. Bustamante; 
Republicans 
Mr. G. William Whitehurst; 
Mr. Robert E. Badham. 
19th June 1986 
Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia 
Admiral Lee Baggett, US Navy, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, and staff; 
Vice-Admiral Sir Geoffrey Dolton, RN, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic; 
Vice-Admiral Bernard Cauderer, US Navy, Commander Submarine Force US Atlantic Fleet; 
Rear-Admiral Jerry Tuttle, US Navy, Deputy and Chief-of-Staff for the Commander-in-Chief US 
Atlantic Fleet, and staff. 
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20th June 1986 
Arms Control Association, Washington DC 
Mr. Paul Wamke, form~r Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Associ-
ation; 
Mr. Spurgeon Keeny, President of the Arms Control Association. 
It subsequently met in the United Kingdom on 13th and 14th October 1986. 
13th October 1986 
by: 
The committee made an underway visit to HMS Ark Royal, Portsmouth, when it was addressed 
Captain J.L. Weatherall, RN, Commanding Officer; 
Commander Fraser Hutchison, Commander (Air). 
14th October 1986 
The committee met at Headquarters Allied Commander-in-Chief Channel, Nqrthwood, when it 
was addressed by: · 
Admiral Sir Nicholas Hunt, RN, Commander-in-Chief Channel; 
Rear-Admiral R. den Boeft, RNLN, Chief of Allied Staff; 
Air-Vice Marshal Derek Hann, RAF, Chief-of-Staff Maritime Air Forces, Eastern Atlantic; 
Commander Nillesen, RNLN; · 
Captain Whitfield, US Navy, representative of Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic. 
At a meeting in London that day the committee discussed a first draft of the preliminary report. 
It met subsequently at the seat of the Assembly in Paris on 3rd November 1986 when it adopted 
the preliminary report (Document 1076). 
The committee held a meeting at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 24th Febrnary 1987 where it 
was addressed by: 
The Rt. Hon. Lord Carrington, Secretary-General of NATO; 
The Hon. Stephen Ledogar, United States Charge d'Affaires, Acting Permanent Representative to 
NATO; 
General Wolfgang Altenburg, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee. 
The committee met at the seat ofthe Assembly, Paris, on 8th April when a preliminary discussion 
of the report took place. On 9th April the committee held a joint meeting with the Military Committee 
of the North Atlantic Assembly and the two committees were addressed by: 
Mr. Benoit d' Aboville, Deputy Director, Political Affairs, French Ministry for Foreign Affairs; 
Admiral Lacoste, Director of the 'Fondation pour les etudes de defense nationale'. 
Revised versions of the report were discussed at meetings of the committee held in Luxembourg 
on 28th April during the extraordinary session of the Assembly and at the seat of the Assembly, Paris, 
on 12th October. The report was adopted at a further meeting at the seat of the 1Assembly on 2nd 
November, when Mr. Ian Dawson, Director of Agencies for security questions I and 11, addressed the 
committee. 
The committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the Ministers, members of Congress, 
officials and senior officers who met the Rapporteur or committee and replied to questions. 
The opinions expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those ~f the committee. 
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Draft recommendation 
on threat assessment 
The Assembly, 
(i) Recognising that any assessment of the threat which the Atlantic Alliance faces from the Soviet 
Union requires first a political assessment of the Soviet Union's external policy and behaviour, and its 
presumed intentions, as well as rigorous comparison of the military capabilities of NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact; 
(ii) Aware that friendly relations cannot develop while the Soviet Union pursues directly or by proxy 
a policy of military repression in many countries, including Afghanistan and the Baltic states, and con-
tinues to deny the free movement of people across its borders; 
(iii) Reiterating the importance of public support for the necessary allied defence effort, which must be 
seen to be based on a credible comparison of the forces of a potential adversary with those of the 
alliance; 
(iv) Deeply concerned about the large numerical superiority of Soviet conventional forces in the 
northern and central European region dating from the immediate post-war period, noting that qualita-
tively these forces have been continuously improved since then and that geography here favours the 
Soviet Union; 
(v) Noting also the unremitting growth in Soviet nuclear, chemical and maritime forces in the last 
twenty-five years, and noting in particular the submarine threat to the vital transatlantic sea routes; 
(vi) Believing that the sometimes divergent, even contradictory, estimates of Soviet forces or 
equipment used in some public statements by different allied national authorities can only detract from 
the credibility of the estimates; 
(vii) Aware that the agreed NATO force comparisons on which consistent official statements can be 
based could be more comprehensive, and aware that an internal political dispute is still preventing their 
further publication; 
(viii) Believing that a joint European programme for technical sources of defence intelligence would be 
cost effective, which the three independent national programmes in WEU countries cannot be, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Impress on governments the need for defence policy to be based on a credible, objective and con-
sistent assessment of the threat as a whole, economic, political and military: 
(a) which takes account of both allied and Soviet perceptions of security requirements; 
(b) which takes account of both qualitative and numerical factors and the reinforcement capabil-
ities of each alliance; 
(c) which compares the forces of the Soviet Union and its allies with comparable allied forces; 
2. Urge allied governments: 
(a) to draw as far as possible on the agreed NATO force comparisons in their public statements, 
so as to present a more consistent picture of the size and capabilities of Soviet forces com-
pared with those of the alliance; 
(b) to press for further improvements in the comprehensiveness of the agreed force comparisons 
published by NATO, and for an urgent resolution of the dispute currently preventing their 
further publication; 
(c) to encourage the Soviet Government to follow up its newly-declared attitudes towards 
openness and the reduction in international tension by matching words with further deeds; 
3. Co-ordinate the present disparate programmes of three member countries by initiating a joint 
European programme for technical sources of information such as observation and signals intelligence 
satellites and electronic listening posts. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Stokes, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1.1. A preliminary version of the present 
report was adopted by the committee on 3rd 
November 1986, but was not discussed at the 
second part of the thirty-second session of the 
Assembly in December 1986. The present report 
is the completed version of the preliminary 
report. 
1.2. When the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments was first set up thirty years 
ago to examine the security requirements of 
Europe and the alliance, the first problem it 
faced was the acquisition of information to 
provide a basis for its discussions. Perhaps coin-
cidentally, the years that followed saw growing 
interest in informed public discussion of defence 
issues and the establishment of many more inde-
pendent academic institutions devoted to 
defence studies. In addition to a number of 
national institutes and specialised departments 
within universities, two international institutes 
were set up which have since acquired a consid-
erable reputation in their particular fields: the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies based 
in London, founded in 1958 and the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute founded 
in 1966, financed by the Swedish Government. 
Since 1959, the first of these has published each 
year its now substantial and authoritative Mil-
itary Balance, and the second, since 1968, its 
well-known yearbook of World Armaments and 
Disarmament. 
1.3. Especially in the early 1980s there was a 
marked increase also in the public information 
effort devoted by certain countries to publicising 
the military capabilities of potential adversaries. 
In September 1981 the United States Depart-
ment of Defence published for the first time in 
English, and through United States Embassies in 
other languages, its illustrated brochure Soviet 
Military Power which provided considerable 
information about Soviet military forces, their 
equipment, and the Soviet defence production 
effort. The Soviet Union responded remarkably 
promptly with two editions the following year of 
its publication Whence the threat to peace?, in 
English and French as well as the original 
Russian, a skilful rejoinder to the United States 
publication, which described United States mil-
itary capability, but also drew one or two com-
parisons with the Soviet Union's own military 
capability. Later the same year the NATO inter-
national staff produced for the first time its own 
publication NATO and the Warsaw Pact- force 
comparisons which made objective comparisons 
between the collective forces of the two military 
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pacts, representing an agreed view of the NATO 
countries. These publications !have appeared in 
revised form at varying intervals since. 
' 
1.4. As far as the United States was concerned, 
this public relations exercise Of the early 1980s 
sought to bring to the notice of a wider public, in 
more popular, indeed dramatic, form infor-
mation much of which had been available for 
many years in official governmental publications 
such as the annual report to Congress of the 
United States Secretary of Defence, the chiefs-of-
staff military posture statement, as well as the 
voluminous congressional hearings. But it was 
supplemented by some newly declassified infor-
mation on Soviet weapons systems. For the 
Soviet Union, the glossy publication Whence the 
threat to peace? was an innovation in public rela-
tions - it drew on many western sources, at least 
for its illustrations, as it duly acknowledged, but 
some of the themes were not new. In 1987, for 
the first time apparently a Soviet publication 1 
gave broad Soviet estimates oil" the conventional 
force balance in central Europe, and the institute 
concerned is understood to bt refining its esti-
mates, with the intention of publishing them 
annually in future - a welcome example of mil-
itary glasnost. 
1.5. Other notable official sources which now-
adays provide a comparison of forces include the 
annual United Kingdom white paper, Statement 
on the Defence Estimates, and the less frequent 
white papers published by the Federal Republic 
of Germany in English and French, as well as 
German, the most recent (June 1985) entitled 
" The situation and the development of the 
federal armed forces ". Thus, the committee's 
information problem today is one of selection 
rather than acquisition. 
1.6. In 1979 the committee prepared a first 
report on the balance offorce, dealing with much 
the same subject as the present report 2• On that 
report, the Assembly adopted ~ecommendation 
336. The preamble began: 
" Aware that different [political assump-
tions used in interpreting information can 
lead to widely differinS assessments of 
adversary capabilities amd of the balance 
of force;" 
I. Disarmament and Security 1986, Volume I, Table 11, page 
208. Yearbook of the Institute of World Economy and Inter-
national Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences, pub-
lished by Novosti, 1987. 
2. Document 809, 22nd May 1979, Rapporteur: Mr. 
Pawelczyk. 
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and recommended that the Council: 
"Urge member governments: 
1. To take account of both Soviet and 
western perceptions of objectives, militarv 
capabilities and resulting threats, and to 
reject worst-case analysis as the only basis 
of assessment; " 
1. 7. The present report eschews the word 
"balance" because it implies judgment in com-
paring many unlike quantities in the asymmet-
~cal forces ~oncerned. The purpose of the report 
IS to examme some of the difficulties of force 
comparisons and to draw attention to the need in 
the alliance for objective and consistent official 
information. The importance of the subject 
cannot be overstated because the attitudes of 
both sides to arms control and disarmament 
negotiations, on which the committee reports 
elsewhere 3, are of course intimately bound up 
with their respective assessments of the threat. 
II. Objectives and intentions 
(a) Behaviour 
2.1. As the British Prime Minister pointed out 
after her visit to Moscow in March-April 1987 
the political. and military problems are insep~ 
arable. That IS why she put so much emphasis on 
~um~n rights. We _must also not forget the 
mvaswn of Afghamstan, the continued occu-
pation of the Baltic states, the support for Cuban 
mercenaries in numerous parts of the world and 
the denial of the free movement of peoples 
between the USSR and its satellites across the 
iron curtain. 
(b) Military intentions 
2.2. Most threat assessment is concerned with 
attempts at the quantitative assessment of mil-
itary capability, compared with which any 
attempt to guess the underlying intentions of a 
poten~ial adversary is fraught with uncertainty. 
IntentiOns can change overnight" military capa-bilit~ only _slowly over five, ten ~r twenty years. 
The mtentwns of the leaders who took the deci-
sions that led to the acquisition of certain 
equipment may not be those of the leaders in 
power when that equipment enters service. Indi-
vidual members . of a coll~ctive leadership, 
whether democratic or not, will often have dif-
ferent reasons for supporting particular executive 
decisions. 
2.3. Nevertheless, despite the inherent uncer-
tainties, the Rapporteur has attempted to 
3. Disarmament - reply to the thirty-second annual report of 
the Council, Document 1116, 2nd November 1987 
Rapporteur: Mr. Scheer. ' 
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assemble a range of official opinion on Soviet 
intentions, first by drawing on the official 
sources mentioned in paragraph 1.4., and sec-
ondly, by addressing the following specific ques-
tions to the national and allied authorities with 
whom he discussed the report, asking for replies 
on a non-attributable basis: 
(a) What intentions lie, or lay, behind the 
acquisition of the present forces and 
armaments of the Soviet Union: 
(i) territorial expansion? 
(ii) global power/influence projection? 
(iii) defence of its own and Warsaw 
Pact territory? 
(b) What opportunities does the Soviet 
Union believe its military capability 
gives it today: 
(i) in Europe? 
(ii) vis-a-vis the United States? 
(iii) globally for power/influence pro-
jection? 
2.4. As far as the general objectives of the new 
leadership of the Soviet Union under General 
Secretary Gorbachev are concerned, the 
Rapporteur found remarkable unanimity among 
persons he interviewed, most of whom con-
sidered that the primary objective at home is the 
modernisation and strengthening of the Soviet 
~conomy, while externally the primary objective 
Is to be seen to be able to deal with the United 
States on a basis of equality and not to allow the 
United States to dictate to the Soviet Union 
from a position of strength. At home, the Soviet 
leadership is deeply conscious that the Soviet 
Union is a world power only on the basis of its 
defence effort and resulting military capability 
while its economy in many ways suffers from th~ 
shortcomings of those of the third world coun-
tries. Thus, the first objective of defence (and 
arms control) planning in the Soviet Union 
today, after ensuring the integrity of its own ter-
rito~, and dominance in Eastern Europe, is to 
achieve or retain a semblance of parity with the 
United States. 
2.5. While no responsible western authorities 
today believe that the Soviet Union is actively 
planning aggression against any NATO country, 
that does not mean that the Soviet Union will 
cease to be opportunist in its attempts around 
the world to bolster or install regimes friendly to 
the Soviet Union in third world countries nor 
would it be wise to assume that circumst~nces 
may not again arise in which the Soviet Union 
will _resort to the open use of force in territory 
contiguous to the Soviet Union, where it is best 
placed _to _apply its considerable military force, 
and as It d1d m Czechoslovakia in 1968 and most 
recently in Afghanistan in 1979. 
2.6. In the words of recent United Kingdom 
white papers on defence: 
" The challenge for NATO is not simply a 
military one. Soviet leaders have never 
renounced the 'ideological struggle' and 
have used every means available to prop-
agate their own brand of Marxism, taking 
full advantage of the freedoms that exist in 
western societies to further Soviet aims. 
These activities are designed to weaken 
the cohesion of NATO ... " 4 
and again: 
"The Soviet Union inherited the product 
of many centuries of Russian expansion; it 
is a country obsessed with its own security 
but insensitive to the security concerns of 
others. These traditions, and the great 
importance given to military power that 
goes with them, have been combined with 
an ideology dedicated to the ultimate 
victory of communism. The evidence sug-
gests that these ideological goals will be 
pursued with caution and discretion, but 
that opportunities will be grasped if the 
price is limited and acceptable. Given the 
present scale ofNATO's defences, we have 
no reason to believe that Soviet leaders 
have any immediate intention of attacking 
NATO countries; but we cannot ignore the 
fact that those same leaders continue to 
improve the Soviet capability for such an 
attack. Moreover, the size and reach of the 
Warsaw Pact's forces make them a potent 
political weapon. If they were not counter-
balanced by an adequate military capa-
bility, they could be exploited to bring 
unwelcome influence to bear on the 
domestic and foreign policies of other 
countries. " 5 
2.7. The most recent German white paper pub-
lished in June 1985, only very shortly after Mr. 
Gorbachev became General Secretary, contrasts 
the readiness of the Soviet Union to use force to 
maintain the limitation of sovereignty of 
Warsaw Pact countries - the Brezhnev doctrine 
- with its policy of peaceful coexistence: 
"83 ... Vis-a-vis western countries, the 
Soviet Union pursues her policy of 
'peaceful coexistence'. This policy is aimed 
at attenuating the conflict between the 
eastern and western systems in interna-
tional relations while continuing it at the 
societal and political levels in a manner 
which favours the Soviet Union unilat-
erally. Extension of Soviet influence to 
western and third world societies through 
4. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence statement on the 
defence estimates 1986, paragraph 109. 
5. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence statement on the 
defence estimates 1985, paragraph 105. 
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communist parties and other revolu-
tionary movements is to be tolerated by 
the West as legitimate, while reversely the 
Soviet Union reserves to herself the right 
of preventing intrusion of western influ-
ences into her sphere of power by all 
means, including violence. This continu-
ation of class warfare under unequal con-
ditions against the free social order of the 
West is to pave the way towards a victory 
of 'socialism on a global scale' without 
war." 
The excessive military power acquired by the 
Soviet Union results from deliberate political 
decisions, to be used as a substitute for economic 
power in international relations: 
" 86. Forces for the defence of one's own 
country are legitimis~d under legal, 
political, and moral criteria. The Soviet 
Union and her allies, however, have built 
up a military posture that goes far beyond 
what would be required for defence. This 
is also true if one accords to these coun-
tries an excessive want of security. 
In the 'correlation of forces' - a key term 
of Marxist-Leninist ideology - military 
power has steadily gained in importance as 
other instruments of political power, such 
as ideology and economic power, have lost 
in effectiveness in competition with the 
West. The Soviet Union is convinced that 
the political balance of forces is essentially 
governed by military power. This phi-
losophy attaches particular importance to 
the political-psychological effect of mil-
itary power, especially as a threat potential 
in situations of crisis. Today, the Soviet 
Union owes her position as a world power 
primarily to her military strength. 
87. The existence of nuqlear weapons has 
reduced the use of mili[tary power as an 
instrument of warfare. Nonetheless, great 
weight attaches to military power as a 
political factor. The military superiority of 
the Warsaw Pact is a deliberate result of 
political decisions and priorities. In peace 
and crisis, this superiority is the threat 
potential with which the Soviet leaders 
seek to force the West to behave well and 
to yield to intimidation and 
blackmail. " 6 
2.8. The corresponding United States 
assessment of Soviet objectives is noticeably 
harsher: 
" The Soviet Union has long relied on mil-
itary power as its primary instrument for 
expanding control and influence 
throughout the world. Consequently, its 
6. Federal German Ministry of Defence white paper, 1985. 
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military forces are structured and designed 
as offensive forces, ever growing in size 
and sophistication, meant to intimidate 
and, if necessary, to impose the will of the 
Soviet Union on other nations ... 
While Soviet leaders regard military power 
as their primary strength, they view the 
struggle with the West as multidimen-
sional, combining political, economic, sci-
entific, ideological, and military factors 
into what they characterise as the corre-
lation of forces. The Soviets constantly 
work to modify and exploit this corre-
lation to their benefit through subversion, 
propaganda, covert activities, the use of 
proxies, and the threat of intervention. 
Brezhnev declared in 1973: A decisive 
shift in the correlation of forces will be 
such that by 1985 we will be able to exert 
our will whenever we need to. Although 
the efforts of the western world prevented 
the Soviets from reaching their 1985 goal, 
we must continue our efforts to ensure 
that they never reach it. 
Soviet ambitions are global. Lenin wrote: 
We aim at the firm union and full fusion 
of the workers and peasants of all nations 
of the world into a single, worldwide 
Soviet Republic. This goal remains 
unchanged. ", 
but sees also the inherent weaknesses of the 
system especially in the longer term: 
" But in the longer run, Soviet weaknesses 
become even more impressive. The heart 
of their long-term weakness is the source 
of their short-term strength: their political 
system's command and control of every 
area of Soviet life. Such control risks scle-
rosis. An economy co-ordinated by 
politicised command rather than market 
forces has seen its rate of growth steadily 
decline. Such control inhibits adaptive 
experimentation especially in an era of 
rapid technological change led by inde-
pendent centres of initiative. The revo-
lution spearheaded by microelectronics 
and computers depends on widespread 
access to information and communication, 
and thus poses for the Soviet systems a 
threat of terminal decline. Geography 
bequeaths them no warm water ports, 
thereby limiting ocean access. Short-term 
advantages of empire are falling victim to 
the inevitable strains inherent in an 
attempt to dominate nations with the his-
tories and traditions of the Eastern Euro-
peans. Geopolitically, it has been quipped 
that the Soviet Union is the only nation to 
be entirely surrounded by hostile com-
munist countries. They face the threat of 
adversaries on two fronts, NATO to the 
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west and the People's Republic of China 
(PRC) and Japan to the east. Trends in 
demography, health statistics (especially 
alcoholism), and the growth of 
non-Russian nationalities challenge the 
Soviet leaderships' conception of their 
regime. The political and cultural values 
enshrined in Soviet communism are 
falling behind the march of history." 7 
2.9. In response to the Rapporteur's specific 
questions in paragraph 2.3 above, some author-
ities drew attention to some of the foregoing quo-
tations, two others provided custom-made 
replies. In response to question (a) concerning 
Soviet intentions in acquiring its present military 
capability, first: 
"(a) The Soviet Union has, as part of its 
national psyche, a mortal fear of 
invasion and dismemberment. Its 
lengthy history of occupation by 
foreign powers is a basis for this fear. 
Its primary motivation for a large 
armed force is, therefore, national 
defence. 
At the same time (it justifies) its 
history of expansion... by the 
assessment... that a weak or unstable 
neighbour represents a potential 
prize for another, probably 
unfriendly, power. Such border states 
must therefore be brought under 
Russian control lest they fall to 
another. Afghanistan is one such sce-
nario, and the absence of any 
credible threat by any of the Soviet 
Union's neighbours is either irrel-
evant or encouragement. 
From this it follows that Soviet 
power confers a measure of support 
for influence exercised against the 
border areas, or against countries not 
immediately contiguous who might 
as themselves, or by proxy, represent 
a possible adversary. 
In short all three of these 
sub-questions are relevant, each in 
its own way. The term 'aggressive 
defence' might well apply to the 
concept outlined. " 
In general agreement with the second reply to the 
same question: 
"(a) The Soviet Union's armed forces and 
armaments exist primarily to defend 
the Fatherland and sustain the Soviet 
system. Historical experience has 
however made the Russians deter-
7. Annual Report to Congress by United States Secretary of 
Defence, 5th February 1986, pages 55 et seq. 
mined that a future war should not 
be fought on Soviet territory and that 
in the event of war they should seek 
to gain or regain the initiative as 
soon as possible. A second but 
increasingly important rationale for 
the size and shape of the Soviet 
armed forces is its determination to 
maintain at least parity with the 
United States, together with a capa-
bility to counter perceived threats 
from other quarters. The Soviet 
armed forces are not intended for ter-
ritorial expansion per se, but have 
been and are used to maintain Soviet 
control in a number of socialist coun-
tries, mainly on the Soviet Union's 
borders." 
2.10. As to the opportunities the Soviet Union 
may believe its military capability may give it 
(question (b)) the replies are less convergent; 
first: 
"(b) ... The Soviet Union, despite its 
radical Marxist ideology, is 
extremely cautious and conservative 
when it comes to confrontation with 
a more powerful, and hence more 
potentially dangerous, adversary ... 
the Soviet leadership (has no) 
intention of risking outright hostil-
ities... they would far rather gain 
political ends by subverting possible 
target countries, swinging the lead-
ership of those countries into 
political alliance with them through 
'democratic' means. 
(i) Countries in Europe? ... theore-
tically possible but not yet! 
(ii) ... A long-term intent would be to 
isolate (the United States) from 
both its European and Asiatic 
allies ... an unlikely eventuality. 
Shorter-range goals would be to 
divide the United States from its 
allies, and to make it politically 
unacceptable to as much of the 
non-aligned world as possible. 
The Soviet Union labours under 
a major disadvantage in this 
activity, from the fact that the 
United States enjoys economic 
superiority... (but the latter) 
does not best use its advan-
tages. 
(iii) ... The Soviet Union does have 
an advantage with its propa-
ganda about 'freedom', liberty, 
and the rights of the workers ... 
whereas the Americans have 
become identified with the sup-
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porters of the status quo... The 
Soviets can supply arms. But 
they cannot supply economic 
facilities ... Nor can they provide 
markets... Here the United 
States has a great advantage, and 
the third world manufacturers 
an even greater one. " 
Whereas the second respondent claims simply: 
"(b) The Soviet Union believes that its 
military capability gives it the oppor-
tunity to deal with Pte United States 
and be dealt with, as an equal. By the 
same token it expects to be treated as 
overwhelmingly th~ strongest Euro-
pean power. It is increasingly using 
its military and especially naval, 
capability to project its superpower 
status and influence globally, particu-
larly in Asia, the Pacific, the Middle 
East and some parts of Africa, in the 
absence of a commensurate political 
or economic capability. " 
2.11. As a conclusion to the thapter on inten-
tions it has to be borne in mind that reassuring 
assessments that the Soviet Union has no imme-
diate intention of attacking NATO countries are 
no basis for allied defence planning which must 
take account of the Soviet military capabilities 
discussed in Chapter IV. As alr~ady stated, inten-
tions can change overnight. Ndt only must allied 
military capability be sufficient to deter attack, 
there must be a willingness to take precautionary 
measures when needed to :prevent surprise 
attack. Outside observers have always been 
notoriously bad at assessing the intentions of 
potential adversaries in times ~f tension - bluff, 
intimidation or bent on aggression? The exter-
nally observable signs are the same. Two recent 
examples are the invasion of <Czechoslovakia in 
August 1968 and, in a quite different context, 
that of the Falklands in 1982. In the case of 
Czechoslovakia, military intelligence accurately 
reported concentrations of Soviet and other 
Warsaw Pact forces on the frontiers of Czecho-
slovakia, but the majority of western political 
assessment was that the Soviet Union at that 
time, in a period of improving relations with the 
West, would not resort to the use offorce against 
an ally as it had done in Hungary twelve years 
earlier. As the committee has reported 8, the 
equally valid but different example of the 
invasion of the Falklands by A-rgentina in April 
1982 left London with less than four days clear 
military warning, despite many earlier signs of 
belligerent intent. Openly belligerent language 
had been used by Argentine leaders for many 
8. The Falklands crisis, Document 93$, 8th November 1982, 
Rapporteur; Mr. Cavaliere. See explanatory memorandum 
Chapter V, Warning and alert. 
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years, but always dismissed as bluff in diplo-
matic assessments. 
2.12. Thus to say merely that Soviet defence 
planning aims at defence of the homeland and 
maintaining parity with the United States does 
not provide any useful indication of the way the 
Soviet Union might employ its armed forces in 
particular circumstances. Permanent vigilance 
and an adequate defence effort are the only guar-
antees of allied security. 
Ill. What comparison - what viewpoint? 
3.1. Significantly different conclusions can be 
drawn from a comparison of the United States 
with the Soviet Union on the one hand or of the 
whole of NATO with the Warsaw Pact on the 
other. The fifteen NATO allies of the United 
States make a much larger contribution in man-
power, economic strength and military forces 
and equipment than do the six Warsaw Pact 
allies of the Soviet Union. Again the viewpoint 
will affect the countries to be taken into account 
in a force comparison. Viewed from Washington 
or any European country, the Soviet Union is the 
major, if not the only, potential adversary. 
Viewed from Moscow, the Soviet Union with its 
long land and sea frontiers must take account of 
China, other neighbours, and also Japan as well 
as the NATO countries in its force comparisons. 
The Soviet Union also sees itself confronted by 
four independent nuclear weapon powers. 
3.2. At Appendix II are tabular comparisons of 
some main strategic indicators considered in the 
next chapter. It is seen that depending on the 
groups of potential adversaries compared, very 
different ratios of advantage or inferiority could 
be adduced. Thus, in population terms, the 
Soviet Union is larger than the United States in 
the ratio 1 to 0.9 whereas the Warsaw Pact as a 
whole is inferior to the whole of NATO in the 
ratio of 1 to 1.5, and when the remaining 
potential adversaries of the Soviet Union are 
added to the NATO total, the Warsaw Pact is 
inferior in the ratio of nearly 1 to 5. Using the 
same comparisons for GNP expressed in dollars 
(with the reservations involved in the conversion 
process) the Soviet Union is inferior to the 
United States in the ratio of 1 to 1.8; the Warsaw 
Pact is inferior to NATO as a whole in the ratio 
of 1 to 2.4, and inferior to NATO and all other 
potential adversaries of the Soviet Union in the 
ratio of 1 to 3.1. 
3.3. When the defence efforts are compared in 
the same way, the Soviet Union has a superiority 
over the United States in the ratio of 1 to 0.5 for 
armed forces and 1 to 0.8 for defence expend-
iture. But the same ratios for the Warsaw Pact as 
a whole to NATO show the Warsaw Pact equal 
or inferior in the ratios 1 to 1 and 1 to 
1.1 respectively, and inferior to all potential 
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adversaries of the Soviet Union in the ratio of 1 
to 1.9 and 1 to 1.3. 
3.4. These comparisons are for 1983 and are 
based solely on official United States figures pub-
lished annually in World Military Expenditures 
and Arms Transfers with the reservations 
inherent in the dollar assessments of GNP and 
defence expenditure of the various countries con-
cerned, discussed in the next chapter. 
3.5. While Soviet perceptions of security 
requirements must be borne in mind, " equal 
security" for the Soviet Union cannot be 
allowed to mean force levels comparable to the 
sum of those of all possible adversaries as the 
Soviet Union has at times claimed. It has been 
pointed out that the military structure of the 
Soviet Union resembles that of ancient Rome, 
with far-flung legions, composed of many dif-
ferent peoples, manning the distant frontiers of 
empire, protecting its civilisation from the bar-
barian hordes beyond. This indeed may be a 
Soviet perception of its defence posture today on 
parts of its frontier. 
3.6. But this view cannot be true of the central 
region in Europe. Here the Soviet Union has 
overwhelming numerical superiority in men and 
most major weapons which (except for tanks) it 
is reluctant to admit. There is however a recog-
nition, as the committee has heard, that force 
levels in Europe are too high and that an attempt 
should be made to reduce them through negoti-
ation, with inspection procedures " from the 
Atlantic to the Urals ", as the committee has 
reported elsewhere 9• 
IV. What to measure? 
4.1. Resources (manpower and gross domestic 
product) can be measured as can defence input 
(the resources devoted to defence) and defence 
output (numbers of men and weapons systems). 
Although there are difficulties in comparing the 
essentially capitalist economies of the West with 
the centrally directed economies of the Warsaw 
Pact, especially as the official statistics of the 
latter may be suspect, nevertheless an attempt 
can be made to measure these quantities objec-
tively. There remain other important factors 
such as geography, demography, and the quality 
of equipment which are more difficult to 
quantify, but are still important in making a 
comparison of military capability. This report 
looks first at available resources on which they 
can be based (manpower and gross domestic 
product). 
9. Disarmament- reply to the thirty-second annual report of 
the Council, Document 1116, 2nd November 1987, 
Rapporteur: Mr. Scheer. See explanatory memorandum, par-
agraphs 4.34 to 4.38. 
(a) Resources -population 
4.2. The population column in the table of 
strategic indicators at Appendix II reveals only 
the aggregate picture as far as population com-
parisons between the two alliances are concerned 
(using United States data for 1983). With popu-
lations of 234 million and 272 million respec-
tively, the United States and the Soviet Union 
both have large manpower resources but the 
even larger total populations of the rest of NATO 
redress the total population balance between all 
Warsaw Pact countries and all NATO countries 
to 1:1.5 in favour of NATO. 
4.3. As far as the NATO-Warsaw Pact com-
parison is concerned, aggregate population 
figures are an insufficient indication of available 
military manpower resources. Compared with 
the Soviet Union, the NATO countries have rel-
atively homogenous, largely urbanised and 
industrialised populations in which certain basic 
technical skills such as the ability to drive motor 
vehicles are widespread, and where literacy is 
universal. Turkey is perhaps an exception to this 
general description where literacy for example is 
still only 62%, and to a lesser extent Portugal 
assessed to have 70% literacy. 
4.4. In terms of population resources the 110 
million population of the European Warsaw Pact 
countries, other than the Soviet Union, corre-
spond broadly in character with the 332 million 
population of the European NATO countries, 
but the same is not true of the population of the 
Soviet Union itself. Composed of 15 constituent 
republics with some 40 different nationalities 
and as many principal languages, the population 
of the Soviet Union is very far from being 
homogenous and is less urbanised than the popu-
lations of European countries. Of the 127 
recorded languages of the Soviet Union 45 were 
in use for instruction in Soviet schools in 
1977. 
4.5. According to Soviet statistics the urban 
population of the Soviet Union as a whole 
increased from only 48% in 1959 to 65% by 1985, 
but the proportion differs widely among the dif-
ferent republics, being only 34% in the Tad.zhik-
istan republic. Great efforts have been made to 
teach Russian throughout the country, but in the 
republics where it is not an indigenous language 
Russian is understood mainly by the urban pop-
ulation, and is still being taught as a " foreign " 
language to more than one third of all ele-
mentary and high school students in the Soviet 
Union 10• Official Soviet reports of" fluency" in 
Russian have varied, ranging from 62% (urban) 
and 28% (rural) in Moldavia, through 42% in 
1 0. See Prospects for out-migration from Central Asia and 
Kazakhstan in the next decade, by Murray Feshbach in US 
Congress Joint Economic Committee Soviet economy in a 
time of change, Volume 1, 1979. 
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K.azakhstan, 28% in Estonia, to 14-19% in the 
Central Asian republics. 
4.6. Because the birth rate is declining in the 
European part of the Soviet Union while at the 
same time it is increasing in the eight republics of 
predominantly Muslim origins along the 
southern border of the Soviet Union with Iran, 
Afghanistan and China, the proportion of 
18 year olds available for conscription into the 
Soviet forces is shifting rapidly. These eight 
republics (four in Central Asia plus K.azakhstan 
and three trans-Caucasian republics) accounted 
for less than 19% of the 18 yeat old population in 
1970, but now account for 30% and will account 
for 35% in the year 2000. Soviet military writings 
have referred to the " yellowing " of the armed 
forces. The basic technical skills of European 
populations are less widespread among these still 
very rural and culturally different peoples of the 
Soviet Union. 
4.7. Reports differ on the importance of the 
Muslim religion in the Soviet Union today. 
While the 1972 edition of the great Soviet ency-
clopedia claims, in accordance with official doc-
trine, that " Islam, like other religions, is 
becoming more and more a vestige of the past", 
leaders of the Muslim religton in the Soviet 
Union have made quite different claims such as 
that by the Mufti Babakhan for Central Asia in a 
broadcast on 1st April 1979 ~laiming " over 40 
million Muslims in the Soviet Union" 11 - a 
figure corresponding to the total population of 
the various nationalities of Muslim origin in the 
Soviet Union. Assimilation appears to have been 
dropped as a policy slogan in the Soviet Union in 
favour of " rapprochement " and even " flour-
ishing " of the different nationalities. Muslim 
fundamentalism in Iran and other neighbouring 
countries is a cause of concern to the Soviet 
Union. 
4.8. Thus, while total manpower resources 
available in the Soviet Union are not declining, 
the proportion of that population that is techni-
cally competent and fluent in Russian is 
declining both in absolute numbers and as a pro-
portion of the whole. The burden of training in 
the Soviet armed forces Will be that much 
greater, especially with the introduction of ever 
more advanced technical equipment. 
4.9. In the NATO countries in contrast, popu-
lation growth over the last five years has been 
limited largely to the United States and Turkey, 
being largely static in other countries, reflecting 
in fact a decrease in the number of 18 year olds 
available for military service, which in the case 
of Germany has led to an extension of service 
from 15 to 18 months in 1989. 
11. Quoted by Feshbach op. cit. 
DOCUMENT 1115 
(b) Resources- economy 
4.10. There is a wealth of statistical data 
available on the economies of the western 
industrialised countries, published in compa-
rable form by the various international 
organisations including the European Com-
munity and the OECD. Western experts on the 
Soviet economy warn both on the absence of 
important official Soviet economic statistics, and 
on the unreliability of those that are published. 
4.11. The non-availability of much important 
information about the Soviet Union reflects in 
part a defensive secrecy, an unwillingness to dis-
close weaknesses to the outside world. But it is a 
consequence also of the natural secretiveness of 
the highly compartmentalised, bureaucratic com-
munist system which lacks the extensive lateral 
communication between different branches of an 
administration, partly structurally organised and 
partly informal, that characterises most western 
societies. The unreliability of some of the offi-
cially published Soviet statistics, according to 
Soviet writers themselves, reflects a tendency to 
inflate production figures to meet the planning 
targets that are a feature of the state planning 
system. 
4.12. Mr. Gorbachev's call for glasnost or 
openness is quite likely to be motivated as much, 
or more, by the urgent need to inform the central 
authorities of the Soviet Union of the true state 
of affairs throughout its own sprawling, 
backward empire, than by a desire to present a 
more favourable image to the West. 
4.13. A more fundamental problem arises in 
comparing prices in a centrally-planned 
economy with those of the comparatively free-
market economies of the West where market 
forces result in prices reflecting the value of a 
product in terms of labour and other resources 
devoted to their manufacture. However, several 
western estimates of the Soviet economy as a 
whole are available, without too much disa-
greement between them. 
4.14. The United States Central Intelligence 
Agency however publishes its own estimate of 
Soviet economic performance and that of the 
other Warsaw Pact countries, calculating gross 
national product in United States dollars on a 
purchasing power equivalent basis 12• This basis 
of comparison is understood to be the mean 
between estimates of Soviet GNP, as valued and 
compared with United States at both dollar and 
rouble prices. More detailed statistics are pub-
lished by the United States Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency 13 which, for the Soviet 
Union, again draws on the CIA figure. 
12. Handbook of economic statistics, 1985. 
13. World military expenditure and arms transfers, 1985. 
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4.15. The CIA figures for the year 1984 show 
Soviet gross national product of $1 958 billion 
compared with $3 663 billion for the United 
States. In terms of GNP per capita, the same 
source shows $7 120 for the Soviet Union com-
pared with $15 470 for the United States. The 
more detailed ACDA figures for the previous 
year permit comparisons with a number of indi-
vidual countries. They show a Soviet GNP per 
capita of$6 490 -lower than that of any NATO 
country except Greece, Portugal and Turkey. 
The same source shows total GNP for all NATO 
countries of$5 942 billion compared with $2 460 
billion for the Warsaw Pact countries. The GNP 
per capita figures from the same source show 
$10 045 for NATO compared with $6 417 for the 
Warsaw Pact. 
4.16. While the United States remains outstand-
ingly the most powerful economy among the 
NATO countries, in proportion to its population 
that of the Soviet Union is not outstanding com-
pared to the more developed Warsaw Pact coun-
tries. The CIA figures for 1984 for GNP per 
capita show $8 250 for Czechoslovakia; $9 800 
for East Germany; and $7 200 for Hungary (com-
pared with $7 120 for the Soviet Union). 
4.17. Although the Soviet economy expanded 
considerably in the aftermath of World War 11, 
increasing by as much as 8% per annum 
according to some estimates, the growth was 
achieved by a progressive increase in the labour 
force and in capital investment. The growth 
slowed during the 1960s, and during the 1970s 
the Soviet Union had to look to increased labour 
productivity to maintain its economic growth 
but with less success than the industrialised 
western countries. Significantly, the twelfth 
five-year plan for the period 1986-90 calls for an 
increase in labour productivity of between 20 
and 23%, and calls for 80 to 95% of industrial 
production to meet international quality stan-
dards - an admission that the quality of many 
civilian goods produced by the centrally-planned 
system cannot match the quality of those pro-
duced in the West. 
(c) Defence inputs- expenditure 
4.18. Even among the NATO countries, there 
has been debate in the past about the proper 
comparison of national defence expenditure, 
turning on items such as pensions to ex-service 
personnel (which some countries in their budgets 
show as social affairs expenditure, others as 
defence expenditure) or frontier police (countries 
with long and remote frontiers may employ 
armed paramilitary units in a multi-purpose 
defence/customs/immigration role, whereas 
similar functions in other countries are per-
formed by purely civilian officials). NATO now 
has its agreed common definition of defence 
expenditure and publishes its own comparative 
defence statistics - see Appendix Ill. 
4.19. Estimating Soviet defence expenditure in 
terms comparable with that of allied countries 
encounters first the same difficulties as western 
estimates of the Soviet economy, mentioned in 
the foregoing section, further complicated by the 
much greater secrecy that surrounds defence 
information in the Soviet Union. Many properly 
military items are obviously excluded from that 
country's published defence budget. But whereas 
there is not much discrepancy between different 
western academic estimates of the Soviet 
economy as a whole, there is some disagreement 
between western estimates about the proper 
methodology to apply when comparing Soviet 
defence expenditure with that of allied coun-
tries. 
4.20. The United States CIA regularly estimates 
Soviet defence expenditure at dollar cost using 
the " building block " method, whereby the dif-
ferent items which comprise the Soviet armed 
forces - personnel, equipment, operating costs -
are identified and the cost of procuring the same 
items in the United States is then estimated 
using United States prices for goods and labour. 
This dollar cost estimate of Soviet defence 
expenditure is published each year in the United 
States ACDA publication, "World military 
expenditure and arms transfers". This figure for 
Soviet defence expenditure is then used, in con-
junction with the averaged dollar-rouble cost 
estimate of Soviet GNP, to calculate the per-
centage of GNP devoted to defence. 
4.21. Rouble cost-estimates of Soviet defence 
expenditure, using the same building blocks as 
for dollar estimates, are also calculated but do 
not appear to have been published more recently 
than for the years 1970 to 1975. It is widely 
recognised both by critics of the method and in 
the official United States and NATO publica-
tions concerned, that estimates of this type gen-
erally overstate the relative size of Soviet mil-
itary expenditure: " ... data on Soviet military 
expenditure are based upon Central Intelligence 
Agency estimates of what it would cost in the 
United States in dollars to develop, procure, staff 
and operate a military force similar to that of the 
Soviet Union. Estimates of this type ... generally 
overstate the relative size of the second country's 
expenditures in inter-country comparisons. " 14• 
And again: " ... familiar reasoning would indicate 
that comparisons of Soviet and United States 
military spending should be carried out regularly 
not only in dollars, but in roubles too. When 
crude comparisons have been carried out in 
14. United States ACDA World military expenditure and 
arms transfers, 1985, page 140. 
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roubles, then the Soviet advantage in terms of 
expenditures on military activities has been 
shown to be less than a qollar comparison 
indicates. " 15• · 
4.22. Appendix IV shows the United States 
ACDA figures for military expenditure of the 
United States and the Soviet :Union, of NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact collectively, for the years 
1973 to 1983 - the latest published. On the CIA 
dollar basis for Soviet expenditure, this shows 
Soviet expenditure exceeding that of the United 
States by some 25% during much of the period, 
but also shows total NATO expenditure 
exceeding that of the Warsaw Pact for the first 
two and last three of the years covered. The con-
tribution by the " rest of NATO " is more than 
double that of the "rest of the Warsaw Pact" 
during the period. 
4.23. Prior to 1983, the CIA estimated that 
Soviet military expenditure over the previous 
five years had been increasing by 3% per annum 
(constant dollars) or 4 to 5% (constant roubles). 
This estimate made a large contribution to the 
NATO objective in the late 1970s to secure a 3% 
annual increase in real terms ip defence expend-
iture by all NATO countries. In a significant 
revision of its estimates in 1983 the CIA con-
cluded that in the post-1976 period, there had 
been a reduction in the rate otincrease of Soviet 
military expenditure to 2% a year or slightly less 
up to the year 1982. In particular, expenditure on 
military equipment was estimated not to have 
increased in the post-1976 period, although 
expenditure on research and development 
probably increased by more than 2 to 3% per 
annum. 
4.24. In maintaining its large concentration of 
men, tanks and aircraft in Europe, whilst striving 
for parity with the United States in strategic 
nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union inevitably 
has devoted a far larger proportion of its rela-
tively modest economic base, to military pur-
poses than any of the NATO countries. The 
earlier CIA estimate showed that the Soviet 
Union had devoted from 12 to 13% of its GNP 
to military expenditure in the period 1970 to 
1978 and that the percentage had increased to 13 
or 14% in the period 1979 to 1981. After 1983 the 
view was that the percentage had remained at 
13 to 14% during the whole of the period 1970 to 
1981. The 1983 revision by the CIA apparently 
resulted from accumulating evidence from 
1976 onwards that Soviet expenditure on mil-
I 
15. Soviet military expenditure estimates: meaning and mea-
surement, Brian Field, Assistant Director, NATO Economics 
Directorate, in NATO Review for August 1986. A footnote at 
this point in the article states: " The CIA found that Soviet 
military expenditures in 1974 were 2P% higher than in the 
United States in dollar terms and 10% higher in rouble 
terms". 
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itary equipment had levelled off from 
1976 onwards 16• 
4.25. A sharper critic of the dollar cost method-
ology of assessing Soviet military expenditure 
has pointed out that whereas the CIA uses an 
average of its dollar cost and rouble cost esti-
mates in assessing Soviet GNP, it does not 
publish such an averaged evaluation for Soviet 
military expenditure 17• On the basis of these crit-
icisms, rouble estimates of Soviet defence 
expenditure, with some adjustments for dis-
torted Soviet prices, provide the best estimate of 
resources devoted to defence as perceived by the 
Soviet Union. The dollar estimate of defence 
expenditure is more properly seen as a measure 
of defence output by United States standards. 
(d) Defence inputs- manpower 
4.26. Generating armed forces of 4.4 million 
men compared with some 2.2 for the United 
States, from a population only slightly larger 
than that of the United States, the Soviet Union 
inevitably draws on a large proportion of its pop-
ulation. It also has longer periods of conscription 
than any NATO country except Greece - three 
years in the navy, two years in all other services. 
Figures for NATO countries are at Appendix Ill 
B; for Warsaw Pact at Ill C. Canada, Luxem-
bourg, the United Kingdom and (since the end of 
the Vietnam war) the United States have no 
compulsory military service; that of other NATO 
countries ranges from 9 to 24 months. Com-
pulsory service in other Warsaw Pact countries 
ranges from 16 to 36 months. The following table 
compares numbers in armed forces per thousand 
population. 
United States and Soviet Union; 
NATO and Warsaw Pact 
Numbers in armed forces per thousand 
population - 1983 
United States 
NATO 
Warsaw Pact 
Soviet Union 
9.5 
9.4 
15.2 
16.1 
4.27. Another factor relevant to the raising of 
armed forces is the extent of pre-military edu-
16. For an analysis of the CIA decision to revise its esti-
mates, see Causes of the slow-down in Soviet defence, 
Richard F. Kaufman, Assistant Director, United States Con-
gress Joint Economic Committee, published in Soviet 
Economy, January to March 1985 (reprinted in Survival, 
July/August 1985). 
17. Franklyn Holzman, Professor of Economics at Tufts 
University, quoted in United States Congressional Research 
Service, Estimates of Soviet defence expenditures: methodo-
logical issues and policy implications, Robert E. Foelber and 
others, 5th July 1985. 
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cation and training in schools. This is under-
stood to be institutionalised in the Soviet Union, 
both in schools and in the young pioneers. There 
are far fewer cadet forces in schools in NATO 
countries. 
(e) Defence output 
4.28. Defence output - the final product of the 
defence effort - is represented by the armed 
forces and military equipment which are main-
tained by the defence effort. These are described 
in the next chapter. 
V. Force comparisons 
5.1. Potentially, the most useful official source 
of comparative information of the forces of the 
two military blocs is the NATO publication: 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact: force comparisons, 
because it represents a view agreed within 
NATO rather than the view of any one gov-
ernment. First published in 1982, an updated 
edition was issued in 1984. 
5.2. It suffers from the serious defect of 
excluding French and Spanish forces from the 
comparison, at the insistence of those two coun-
tries, because they do not participate in the inte-
grated military structure of the alliance. 
Moreover, it has not been updated since 1984 
because of a Greek-Turkish dispute over the dec-
laration of Greek forces on an island in the 
Aegean. This is a curious exclusion when it is 
remembered that France has always notified 
NATO of its defence expenditure and is included 
in the relevant NATO publications (Appendix 
Ill A). The most widely-quoted publication is the 
annual IISS Military Balance, which has won 
international recognition since its first publi-
cation in 1959. 
(a) Nuclear weapons 18 
(i) Strategic nuclear weapons 
5.3. The following tabulation of nuclear forces 
follows the categories defined by the arms 
control process. This has the advantage of rela-
tively clear definition of each category, but will 
not correspond to the forces taken into account 
in assessing a particular military threat, which is 
a far more complex process. 
5.4. The SALT I and SALT II agreements in 
effect cover all nuclear weapon delivery systems 
stationed on the territory of one superpower that 
are capable of reaching the territory of the other 
and all submarine-launched ballistic missiles. 
These weapons are: intercontinental ballistic 
18. Notes: Chief source: IISS Military Balance 1986-87. 
Figures valid for mid-1986 except where otherwise shown. 
" Range ~ means range of missiles, combat-radius of aircraft 
which can only be a rough estimate. 
missiles, defined in SALT 11 as those having a 
range in excess of 5 500 km; heavy bombers, 
defined in SALT 11 as the following aircraft, or 
any aircraft with comparable performance: 
United States B-52 and B-1; Soviet Tu-95 (Bear); 
and Mya-4 (Bison), or any aircraft equipped to 
carry air-launched cruise missiles with a range in 
excess of 600 km; and lastly, all submarine-
launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). 
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5.5. Table I shows the numbers of these 
weapons. While the Soviet Union has more 
ICBMs and SLBMs, because of the larger 
number of multiple independent re-entry 
vehicles (MIRVs) on United States SLBMs, and 
the larger bomb and ALCM load of United 
States heavy bombers, the United States force 
comprises more warheads than that of the Soviet 
Union. 
TABLE I 
Strategic nuclear weapons 
United States Sovzet Union 
Range (km) 1 No. No. of No. of No; Range (km) 1 
warheads warheads 
ICBMs 11 300- 1 010 2 110 6 420 1 398 2 9 600-
14 800 13 000 
SLBMs 4000- 640 6 656 3 216 944 2400-
7 400 9 100 
Heavy bombers 5 000- 260 4 080 1 080 160 4 500-
6 000 I 6 400 
Totals 1 910 12 846 10 716 2 502 
l. Throughout this paper "range" means range of missiles; combat-radius of aircraft. 
2. Some of the SS-11 and SS-19 missiles in this total are designed for use either against Europe or the United States. 
(ii) Grey area nuclear weapons falling between the 
present SALT and INF arms control categories 
5.6. During the SALT negotiations, both the 
Soviet Union and the United States raised objec-
tions concerning other categories of nuclear 
weapons capable of reaching the territory of 
either superpower, but which were finally 
excluded from the SALT agreements. These are 
essentially the British and French strategic 
forces; what the Soviet Union terms the forward 
based weapons of the United States; the Soviet 
Backfire bomber which could reach the United 
States with in-flight refuelling, and possibly the 
obsolescent SLBMs in the Baltic and submarine-
launched cruise missiles. Table 11 lists all such 
weapon systems which are also understood to be 
excluded from the current INF negotiations. 
(iii) Intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) 
LRINF 
5.7. The current bilateral INF negotiations in 
Geneva are concerned primarily with missiles 
that have acquired the cumbersome term in 
NATO communiques " long-range intermediate 
nuclear forces " (LRINF). These are taken to be 
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the current Soviet SS-20 and presumably its sur-
viving predecessors, the SS-4 (the SS-5 having 
been withdrawn from service) and the NATO 
cruise and Pershing 11 missiles, the ranges of 
which are shown in Table Ill. 
SR/NF 
5.8. The deployment by the Soviet Union after 
the NATO 1979 INF decision of SS-22 (other-
wise referred to as a modified SS-12) and SS-23 
missiles, with ranges of 900 and 500 km respec-
tively, led to the definition of a further missile 
category " shorter-range intermediate nuclear 
forces " (SRINF), not to be confused with short-
range missiles tout court with ranges from tens of 
kilometres up to 150 km (tactical nuclear 
weapons below). NATO seeks constraints on 
SRINF in the INF negotiatiop.s. It is uncertain 
how many of the reported SR:INF are deployed 
in East Germany and Czecho~ovakia, but those 
that are in range of large areas of European 
NATO countries. NATO has Pershing lA mis-
siles with 700 km range in Germany, otherwise 
no corresponding missile system but its nuclear-
capable tactical aircraft fulfil a comparable mil-
itary role. 
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TABLE II 
Grey area nuclear weapons excluded from SALT and INF negotiations, 
capable of reaching territory of adversary superpower 
Allied Soviet Umon 
Weapon Range Country No. No. of No. of No. Range (km) deploying warheads warheads (km) 
Missiles 
IRBM 3 500 France 18 18 
SLBM 3 000- France 96 176 39 39 1400 
4400 
SLBM 4600 UK 64 64 
SLCM 2 2 500 us 164 164 (356) 356 450-
550 
Aircraft 
Land-based 
FB-lllA 2000 us 55 300 420 4 140 4 5 000 
F-111 2000 us 150 450 
Mirage IV 5 1400 France 30 30 
Carrier-based 
A-6 1 500 us 30 6 90 6 
A-7 1 200 us 726 288 6 
Totals 679 1 580 815 535 
1. Believed deployed in Baltic. 
2. Sea- (submarine or surface) launched cruise missile. 
3. Anti-ship missiles that may have land target capability. 
Weapon 
Missiles 
SLBM 1 
SLCM 3 
Aircraft 
Tu-22M 
Backfire 5 
Totals 
4. A further 120 of these aircraft belong to naval aviation. If in nuclear role they might add 360 warheads. 
5. Require in-flight refuelling to reach US/Soviet territory. 
6. Assumes 3 only of United States 15 aircraft carriers in Atlantic/Norwegian Sea or Mediterranean. Pacific coast threat to Soviet 
Union ignored. 
TABLE Ill 
NATO Soviet Union 
Weapon Range No. No. of No. of No. Range Weapon (km) warheads warheads (km) 
In Europe In range of 
Europe 
GLCM 2 500 208 I 208 I 810 270 5000 SS-20 
Pershing II 1 800 108 108 112 112 2000 SS-4 
In Asia 
513 171 5000 SS-20 
Total 316 316 1435 553 Total 
I. Figure for end-1986. Deployment continuing to planned 464 GLCM. 
(iv) Short-range nuclear forces (SNF) and tactical 
nuclear weapons 
5.9. There is a variety of other nuclear weapon 
systems usually thought of as tactical or battle-
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field weapons, most of which are dual-capable -
capable of delivering nuclear or conventional 
weapons. These include most tactical aircraft 
and much artillery. Only short-range missiles in 
this category are likely to be reserved to a nuclear 
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NATO Sovzet Unwn 
' 
Missile Range (km) No. of No. of Range (km) Missile launchers launchers 
Pershing lA 700 72 60-80 900 SS-22 (or modified 
SS-12) 
20 500 SS-23 
Totals 72 90 
TABLE IV 
Shorter-range nuclear-capable delivery systems in European area 
' (Except for the missiles with one nuclear warhead each, all these systems are dual-capable. The size of the nuclear threat depends 
on the size of the nuclear stockpile rather than the number of delivery systems.) 
NATO Warsaw Pact 
Weapon Range No. of No. of Range Weapon (km) launchers launchers (km) 
Missiles Missiles 
140 120 SS-21 
Lance 110 163 500 70 Frog, 
Pluton 120 44 600 300 Scud 
Artillery Artillery 
Reminder: calibres 150 mm and over are nuclear-capable. 
See conventional forces below for numbers. 
Tactical aircraft Tactical aircraft 
(and Soviet Union 
medium bombers) 
Soviet Union 
F-104 1 000 271 180 { 2100 Tu-16 Badger F-4 950 263 2 800 Tu-22 Blinder 
F-16 1 600 387 600 Su-7 Fitter A 
Mirage Ill 1000 30 450 MiG-21 Fishbed L 
Jaguar 650 45 1 190 600 MiG-27 Flogger D/3 
Tornado 1200 358 550 Su-17 Fitter D/H 
1 600 Su-24 Fencer 
(Carrier-based) 700 38 
Warsaw Pact 
90 600 Su-7 
40 550 Su-20 
109 1 100 MiG-23 
Totals 1 392 1 609 Totals 
235 Soviet naval aviation 
Tu-16, Tu-22, Tu-22M 
Excluded from both alliances: ASW aircraft which may carry nuclear depth charges. 
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role. A measure of the nuclear forces on each side 
in this category depends therefore on the number 
of nuclear warheads available for the dual-
capable systems, rather than on the number of 
delivery vehicles. Reliable figures are not pub-
lished. 
5.10. NATO in the 1970s was understood to 
have 7 000 United States nuclear warheads for 
tactical systems deployed in Europe (Belgium, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Turkey, the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom) plus those of France. 
The Soviet Union was then reported to have 
3 500. Following the Montebello decision of the 
NATO Nuclear Planning Group on the 
modernisation of tactical weapons and the 1979 
INF decision (to withdraw one warhead for 
every one deployed on INF), NATO is under-
stood to have reduced the number of tactical 
warheads in Europe to 4 000. No recently quoted 
comparable figure for the Soviet Union is to 
hand. 
5.11. Possible reductions in such tactical 
weapon systems are implicitly covered in discus-
sions of armaments and air forces in the MBFR 
negotiations, but any limited initial agreement 
would be unlikely to affect them. 
(b) Conventional forces 
5.12. The strategic indicators at Appendix II 
show the total numbers of armed forces for the 
two alliances. Of more interest in threat 
assessment is a comparison of the conventional 
forces and equipment in Europe. Such a com-
parison raises difficult problems of definition 
including the degree of readiness and peacetime 
location of forces, and the operational capability 
of different items of military equipment, which 
should be included (or not) in an objective com-
parison. 
5.13 The publication issued by NATO in 1982 
and revised in 1984, NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact: Force comparisons, is used here. It gives 
definitions of the criteria used in including or 
excluding forces and equipment in the different 
categories compared. The publication is the work 
of the international military and civilian staffs in 
NATO headquarters based on information 
reported by member governments and is 
moreover collectively approved by the NATO 
countries. It represents a more objective 
approach than some purely national sources. The 
publication suffers however from the major 
defect that it excludes French and Spanish forces 
on the legalistic grounds that they are not part of 
the integrated military structure of NATO. 
inclusion of French and Spanish forces where 
appropriate with information drawn chiefly from 
the IISS Military Balance. 
(i) Ground and air forces 
5.15. These comparisons confirm the well-
known picture of large numerical superiority of 
Warsaw Pact conventional ground and air forces 
in Europe, particularly in tanks and artillery 
(more than 2 to 1) and in total numbers of 
combat aircraft (2.5 to 1). The only significant 
item in which NATO is numerically superior is 
transport and support helicopters. 
5.16. Warsaw Pact spokesmen claim that the 
relationship of conventional forces in Europe is 
asymmetrical; in recent years they have 
recognised Warsaw Pact superiority in numbers 
of tanks and air defence fighters, but have 
claimed that NATO is superior in anti-tank 
weapons and strike and attack aircraft. The 
figures at appendix do not support this claim of 
NATO numerical superiority, but do show that 
Warsaw Pact superiority in tactical aircraft is 
largely confined to those in the air defence fighter 
role. NATO figures for anti-tank weapons (which 
exclude short-range shoulder-launched weapons) 
show a 1 to 1.5 Warsaw Pact numerical superi-
ority. 
5.17. When certain qualitative factors con-
sidered in the next chapter are taken into 
account, however, the overall picture is a little 
less unfavourable for NATO than the foregoing 
numerical comparisons would suggest. 
(ii) Naval forces 
5.18. As far as navalforces are concerned NATO 
is in a far stronger position with a monopoly of 
aircraft carriers for conventional fixed-wing air-
craft, and clear superiority in ocean-going surface 
forces. The Warsaw Pact has larger numbers of 
submarines and of smaller coastal craft. 
5.19. NATO navies, however, enjoy consid-
erable geographical advantages with ready access 
to the seas and oceans. The Soviet navy is of 
necessity divided into four separate fleets largely 
isolated from each other with the Baltic and 
Black Sea fleets having to transit the NATO-
controlled Danish and Turkish straits respec-
tively to reach the seas beyond. The width of the 
ice-free passage for the Soviet Northern Fleet 
from Murmansk to the Norwegian Sea may be 
reduced to 100 miles in winter. The Pacific fleet 
from its main base at Vladivostok has to transit 
Japanese straits to reach the Pacific. At all of 
these choke-points NATO countries have surface 
and submarine surveillance devices. Only the 
5.14 The comparisons of conventional forces in secondary base of the Pacific Fleet at Petropav-
Europe at Appendix Ill A-D are therefore based lovsk on the remote Kamchatka peninsula pro-
on the NATO publication, corrected by the vides direct access to the Pacific Ocean. 
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(c) Qualitative factors 
5.20. Numbers of conventional forces discussed 
in the foregoing section are obviously an 
important factor, but the capabilities of the mil-
itary equipment can significantly affect the 
assessment of the threat. Qualitative factors are 
however more difficult to measure. 
5.21. As far as the basic technologies available 
to weapons designers are concerned, the NATO 
force comparisons publication notes that 
" NATO nations until recently enjoyed clear 
leadership in most areas of technology 
although, ... this lead is being eroded". The US 
Secretary of Defence provides each year a general 
comparison of US and Soviet technology. The 
report for FY 1987 does not recognise Soviet 
superiority in any of the selected fields: 
Relative US/USSR standing 
in the twenty most important basic technology areas 
Basic technologies us US/USSR USSR superior equal superior 
1. Aerodynamics/Fluid dynamics ........................... . X 
2. Computers and software ................................. . 
-
X 
3. Conventional warheads (including all chemical explosives) .. X 
4. Directed energy (laser) .................................. . X 
5. Electro-optical sensor (including infrared) ................. . X 
6. Guidance and navigation ................................ . X 
7. Life sciences (human factors/biotechnology) ............... . X 
8. Materials (lightweight, high strength, high temperature) ..... . 
9. Microelectronic materials and integrated circuit manufacturing 
X ---+ 
X ' 
10. Nuclear warheads ....................................... . X 
11. Optics ................................................. . X 
12. Power sources (mobile) (includes energy storage) .......... . X 
13. Production/Manufacturing (includes automated control) .... . X 
14. Propulsion (aerospace and ground vehicles) ............... . X ---+ 
15. Radar sensor ........................................... . X ---+ 
16. Robotics and machine intelligence ........................ . X 
1 7. Signal processing ....................................... . X 
18. Signature reduction ..................................... . X 
19. Submarine detection .................................... . X ---+ 
20. Telecommunications (includes fiber optics) ................ . X 
Notes: 
- The list is limited to 20 technologies, which were selected with the objective of providing a valid base for comparing overall US 
and USSR basic technology. The list is in alphabetical order. These technologies are "on the shelf" and available for appli-
cation. (The technologies are not intended to compare technology level in currently DEPLOYED military systems.) 
- The technologies selected have the potential for significantly CHANGING the military capability in the next 10 to 20 years. 
The technologies are not static; they are improving or have the potential for significant improvements; new technologies may 
appear on future lists. 
- The arrows denote that the relative technology level is CHANGING significantly in the direction indicated. 
- The judgments represent overall consensus for each basic technology area. The USSR may be superior in some of the 
subtechnologies making up each basic technology. The average assessment can incorporate a significant variance when indi-
vidual components of a technology are considered. 
Source: Annual report to Congress, FY 1987, US Secretary of Defence 
5.22. The Soviet Union excels in heavy engi-
neering, a fact reflected in its huge defence 
investment in tanks and artillery, but lags in 
sophisticated electronics-based technologies that 
make for increased accuracy with higher first-
round hit probabilities for modern guided 
weapons. Some qualitative comparisons of spe-
cific equipment have been attempted in the fol-
lowing paragraphs. 
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(i) Tanks 
5.23. An examination of the models of tanks in 
service in the two alliances shows at once that 
the 2.5 to 1 Warsaw Pact numerical superiority 
in Europe hides considerable differences in the 
ages and sophistication of tanks in service. The 
following table lists dates of first entry-into-
service of tanks currently in service with certain 
indicators for tank equipment, together with 
numbers in service in the forces of the countries 
concerned: 
-N 
N 
Country Date entry 
of Model into Range/km 
manufacture service 
France AMX 30 1966 500-600 
AMX 30 B2 1982 500-600 
FRG Leopard 1 1965 600 
Leopard 2 1980 550 
UK Chieftain 5 1961 400-500 
Challenger 1982 500 
us M47 1951 130 
M48 1952 110 
M48 A3 1964 460 
M60 A1 1960 500 
M60 A3 1979 500 
M1 Abrams 1980 500 
M1 A1 1985 465 
USSR T54/55 1947 400-500 
T62 A 1961 450 
T64 1966 450 
T72-M 1971 480 
T80 1986 ? 
Sources: RUSI/Brassey's Defence Yearbook, 1987 
Jane's Armour and Artillery 1986-87 
IISS Military Balance 1986-87 
Description of tanks in service with NATO and Warsaw Pact forces 
Fire control devices 
Max road 
speedfkph Weight/tons Gun/mm Ballistic Thermal Gun 
computer imager stabiliser 
65 36 105 rifled N N N 
65 105 rifled y y y 
65 40 105 rifled N N y 
72 55 120 smooth y y y 
48 55 120 rifled y N y 
60 62 120 rifled y y y 
48 46 90 mm rifled N N N 
42 45 90 mm rifled N N N 
48 47 90 mm rifled y N N 
48 53 105 rifled y N y 
74 56 105 rifled y y y 
72 55 105 rifled y y y 
66 57 120 smooth y y y 
48 36 lOO rifled N N (elevation) 
50 40 115 smooth N N y 
70 38 125 smooth y N y 
60 41 125 smooth y N y 
? ? ? ? ? ? 
Armour 
-Nos in service 
-Laser Frontal in producing 
range-finder Type thickness/ country mm 
-Vl 
N rolled steel 79 1 050 
y rolled steel 79 248 
1 300 
y steel plate 70 2437 
y multilayer - 1 513 
spaced 3 950 
y cast steel (22) 900 
y Chobham - 250 
1 150 
N cast steel 76/101 0 
N cast steel 100/120 0 
N cast steel 101/120 1478 
N cast steel 32 668 
y cast steel and 
steel ceramic 406 7 352 
y Chobham - 4 798 
y Chobham -
14 296 
- welded steel 97 19 900 
- cast steel 102 13 700 
- cast steel - 9 300 
y cast steel 200 8 500 
laminated 
glacis 
? ? - 1400 
52 800 
5.24. The table shows that 34% of all United 
States main battle tanks are the 1980s model M-1 
with some 4 800 in service. There are only 1 400 
comparable Soviet T -80 tanks in the Soviet 
forces, representing 2.5% of all Soviet tanks. 
Only 15% of US tanks are the 1960s models 
M-48 and M-60 A1 and the United States has no 
older tanks in service. About 23 000 Soviet 
tanks, half of the total, are the 194 7 models 
T-54/55. While the annual Soviet tank pro-
duction has been more than twice that of the 
United States, the large Soviet superiority 
reflects the retention in service of older models 
for much longer periods. 
NATO 
Period of entry Models Numbers into service in Europe 
M-1 4800 l Challenger 250 1979-1985 Leopard 2 1 958 8 142 AMX-30B-2 248 M-60 A-3 888 
AMX-30 1 300 ! 1960-1966 Leopard 1 4 901 9 273 M-48 A-3 2 172 Chieftain 5 900 
1950s M-48 585 } 2 305 M-47 1 720 
Totals 19 720 
The foregoing. estimates are made on the 
assumption that all of the most recent tanks of 
each alliance are deployed in Europe, the balance 
of the totals being made up of older tanks. The 
table shows Warsaw Pact numerical superiority 
in tanks of all age groups - but one which ranges 
from 1:1.3 in modern tanks and those of the 
1960s, to 1: 10 in tanks of the 1940s and 50s. 
NATO scraps its old tanks, or sells them to third 
countries; the Warsaw Pact keeps its in 
service. 
5.26. In recent months there has been some 
speculation in the press about the ability of 
anti-tank guided missiles with high explosive 
warheads to penetrate certain advanced types of 
armour which, it is claimed, only the solid high 
velocity penetrator rounds fired by smooth bore 
tank gun can penetrate. Israel developed a 
"reactive armour" called "Blazer", used in the 
Lebanon in 1982. It comprises small explosive 
charges hung outside the main tank armour. 
These charges are detonated by high explosive 
warheads of anti-tank missiles, distorting the 
blast pattern which then fails to penetrate the 
main armour. In July, Major General Robert 
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5.25. The more modern tanks are mostly 
deployed in the European area. In the case of the 
Warsaw Pact, T -80s are in service only with 
Soviet troops; the vast majority of the tanks in 
service with all the other Warsaw Pact countries 
are T-54/55 dating from 1947, with the T-72 in 
any substantial numbers in *rvice only with 
GDR and Czechoslovakia. NA[fO has old tanks 
of the 1950s in service only in iltaly, Greece and 
Turkey. The following estimates have been made 
of tanks in service in Europe by type and date, 
based on the NATO force comparison figure of 
46 230 Warsaw Pact tanks and 19 720 NATO 
tanks. 
Warsaw Pact 
Numbers Models Period of entry in Europe into service 
11 400 T-80 10 900 1971-1986 
9 500 T-72-M 
18 500 T-64 
12 300 1961-1966 3 800 T-62 A 
23000 T-54/55 1947 
46 200 
Sunell, Director of a US Army team studying the 
problem, was quoted as saying: " Blazer subse-
quently fell into Soviet hands and now Moscow's 
T -72 and T -80 main battle tanks are protected by 
it. Only the high velocity metal penetrator rods 
fired by our latest tank cannon~ can get through 
it " 19• This conclusion was refu.ed by a Pentagon 
spokesman on 20th July, who said the latest 
version TOW 2A missile could destroy existing 
Soviet tanks 20• 
5.27. It is far from clear whether reactive 
armour has been widely adopted by the Soviet 
Union, or whether it is as fidvantageous as 
claimed - the United States woljlld certainly have 
adopted it if it were. Heatjings before the 
informal Congressional Military Reform Caucus 
on 29th July highlighted the different views of 
competing equipment manufacturers. 
5.28. The most objective evidence of Soviet 
tank vulnerability comes from the 1982 clash 
between Israeli and Syrian forces in the Lebanon 
19. International Herald Tribune, 13th July 1987. 
20. International Herald Tribune, 22nd July 1987. 
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in the course of which Israeli forces destroyed 
several hundred tanks supplied by the Soviet 
Union, including some T-72s. Israel is equippe~ 
with TOW anti-tank missiles, but an Israeh 
general is quoted as saying the (quite old) 
105 mm tank gun had largely been responsible 
for destroying T -72s 21 • 
(ii) Anti-tank guided weapons 
5.29. Anti-tank guided weapons are notoriously 
difficult to count- data for the Warsaw Pact in 
particular are uncertain. The NATO force com-
parisons publication shows 38 800 crew-served 
or helicopter- and vehicle-mounted anti-tank 
guided weapons for the Warsaw Pact compared 
with 19 170 for NATO. Such missiles in wire-
guided version such as th~ F~ench SS-1 ~ and 
SS-11 first came into service m NATO m the 
1950s. The first generation required well-trained 
operators who, in battle conditions, were 
required to " fly " the missile t<;> the target, 
keeping both in sight the whole time. Second-
generation NATO missiles appeared in the 
1970s· computerised, they required the operator 
merely to keep telescope cross-wires on the target 
while the missile was automatically guided to it. 
There is a 10-year lag in the deployment of com-
parable missiles by the Soviet Union. 
5.30. Published figures have not been found for 
the respective numbers of such first- and second-
generation missiles in service with Warsaw Pact 
forces but second-generation missiles (mostly 
US TOW and the Franco-German Milan) form 
the bulk of ATGW in service with most NATO 
countries whereas the first Soviet 
second-generation missile AT -4 (Spigot) has only 
recently reached four Warsaw Pact allies, the 
bulk of whose missiles remain first generation. 
5.31. Soviet spokesmen have consistently 
claimed that NATO has considerable superiority 
in ATGW. To substantiate such a claim the 
Soviet Union would have to publish its own 
reliable figures of Warsaw Pact ATGW; as noted 
above 22 such detailed information is not as yet 
available from Soviet sources. From the fol-
lowing comparison of A TGW by generation and 
date of entry into service, it seems likely that 
NATO has considerable superiority in sophisti-
cated ATGW with high-kill probability. 
5.32. As far as tank/anti-tank comparisons are 
concerned the important article quoted below 
points out that: " The Atlantic Alliance, because 
it sought a defensive image, and more particu-
larly because it had greatly superior technology, 
therefore limited the role and numbers of its 
tanks, turning rather to anti-tank weapons, born 
from the recent explosion in electronics and 
21. See The Threat, Andrew Cockburn, pub!. Hutchinson 
1983, pages 273-274. 
22. See paragraph 1.3. 
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information technology ... Today there are more 
than ten (such NATO missiles) for each existing 
Soviet tank, and this number grows each 
year. " 23 
(iii) Combat aircraft 
5.33. As shown in Appendix Ill B, the 
numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact in air-
craft in Europe is confined to air defence aircraft. 
The numbers or fighter bomber/ground attack 
aircraft in place in Europe - 2 160 for NATO 
including France and 2 250 for the Warsaw Pact 
- are not greatly different, but some Warsaw 
Pact air defence aircraft have ground attack capa-
bility. Warsaw Pact spokesmen, and some 
western experts including Mr. Les Aspin, 
Chairman of the United States House Armed 
Services Committee, have claimed that on quali-
tative grounds the NATO ground attack capa-
bility is superior in terms of the ordnance load 
and combat radius over which it can be deli-
vered. 
5.34. The corresponding table compares these 
criteria for the NATO and Warsaw Pact aircraft 
concerned, but the data for combat radius must 
be treated with caution because the effective 
combat radius of modem aircraft can vary by a 
factor of more than two, depending on many 
factors: whether external fuel tanks are carried 
(thus reducing advance load), and especially the 
flight profile whether low-level all the way out 
and back (lo-lo-lo) to escape radar detection, or a 
combination of partly high- and low-level (e.g. 
lo-lo-hi). 
5.35. With some 700 Su-24 Fencer in service (of 
which 250 with tactical aviation) the Soviet 
Union has an aircraft that matches recent NATO 
models but older Soviet aircraft in general have 
shorter' combat radius than NATO aircraft. 
Another study 24 comparing the offensive load 
capacity of three air forces based. i~ Europe ~ro­
jected for 1985 a figure _of 4.5 mllhon ton mi~es 
for the United States air force, compared With 
1.8 for the Soviet air force, and 1.5 for the 
German air force. 
(iv) Morale and the occupying forces 
5.36. An unquantifiable factor in a qualitative 
comparison of forces in Europe is the rela-
tionship between the Soviet forces and the 
Warsaw Pact countries in which they are sta-
tioned. As has been demonstrated at various 
times since World War 11 in the German Demo-
cratic Republic, Hungary and Czechoslovakia in 
particular, Soviet forces in these countri~s help 
to maintain in power governments comphant to 
23. Vice Admiral Antoine Sanguinetti, retired, in Le Monde 
Diplomatique, October 1987. 
24. Soviet Air Power in Transition, Robert P. Berman, 
Brookings Institution 1978. 
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Anti-tank guided missiles in service (crew-served or vehicle-mounted) 
NATO Warsaw Pact 
I 
Entry into Model Range Producing In service In service Range Model Entry into service (m) country with with (m) service 
Early 80s Hellfire 7 000 us us USSR ? AT-J 1988? 
KO RA 
1975 HOT 4000 France FRG USSR 8000 AT-6 1980? 
FRG France Spiral 
Spain 
i 
1974 MILAN 2000 France Belgium USSR 4000 AT-5 1980? 
FRG FRG Czecho- Spandrel 
France slovakia 
Greece 
s:: Italy USSR 2000 AT-4 1980 
0 Portugal Czecho- Spigot ...... 
..... 
i:! Spain slovakia 
l1.l 
s:: Turkey GDR 
l1.l 
00 UK Hungary i 
"d Poland s:: 
0 (.) 1970 TOW 3 700 us Canada l1.l 
Cl'.l Denmark 
FRG 
Greece 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Turkey 
UK 
us 
r 1969 Swingfire 4000 UK UK Belgium 
s:: 
0 
...... 
..... 
i:! 
l1.l 
s:: 
l1.l 
00 
..... 
"' J: 1960 SS-11 3 000 France France 
! Greece Portugal. Turkey 
Soviet policies. In the event of a conflict the 
resentment of local populations could hamper 
the operational efficiency of Soviet forces. The 
same factor undoubtedly affects the morale and 
reliability of the armed forces of the non-Soviet 
Warsaw Pact countries. 
VI. Sources of information 
USSR 3000 AT-3 1965 
Bulgaria Sagger 
Czecho-
slovakia 
GDR 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
USSR 2 500 AT-2 1960s 
Swatter 
or ship-based radio interception, what is known 
as " national means of verification " in the arms 
control context, coupled with such official publi-
cations as are available, have become by far the 
most important sources of information for mea-
suring the military capability 
1
of an adversary. 
But the raw information derived from techno-
logical sources remains as closely guarded a 
national secret as that derived from traditional 
espionage. Overwhelmingly, the United States 
6.1. With the development of surveillance with its huge investment in satellite sensors of all 
technology involving both satellites and ground- types and a worldwide network of electronic lis-
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Fighter /bomber ground attack 
NATO 
Combat 1 Aircraft 
radius (km) 
Alpha Jet 500 1.1.1. 
Buccaneer 850 
Corsair 11 A-7 750 
Fighting Falcon 920 
550 h.l.h. 
Freedom Fighter F-5 220 1.1.1. 
Harrier 4001.1.1. 
Jaguar 720 
550 1.1.1. 
Mirage IIIE 800-1 200 
Mirage 5F 500 1.1.1. 
Phantom F-4 1060 
800 
Starfighter F-104 450 
Thunderbolt 11 A-10 900 
Tornado 650 1.1.1. 
F-111 2400 
Source: RUSI/Brassey's Defence Yearbook 1987 
Jane's All the World's Aircraft. 
Warsaw Pact 
Weapons Weapons Combat Aircraft load (kg) load (kg) radius (km) 
3000 2 500- 950 l.l.h. Fencer Su 24 
3000 322 1.1.1. 
7000 
2 500 300 1.1.1. Fitter Su-7 
6 800 
4000 450 1.1.1. Fitter Su-17 /22 
7000 4000 390 1.1.1. Flogger MiG-27 
3000 4500 550 1.1.1. Frogfoot Su-25 
2 500 
4500 
4000 
4000 
7000 
2000 
7 500 
9000 
14000 
1. Flight proflle indicated (h = high, 1 = low) where given by source consulted. 
tening posts, has privileged access to raw infor-
mation, but some other NATO countries are in a 
position to make significant contributions of 
their own. 
6.2. Such raw technological intelligence data is 
not distributed throughout the alliance, but there 
is some selective exchange of information on a 
bilateral basis between a few of the NATO coun-
tries. The United Kingdom in particular has a 
long-standing agreement with the United States 
for the exchange of data to which the United 
Kingdom contributes signals intelligence from 
listening posts on British territory in several 
parts of the world. A multilateral agr~ement 
involving also Canada and Australia has 
operated since World War 11. 
6.3. The interpretation of raw data is a separate 
process, an inexact science that can offer dif-
ferent conclusions from the same data. Some 
interpreted intelligence data from several coun-
tries is pooled in NATO, but the dominance of 
one country in particular in access to the basic 
raw data occasionally raises problems concerning 
the reliability of interpreted intelligence infor-
mation disseminated by one country which other 
countries are unable to confirm independently. 
6.4. In addition to being a vital source of intel-
ligence, satellite images are used for targeting 
nuclear weapons, while terrain data from satel-
lites is needed for the on-board navigational 
system of cruise missiles. For all these reasons 
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the committee has stressed on a number of occa-
sions the need for the European allies to possess 
better technological resources of their own for 
collecting raw information concerning military 
capabilities of an adversary, especially through 
observation satellites, so as to be able to make 
their own interpretations of the data collected. It 
has also proposed the establishment of interna-
tional satellite observation agencies both for the 
verification of arms control agreements 25 and 
to support United Nations peacekeeping 
functions 26• 
6.5. But the growing use of observation satel-
lites, both commercially and by some European 
allies, would now make it highly desirable for a 
collective European satellite observation capa-
bility to be established. Such a capability can 
contribute to European security and to the sta-
bility of defensive arrangements. Early warning 
of preparation for hostilities is essential to 
NATO for the implementation of defence plans 
and satellites can provide it. At the same time 
they can enhance stability by revealing the 
absence of offensive preparations by a potential 
adversary at times when they might otherwise be 
suspected. 
25. East-West relations and defence, Document 587, 8th 
November 1972, Rapporteur: Mr. Destremau; Recommen-
dation 227, paragraph 8, 6th December 1972. 
26. Security and the Mediterranean, Document 637, 21st 
May 1974, Rapporteur: Mr. Jung; Recommendation 254, 
paragraph 1, 20th June 1974. 
6.6. Both the United States and the Soviet 
Union operate a wide variety of observation and 
intelligence-gathering satellites in orbits of 
various heights. The current generation of 
United States observation satellites proper com-
prises the Big Bird series which entered service in 
1971. In orbit some 150 km high, these big satel-
lites, weighing over 11 tonnes, provide resolution 
of objects on the ground of less than 1 m. They 
have used photographic film in the past, which 
can be ejected in a number of pods for recovery 
on the ground, but the latest versions develop 
film on board the satellite and then transmit the 
data to ground terminals via a television-type 
link. The larger and more recent Key Hole series, 
weighing 13.5 tonnes, are said to provide reso-
lution of objects down to 20 or 30 cm. These 
low-orbit satellites would normally have a short 
life because of residual atmospheric drag and 
therefore use on-board booster rockets to 
maintain the orbit from time to time. 
6.7. The United States and the Soviet Union 
also operate a worldwide network of ground-
based or ship-based electronic and other 
intelligence-gathering stations. The Soviet Union 
makes extensive use of ships for this purpose. 
The United States has many stations in allied 
countries, particularly those bordering the Soviet 
Union. The United States post in Iran used to 
monitor Soviet missile tests was lost on the fall 
of the Shah, but the press in 1981 reported that a 
corresponding United States monitoring post 
had been installed in China. It has now been 
reported that the United States also has seismic 
devices in China for monitoring Soviet nuclear 
tests 27 • 
6.8. France in 1986 launched a civilian earth-
resources observation satellite, Spot, which can 
provide resolution of objects of 7 to 10 m in size. 
The American press has reported that the United 
States Department of Defence is negotiating with 
the Spot corporation for the regular supply of 
Spot photographs 28• In December 1985 France 
then started a programme to construct a military 
observation satellite, Helios, due to be launched 
in summer 1993, to be derived from Spot tech-
nology, and which should be able to provide res-
olution of objects smaller than 1 m from a 
400 km-high orbit - a sufficient height for the 
satellite to remain in orbit for several years. A 
report of the Finance Committee of the French 
National Assembly has stated that Italian partici-
pation in the programme could amount to 15% 
of the cost, and that Spain had expressed interest 
in assuming a share not exceeding 5% 29• 
6.9. Prior to the French decision to develop its 
military observation satellite programme inde-
27. International Herald Tribune, 6th April 1987. 
28. Le Monde, 5th-6th April 1987. 
29. Le Monde, lOth April 1987. 
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pendently, the press had reported discussions 
with Germany over a possible jpint programme, 
which foundered on technical disagreement. 
Germany was reported to be interested in devel-
oping an observation satellite taking images at 
radar frequencies which, although it would 
provide much lower resolution, possibly of 
objects of some 15 m on the surface of the earth, 
would be fully operational by night and day and 
in all weather conditions. Observation satellites 
working at optical frequencies can of course 
obtain images only in daylight and when the sky 
is clear. 
6.10. Earlier in 1987 it was reported that the 
United Kingdom simultaneously had a Zircon 
programme to develop an intelligence-gathering 
satellite which reportedly woul(.i operate in the 
very much higher geostationary orbit some 
35 500 km above the earth. It would be designed 
for the interception of radio communications 
and possibly other transmission of radio or radar 
wavelength, which would be retransmitted to 
ground receiving stations. Th~ total cost was 
reported at between £400 million and £500 
million. On 6th August however it was unoffi-
cially reported that the programme had been 
abandoned after £70 million had been spent on a 
feasibility study, possibly in the hope of 
acquiring the necessary technology more cheaply 
from the United States 30• 
6.11. In July the western press carried part of an 
Izvestia report that the country's chief cartog-
rapher, V. Yashchenko, had said that the Soviet 
Union also was offering satellite photographs 
with a resolution of six metres. They were 
available commercially through a government 
trade organisation, Soyvzkarta, and a number of 
countries, including Australia ~nd the German 
Democratic Republic, were listed as potential 
customers 31 • 
6.12. Another very interesting development was 
the publication by the Norwegiap. Foreign Policy 
Institute in 1986 of its study o:f Soviet military 
installations in the Kola Peninsula using com-
mercially available satellite photographs 32• The 
Norwegian institute, using Landsat photographs, 
provided independent confirmation of the very 
extensive Soviet military installations in the 
Kola Peninsula which had been reported in the 
past largely from United States sources, but it 
also scored a first in reporting a new airfield, and 
the precise location of the new large Gremikha 
naval base. The United States Landsat series of 
satellites, beginning with Landsat-1 in 1972 with 
a resolution of some 80 m, has continued in the 
1980s with the launching of Landsat-4 and 
30. Guardian, 7th August 1987. 
31. International Herald Tribune, 16th July 1987. 
32. Investigating Kola - a study of military bases using sat-
ellite photos, Norwegian Foreign Policy lnstitute studies, No. 
57, Norsk Utenrkspolitisk lnstitutt, Oslo 1986 (in English). 
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Landsat-5 providing resolution of 25 to 30 m, 
and photographs from the latter were used by the 
Norwegian Institute. As the United States mil-
itary observation satellites provide far higher res-
olution (20 to 30 cm) the existence of these 
newly-reported installations was undoubtedly 
known to the United States, but had not been 
publicly reported. Similar deductions could 
undoubtedly be made from the French Spot sat-
ellite photographs also available commercially, 
providing resolution of 7 to 10 m as mentioned 
above. Curiously, the United States military 
authorities are reported to have been concerned 
at finding that details of Soviet military installa-
tions are becoming available to the general 
public through the relatively high-resolution 
photographs from commercial satellites such as 
Spot. The Undersecretary of Defence for Policy, 
Craig Alderman, was reported to have asked for 
the security aspects of the situation to be 
reviewed 33• 
6.13. The existence of all these costly and inde-
pendent national programmes referred to above 
clearly points to the need for a co-ordinated 
European allied programme for an observation 
and intelligence-gathering satellite system. The 
committee's previous recommendations on the 
subject of observation satellites are referred to in 
paragraph 6.4. 
VII. Chemical weapons - A specific case 
7 .1. The committee could not fail to notice 
over the years the way in which official allied 
statements concerning levels of some weapons 
systems held by the Soviet Union have lacked 
consistency, and in some cases have ranged so 
widely that their credibility is jeopardised. The 
size of the Soviet Union's chemical weapons 
stockpile is a case in point. 
7 .2. In an earlier report the committee has 
chronicled United States statements concerning 
Soviet stockpiles of chemical weapons in the 
years preceding President Nixon's decision in 
November 1969 to cease any further production 
of chemical weapons. Prior to that decision, 
United States estimates of the corresponding 
Soviet stockpile had ranged from one-fifth or 
one-sixth of the total Soviet ammunition stocks, 
but such claims were abandoned after the 
1969 decision, press reports then revealing that 
aerial photographs of storage sheds in the Soviet 
Union had been wrongly interpreted as chemical 
weapons stores 34• In that earlier report the 
33. Guardian, 13th March 1987. 
34. Nuclear, chemical and biological protection, report sub-
mitted on behalf on the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments by Mr. Banks, Rapporteur, Document 838, 
29th April 1980. See explanatory memorandum, paragraphs 
2.50 et seq. 
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Rapporteur noted simply that " in a recent 
briefing in the United States Department of 
Defence, the Rapporteur was given to under-
stand that the United States today claims simply 
that Soviet stocks of chemical weapons are 'suffi-
cient for their requirements' ... " 35• 
7.3. Similarly the present Rapporteur in the 
course of the discussions he held in preparing the 
report was informed by one authority that the 
country concerned did not know the levels of 
Soviet chemical stockpiles and accordingly did 
not make any public statement concerning those 
levels. This attitude corresponds to that of the 
United States in official statements. The 
Chemical Warfare Review Commission appoint-
ed by President Reagan reported on 11th June 
1985 that: 
" The Soviets have fourteen known 
chemical weapon production facilities, 
and may have more. Soviet production 
rates of chemical weapons are not ade-
quately known ... 
Exact deployments and quantities of 
Soviet chemical munitions are not pre-
cisely known... It is well established, 
however, that the Soviets have major 
resources devoted to research, devel-
opment, testing, production and storage of 
chemical weapons at a number of sites 
throughout the Soviet Union. There are 
indications that such activities also exist in 
several of the Eastern European countries 
of the Warsaw Pact, including Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, East Germany and 
Romania. By the most conservative 
informed estimates, the Soviet stockpile of 
chemical munitions is several times as 
large as the usable portion of the United 
States inventory. " 36 
The foregoing careful distinction between the 
" well-established " existence of chemical 
weapon sites throughout the Soviet Union, and 
" indications " of such activities in four other 
Warsaw Pact countries is not made in the United 
States popularised Soviet Military Power which 
provides a map showing without qualification 
"stored Warsaw Pact chemical munitions in 
forward areas" at 32 sites in six Warsaw Pact 
countries, allies of the Soviet Union 37• Mr. 
Gorbachev in his Prague speech on 1Oth April 
1987 said: 
" .. .1 can inform you that the Soviet Union 
has ceased production of chemical 
weapons. It is known that the other 
Warsaw Pact countries have never pro-
35. Idem. explanatory memorandum paragraph 2.50. 
36. Report of the Chemical Warfare Review Commission, 
11th June 1985, pages 26 and 27 (United States Government 
Printing Office). 
37. 1986 edition, page 75. 
duced such weapons and have never had 
them on their territory. The Soviet Union 
does not have chemical weapons outside 
its territory ... " 
7.4. The same conservative conclusion of Pres-
ident Reagan's Chemical Warfare Review Com-
mission that the levels of Soviet chemical 
weapons stockpiles are uncertain is found in the 
evidence given by Mr. David Abshire, United 
States Permanent Representative to NATO, to 
the Strategic and Theatre Nuclear Forces Sub-
committee of the Senate Armed Forces Com-
mittee on lOth April 1986: 
" The size of the Soviet chemical weapons 
stockpile is a point on which intelligence 
experts do not agree. That disagreement, 
however, should not be allowed to over-
shadow the fact that even the most conser-
vative estimates indicate Soviet stocks are 
several times greater than the usable 
portion of the United States inventory. " 
(emphasis added) 
7.5. This comparison of the whole of the 
Soviet stockpile with the " usable portion " of 
that of the United States leaves open the 
question as to whether the Soviet stockpile 
exceeds the total United States stockpile. The 
Chemical Warfare Review Commission's report 
states of United States stocks that "The 
Department of Defence calculates that only 28% 
of the total tonnage of chemical agent on hand 
could be put to any use at all. And only 7% of the 
agent... (in)... munitions substantially meets 
current Department of Defence requirements". 
Moreover, although the whole of the United 
States stockpile pre-dates 1969 when production 
stopped, and, according to the report, the Soviet 
chemical programmes did not apparently have 
high priority until the early 1970s, nevertheless 
Soviet production of nerve agent weapons began 
after World War Il with captured German facil-
ities, so it is hardly likely that the whole of the 
Soviet stockpile is serviceable, if only 28%, or 
only 7%, of the United States is 38• 
7.6. Despite this official caution in putting a 
figure to the size of the Soviet chemical weapons 
stockpile, in the past year the committee itself 
has heard from different officials estimates 
which have ranged from 100 000 tonnes (an 
unattributable remark in closed hearing) through 
the higher levels claimed in British public state-
ments of 300 000 tonnes of chemical weapons 39 
to an almost certainly exaggerated claim made in 
the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva 
38. See paragraphs 7.12 to 7.14 below for an estimate of 
usable parts of the United States stockpile. 
39. See for example Mr. Luce, United Kingdom Minister of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, in his address 
to the Assembly on 4th December 1984, official report, page 
117. 
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according to which the Soviet stockpile could 
possibly approach the total production of all 
nations since chemical warfare began. 
7. 7. Estimates of chemical weapons stockpiles 
are complicated by the distinct;ion that must be 
drawn between the weight of cHemical agent and 
the weight of filled ammunition which will range 
from 6. 7 times (aircraft bombs) to 20 times 
(artillery shells) the weight of chemical agent 
contained in them 40• The figure of 300 000 
tonnes most frequently quoted in recent years 
originally applied to filled ammunition and 
would correspond to something like 30 000 
tonnes of contained agent, but ~his distinction is 
not always made, perhaps ndt always under-
stood, by ministers in their p111blic statements. 
Even official reports, updated presumably by 
civil servants, reveal this confusion because 
British defence white papers, 
1 
which in 1983 
referred to Soviet "chemical weapons ... already 
assessed to be over 300 000 tonnes ... ", have 
from 1984 to 1986 referred to " 300 000 tonnes 
of nerve agent ... " 41 • This latter !figure could cor-
respond to something like 3 million tonnes or 
more of filled ammunition equivalent. 
7.8. The foregoing observations were made in 
the committee's preliminary report 42• The com-
mittee is encouraged to note that, perhaps as a 
consequence, more careful statements have since 
appeared. Thus, the 1987 British white paper 
states more credibly that" The Warsaw Pact has 
the capability to conduct chemical warfare 
against NATO forces on a very large scale, and 
produces and stockpiles a range of lethal agents 
and incapacitants " 43• Similarly, Mr. David 
Melior, British Minister ofState1for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, addref;sing the Con-
ference on Disarmament in Geneva on 14th July 
1987, referred to "a truly massive Soviet 
stockpile " of chemical weapons 44• Neither of 
these statements attempted t~ quantify the 
Soviet stockpile. 
7.9. Of course, the Soviet Union has provided 
no public information of its own on the levels of 
its chemical stockpiles. Prior to ~r. Gorbachev's 
speech of lOth April quoted. in paragraph 
7.4 above, it had admitted possessing them only 
tacitly in accepting proposals for the declaration 
and destruction of its existing stockpiles in the 
course of negotiations on a cMmical weapons 
ban. For the first time, however, Mr. 
40. See for example Red God of War, Soviet Artillery and 
Rocket Forces, Chris Bellamy, Publ. Brassey's 1986, pages 
172-3. 
41. Statement on the defence estimate$ 1986, Volume I, 
Annex A, paragraph 14 (Cmnd. 9763-1). Compare with 1983 
edition, paragraph 408 (Cmnd. 8951-1). 
42. Threat assessment, Document 1076, 3fd November 1986, 
Rapporteur: Mr. Stokes. 
43. Statement on the defence estimates 1987, Volume I, Cm 
101-1, page 10, boxed paragraph l. 
44. Final record for 14th July 1987, CD/PV 421, page 8. 
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Shevardnadze, the Soviet Foreign Minister, in 
addressing the Conference on Disarmament in 
Geneva on 6th August 1987, invited the 40 par-
ticipants to inspect specimens of Soviet chemical 
weapons in a military facility at Shikhany -
United States representatives visited the plant on 
7th and 8th October - and, in undertaking to 
issue similar invitations to observe the plant for 
the destruction of chemical weapons, once con-
struction was complete, revealed that it was 
located at Chapayevsk. 
7.1 0. Unlike strategic nuclear missiles, chemical 
weapons do not lend themselves to identification 
by observation satellite. It is therefore very dif-
ficult to assess levels of Soviet chemical 
weapons, but it appears that several different 
approaches have been used to produce the 
divergent figures of the previous paragraphs. One 
approach is through assumptions concerning the 
proportion of chemical weapons held in the total 
Soviet ammunition stockpiles. The other 
approach is to assess assumed Soviet require-
ments for offensive operations based on 
available literature on Soviet artillery applica-
tions which discusses quantities of chemical 
weapons which would be required to attack par-
ticular targets. Yet another is to try to assess the 
likely production capacity of known chemical 
weapon production plants and then to calculate 
the maximum amount of chemical agent that 
could have been produced if the plants had been 
run at full capacity from the date of their con-
struction to the present time. This last approach 
is presumably the basis of the last statement 
mentioned in paragraph 7.5 above. 
7.11. Official allied statements about Soviet 
stockpiles would be more credible if they were 
more consistent, if they made some reference to 
the assumptions on which the assessment was 
based and probably if they were expressed as a 
possible range between a high and a low limit. 
7 .12. In contrast to the speculation about Soviet 
stockpiles, the level of existing United States 
chemical weapons has not recently been 
publicised in terms of total stockpile, but over 
the years considerable information has been 
American chemical weapons: estimates from open sources 
Item 
GB nerve gas munitions for in-service weapons 
105 mm howitzer rounds ......................................... . 
155 mm and 8 in howitzer rounds ................................ . 
500 lb and 70 lb aircraft bombs ................................... . 
VX nerve gas munitions for in-service weapons 
155 mm and 8 in howitzer rounds ................................ . 
2 000 lb aircraft spraytanks ....................................... . 
M1lstard gas munitions for in-service weapons 
4.2 in mortar rounds ............................................. . 
105 mm howitzer rounds ......................................... . 
155 mm howitzer rounds ......................................... . 
Munitions deteriorated beyond repair, obsoleted, or for weapons no longer 
in service 
115 mm rockets ................................................. . 
Leakers, land-mines and 155 mm gun rounds ...................... . 
Unweaponised agent held in bulk storage 
1 ton drums of GB nerve gas ..................................... . 
1 ton drums of VX nerve gas ..................................... . 
1 ton drums of mustard gas ...................................... . 
Planned binary-munition acquisition quantities 
155 mm howitzer rounds, binary GB .............................. . 
500 lb aircraft spraybombs, binary VX ............................ . 
227 mm MLRS rocket warheads, binary GD (?) .................... . 
Number 
held 
900 000 
200 000 
13 000 
300 000 
900 
470 000 
480 000 
300 000 
480 000 
320 000 
5 700 
2 300 
14 000 
410 000 
44000 
? 
Tons of 
agent fill 
750 
850 
1 300 
950 
630 
1400 
700 
1 700 
2 500 
1 400 
4 300 
1 800 
12 600 
1 700 
4100 
? 
Note: Of the total tonnage held of mustard and nerve gases, 93.3% is in the United States, 1.4% in West Germany, and 5.3% on 
Johnston Atoll in the Pacific. The holdings in Germany constitute some 17% by agent weight of all of the available nerve gas 
howitzer ammunition. 
Source: Julian Perry Robinson in Sussex University ADIU report, September-October 1985. 
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made public officially, in particular in congres-
sional hearings. The committee has previously 
drawn attention to the academic estimate, shown 
in the above table, of United States stockpiles 
based on such public information. 
7 .13. The table shows a total of 30 880 tonnes of 
chemical agent in existence (not counting the 
planned binary production). If the multiplier 
referred to in paragraph 7. 7 above concerning the 
amount of chemical agent contained respectively 
in artillery shells, aircraft bombs, etc., is applied 
to that figure an estimate of the United States 
stockpile is then 342 000 tonnes of filled ammu-
nition equivalent, inclusive of the weight of 
ammunition that could be filled from the 
chemical agent in bulk storage. 
7 .14. Some of this stockpile is known to be 
obsolete at the present time, not so much 
because of deterioration of the chemical agent, 
but because the weapons systems for which it 
was designed have largely been withdrawn from 
service - this applies particularly to 105 mm 
howitzer rounds. Thus adjusted for obsolete and 
deteriorated ammunition shown in the above 
table, and deducting all 105 mm rounds, the ope-
rationally usable United States stockpile is 
probably 282 000 tonnes of filled ammunition 
equivalent. 
7.15. Unless and until all chemical weapon 
stocks are declared and inspected under the 
terms of a treaty banning such weapons, it 
cannot be known with certainty whether Soviet 
stocks exceed United States stocks, but the pre-
sumption must be that they do if only because 
Soviet production has continued unabated since 
the 1970s whereas United States production 
ceased in 1969, and the militarily usable 
stockpile decreased thereafter, largely through 
obsolescence of weapons systems. However, the 
report of President Reagan's Chemical Warfare 
Review Commission portrays the Soviet 
chemical warfare programme essentially as a 
reaction to the earlier United States pro-
gramme: 
" ... the Soviet Union apparently did not 
give chemical programmes high priority 
until the early 1970s - just after the 
United States abandoned its own chemical 
weapons production... during the 1960s, 
Soviet military leaders apparently became 
concerned about the seeming United 
States technological lead in this and other 
military areas and recommended 
stepped-up efforts to develop and produce 
more chemical weapons. " 
7 .16. In the foregoing paragraphs attention is 
drawn to the conflicting and at times clearly 
exaggerated official statements that have been 
made about Soviet chemical stockpiles. The 
result is to undermine the credibility of state-
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ments about what is certainly a serious military 
threat. The lessons from this case-study of 
chemical weapons are of general application to 
threat assessment as a whole. It $hould be a sober 
process. Deliberate or subconscibus exaggeration 
of one part of an adversary's military capacity 
can lead to incorrect allocation of resources in 
allied defence plans, or at worse, trigger an arms 
race. 
VIII. Conclusio"s 
8.1. In conclusion, the committee draws 
attention to the statement included in the 
platform on European security interests which 
the Council adopted in The Hague on 27th 
October 1987: 
"3. We have not yet wi~nessed any less-
ening of the military build-up which the 
Soviet Union has sustained over so many 
years. The geostrategic situation of 
Western Europe makes it particularly vul-
nerable to the superior conventional, 
chemical and nuclear forces of the Warsaw 
Pact. This is the fundam~ntal problem for 
European security. The Warsaw Pact's 
superior conventional forces and its capa-
bility for surprise attack and large-scale 
offensive action are of special concern in 
this context. " 
8.2. The committee notes th~t many govern-
mental and NATO publications1provide a sound 
basis of force comparison, but that on some par-
ticular points, such as that examined in Chapter 
VI, statements by national authorities can be 
inconsistent if not contradictory. The alliance 
needs an agreed consistent policy on threat 
assessment and in particular o~ the public pre-
sentation of it. There is m~ch information 
available for those who seek it on the levels of 
allied forces and equipment, but the inherent 
secrecy of the Soviet Union about all aspects of 
government, but more particularly about its mil-
itary forces, means that the alliance must devote 
effort to publicising the levels of Soviet forces 
and equipment. NATO itself does not possess 
any intelligence sources of 1its own, being 
dependent solely on national inputs. 
8.3. The committee stresses the need for public 
presentation of the Soviet defence effort to be 
consistent and objective. Without concealing the 
large numerical superiority of certain Soviet 
forces which pose a real military threat to the 
alliance, it must take account Of Soviet percep-
tions both of the threat the Soviet Union believes 
it faces and of the capabilities it believes its own 
forces to possess in the face of those of potential 
adversaries. It must take account of the historical 
and other reasons which led to the present accu-
mulation of Soviet forces and armaments. 
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8.4. It is particularly important that estimates 
of Warsaw Pact military capabilities should not 
be exaggerated for political purposes. In a 
warning reminiscent of President Eisenhower's 
in his last days in office, a distinguished military 
commentator has written: 
" It remains to ask why the legend of the 
East's enormous conventional superiority 
is carefully cultivated in Europe, especially 
in France. Certainly the maintenance of 
fear is an avowed means of ensuring the 
cohesion of the alliance. But that no doubt 
would be insufficient if the special 
financial and other categories of interests 
were not added, of two influential pressure 
groups for whom detente is never prof-
itable: the industrialists and the military. 
The reverse of the coin is that sound 
policy cannot be built on bad data. Apart 
from the waste of money, always harmful, 
the systematic overestimation of the capa-
bilities of the Soviet Union serves its 
interests in building up its prestige image 
in a third world fascinated by power. And 
no doubt it is there, and not in Europe, 
that the future will be played out. " 45 
8.5. Although the committee does not believe 
that the Soviet Union is bent on aggression 
today, it notes that from the end of World War II 
the Soviet Union has built up, maintained and 
continuously improved its conventional forces in 
the central European region. Today, in many 
areas, these forces are greatly superior in 
numbers to those of NATO which historically 
have been built up only as a defensive reaction to 
the Soviet threat. As a consequence the concen-
tration of military force on both sides in the 
central region today is greater than anywhere else 
in the world. While this Soviet build-up in the 
late 1940s may have been intended to ensure 
Soviet domination of the occupied Eastern 
European countries, and as an insurance against 
any renewed aggression by its recent adversary, 
the levels of these forces today cannot be jus-
tified by any legitimate defence requirement. 
They provide a capability to advance into 
NATO-held territory and to seize at least key 
objectives. Similarly, the numerical superiority 
of the Soviet submarine fleet provides a signif-
icant capability to disrupt allied shipping in the 
event of hostilities. 
8.6. On the other hand, the unremitting growth 
in Soviet strategic nuclear forces, surface naval 
forces and chemical weapons, appears to result 
45. Vice Admiral Antoine Sanguinetti, retired, in Le Monde 
Diplomatique, October 1987. 
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from Soviet reaction to historically larger 
western forces, themselves a response to Soviet 
conventional superiority in Europe. The first two 
are unlikely to be seen by the Soviet Union as 
giving it more than an ability on the one hand to 
deter an initial first strike by western nuclear 
forces and on the other to demonstrate the right 
of the Soviet Union to be present in the oceans 
of the world. 
8.7. Within NATO there are agreed procedures 
for presenting a reasonably objective picture of 
force comparisons between NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact. But a Greek-Turkish dispute 
involving the declaration of Greek forces on one 
Aegean island has prevented any revision of the 
NATO publication since 1984. Moreover the 
exclusion of French and Spanish forces, at the 
insistence of these two countries, detracts from 
the objectivity of the publication. While those 
forces are not now in the integrated military 
structure of NATO, both governments maintain 
they would be available to the alliance in the 
event of Soviet aggression. Objectivity thus 
requires their inclusion in NATO force compar-
isons. 
8.8. In the draft recommendation the com-
mittee urges that the Assembly recommend that 
allied governments in their public presentation 
of the threat should draw on the agreed NATO 
force comparisons to give a more consistent pre-
sentation of the levels of Soviet forces compared 
objectively with corresponding allied forces. At 
the same time every effort must be made through 
discussion within NATO to overcome the 
present political obstacle to the regular updating 
and publication of the NATO force comparisons 
and to improve the objectiveness and scope of 
this publication, in particular through the 
inclusion of data for French and Spanish forces 
which those countries have so far insisted should 
be excluded. 
8.9. The committee finds a clear political case 
for independent European technical data sources 
such as observation satellites and other elec-
tronic intelligence installations. It draws 
attention to the existence of three costly inde-
pendent intelligence satellite projects in France, 
Germany and the United Kingdom and notes 
that their different nature makes them poten-
tially complementary. It recommends therefore 
that the Council give active consideration to ful-
filling the need for a collective European capa-
bility and to co-ordinating existing national 
projects. 
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A. United States and Soviet Union 
historical levels of strategic nuclear weapons 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 
Umted States 
ICBMs .. 18 63 294 424 834 854 904 
SLBMs .......... 32 96 144 224 416 496 592 
Heavy bombers .. 450 550 600 630 630 630 600 
Total vehicles .... 500 709 1 038 1 278 1 880 1980 2096 
Warheads: 
on ICBMs .. .. 18 63 294 424 834 854 904 
on SLBMs .. .... 32 96 144 224 416 496 592 
on bombers I 800 2 200 2 400 2 520 2 520 2 520 2400 
Total weapons I 850 2 359 2 838 3 168 3 770 3 870 3 896 
Sov1et Umon 
ICBMs ... .... 35 50 75 lOO 200 270 300 
SLBMs ......... 0 (20)* (50)* 100 120 120 125 
Heavy bombers .. 175 190 190 190 190 190 200 
Total veh1cles .... 210 260 315 390 510 580 625 
Warheads: 
on ICBMs ....... 35 50 75 lOO 200 270 300 
on SLBMs 0 (20)* (50)* lOO 120 120 125 
on bombers ...... 175 190 190 190 190 190 200 
Total weapons 210 260 315 390 510 580 625 
Related events ... 
• F1gures m brackets are approximate mterpolauons. 
Related events 
(1) SALT negot1atwns begm 17th November 1969 
(2) Imt1al Umted States deployment MIRVs on ICBMs and SLBMs 
(3) Imtial Umted States deployment SRAM on bombers 
(4) SALT I and ABM treaty s1gned 26th May 1972 
(5) lmt1al Soviet deployment MIRV on ICBMs 
(6) lmllal Soviet deployment MIRV on SLBMs 
(7) SALT II s1gned 18th June 1979 
(8) Imtial Umted States deployment ALCMs on bombers 
(9) Inillal Sov1et deployment ALCMs on bombers 
Sources. 
1960-1969, 1985 - vanous ed1t10ns of IISS M1htary Balance 
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1973 1975 
I 054 I 054 I 054 I 054 I 054 I 054 I 054 
656 656 656 656 656 656 656 
540 545 450 465 435 397 330 
2 250 2 255 2 160 2 175 2 145 2 107 2 040 
1054 I 054 1054 1074 1274 1 754 2 154 
656 656 656 800 I 664 3 824 4688 
2 160 2 180 1 800 1 860 I 740 2 088 2 220 
3 870 3 890 3 510 3 734 4 678 7 666 9 062 
460 800 1050 1 427 1 489 1 547 1 607 
130 130 160 289 401 589 741 
210 150 150 145 145 145 145 
800 1080 1 360 1 861 2035 2 281 2493 
460 800 1 050 1 427 1 489 1 547 1 937 
130 130 160 289 401 589 741 
210 150 150 145 145 145 145 
800 1 080 1 360 1 861 2 035 2 281 2 823 
(l) (2) (3) (5) 
(4) 
1977 1979 
I 054 I 054 
656 656 
316 316 
2 026 2 026 
2 154 2 154 
5 120 5 120 
2 414 2 414 
9 688 9 688 
1477 I 398 
970 989 
145 145 
2 592 2 532 
2 407 4 187 
I 130 I 309 
145 145 
3 682 5 641 
(6) (7) 
1970-1979 - US-Sov1et M1htary Balance 1970-1981, John M. Colhns, Umted States Congresswnal Research Serv1ce, October 1981 
1981-1984 - US-Sov1et M1htary Balance 1980-1985, John M. Collins, Umted States CongressiOnal Research Serv1ce, March 1985 
Notes on counting rules 
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1981 1982 1983 1984 
1052 1049 1040 I 030 
512 520 568 592 
316 299 241 241 
1 880 1 868 1 849 I 863 
2 152 2 149 2140 2 130 
4 752 4 800 5 152 5 344 
3 372 3 304 3200 3 744 
10276 10253 10492 11 218 
I 398 I 398 I 398 I 398 
1017 969 961 946 
145 145 145 173 
2 560 2 512 2 504 2 517 
5 302 5 862 6420 6 420 
1 849 1 865 I 957 2 122 
580 580 580 792 
7 731 8 307 8 957 9 334 
(8) (9) 
Only weapons counted in the SALT treaties are included: ICBMs: SLBMs: United States B-52 and 
Soviet Tu-95 and Mya-4 bombers. All such bombers in service are counted as carrying nuclear weapons, 
even if operationally assigned to a non-nuclear role (as .. 61 B-52s are), because they are counted as 
nuclear-capable for the purposes of the treaties. 
Data from the different sources are fairly consistent for numbers of missiles and their warheads. 
The numbers of nuclear weapons carried on a bomber can vary widely however, and have increased 
with the introduction of the United States SRAM and ALCM, and the Soviet equivalent. Weapon-
counting rules applied to all data for bombers are as follows: 
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1985 
I 026 
616 
241 
I 883 
2 126 
5 536 
3 792 
11 454 
I 398 
979 
170 
2 547 
6 420 
2 787 
780 
9 987 
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Aircraft Total number of nuclear weapons per aircraft 
1960-1971 1972-1982 1983-1985 
B-52 (all other) •••••• 0 ••• 0 •••• 0 ••••• 4 4 -
B-52G with SRAM ••••••• 0. 0 ••••••• - 12 12 
B-52G with ALCM ••• 0 ••••••••••••• - - 20 
B-52H with SRAM 0 0 0 •••••••••••••• - 14 14 
Tu-95 •• 0. 0 0 0 ••••••••••••••• 0 •••••• 1 4 4 
Tu-95 (Bear H) with ALCM •• 0 ••• 0 •• - - 8 
Mya-4 ••• 0 •••• 0 0 ••••••••••••••••••• 1 4 4 
These counting rules are those used by Collins in the sources quoted, except fc.r 1983 to 1985 for 
which IISS Military Balance 1985-86 is the source for United States ALCMs. 
The effect of these rules is to overstate the numbers of nuclear weapons that could be delivered 
operationally, but they derive implicitly from the SALT treaties and provide an objective basis of com-
panson. 
Numbers of 
weapons 
B. United States and Soviet Union 
historical trend of total numbers of strategic nuclear weapons 1960-1985 
1960 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 
12 000-
11 000-
10 000 -
9 000-
8 000-
7 000-
6 000-
5 000-
4 000-
3 000-
2 000 -
1 000-
0 
-
- 12 000 
000 
000 
9 000 
8 000 
7 000 
6 000 
5 000 
4 000 
3 000 
2 000 
1 000 
0 
1960 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 
Related events (1)(2) (3) (5) (6) (7) (8)(9) 
Related events 
(I) SALT negot1at10ns begm 17th November 1969 
(2) Imt1al United States deployment MlR Vs on JCBMs and SLBMs 
(3) Imt1al United States deployment SRAM on bombers 
(4) SALT I and ABM treaty s1gned 26th May 1972 
(5) lnltlal Sov1et deployment MIRV on JCBMs 
(6) Initial Soviet deployment MIRV on SLBMs 
(7) SALT 11 s1gned 18th June 1979 
(8) Imtial Umted States deployment ALCMs on bombers 
(9) lmllal Sov1et deployment ALCMs on bombers 
(4) 
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APPENDIX 11 
Ratio of strategic indicators for different assumptions - 1983 
Resources Defence effon 
PopulatiOn GNP Armed forces Defence 
m. $b. thousands expenditure $b. 
United States .................................... 234.5 3 298 2 222 217.2 
WEU ······· .................................... 253.7 2 357.4 2 119 92.0 
Rest of NATO 
············ ··········· ............ 
103.4 538.6 I 246 15.9 
Total NATO .................................... 591.6 6 194 5 587 325.1 
Other potential adversaries of USSR 
Iran 
············································· 
42.5 110.1 470 5.5 
Pakistan 
............... ····················· ..... 
94.1 36.6 584 2.0 
China 
....... ···································· 
I 020.9 401.0 4 100 34.5 
Japan 
························· .................. 
119.3 1 137.8 241 11.5 
Total other potential adversaries .................. I 276.8 I 685.5 5 395 53.5 
Total NATO and other potential adversaries ....... I 868.4 7 879.5 to 982 I 378.6 
USSR 
··········································· 
272.5 I 843.4 4 400 258.0 
Rest of Warsaw Pact 
............... ·············· 
110.9 720.6 I 410 41.8 
Total Warsaw Pact 
···················· ··········· 
383.4 2 564 5 810 299.8 
Mongolia ........................................ 1.8 1.9 38 0.2 
Total Warsaw Pact + Mongolia 
··················· 
385.2 2 566 5 848 300.0 
Ratws: 
USSR: United States .............................. 1:0.9 1:1.8 1:0.5 1:0.8 
Warsaw Pact: NATO ............................. I: 1.5 1:2.4 1:1.0 1:1.1 
Warsaw Pact+ Mongolia: 
NATO + other potential adversaries ............... 1:4.9 1:3.1 1:1.9 1:1.3 
Source: Absolute data from World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers 1985, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (except defence expenditure and 
GNP for Mongoha from IISS Mihtary Balance 1986). 
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A. NATO- Warsaw Pact force comparison 
EUROPE 
Fon:es m Place in Europe 
Reinforced by Rapidly 
Oeployable Forces (") 
Fully Reinforced Forces ("•1 
France 1 
Spain 1 
0,5 5 1300 1500 1100 3800 200 360 
0,3 680 130 1600 1500 4D 130 
TOTALIIIUTARY DIVISION MAIN BA TILE TANKS ANTI-TANK ARTILLERY /MORTARS ARMOURED PERSONNEl ATTACK TRANSPORT /SUPPORT 
GUIDED WEAPON LAUNCIIERS {tubes 100 nm 11111 obove CARRIERS 6 IM'ANTRY INCUIIING EOIJIVAUNTS {Miin11lll8111111190nm HEUCOPTERS HEUCOPTERS 
NAVAL FORCES llldobovel {Claw S8IV8d fl'lll/01 111011111dl tnebling Rocbl l..an:llnl AGHTlNG VEHICULES 
6 OTHER ARMOURED 
VEHICULES 
I. Estimate of French and Spanish forces in metropolitan territory (and French forces in Germany) taken from IISS Military Balance 1986-87. 
These forces are excluded from the above table, but are logically comparable with Sovtet forces included in the table. 
Notes: Warsaw Pact divistons normally consist of fewer personnel than many NATO divisions but contam more tanks and artillery, thereby 
obtammg simtlar combat power. 
(*) Raptdly deployable forces - include those United States forces whose equipment is stored in Europe and high-readiness Soviet forces located in 
the Baltic, Belorusstan, Carpathian, Odessa, Kiev and North Caucasus military districts. 
(**) Fully reinforced forces - mclude North American reinforcements and all Warsaw Pact forces located west of the Ural mountains. 
Source. Table adapted from NATO and the Warsaw Pact: force comparisons, fig. 2, pub!. NATO 1984. 
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WARSAW PACT 
BACKARE TU-22M 
BADGER TU-18 
BUIIIDER TU-22 
BREWER YAK-28 
FENCER SU-24 
ADDLER TU-28 
ASHBED MIG-21 
FITTIR A SU-7 
FITIER C/0/H/E/G/H/J SU-17/22 
FLAGON SU-15 
FLOGGER 8/G MIG-23 
FLOG6ER 0/J MIG-27 
FOXBAT A/B/0/E MtG-25 
FOXHOUND A MIG-31 
FROGFOOT SU-25 
FULCRUM MIG-29 
NATO 
ALPHA-JET 
BUCCANEER 
CORSAIR 11 A-7 
EAGLE F-15 
AGHTING FALCON F-18 
FREEDOM FIGHTER F-5. RF-5 
HARRIER 
JAGUAR 
MIRAGE 5 M5BR, M5BA, M5F 
MIRAGE F-1 
MIRAGE Ill E. R 
MIRAGE 2000 
PHANTOM F-4, RF-4 
STARFIGHTER F-104, RF-104 
THUNDERBOLT 11 A-10 
TORNADO 
F~ll 
EF-UI 
~ 
B. NATO- Warsaw Pact combat aircraft 
Quantitative comparisons 
Selected types of aircrfl/t in plllce in Europe 
(excluding Moscow air defence district and Spain) 
NATO Aircraft 
2,990 Total in Europe 
ALPHA-JET 
BUCCANEER 
CORSAIR 11 
AGHTING FALCON 
FREEDOM FIGHTER 
HARRIER 
JAGUAR 
MIRAGE IIIE 
MIRAGE 5F 
PHANTOM 
ST ARFIGHTER 
THUNOERBOL T 11 
TORNADO 
F-Ill 
BACKFIRE 
BADGER 
SUNDER 
NATO 0 
~0 
WARSAW PACTA 
Aircraft 
7,430 Total in Europe 
FENCER 
FlmR 
FLOG6ER D/H/J 
FROGFOOT 
EAGLE 
FIGHTING FALCON 
MIRAGE 
PHANTOM 
STARFIGHTER 
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4195 
FREEDOM FIGHTER 
JAGUAR 
MIRAGE'5 
PHANTOM 
ST ARFIGHTER 
TORNADO 
EF-111 
~ 
~ ~~s ~ 
France 1988 1 200 180 80 
1974 1983 1974 1983 
BOMBERS 
1974 1983 1974 1983 
FIGHTER BOMBERS 
GROUND/ A TI ACK 
1974 1983 1974 1983 
INTERCEPTORS 
1974 1983 1974 1983 
RECONNAISSANCE 
L Estimates of French aircraft in metropolitan France and Germany, excluded from above tablt, are taken from IISS Military Balance (excluding 
Mirage IV strategic bombers). 
NB. A large proportion of interceptor aircraft can be used in ground/attack roles. The figures mentioned above refer to combat aircraft in operational 
units only. 
Source: Table adapted from NATO and the Warsaw Pact: force comparisons, fig. 4., pub!. NATO 1984. 
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C. NATO and Warsaw Pact: Force comparisons 1984- Regional comparisons in Europe 
Ltuuiforcu Ttu:tkal air forcu 
Divisional Main battle Artillery Fighter/bOmber Interceptors Reconna1ssance 
equivalents tanks and mortars ground attack 
N WP N WP N WP N WP N WP N WP 
NORTH AND CENTRAL REGIONS 
- In place and rapidly deployable 1 •••• 43 61 8 165 16 620 4 920 10 270 1 345 1 555 500 2 635 145 390 
- Active and mobilisable reserves ..... 28 2 43 4100 10 760 3 670 10 530 
(in US or more distant parts, SU up to 
Ura1s) 
Total fully-reinforced ................. 71 104 12 265 27 380 8 590 20800 
Note: French excluded from above 3 ... 5 1 260 1260 200 180 60 
SOUTHfvRN REGION 615 695 295 1 560 90 195 
N.E. ltay 
- In place and rapidly deployable ..... 8 10 I 250 2 340 1 400 I 560 
- Active and mobilisable reserves ..... 1/3 7 2000 1 300 
Total fully-reinforced ................. 8 1/3 17 •1 250 4 340 1400 2 860 
Greek and Turkish Thrace 
- In place and rapidly deployable 22 3 680 2 940 
- Active and mobilisable reserves 25 12 2 890 3460 
Total fully-reinforced ................ 34 4000 6 570 4 600 6 400 
East Turkey 
- In place and rapidly deployable ..... 8 12 2435 2 735 
- Active and mobilisable reserves ..... 4 1 865 2065 
Total fully-reinforced ................. 12 20 4 300 4800 
Note: Spanish forces 4 excluded from 
I above ............................. 6 880 2400 30 107 20 
I. Includes 4 US divisions with eqUipment stored in Europe but 2/3 of their manpower in US. They are air-transportable to Europe. 
2. Some might be assigned to southern region. 
3. Source for French forces: FRG Ministry of Defence White Paper 1985 quotmg "appendix to NATO force compansons 1984 ". 
4. Source for Spanish forces: IISS Mihtary Balance 1986-87. These forces are not assigned for NATO purposes and the ground forces could not be rapidly transported to the 
three isolated areas of the southern region. 
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D. NATO and Warsaw Pact maritime forces: 
(a) In North Atlantic and seas bordermg Europe. 
(b) Total including US, Canadian and Soviet Pacific fleets 
Category NATO Warsaw Pact NATO Warsaw Pact 
Aircraft carriers: VSTOL carriers o o 0 0 0 0 0 o o o o o 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 10 - 16 -
K.iev-class ships • 0 •••• 0 .......... 0 0 ............... 0 0. - 2 - 3 
Helicopter carriers ................................. - 2 - 2 
Cruisers ••••••••••• 0 •••••••••••••••••••• 0 ••••••••• 14 23 29 36 
Destroyers and frigates ............................. 277 187 350 74 
Coastal escorts and fast patrol boats • • • • • • • 0 •• 0 0 •• 0. 192 515 n.a. n.a . 
Amphibious ships 
- ocean-going ..................................... 44 19 75 
- independent coastal craft • 0 ••••• 0 ••••••••••••• 0 •• 69 174 n.a. n.a. 
Mine warfare ships .......................... :-. :-.- . :- -L73- 378 277 474 
- Long-range attack submarines 1 67 142 109 185 
- Other types ..................................... 95 55 95 77 
- % submarines nuclear-powered •••••••••• 0 0 •••••• 0 50% 64% n.a. n.a. 
Sea-based tactical ASW and support 
aircraft including helicopters o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 685 181 1 372 
Land-based tactical and support I 
aircraft including helicopters ..................... 366 2 700 3 1 600 2 I 1 549 
Land-based anti-submarine warfare 
fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters •• 0 ........... 0 •• 454 228 738 
Note: n.a. - not available 
coastal craft not included in worldwide totals 
Source: Adapted from " NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Force comparisons 1984 ", page 16, with additional data from IISS Military 
Balance. 
I. Excluding ballistic missile submarines. 
2. For 1983, includes US Marine Corps aircraft and helicopters. 
3. About 300 of these are bombers. 
139 
----
---------
DOCUMENT 1115 
Country National currency unit Defence expenditure (national currency, current prices) d 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 c 1982 
(0) (I) (- 5) (- 4) (- 3) (- 2) (- I) (I) 
Belgium •••••••••••••• 0. 0 •• Million B. Frs. 132 127 136 615 139 113 141 582 - 2 892 
France (c) .................. Million F. Frs. 148 021 165 029 176 638 186 715 196 465 22 523 
Germany .................. Million DM 54234 56496 57 274 58 650 60 378 22 350 
Italy ....................... Milliard Lire 12 294 14400 16 433 18 584 20 332 9 090 
Luxembourg ............... Million L. Frs. 1 893 2104 2234 2265 2 533 41 
Netherlands ................ Million Guilders 11 921 12 149 12 765 12 901 13 244 4464 
United Kingdom ........... Million £ Sterling 14 870 15 830 17 511 18 352 19 213 26030 
TOTAL WEU ........... 87 390 
Canada .................... Million C.$ 7 802 8 815 9 754 10329 11 115 6 324 
Denmark .................. Million D. Kr. 11 669 12 574 13 045 13 344 13 750 1400 
Greece ..................... Million Drachmas 176 270 193 340 271 922 321 981 366 632 2 639 
Norway .................... Million N. Kr. 10956 12 395 12 688 15 446 15 788 1 698 
Portugal ................... Million Escudos 63 817 76 765 92009 Ill 375 138 479 803 
Turkey .................... Millions L. 447 790 556 738 803 044 1234 547 1 867 990 2 755 
United States .............. Million US$ 189 971 213 626 231 459 258 164 272 499 189 971 
TOTAL NON-WEU ...... 205 590 
TOTAL NATO (d) ...... 292 980 
APPENDIX IV 
COMPARATIVE TABLE OF DEFENCE EFFORT 1982-1986 
Defence expenditure GDP in purchaser' values Population (thousand) (current prices - US $ million) a (current prices - US $ million) a 
1983 1984 1985 1986• 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986• 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986• 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (I!) (12 (13) (14) (15) 
2 672 2407 2 384 - 84 879 80408 76 187 79 076 99 448 9 856 9 855 9 855 9 857 9 857 
21 654 20212 20 780 25 955 542 746 516317 490078 510321 647 692 54480 54 729 54946 55 162 55 400 
22 127 20 125 19 922 24 717 658 502 653 883 614 252 621 739 794 989 61 638 61 423 61 175 61 015 60 832 
9 481 9 353 9 733 12 252 347 862 355 441 350 096 358 669 452 710 56 639 56 825 56 983 57 128 57 299 
41 39 38 51 3 497 3476 3 446 3 573 4579 366 366 366 366 367 
4257 3978 3 884 4 811 138 139 133 499 124 184 124 968 154 310 14 313 14 367 14424 14484 14 542 
24014 23400 23 789 27 886 483 864 455 443 424 679 450 721 539 921 56 335 56 377 56488 56 642 56 810 
84245 79 515 80 527 98 072* 2259 490 2 198 467 2 082 923 2 149 069 2 693 649 253 627 253 942 254237 254 654 255 107 
7 153 7 531 7 564 8 030 299 061 323 600 334105 341 736 356 783 24657 24 905 25 146 25 379 25 607 
I 375 I 260 I 259 I 536 55 742 56024 54060 57 840 73 617 5 119 5 114 5 111 5 113 5 114 
2 195 2 412 2 331 2 573 38 206 34657 33444 32 777 38 700 9 790 9 847 9900 9 950 9 997 
1 699 1 555 1 797 2 069 56 277 55 064 54 736 54 681 65 882 4 116 4128 4 141 4148 4 165 
693 629 654 884 23295 20 672 19 309 20770 27404 9 969 10050 10 129 10230 10 332 
2469 2 190 2 365 3 082 53 738 51 225 49667 52 701 65 469 46 780 47 804 48 825 49 840 50 850 
213 626 231 459 258 164 272499 3 045 279 3 275 728 3 634 582 3 840 845 4 064 881 232 520 234 799 237019 239 283 241 676 
229 210 247 035 274134 290674 3 571 598 3 816 969 4 179 904 4 401 350 4 692 736 332 951 336 647 340271 343 943 347 741 
313455 326 550 354 663 388 740* 5 831 088 6 015 436 6 262 827 6 550 418 7 386 385 586 578 590 589 594 508 598 597 602 848 
Note a: GDP and defence expenditures are calculated in national currency and converted to United States$ at the rates shown below. Figures in 
columns (I) to (10) and (21) to (30) are affected by change in exchange rates and are not therefore always comparable between countries, 
whereas figures of defence expenditures as% of GDP in columns (16) to (20) do not involve currency conversion. 
For the period 1982-1986, the following rates of exchange have been applied: 
Units per US $ 
Country National currency unit 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 b 
(0) (I) (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Belgium Million B. Frs. 45 69100 51 13200 57 78400 59 37800 4976400 
France Million F. Frs. 6 57210 7 62130 8 73910 8 98520 7 56950 
Germany Million DM 242660 2 55330 2 84590 2 94400 2 44280 
Italy Milliard Lire I 35250 I 51880 1 75700 190940 l 65950 
Luxembourg Million L. Frs. 45 69100 51 13200 57 78400 59 37800 49 76400 
Netherlands Million Guilders 267020 2 85410 3 20870 3 32140 2 75290 
United Kingdom Million Pound Sterling 0 57127 0 65920 0 74833 0 77143 068899 
Canada Million C. $ I 23370 l 23240 l 29510 I 36550 I 38410 
Denmark Million D. Kr. 8 33240 9 14500 10 35660 10 59600 8 94900 
Greece Million Drachmas 66 80300 88 06400 112 72000 138 12000 142 48000 
Norway Million N. Kr. 6 45400 7 29640 8 16150 8 59720 7 63110 
Portugal Million Escudos 79 47300 110 78000 146 39000 170 39000 156 62000 
Turkey Million Turkish Lira 162 55000 225 46000 366 68000 521 98000 60613000 
United States Million US$ I 00000 I 00000 I 00000 l 00000 I 00000 
Note b: Average August 1985/July 1986. 
Note c: France is a member of the alliance without belonging to the integrated military structure; the relevant figures for defence expenditures 
are indicative only. 
Note d: The corresponding statistical data for Spain are not available. 
e = Estimate. 
• = WEU secretariat estimate. 
Source: Defence expenditures (NATO definition), from NATO press release M-DPC-2 (86) 39. 
Defence expenditure as % of Defence expenditure per head Defence expenditure as % of total WEU GDP in purchasers' values (current prices - US $) a 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986• 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986• 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986• 1 
(16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) 
3.4 3.3 3.2 3.0 - 293 271 244 242 - 3.31 3.17 3.03 2.96 -
4.1 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.0 413 396 368 377 468 25.77 25.70 25.42 25.81 26.50 
3.4 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.1 363 360 329 327 406 25.57 26.26 25.31 24.74 25.20 
2.6 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 160 167 164 170 214 10.40 11.25 11.76 12.09 12.50 
1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 113 112 106 104 139 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
3.2 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.1 312 296 276 268 331 5.11 5.05 5.00 4.82 4.90 
5.4 5.3 5.5 5.3 5.2 462 426 414 420 491 29.79 28.50 29.43 29.54 28.40 
3.9 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.6* 345 332 313 316 384* 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
2.1 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.3 256 287 299 298 314 7.24 8.49 9.47 9.40 8.20 
2.5 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.1 274 269 246 246 300 1.60 1.63 1.58 1.56 1.60 
6.9 6.3 7.2 7.1 6.6 270 223 244 234 257 3.02 2.61 3.03 2.89 2.60 
3.0 3.1 2.8 3.3 3.1 412 412 375 433 497 1.94 2.02 1.96 2.23 2.10 
3.4 3.4 3.3 3.1 3.2 81 69 62 64 86 0.92 0.82 0.79 0.81 0.90 
5.1 4.8 4.4 4.5 4.7 59 52 45 47 61 3.15 2.93 2.75 2.94 3.10 
6.2 6.5 6.4 6.7 6.7 817 910 977 1079 1 128 217.38 253.58 291.09 320.59 277.90 
5.8 6.0 5.9 6.2 6.2 617 681 726 797 836 235.26 272.08 310.68 340.43 296.40 
5.0 5.2 5.2 5.4 5.3* 499 531 549 592 645* 335.26 372.08 410.68 440.43 396.40 
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B. Manpower effort- 1986 
Period of compulsory 1 Total in armed forces 2 Total armed forces 2 Total armed forces 
military service military personnel (military and civilian) as percentage of 
(months) (thousands) as percentage ' population aged 
of active population 18-45 
Army Navy Air force (e) 
* 
Belgium ...... 10 3 10 3 10 3 108 2.9 2.7 
France •• 0 ••• 0 12 12 12 558 3.0 2.5 
Germany ..... 15 4 15 4 15 4 495 2.4 2.0 
Italy .......... 12 18 12 529 2.5 2.4 
Luxembourg .. voluntary 1 0.9 1.0 
Netherlands ... 14-16 14-17 14-17 106 2.3 1.6 
United 
Kingdom ... voluntary 331 2.0 1.5 
TOTAL WEU .. 2 128 2.5 2.1 
Canada ....... voluntary 84 
I 
1.0 0.7 
Denmark ..... 9-12 9-12 9-12 29 1.4 1.4 
Greece ....... 21 25 23 205 6.1 5.5 
Norway ••• 0 0. 12 15 15 36 2.5 2.1 
Portugal ...... 16 24 21-24 102 2.8 2.5 
Spain ......... 12 12 12 320 .. 2.1 
Turkey ....... 18 18 18 853 4.6 4.2 
United States . voluntary 2 294 2.9 2.1 
ToTAL NON-WEU . 3 923 3.1 2.4 
TOTALNATO ..... 6 051 2.8 2.2 
Sources: 
1. IISS, Military Balance 1986-87. 
2. NATO press release M-DPC-2 (86) 39 of 4th December 1986. Spain as for 1. 
3. Eight months if served in Germany. 
4. To be eighteen months from 1989. 
e : Estimate. 
* : 1985 figures taken from NATO press release quoted above. 
C. Warsaw Pact manpower effort 
Period of compulsory Total in Armed forces as 
military service 
armed forces i percent of 
(thousands) population Army Navy Air force aged 18-45 
Bulgaria .............. 24 36 24 149 I 4.3 
Czechoslovakia ••••• 0 0 24 - 36 201 3.2 
GDR • 0 •• 0 •••••• 0 •••• 18 36 I 18 179 2.6 
Hungary ••• 0 0 0 0. 0 ••• 0 18 - 24 105 2.5 
Poland ............... 24 36 I 24 402 2.6 
Romania ............. 16 24 16 190 2.2 
Soviet Union ......... 24 36 24 5 130 4.5 
Warsaw Pact Total ................................... 6 356 ' 4.0 
1. Sea-going. 
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APPENDIX V 
United States and Soviet Union; NATO and Warsaw Pact 
Military expenditures 1973 to 1983 
($ bat constant 1981 $) 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
United States ...................... 154 155 150 142 149 150 155 
Rest of NATO ..................... 81 85 86 84 89 92 93 
Total NATO ....................... 235 240 236 230 238 242 248 
Total Warsaw Pact ................. 223 234 243 253 255 259 264 
Rest of Warsaw Pact ............... 34 35 36 36 36 36 37 
Soviet Union ...................... 189 199 207 217 219 223 227 
Source: 
1980 1981 1982 
168 181 196 
96 98 101 
264 279 297 
270 274 284 
37 37 40 
233 237 244 
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers", 1985. 
(Soviet Union expenditure from US CIA dollar cost estimate- paragraph 4.18 et seq. of explanatory memorandum.) 
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1983 
208 
104 
312 
288 
40 
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Amendment 1 
Threat assessment 
AMENDMENT 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Reddemann and others 
2nd December 1987 
1. At the beginning of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows: 
"Considering that independently ofthe assessment of the political intentions ofthe leaders ofthe 
Soviet Union and ofthe Warsaw Pact, the military potential ofthose countries is in itself a major 
factor in the threat assessment, particularly when - as is the case of the Warsaw Pact - their 
technico-military doctrine has led them to establish a structure better suited to offensive purposes 
than to defence; " 
Signed: Reddemann, Val/eix, Finsberg, Fioret, Wilkinson, Kinnoul/, Dudley Smith, Hill 
1. See 11th sitting, 3rd December 1987 (amendment withdrawn). 
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Disarmament - reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 2 
by Mr. Scheer, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTORY NOTE 
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on disarmament 
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submitted by Mr. Scheer, Rapporteur 
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11. Activities of the Council 
(a) General 
(b) Arms control and disarmament questions 
(c) Restructuring and eo-location 
(d) European security charter 
(e) Enlargement 
(f) Agencies for security questions 
(g) Institutional defence tasks of the Council 
(i) Level of forces of member states 
(ii) United Kingdom forces stationed on the mainland of Europe 
(h) Agency for the Control of Armaments 
(i) European defence co-operation outside the WEU framework 
Ill. Other texts referred to the committee 
IV. International negotiations on the control of armaments 
(a) General 
(b) The thrust of Soviet policy 
(c) Strategic and space talks 
(d) Intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) 
(e) Chemical weapons 
(f) Nuclear test ban 
1. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Klltelmann (Chairman); MM. Cifare/11, Fourre (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alloncle (Alternate: 
Jeambrun), Amadei, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. de Be~r, De Decker (Alternate: Close), Edwards, Giust, Irmer, Jung, Konen, 
de Kwaadsteniet (Alternate: De Hoop Scheffer), Mrs. Lalumu!re, MM. Lemmrich, Matraja, Dr. Miller, MM. Pecchioli, Ramaekers, 
Sarti, Scheer, Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Speed, Steiner, Steverlynck (Alternate: Declercq), Stokes. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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(g) Negotiations on conventional forces and confidence-building measures 
(h) Other Warsaw Pact proposals 
(i) Conclusions 
APPENDICES 
I. WEU platform on European security interests, adopted by the Council in The 
Hague, 27th October 1987 (Extracts) 
11. Statement on the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Rey-
kjavik, 11th-12th June 1987 (Extracts) 
Ill. Document on military doctrine adopted by the Warsaw Pact Politic~ Consul-
tative Committee in Berlin on 29th May 1987 (Extracts) 1 
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Introductory Note 
In preparing this report the committee as a whole met in Geneva on 30th and 31st July 1987, 
when it was addressed by the following representatives to the Conference on Disarmament: 
H.E. Mr. Robert van Schaik, Ambassador, Head of the Netherlands Delegation; 
Dr. Waiter Krutzsch, Minister Plenipotentiary, Delegation of the German Democratic 
Republic; 
Mr. Sergei Batsanov, Deputy Head of the Delegation of the USSR; 
Mr. Thomas Barthelemy, Minister Plenipotentiary, Alternate Representative of the United States 
Delegation; 
H.E. Mr. Pierre Morel, Ambassador, Representative of France; 
H.E. Mr. Rolf Ekeus, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of Sweden; 
H.E. Mr. Fan Guoxiang, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of China. 
The Rapporteur arranged for the following officials to be interviewed on his behalf in Moscow 
from 19th to 21st October 1987: 
Soviet Committee for European Security and Co-operation 
Mr. Yevgeniy K. Silin, Vice Chairman. 
Institute for the Study of the United States and Canada 
Mr. Fedorenko, Senior Research Associate; 
Mr. Lev Semeiko, Military Expert. 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
Mr. Victor V. Smolin, Minister, Deputy Director Evaluations and Planning Department; 
Mr. Alexander V. Yakovenko, Assistant to the Director of Department; 
Mr. Vladimir Bashkirov, Counsellor, Disarmament Department. 
Institute of World Economy and International Relations (/MEMO) 
Dr. Bugrov, Head of Department; 
Dr. Blagovolin, Head of Department; 
Dr. Nikolai Kishilov, Head of Section, Defence Expert; 
Dr. Rassadin, Senior Research Fellow; 
Mr. Usachev, Research Fellow. 
Soviet General Staff 
General Makelov, Disarmament Department. 
The committee as a whole met in Paris on Monday 2nd November 1987, when it discussed and 
adopted the present report and was addressed by Mr. Ian Dawson, Director of WEU Agencies for 
security questions I and 11. 
The committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to all the officials and senior officers who 
provided information for the report in one way or another. In particular thanks are due to the staff of 
the Agency for the study of arms control and disarmament who have assisted the committee. 
The views expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee. 
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Draft recommendation 
replying to the thirty-second annual report of the Council 
The Assembly, 
(i) Welcoming the Council's continued close consultation on European securityi and disarmament 
questions and its determination not to allow Europe to be sidelined in the present strategic debate; 
(ii) Welcoming the commitment in the platform on European security interests adopted by the 
Council on 27th October 1987 to build a European union; 
(iii) Welcoming in particular the active role of the presidency of the Council in initiating consultation, 
including the first consultation on a threat to peace arising outside Europe; 
(iv) Welcoming also the establishment of the Council's high-level special workin~ group to improve 
co-operation between Ministries for Foreign Affairs and Defence in all member countries; 
(v) Stressing the need for a decision in 1988 on the eo-location and restructuring of all Council organs 
and WEU institutions; 
(vi) Calling for an early decision thereafter on the accession of the countries which have expressed a 
wish to join WEU; 
(vii) Recalling the continued importance of the long-standing institutional responsibilities of the 
Council concerning troop levels and the remaining internal arms control, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Continue its discussions on all aspects of European security and disarmament and ensure that 
European interests are safeguarded in the present strategic debate; 
2. Decide to eo-locate all Council bodies and WEU institutions and to define the new tasks of the 
agencies for security questions; 
3. Reinstate in its annual reports the information previously given on the number of control mea-
sures carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
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Draft recommendation 
on disarmament 
The Assembly, 
(i) Calling for the collective defence effort to be maintained at all times at the level necessary to 
ensure the security of all countries of the alliance, while negotiations are actively pursued on the mutual 
reduction of forces and armaments to the lowest levels compatible with that essential security, in full 
accordance with the long-standing policy of the alliance; 
(ii) Welcoming progress on a properly verifiable INF agreement between the United States and the 
Soviet Union based on zero-zero proposals agreed by the alliance as a whole which it believes should be 
in the long-term security interests of countries both ofthe alliance and the Warsaw Pact, and noting that 
the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments will report fully on all aspects of the anticipated 
agreement when the text is published; 
(iii) Welcoming also the approach to a bilateral agreement to reduce strategic nuclear weapons; 
(iv) Stressing the importance of respect for the existing ABM treaty and notional limitations of the 
SALT accords which can be modified only by agreement between the parties to them, and recalling in 
this connection the reply of the Council to Recommendation 413; 
(v) Noting with satisfaction the improved prospects for the conclusion of a multilateral treaty to ban 
all chemical weapons and a bilateral agreement to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons 
tests; 
(vi) Noting both the similarities and the differences between the security policy declared by NATO 
most recently in Reykjavik and the military strategy enunciated by the Warsaw Pact in Berlin, and wel-
coming the positive aspects of the Berlin proposals for consultations between the two alliances to discuss 
military doctrine and a search for ways of removing imbalances and asymmetries in different arma-
ments and forces; 
(vii) Calling in general for the councils of both alliances to give careful consideration to all arms 
control proposals of the other, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Press for the earliest opening of negotiations on conventional stability mandated to discuss asym-
metrical reductions of conventional forces and armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals so as to 
establish a stable and non-threatening military balance in Europe at the lowest possible levels, with pri-
ority to negotiations on the Central European region; 
2. Express full support for a verifiable bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet 
Union to reduce the strategic warheads of each party to 6 000, and continue to ensure that any such 
bilateral agreement imposes no restrictions on the forces of European countries, who are not parties to it; 
3. Urge on the two parties the importance of fully respecting the existing ABM treaty and notional 
limitations of the SALT accords, which can be modified only by agreement between them; 
4. Call on the North Atlantic Council to consider positively the Berlin proposal of the Warsaw Pact 
for consultations between the two alliances to compare military strategy, and to find ways of removing 
asymmetries in types of armaments and forces through reductions to the lower level in each case, and in 
general to give proper consideration to all arms control proposals of the Warsaw Pact countries with a 
view to identifying those elements which may provide a fruitful basis for mutually-advantageous 
negotiations. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Scheer, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1.1. The terms of reference of the present stat-
utory report under the terms of the Charter and 
Rules of Procedure provide for it to reply to 
those parts of the annual report of the Council 
which the Presidential Committee refers to the 
committee. As for the last eighteen months, the 
terms of reference further provide that: " In view 
of the importance of disarmament in the Coun-
cil's discussions since reactivation, the report 
will examine also developments in all present 
forums for negotiations on the control of arma-
ments and disarmament, both bilateral and mul-
tilateral, on nuclear weapons and on other 
aspects of armaments control. " 
1.2. The committee's previous report on this 
subject 1 already took account of the first part of 
the thirty-second annual report of the Council 
covering the first half of 1986, which was com-
municated to the Assembly on 24th October 
1986. The present report therefore replies to the 
second part of the thirty-second annual report 
received on 24th April 1987, shortly after the 
committee's previous report was adopted. (The 
first part of the thirty-third annual report of the 
Council, covering the first half of 1987, had not 
been received when the committee adopted the 
present report on 2nd November.) This report 
also takes account of course of miscellaneous 
subsequent communications from the Council or 
the Chairman-in-Office; in particular the address 
to the Assembly by Mr. Poos, Luxembourg Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs and the Chairman-in-
Office of the Council, on 28th April, conveying 
the conclusions of the Council at its ministerial 
meeting the previous day. 
1.3. At its meeting on 3rd June 1987 the Presi-
dential Committee referred to the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments the sections 
of the Council's annual report concerning: 
the Council's activities relating to 
security in the framework of the 
Atlantic Alliance, the control of arma-
ments and disarmament; 
- the application of Protocol No. II on 
WEU forces; 
- the activities of the Agency for the 
Control of Armaments and Agencies 
I and II." 
I. Disarmament- reply to the thirty-first annual report of the 
Council, 31st March 1987, Document 1090, Rapporteur: Mr. 
Amadei. 
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ll. Activities of the Council 
(a) General 
2.1. The committee welcom~s the new Council 
arrangements since reactiva~ion whereby, at 
enlarged meetings of the Council, political 
directors and representatives of the Ministers of 
Defence attend meetings of the permanent 
Council in London, thereby involving Defence 
Ministries more closely in European consul-
tation on security matters. 
2.2. The committee particul~rly welcomes the 
initiative of the Netherlands presidency of the 
Council which convened senior officials from the 
Ministries for Foreign Affairs and Defence of 
the WEU countries in The Hague on 20th August 
and again on 15th September 1987 to discuss 
developments in the Gulf. The meeting 
expressed the full support of WEU countries to 
secure implementation of Security Council Reso-
lution 598 and their support for the efforts of the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations to 
secure a ceasefire in the Iraq-Iran conflict. After 
the first meeting the WEU Secretary-General 
stressed to the press that the despatch of mine-
sweepers to the Gulf by vario~s WEU countries 
had not been discussed at the' meeting. 
2.3 The important consensus reached by the 
five permanent members ofthe Security Council 
in adopting Resolution 598 on the Gulf conflict, 
and subsequently in supporting the mission of 
the UN Secretary-General, is a historical 
achievement, marking the first time that the 
Soviet Union has been so publicly associated 
with the western members in a United Nations 
peacekeeping effort. The committee particularly 
welcomes the WEU Council's support for the 
United Nations' role in this area. The Hague 
meetings mark two important precedents for the 
use of WEU in security matters - the first time 
since the signature of the original Brussels Treaty 
in 1948 that the present Article VIII, paragraph 3 
has been invoked whereby the Council may be 
convened for consultation: " with regard to any 
situation which may constitute a threat to peace, 
in whatever area this threat should arise, ... " -
such discussion covers threats arising outside the 
casus belli area of Article V which provides for 
automatic military assistance in the case of an 
armed attack "in Europe" on a WEU country. 
2.4 Secondly, the Hague meetings show the 
important role that the presidency of the Council 
can play in accordance with the provisions of the 
1984 Rome agreement on the reactivation of 
WEU. The committee welcorpes this vigorous 
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demonstration of the right of initiative of the 
presidency but suggests that, in order to ensure 
proper liaison with the Secretary-General of the 
Council in London, the latter should second a 
member of his staff as liaison officer to the 
Foreign Ministry of the country exercising the 
presidency-in-office of the Council at any time. 
There could then be a "WEU cell" within that 
Foreign Ministry which could greatly facilitate 
the proper functioning of the presidency. 
2.5. Bilateral consultations among WEU coun-
tries with appropriate resources have subse-
quently resulted in the deployment of mine-
sweepers by Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom in the Gulf. 
2.6. The committee does not pursue this first 
demonstration of the " outside area " responsi-
bility of the WEU Council, as the subject was 
referred to the General Affairs Committee. 
(b) Arms control and disarmament questions 
2. 7. The Council describes its discussions on 
arms control and disarmament questions under 
the heading" East-West relations" , not wishing 
perhaps to give too much prominence to a 
subject which the United States has let it be 
known it considers should be discussed in the 
NATO framework, and which the committee 
discusses in Chapter IV of this report. 
2.8. The Council has regularly discussed dis-
armament since reactivation, dealing in par-
ticular with the INF negotiations and their rela-
tionship with the problem of shorter-range 
missiles; the multilateral negotiations to ban 
chemical weapons; the importance of removing 
conventional disparities, and the United States 
strategic defence initiative. The section of the 
Council's report is prefaced with the assertion 
that: " Maintaining peace in freedom is a prime 
objective of the security and defence policies of 
WEU member states within the alliance: their 
aim is to prevent any type of war - nuclear and 
conventional. The maintenance of deterrence, 
based on adequate conventional and nuclear 
defences, is an essential element of these pol-
icies ... " 
2.9. At the time of drafting the present report, 
the Rapporteur is not yet in possession of any 
comments by the Council on the latest progress 
of the INF negotiations, but on reporting to the 
Assembly in Luxembourg on 28th April this 
year, Mr. Poos, Luxembourg Minister for 
Foreign Affairs and Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council at that time, pointed out that the 
member states: " approved the zero-zero option 
when it was tabled by their American ally at the 
Geneva negotiations in 1981. It is therefore with 
positive interest and satisfaction that they now 
note the possibility of reaching agreement to this 
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end ... the Ministers recalled their serious concern 
at the existing Soviet superiority in shorter-range 
intermediate nuclear missiles and the 
requirement not to neglect this in any interme-
diate nuclear force agreement...". The very good 
prospects now for a " double zero " INF 
agreement that would eliminate both longer-
range and shorter-range intermediate nuclear 
missiles can only meet with the Council's 
approval. 
2.10. During the period reviewed the Council's 
working group on the United States strategic 
defence initiative continued to work since 
November 1986 within the new high-level 
special working group comprising representa-
tives from Ministries for Foreign Affairs and 
Defence Ministries which is considering 
European security interests. At the ministerial 
meeting in Luxembourg in April 1987 the 
Council was able to take note of a report 
analysing the politico-strategic implications of 
current SDI research programmes and this study 
will be continued. 
2.11. A little more information about the work 
of the Council's special working group comes 
from the report to the Netherlands Second 
Chamber by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs 
and of Defence on 18th June 1987 concerning 
the study on the possible consequences of the 
introduction of various forms of strategic 
defence. The Ministers' report points out that 
various factors would come into play, such ·as the 
time of introduction and possible retaliatory 
measures; whether defence systems would be for 
point defence or the protection of the territory; 
and whether such systems would be introduced 
on one side only, or on both sides in the 
framework of an agreement between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. It is recalled that, as 
far as participation in the United States research 
programme is concerned, among the WEU coun-
tries governmental agreements have been signed 
with the United States only by Germany, Italy 
and the United Kingdom. 
2.12. The committee notes with satisfaction the 
priority now given by the Council to discussions 
of all aspects of arms control negotiations and 
welcomes Mr. Poos's statement to the Assembly 
in Luxembourg in which he said: " ... the Min-
isters expressed their wish to see Western 
Europe, at the present international juncture, 
play a part in the development of any dialogue in 
full exercise of its responsibility. Inter alia, they 
examined how to avoid any risk of Europe being 
sidelined in the present strategic debate. " 
(c) Restructuring and eo-location 
2.13. Among the more domestic WEU subjects 
still under discussion in the Council is the final 
structure which the various bodies of the WEU 
secretariat, including the agencies for security 
questions described below, should take and the 
question of their location. Certainly the sepa-
ration of the Council secretariat in London from 
the main WEU bodies in Paris comprising the 
agencies for security questions and the Office of 
the Clerk of the Assembly considerably hampers 
the efficient conduct of business. It is unlikely 
that the agencies in particular are able to afford 
the permanent Council the close and continuous 
support which the latter has a right to expect. 
2.14. Addressing the Belgian Royal Institute of 
International Relations in Brussels on 16th 
March this year, Sir Geoffrey Howe, the United 
Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, devoted part of his 
speech to WEU and said: " If the organisation 
can be made more effective by concentrating its 
activities in one place - close to NATO here in 
Brussels - then we should consider that, pro-
vided that this is not an excuse for creating a new 
bureaucracy. ". It is understood that the Nether-
lands Government similarly sees the advantage 
of eo-locating all the WEU organs in Brussels 
where the permanent representatives of the 
WEU countries to NATO - who deal with 
defence problems on a day-to-day basis - could 
then represent their countries more effectively in 
the permanent Council of WEU than the present 
Ambassadors to the United Kingdom who must 
necessarily concern themselves primarily with 
the bilateral relations of their countries with the 
United Kingdom. 
2.15. The historical reasons for the present loca-
tions of WEU organs should be recalled. The 
Council secretariat has been in London since the 
signature of the original Brussels Treaty in 1948 
when the Brussels Treaty Organisation was 
established - the precursor of WEU. That body 
transferred its defence functions to NATO in 
1950 when the latter's military structure had 
been established, and ceased thereafter to deal 
with defence questions on a day-to-day basis. 
The NATO secretariat which in 1950 had been 
divided between London and Paris was concen-
trated in the latter city in 1952 in a temporary 
annex to the Palais de Chaillot. With the estab-
lishment of WEU through the modification of 
the Brussels Treaty in 1954, the new WEU 
Agency for the Control of Armaments and the 
international secretariat of the Standing Arma-
ments Committee were established at the outset 
alongside NATO in the Palais de Chaillot -
indeed they were formed from the existing staffs 
of the Preparatory Committee for the European 
Defence Community already working with 
NATO in anticipation of the entry into force of 
that ill-fated treaty. 
2.16. As far as the Office of the Clerk of the 
Assembly was concerned, it originated as a tiny 
staff of some two persons in the Council of 
Europe in Strasbourg at a time when it was 
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envisaged that the WEU Assembly would meet 
but rarely, perhaps for half a day at the end ofthe 
session of the Council of Europe's Consultative 
Assembly. The Charter of the Assembly, as origi-
nally adopted, provided similarly that the seat of 
the Assembly was in Strasbourg. As soon, 
however, as the Assembly had established itself 
as an authoritative political forum for debating 
the problems of European security, it became 
obvious that the Office of the Clerk should be 
eo-located with NATO and the WEU secretariats 
in Paris. It was accordingly decided in 1956 to 
move the Office of the Clerk to the NATO 
building in Paris and arrangements were made 
for the Assembly to meet in tllle nearby chamber 
of the then Assembly of the French Union - the 
premises subsequently occupied by the French 
Economic and Social Council under the Fifth 
Republic. 
2.17. The requirement for tpis close collabo-
ration with NATO was inde4d foreseen in the 
modified Brussels Treaty wlhich provides in 
Article IV that " ... the Coundil and its Agency 
will rely on the appropriate military authorities 
of NATO for information and advice on military 
matters. " , while the decision of the Council of 
7th May 1955 setting up the Standing Arma-
ments Committee provides in paragraph 1: " In 
order that the closest contact may be maintained 
with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation the 
Standing Armaments Committee's seat shall be 
in Paris. ". Unfortunately this close effective col-
laboration between the WEU organs and NATO 
eo-located in the same building in Paris was dis-
rupted in 1966 when the NATO secretariat 
moved to Brussels while the WEU organs were 
left in Paris. At that time, however, WEU was to 
some extent a moribund organisation. Since the 
reactivation ofWEU and the establishment of its 
new agencies for security questions there is again 
a need for the closest collab<l>ration both with 
NATO and with the ~ropean political 
co-operation secretariat; logi ally that should 
lead to the transfer of all . EU organs from 
London and Paris to Brussels. The committee 
considers however that it woulki be premature to 
make a specific recommendation concerning the 
site for eo-location. 
(d) European security charter 
2.18. Following the proposal of the French 
Prime Minister, Mr. Chirac, in the WEU 
Assembly in December 1986, for a European 
security charter, the Council meeting at the level 
of foreign and defence ministers on 27th October 
adopted the platform on European security 
interests, a document which reaffirms well-
known principles of allied defence policy in a 
useful up-to-date statement to which all seven 
governments have now subscribed 2• The corn-
2. Extracts at Appendix I. 
DOCUMENT 1116 
mittee particularly welcomes the introductory 
paragraph: 
"2. We recall our commitment to build a 
European union in accordance with the 
single European act... We are convinced 
that the construction of an integrated 
Europe will remain incomplete as long as 
it does not include security and 
defence." 
and the subsequently expressed intention: 
"4. We intend therefore to develop a more 
cohesive European defence identity which 
will translate more effectively into practice 
the obligations of solidarity to which we 
are committed through the modified 
Brussels and North Atlantic Treaties." 
2.19. Other fundamental features of the 
platform include: 
- the assertion that the continuing 
division of Europe remains unaccep-
table, and that full use should be made 
of the CSCE process to open more pos-
sibilities in the fields of economy, tech-
nology and science, and to achieve the 
free movement of peoples and the 
exchange of opinions and information 
in the whole of Europe; 
- " ... the security of the Western 
European countries can only be ensured 
in close association with our North 
American allies"; 
- " ... the balanced policy of the Harmel 
report remains valid. Political solidarity 
and adequate military strength within 
the Atlantic Alliance, arms control, dis-
armament and the search for genuine 
detente continue to be integral parts of 
this policy ... They should lead to a stable 
balance of forces at the lowest level 
compatible with our security "; 
- " In the present circumstances and as 
far as we can foresee, there is no alter-
native to the western strategy for the 
prevention of war ... "; 
- " We remain determined to pursue 
European integration including security 
and defence and make a more effective 
contribution to the common defence of 
the West. 
To this end we shall: 
- ensure that our determination to 
defend any member country at its 
borders is made clearly manifest by 
means of appropriate arrangements "; 
(this is a clear endorsement of NATO's 
forward defence policy, to which France 
had not hitherto so clearly subscribed). 
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2.20. On arms control and disarmament the 
platform endorses the most recent NATO Rey-
kjavik statement of 12th June 1987 on these 
issues, and declares that " An agreement between 
the United States and the Soviet Union for the 
global elimination of land-based INF missiles 
with a range between 500 and 5 500 km will con-
stitute an important element of... " WED's com-
prehensive approach. These issues are discussed 
in the next chapter. 
(e) Enlargement 
2.21. The problem of the possible enlargement 
of WEU has now been hanging fire for three 
years. Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty 
provides clearly that the parties to the treaty: 
" ... may, by agreement, invite any other state to 
accede to the present treaty on conditions to be 
agreed between them and the state so invited ... ". 
Portugal announced publicly at the time of the 
reactivation of WEU in 1984 that it wished to 
join WEU. In adopting Recommendation 420 in 
May 1985, the Assembly took a clear position in 
favour of Portugal's accession. 
2.22. Subsequently, however, Spain in 1986 
announced its interest in joining WEU and two 
more candidates declared themselves in 1987 -
on 6th April the Greek Prime Minister, Mr. 
Papandreou, announced his country's candi-
dature in an interview with the Financial Times, 
and on 13th April a statement by the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs in Ankara announced 
Turkey's candidature, one day before that 
country deposited its formal application for full 
membership of the European Community. It is 
understood that all four countries have made 
bilateral diplomatic approaches to the seven 
WEU countries expressing their wish to join 
WEU, and indeed in his address to the Assembly 
in April the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, 
Mr. Poos, referred collectively to the four can-
didate countries. It should also be noted that the 
Norwegian Government's report to the Storting 
on "Norway, the European Community and 
European co-operation" of 22nd May 1987, 
devotes two pages to " reviving WEU ". It notes 
that: "Together with Portugal, Turkey and 
Denmark, Norway has regularly sent observers 
to the meetings in Paris of the WED's parlia-
mentary Assembly. Norway is favourable to the 
efforts to reactivate WEU. Depending on further 
clarification within WEU of how the French ini-
tiative will be followed up, the government will 
consider Norway's future relationship to the 
organisation". Then Mr. Ellemann-Jensen, 
Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs, was quoted 
as saying to a European Community periodical 
E.S. A visen, that " Denmark should seek to be 
admitted to WEU if it is in that forum that a real 
policy of European security co-operation IS 
initiated " 3• 
2.23. The Council has made it clear in a number 
of replies to recommendations and in its !lnnual 
report that it has shelved the questiOn of 
enlargement for the time being, until the transi-
tional phase of the reactivation of WEU is com-
pleted. This involves decisions on the new struc-
tures of the agencies on security questions and 
the London secretariat of the Council and the 
question of the eo-location of all WEU organs. 
While the transitional period was scheduled to 
be completed by the end of 1987, it is not yet 
clear whether the Council will succeed in taking 
the necessary decisions in time. In the view of 
the committee, enlargement is not an issue that 
should be indefinitely shelved. 
2.24. The criteria to be applied by the Council 
in considering invitations for c~mntries to j~in 
WEU are becoming clear. ObviOusly countnes 
must subscribe to the Brussels Treaty which pro-
vides in particular in Article IV for close 
co-operation with NATO on which the WEU 
Council and its Agency are required to rely for 
information and advice on military matters. It 
follows automatically therefore that any 
applicant for membership of WEU must be a 
member ofNATO. Under Article V, if a party is 
the object of an armed attack in Europe, the 
other parties must affor~ the party. so atta~ked a!l 
the military and other aid and assistance m t~eu 
power. This is of course a more far-reachmg 
commitment than that in Article 5 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty. Additionally, however, any new 
applicants must be required to su~scrib~ to the 
platform on European secunty mterests 
approved by the Council on 27th Octobe~ 198?, 
and indeed to the whole corpus of Council deci-
sions which apply at the date of joining. 
2.25. The platform includes a statement to the 
effect that European defence policy is based inter 
alia on nuclear deterrence and candidate coun-
tries would be expected to accept that principle, 
which is already accepted by all NATO coun-
tries. A quite different issue appears to have been 
raised in the domestic debate in Spain con-
cerning its relationship with NATO and the re~e­
gotiation of its bilateral defen~e ~greement with 
the United States - the statwmng of nuclear 
weapons on Spanish territory. Spain has not 
allowed nuclear weapons to be stored on its ter-
ritory since a United States nuclear bomb, acci-
dentally released, bro~e up on i~pac~ and caused 
considerable radioactive contammat10n although 
not exploding. The January 1976 version of the 
bilateral defence treaty, concluded after the death 
of General Franco, provided further for Uni.ted 
States strategic nuclear submarines to be with-
drawn from the Rota base by 1st July 1979. 
3. Le Monde, 28th October 1987. 
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arrangements for Portuguese parliamentary 
observers in the Assembly and Assembly com-
mittees. As there are now four applicant coun-
tries, consideration should be given to placing 
their relationship with the Assembly on an equal 
footing. As far as the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments is concerned, it has 
acceded to requests from the Norwegian and 
Turkish parliaments in admitting two observers 
from each to its meetings, and has implemented 
Order 61 of the Assembly in inviting three 
observers from Portugal. It has also exchanged 
observers with the Subcommittee on Security 
and Disarmament of the Political Committee of 
the European Parliament. No request for 
observer status in the committee appears to have 
been received from Spain, Greece or Denmark. 
(j) Agencies for security questions 
2. 30. The Secretary-General informed the 
Assembly by letter on 24th March 1987 of the 
revised terms of reference of the Paris-based 
agencies for security questions. Agency I for the 
study of arms control and disarmament ques-
tions is to work on two studies: 
the first relating to verification pro-
posals in the context of current negoti-
ations on arms control; 
" - the second relating to Soviet tactics vis 
a vis western European countries in 
regard to arms control and disarm-
ament matters. " 
The agency is also to " follow changes in Soviet 
positions in regard to disarmament and arma-
ments control". 
2.31. Agency 11 for the study of security and 
defence questions was " to continue its consider-
ation of resource management - on the basis of 
an analysis of national defence budgets - and of 
the non-military aspects of the threat, and to 
study how the public in WEU member states 
views the strategic balance". In connection with 
resource management, " the agency is to study 
means of achieving true comparability of criteria 
in western countries and rationalisation of 
defence budget management". 
2.32. The activities of Agency Ill for the devel-
opment of co-operation in the field of arma-
ments, and which is also to act if required as the 
secretariat of the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee, have been referred to the Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Ques-
tions. It should be noted that the Standing Arma-
ments Committee has not met for the last two 
years and some of the discussion of armaments 
production problems appears to have taken place 
in meetings of a group of experts organised by 
the Council in London. 
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2.33. While Council communiques have stated 
that the Council has taken note of the state of 
studies undertaken by Agencies I and 11, the 
committee wonders to what extent their work 
can be central to consultations in the framework 
of the Council while the agencies continue to be 
based in Paris and apparently still lack secure 
electronic communication facilities with the 
Council secretariat. In section (c) above, the 
committee finds that the reactivation ofWEU, if 
it is to be effective, should lead to the transfer of 
all WEU organs from London and Paris to be 
eo-located near NATO in Brussels. 
(g) Institutional defence tasks of the Council 
(i) Level of forces of member states 
2.34. In implementation of Protocol No. 11 of 
the modified Brussels Treaty, the Council has to 
find each year that the levels of ground, air and 
naval forces which WEU countries place under 
NATO command do not exceed the limits fixed 
in Articles I and 11 of that protocol. The Council 
examines levels of these forces in the light of the 
NATO annual review. As this no longer covers 
the French forces concerned, the Council has to 
take note also of a declaration on French forces 
made independently by the representative of 
France. 
2.35. The Council further controls "forces of 
member states maintained on the mainland of 
Europe and remaining under national command 
- internal defence and police forces, forces for 
the defence of overseas territories and common 
defence forces " specified in the implementing 
agreement concluded by the WEU countries on 
14th December 1957. 
2.36. The committee notes that the Council's 
report for the second part of 1986 states that 
these procedures were duly carried out for that 
year. 
(ii) United Kingdom forces stationed on the 
mainland of Europe 
2.37. Under the terms of Article VI of Protocol 
No. 11 to the modified Brussels Treaty, the 
United Kingdom undertook to maintain on the 
mainland of Europe the effective strength of: 
"four divisions and the second tactical air force, 
or such other forces as the Supreme Allied Com-
mander, Europe, regards as having equivalent 
fighting capacity". The United Kingdom 
undertook: " not to withdraw these forces against 
the wishes of the majority ofthe high contracting 
parties ... this undertaking shall not, however, 
bind her in the event of an acute overseas emer-
gency ... ". In accordance with the procedure pro-
vided for in that article, the Council subse-
quently" acquiesced" in the United Kingdom's 
request to reduce the levels of forces it maintains 
on the mainland of Europe, and the level now 
agreed by the Council is 55 000 men plus a tac-
tical air force. At the insistence of the Assembly, 
acting on reports from the committee, the 
United Kingdom has latterly agreed to include a 
statement in the Council's annual report setting 
forth the precise levels of the forces affected by 
this undertaking. 
2.38. The Council's annual report states that the 
" average " number of British land forces sta-
tioned on the mainland of Europe in 1986 in 
accordance with this commitment was 54 371, 
but " .. .in 1986 there were on average 836 men 
redeployed ... to Northern Ireland". This means 
that the underlying average number of men on 
the mainland of Europe was 53 535 - a shortfall 
of 1 465 below the current level of the United 
Kingdom's obligation. Moreover, as the figure 
quoted is an average level, it must be concluded 
that there were periods in 1986 when the actual 
level was lower still. 
2.39. The committee regrets that for the first 
time in a number of years the United Kingdom 
fell short of its WEU commitment by an average 
of some 2. 7% in 1986. 
2.40. As far as the United Kingdom's contri-
bution to the second allied tactical air force in 
1986 is concerned, the Council's report provides 
the following information: 
United Kingdom contnbution 
to NATO second tactical air force 
Role Aircraft Equipment 
Strike/ Attack Tornado 
Offensive support Harrier 
Reconnaissance Jaguar 
Air defence Phantom 
Rapier surface-to-air 
missiles 
Air transport Puma 
Chinook 
Ground defence RAF regiment 
Squadrons 
6 
2 
I 
2 
4 
I 
I 
I 
2.41. The committee notes with satisfaction that 
compared with 1985 there has been an increase 
of two in the number of British Tornado 
squadrons in Germany as greater numbers of 
this relatively new aircraft have entered service, 
against which one squadron of Jaguars in the 
strike/attack role has been withdrawn - a net 
increase of one in the number of British aircraft 
squadrons based in Germany. At the same time 
the number of Rapier air defence surface-to-air 
missile squadrons has increased from one to 
four. The committee welcomes this increase in 
the United Kingdom's commitment to second 
tactical air force. 
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(h) Agency for the Control of Armaments 
2.42. In 1986 for the first time the Agency for 
the Control of Armaments applied no controls to 
conventional weapons in WEU countries, in 
accordance with the Council!s decision to abolish 
these controls - a decision which the Assembly, 
on the recommendation ofthe committee, had 
been calling for repeatedly for a number of years. 
The Agency for the Control of Armaments has 
itself been largely disban<lled and comprises 
today a single staff member 'who is an expert on 
chemical weapons. According to the Council's 
Rome declaration of 26th October 1984, which 
announced the reactivation 1 of WEU, while the 
conventional arms controls were to be abolished 
from 1st January 1986, "the commitments and 
controls concerning ABC weapons would be 
maintained at the existing level and in 
accordance with the proced*es agreed up to the 
present time". The second part of the annual 
report for 1986 records that: " The Agency did 
not exercise any control in the field of atomic 
weapons ". While the list of biological weapons 
subject to control, as accepted by the Council in 
1981, was renewed for 1986, " ... the agency did 
not exercise any control in the field of biological 
weapons". The committee notes that the situ-
ation concerning nuclear and biological weapons 
remains unchanged - the controls on these 
weapons provided for in the modified Brussels 
Treaty have never been applied. 
2.43. The situation corlcerning chemical 
weapons is quite different, as the Agency for the 
Control of Armaments has duly applied the con-
trols provided for in Protocol No. Ill of the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty. The Ag~ncy for the Control 
of Armaments circulates a questionnaire to all 
member countries which have not renounced the 
right to produce chemical weapons; two specific 
questions are asked: whether production of 
chemical weapons has passed the experimental 
stage and entered the effective production stage; 
and the levels of stocks of any chemical weapons 
that the member country might hold. The annual 
report states, as in the pas~, that all member 
states replied in the negative to both questions, 
and that accordingly, the agency carried out no 
quantitative controls of chemical weapons in 
1986. 
2.44. The committee notes :in this connection 
the proposal put forward by France in the Con-
ference on Disarmament in Geneva on 11th 
June 1987, whereby under a treaty to ban all 
chemical weapons, countries not possessing such 
weapons should be entitled to procure security 
stocks of 2 000 tonnes to be held during the 
interim period during which, stocks of chemical 
weapons of all parties to the treaty would be pro-
gressively reduced. If a WEU country ever 
acquired chemical weapons under such a system, 
the controls provided for in Protocol No. Ill of 
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the modified Brussels Treaty would of course 
take full effect, and under Article Ill of that pro-
tocol: " ... the level of stocks that the high con-
tracting parties concerned will be allowed to hold 
on the mainland of Europe shall be decided by a 
majority vote of the Council of Western 
European Union.". Such levels would then be 
verified by the WEU Agency for the Control of 
Armaments. 
2.45. As far as Germany is concerned, it has of 
course renounced the right to produce chemical 
weapons on its territory under the terms of a uni-
lateral declaration annexed to the modified 
Brussels Treaty, and the Agency for the Control 
of Armaments applies an agreed procedure to 
verify the non-production of chemical weapons 
in that country. At the present time, visits 
carried out under the agreed procedure remain 
the only inspections carried out by the Agency 
for the Control of Armaments which previously 
numbered some 70 each year when controls were 
applied also to conventional weapons. The 
annual report of the Council up to 1965 gave 
details of all inspections carried out by the 
agency, including the numbers of non-control 
measures applying to the non-production of 
chemical weapons. From 1966 onwards, annual 
reports of the Council provided data only for 
total numbers of control measures carried out by 
the agency, but under a subsequent agreement 
with the Council, the committee was informed 
each year on a confidential basis of the 
breakdown of this number of inspections by 
quantitative controls and non-production con-
trols, etc. The Council's report for 1986 omits 
any reference to the numbers of inspections 
carried out under the residual functions of the 
Agency for the Control of Armaments; the com-
mittee calls for this information to be rein-
stated. 
(i) European defence co-operation 
outside the WEU framework 
2.46. The report would be incomplete if it did 
not mention in passing various proposals, made 
outside the WEU framework in 1987, to increase 
European co-operation on defence questions. 
The year saw the proposal for the constitution of 
a Franco-German brigade with which other 
countries such as the Netherlands and Spain 
have expressed a wish to be associated, and a 
proposal for the constitution of a Franco-
German defence council. These proposals were 
characterised by statements in Bonn as a means 
for linking France more closely to the integrated 
military structure of NATO, through the inter-
mediary of Germany. The French Prime Min-
ister, Mr. Chirac, in his interview with Le Point 
of 6th October 1987, warned in this connection 
that " Symbolic measures, however spectacular 
they may be, should not disappoint those who 
156 
expect more of them, or serve as a pretext for 
those who might be tempted, in this way, to put 
in question our original position in the Atlantic 
Alliance ". 
2.4 7. Then during the Paris meeting between 
Mr. George Younger, British Minister of 
Defence, and Mr. Andre Giraud, French Min-
ister of Defence, on 1st October 1987, the press 
reported that the possibility of co-operation on 
nuclear strategy was discussed. It was suggested 
that at least the patrol programmes of the French 
and British strategic nuclear submarines could be 
better co-ordinated - a proposal originally put 
forward by the committee in 1978 4• 
Ill. Other texts referred to the committee 
3.1. The Rapporteur records his thanks to Mr. 
Reg Freeson, a representative to the Assembly, 
for an interesting paper entitled "Arms trade 
obstructs world disarmament and development " 
which he communicated to the Chairman of the 
committee on 12th January 1987. The 
Rapporteur suggests that this is a subject to 
which the committee might well turn its 
attention in a future report. The Rapporteur also 
notes the communication by Mr. Antoni, a 
member of the committee, of a resolution 
adopted by the Direction of the Italian Com-
munist Party on the security and defence ofltaly 
and Europe. This was communicated to the Pres-
ident ofthe Assembly on 1st December 1986 and 
communicated by him to the committee for 
information. 
3.2. The texts of these two communications are 
held in the committee files and copies can be 
made available to any representative on 
request. 
IV. International negotiations 
on the control of armaments 
(a) General 
4.1. Since the committee last reported on 31st 
March 1987 5, there have been several important 
developments affecting current arms control 
negotiations, both bilateral and multilateral. An 
INF agreement has now moved nearer to com-
pletion following Mr. Gorbachev's decision 
announced on 22nd July to accept the original 
4. The limitation of strategic arms, Document 787, 31st 
October 1978, Rapporteur: Mr. Baumel. See explanatory 
memorandum, paragraphs 109-110; SALT and the British 
and French nuclear forces, Document 859, 17th November 
1980, Rapporteur: Mr. Mommersteeg. See explanatory mem-
orandum, paragraphs 6.1 to 6.14. 
5. Disarmament- reply to the thirty-first annual report of the 
Council, Document 1090, 31st March 1987, Rapporteur: Mr. 
Amadei. 
NATO position that all longer-range interme-
diate nuclear force (LRINF) missiles should be 
eliminated, but adding shorter-range INF 
(SRINF) as well; on 26th August, Chancellor 
Kohl announced that the Federal Republic of 
Germany was prepared to eliminate its SRINF-
Pershing lA missiles - thus removing the last 
substantive obstacle to the conclusion of the 
treaty. Chancellor Kohl stressed this point in his 
announcement at a special session of the Bun-
destag on 2nd September 1987. This was con-
firmed at the meetings between Mr. Shultz and 
Mr. Shevardnadze in Washington on 16th and 
17th September, in Moscow on 22nd and 23rd 
October and again in Washington on 30th and 
31st October. It is now expected that the treaty 
will be signed at a summit meeting between Pres-
ident Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev 
in Washington in December. The same Shultz-
Shevardnadze meetings gave further impetus to 
the negotiations on strategic and space 
weapons. 
4.2. On chemical weapons, Mr. 
Shevardnadze's address to the Conference on 
Disarmament in Geneva on 6th August heralded 
Soviet acceptance of challenge on-site inspection 
and invitations to all participants to inspect spec-
imens of Soviet chemical weapons. On test ban, 
a statement by General Cherevov in Washington 
on 31st August announced Soviet acceptance of 
United States proposals to improve seismic 
methods of verification and was followed on 
17th September by a joint United States-Soviet 
agreement to begin full-stage negotiations before 
1st December on limiting and eventually ending 
nuclear testing. 
4.3. Glasnost in arms control was further 
emphasised on 5th September with the visit by 
three members of the United States Congress to 
inspect the Krasnoyarsk radar which the United 
States had alleged violated the ABM treaty. 
4.4. On 17th September, an article under the 
name of General Secretary Gorbachev in Pravda 
and Izvestia dealt with the Soviet idea of a world 
system of international security, and Mr. 
Gorbachev in the flesh made a speech in Mur-
mansk on 1st October calling inter alia on coun-
tries bordering the Arctic to discuss making it a 
" zone of peace ". 
4.5. Coming events such as Mr. Gorbachev's 
expected speech on the eve of the 70th anni-
versary of the October Revolution and the now 
expected Reagan-Gorbachev summit perhaps in 
December can further change the situation as 
described in this report. 
(b) The thrust of Soviet policy 
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widened the Russian's means of information and 
stimulated Soviet intelligentsia among which 
must be included the Soviet diplomatic service. 
This has produced a remarkable expansion of 
Soviet diplomatic and political contacts in 
hitherto taboo areas including in particular the 
European Community as well as Western 
European Union and attempts, believed so far to 
have been unsuccessful, to make direct contacts 
with NATO. At the same time, quite extensive 
military verification measures are now either 
being applied on Soviet and NATO territory -
chiefly the confidence- and security-building 
measures of the Stockholm agreement - or are 
now offered in negotiations such as those on 
INF, chemical weapons or a nuclear test ban. 
4.7. There has resulted an apparent profusion 
of Soviet proposals in all are~s of arms control 
and disarmament, which at tiJ1IleS have appeared 
confusingly contradictory. T4e fact that nearly 
all the concrete progress in ~ctual negotiations 
has come about merely through the tardy Soviet 
acceptance of western proposals which have been 
on the table for some years passes unnoticed in 
the blaze of publicity attracted by Soviet glasnost 
and " new thinking ". 
4.8. It is the relative speed with which the 
dynamic Soviet leadership now takes high-level 
decisions that contrasts most strikingly with the 
sluggish last years of the Brezhnev era. This faces 
the West with quite a new challenge. On the one 
hand, it will require greater resources devoted to 
analysis of arms control issues and an ability to 
consult permanently and reach consensus in the 
alliance and WEU far more rapidly than has 
hitherto been possible. 
4.9. The West can afford to welcome Soviet 
concessions in accepting western proposals that 
have now made possible the conclusion of an 
INF agreement, which for the first time will lead 
to the elimination of some hundreds of nuclear 
weapons. 
I 
(c) Strategic and spac~ talks 
4.1 0. In the bilateral negotiations in Geneva, the 
Soviet Union has continued to insist on the 
linkage between space talks which would impose 
agreed limits on the United States strategic 
defence initiative, probably through a reconfir-
mation of the ABM treaty, and progress on the 
goal towards reducing strategic nuclear weapons 
by 50%, as agreed in principle at the Reykjavik 
summit. The Soviet Union has pointed out that 
to maintain the credibility of its strategic forces 
in the event of United States deployment of an 
operational SDI, it would need to increase the 
numbers of its strategic warheads - although it 
4.6. While Mr. Gorbachev's reforming zeal has been thought that it might also develop an 
may not as yet have improved the material lot of anti-SDI system. Negotiations up to the first 
the man in the Russian street, it has already quarter of the year are reviewed in the last 
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report 6• Early in 1987 a joint working document 
had agreed on a ceiling of 6 000 warheads and 
1 600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBMs, 
SLBMs, and heavy bombers) for each side and 
on counting rules for bombs and cruise missiles 
carried on bombers. The subject was discussed at 
the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting on 17th Sep-
tember when the Soviet Union for the first time 
is understood to have accepted the principle that 
not more than 60% of the agreed 6 000 warheads 
should be carried on any of the three strategic 
systems (strategic submarines, ICBMs, bombers) 
and that not more than a total of 1 540 warheads 
should be carried on " heavy " missiles - i.e. 
those with more than 6 independent re-entry 
vehicles. At the 22nd to 23rd October Shultz-
Shevardnadze meeting the Soviet Union pro-
posed further sub-ceilings of 3 000 to 3 300 war-
heads on ICBMs, 1 800 to 2 000 on SLBMs and 
800 to 900 on ALCMs. 
4.11. The strategic arms talks are linked 
however to United States testing of the new 
Trident-2 submarine-launched missile which in 
early September was tested with 10 warheads 
instead of the original 8. The United States Sec-
retary of Defence, Mr. Weinberger, was 
reported 7 as pressing for it to be tested with 12 in 
November against the advice of the Chiefs of 
Staff and State Department. The United States 
has so far refused to include in the new strategic 
treaty the SALT II principle whereby all missiles 
are counted as if fitted with the maximum 
number of warheads for which they have been 
tested. This issue may well have consequences 
for the future British Trident force. 
4.12. The United States administration still 
appears to consider an agreement on strategic 
weapons possible during the Reagan adminis-
tration, but the ABM treaty and its conflict with 
the strategic defence initiative has so far been a 
major stumbling-block. At the September Shultz-
Shevardnadze meeting it is understood that the 
Soviet Union proposed clarification of the ABM 
treaty in submitting a list of objects which it 
should be forbidden to launch into space and 
inviting the United States to propose criteria 
concerning the physical parameters for such 
objects. The bilateral review conference of the 
ABM treaty, held every 5 years since its signature 
in 1972, is due in October 1987 and the Soviet 
Union is expected to press for a non-withdrawal 
agreement to last 10, or possibly 7 years. 
4.13. On 5th September, three United States 
Congressmen, accompanied by four military 
experts, inspected the large phased-array radar 
under construction at Krasnoyarsk, which the 
United States has alleged violates the ABM 
6. Document I 090, explanatory memorandum, paragraphs 
5.28 to 5.48. 
7. International Herald Tribune, 8th October 1987. 
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treaty. The building was photographed inside 
and out. The visitors reported the radar not yet 
operational. The visit did not resolve the 
question as to whether the radar was for space 
tracking (permitted) or ABM defence; it was 
probably capable of performing either role to a 
limited extent. The fact that it was not protected 
against nuclear attack and was dependent on 
outside sources of electrical power implied that 
its primary function was for peacetime oper-
ation. At the 22nd to 23rd October Shultz-
Shevardnadze meeting the Soviet Union offered 
to suspend construction of the Krasnoyarsk 
radar if the United States would forego the 
modernisation of its Fylingdales radar in the 
United Kingdom, which the Soviet Union con-
tends would violate the ABM treaty because the 
radar is not on United States territory as the 
treaty requires. The Soviet Union further offered 
to open to inspection other radars at Gomel, 
south-west of Moscow. 
4.14. WEU governments individually have 
made it clear from the outset that their support 
for the United States SDI proposals was limited 
to laboratory research and that under the ABM 
treaty any tests or deployment would be a matter 
for negotiation. The WEU Council stated this 
position clearly on 11th April 1985 in its reply to 
Recommendation 413 of the Assembly: 
" The Council notes that the strategic 
defence initiative (SDI) announced by the 
United States is no more than a scientific 
research programme and hence does not 
contravene the provisions of the 1972 
ABM treaty. The Council also takes the 
view that laboratory research does not 
lend itself to arms control measures. On 
the other hand, relevant tests or deploy-
ments will have to be a matter for negoti-
ation, under the terms of the ABM treaty. 
In view ofthe contribution of this treaty to 
stability, the Council stresses the impor-
tance of preventing its erosion. " 
4.15. The restraints that the Reagan adminis-
tration will accept on SDI, through continued 
respect for the ABM treaty as negotiated, may 
determine the outcome of the strategic arms 
negotiations. The United States administration 
itself remains divided on the issue; a press report 
from Washington in February revealed that Mr. 
Shultz, with the support of the governments of 
Belgium, Canada, Germany, Japan and the 
United Kingdom, and of the Secretary-General 
of NATO, as well as congressional circles, had 
successfully opposed Mr. Weinberger's proposal 
that the United States proceed with the early 
deployment of some simple version of SDI, 
while unilaterally announcing a new " broad " 
interpretation of the ABM treaty. President 
Reagan had ruled against Mr. Weinberger. Since 
then the Pentagon has revealed that allied coun-
tries had been awarded only 2% of the $4.25 
billion total of SDI contracts in the last two 
years: Germany has 19 contracts worth $45 
million; the United Kingdom 24 worth $30 
million; Italy $5 million; France $3 million; and 
Canada, Belgium and the Netherlands together 
$1.5 million. 
(d) Intermediate-range nuclear forces (/NF) 
4.16. When the committee last reported 8 on 
31st March an INF agreement as then envisaged 
would have allowed each side to have retained 
100 warheads on longer-range INF (LRINF, 
1 000 to 5 500 km), and dealt with shorter-range 
INF systems (500 to 1 000 km) only through 
restraints and follow-on negotiations. On 22nd 
July, Mr. Gorbachev proposed the elimination of 
all INF missiles as NATO had urged, as well as 
the total elimination of SRINF - of which the 
Soviet Union has deployed some 100 SS-23s and 
SS-12s in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. 
The proposal was conditional upon the elimi-
nation of 72 warheads for the German Pershing 
lAs and destruction of INF missiles, precluding 
their conversion to other types of missile. 
4.17. The United States had accepted the 
no-conversion requirement but made it clear 
that third country weapons, such as the German 
Pershing lA missiles, were not the subject of the 
bilateral negotiations. Chancellor Kohl 
announced on 26th August that Germany was 
prepared to eliminate its Pershing lA missiles at 
the latest by 1992 which would have marked a 
5-year period during which INF missiles were 
expected to be eliminated. The United States and 
the Soviet Union have now solved the problem 
with a supplementary agreement which deals 
with warheads. 
4.18. The United States tabled a new draft INF 
treaty on 14th September, reportedly proposing 
the elimination of all LRINF missiles and 
launchers within 3 years and all SRINF within 
1 year, and banning the production or testing of 
any INF missile systems. For the first time, the 
United States tabled a separate protocol on veri-
fication, said to run to some 40 or 50 pages. It is 
understood that, as in the case of the SALT II 
treaty, there would be an exchange of data on 
numbers and locations of existing INF weapons 
systems of all sorts prior to entry into force of a 
treaty and provisions to verify the validity ofthe 
data. Verification of the process of elimination of 
missiles would be stringent, but progressively 
reduced as production facilities were closed and 
missiles destroyed. With agreement to eliminate 
all INF systems, the United States had been able 
8. Document I 090, explanatory memorandum, paragraphs 
5.5 to 5.27. 
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to drop its original proposal for a strictly-
controlled perimeter around any missiles 
retained by either side. 
4.19. The implication of" elip1ination "for war-
heads appears to have be~ agreed with both 
parties retaining the right to remove and retain 
for their own purposes fissi e nuclear material 
and guidance mechanis s prior to the 
destruction of the remaind~r of the re-entry 
vehicles. 
4.20. At the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting in 
Moscow on 22nd and 23rd October, agreement 
was reached on the timetable for SRINF to be 
eliminated in 18 months, and LRINF in three 
years, with the United States agreeing to begin 
reductions in its 348 cruise and Pershing II mis-
siles at the same time that the Soviet Union 
begins reductions in the 1 500 warheads on its 
SS-20 and remaining SS-4 missiles. German Per-
shing IA missiles would be removed only after 
three years in accordance with Chancellor Kohl's 
unilateral declaration and the United States war-
heads for them would be eliminated at the same 
time. Both sides stated in Moscow that only 
minor details of verificatlon arrangements 
remained to be agreed, and final drafting of a 
treaty was expected to be completed by the dele-
gations in Geneva within three weeks. 
4.21. With the recent reported 9 deployment of 
16 United States cruise missiles to the 
Molesworth site in the United Kingdom (due to 
reach its total of 64 by the end of 1987) the 
number of cruise missiles in Europe was 240 out 
of a planned total of 464. With the 108 Pershing 
II missiles deployed in Germany the total of 
LRINF was thus 348. Further deployments were 
due in Belgium and initial deployments in the 
Netherlands in 1988. At the 22nd to 23rd 
October Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting the Soviet 
Union proposed a moratorium on further INF 
deployment pending the entry into force of the 
treaty. This proposal was not accepted by the 
United States, but a NATO working group is 
now re-examining the programmes for future 
deployment in the expectation that there would 
now be no need for any deployment in the Neth-
erlands. The United States Senate on 27th 
October deleted from a military appropriations 
bill funds for further cruise missile sites in 
Germany and the Netherlands. 
4.22. The INF agreement all>pears likely to be 
published on signature at a summit meeting in 
Washington before the end of December and the 
committee will wish to report on it in detail at 
the next session. Meanwhile the committee wel-
comes the INF treaty as at present proposed, as a 
worthwhile contribution in itself to lowering the 
level of confrontation between East and West 
9. Sunday Times, 25th October 1987. 
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~ithout in any way reducing western security -
mdeed the foreshadowed agreement will include 
a number of significant Soviet concessions to the 
original NATO proposals as the committee 
pointed out in its previous report. While signifi-
cantly reducing the number of Soviet nuclear 
warheads of less than strategic range, it will not 
greatly reduce the more than 4 000 warheads for 
NATO tactical aircraft and other weapons 
systems currently stored in Europe, or the corre-
sponding Soviet nuclear weapons, nor will it 
affect at all the some 1 500 warheads on " grey 
area " nuclear weapons on forward-based 
systems of NATO countries that are in reach of 
Soviet territory, but which fall outside either an 
INF agreement or SALT - the committee draws 
attention to these in another report 10• The Soviet 
Union will in fact have to eliminate some 1 600 
warheads on its SS-20s and remaining SS-4 com-
pared with some 348 warheads eliminated by 
NATO in the LRINF bracket. In the SRINF 
range, against the 72 Pershing 1As which 
Germany will unilaterally withdraw, outside the 
framework of the bilateral United States-Soviet 
Union treaty, the Soviet Union will be removing 
some 100 SS-23 and SS-12 targeted on western 
Europe. 
4.23. The committee can therefore endorse the 
verdict of Lord Carrington, Secretary-General of 
NATO, in his speech to the Royal United Ser-
vices Institute in London on 5th October 1987 
when he said: 
" .. .I do not believe that the INF 
agreement which has been reached in prin-
ciple is a bad one. Having worked hard 
and consistently to that end since 1979 
and 1981 and finally brought the Soviet 
side round, we should take yes for an 
answer - and also take credit for the major 
achievement that is in sight. 
The alliance is now in a good position to 
do some constructive thinking on future 
disarmament negotiations... an INF 
agreement is I hope well on the way; 50% 
reductions in US and Soviet strategic arms 
should be the next step in the nuclear field; 
and we are also committed to work for an 
effective global ban on chemical warfare 
and for a stable East-West balance in con~ 
ventional weapons at lower levels. None of 
this need - or should - be put into 
question. But we do need from now on to 
have a better overall picture of the route 
we want to take, and of the influence 
which progress - or the lack of it - in one 
field, whether nuclear or conventional 
should have on what we do in another. ,; 
10. Threat assessment, Document 1115, 2nd November 
1987, Rapporteur: Mr. Stokes. See explanatory memo-
randum, paragraph 5.6. 
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(e) Chemical weapons 
4.24. The committee surveyed progress on 
chemical weapons negotiations in the first 
quarter of the year in its previous report 11 • In 
July it was addressed by representatives to the 
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. 
4.25. On 6th August, shortly after that meeting, 
Mr. Shevardnadze addressed the conference 
announcing that the Soviet Union would accept 
mandatory challenge inspection of any site in the 
Soviet Union suspected of holding chemical 
weapons without right of refusal. Details spelled 
out by the Permanent Representative, Mr. 
Nazarkin, on 11th August, provided for 
inspectors to arrive on site within 48 hours but 
to guard state secrets unrelated to che:Uicai 
weapons production, provided that an inspected 
state would also have the right to offer " alter-
nati':"e measures " sufficient to satisfy the 
~eqmre~ents of !he state requesting the 
mspectwn. Alternative measures could include 
observation of a facility from outside; photo-
graphy; analysis of chemical samples; partial 
access and remote-control devices. This proviso 
was in line with a British proposal of July 1986. 
Mr. Nazarkin added further Soviet proposals for 
a preparatory commission to be established and 
te~hnical inspe~tors recruited, on signature, but 
pnor to entry mto force, of a treaty, and pro-
posed further that entry into force should require 
only 30 to 40 ratifications. He further proposed 
that decisions by the organs established under 
the treaty should be taken by two-thirds majority 
vot~ _on substantive . issues and by simple 
maJ?nty on others. This represents a significant 
Soviet departure from its traditional insistence 
on the right of veto in international 
organisations. 
4.26. The Soviet Union also invited all partici-
pants at the conference to observe specimens of 
Soviet chemical weapons at a military facility at 
Shikhany on 7th and 8th October. The demon-
stration was attended in the event by delegates 
fro~ 45 cou_ntries who ~ere shown 19 types of 
Sovie~ ~hemical weapon mcluding 250 kg bombs 
contammg the nerve agent Sarin, and other 
weapons containing mustard gas. Some expert 
w~stern observers claimed that weapons filled 
with the nerve agent Tabun had not been dis-
closed by the Soviet Union. 
4.27. The Soviet Union has consistently refused 
however to reveal publicly the present level of its 
~tocks which seem to be estimated most reliably 
m the West at 300 000 tonnes. The committee 
reviews the evidence in another report 12• The 
11. Document 1090, explanatory memorandum, paragraphs 
5.101 to 5.117. 
12. Threat assessment, Document 1115, 2nd November 
1987, Rapporteur: Mr. Stokes. See explanatory memo-
randum, paragraphs 7.1 et. seq. 
Soviet Union has however agreed that data on 
chemical weapons held by parties to the treaty 
should be exchanged between the signature of the 
treaty and its entry into force. 
4.28. It is now clear that the major East-West 
obstacles to the conclusion of a fully verifiable 
treaty to· ban all chemical weapons have been 
largely overcome with the latest decisions in 
principle by the Soviet Union. However, the 
drafting of the document in the ad hoc com-
mittee of the Conference on Disarmament in 
Geneva is a lengthy and detailed process 
involving 40 countries, some of which are only 
belatedly examining the detailed implications of 
inspection for their own chemical industries. 
Despite the new sense of urgency which has led 
the ad hoc committee on chemical weapons to 
fix special sessions in the first half of December 
and in the first two weeks ofJanuary 1988, most 
experts believe that at least another 12 months of 
highly detailed and technical negotiation and 
drafting lie ahead before a multilateral treaty can 
be opened for signature. 
4.29. Obviously the great incentive for the 
Soviet Union in making its latest concessions at 
this time is the imminent opening of the new 
United States production plant for binary 
chemical weapons, which is scheduled to start 
production in early December - the first time 
since 1969 that the United States will have pro-
duced any chemical weapons. As the committee 
has reported, the Soviet Union is believed, by 
President Reagan's special committee on 
chemical weapons, to have begun large-scale pro-
duction of chemical weapons only after United 
States production had ceased. On lOth April 
1987, in his Prague speech, Mr. Gorbachev 
announced that the Soviet Union had ceased the 
production of chemical weapons and was 
building installations for their destruction. He 
added that the Soviet Union had not stockpiled 
chemical weapons beyond its frontiers, and that 
no other Warsaw Pact country possessed any. 
For the time being this statement remains unver-
ified, but has not been seriously challenged by 
allied governments. 
(f) Nuclear test ban 
4.30. The United States and the Soviet Union 
had been at loggerheads over the issue of 
banning or restricting nuclear tests ever since 
1980 when the United States withdrew from the 
trilateral test-ban talks which had also involved 
the United Kingdom. The bilateral threshold 
test-ban treaty of July 1974 signed by President 
Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev, which limits nuclear 
tests to a maximum yield of 150 kt, and the 
peaceful nuclear explosions treaty of May 1976 
signed by President Ford and Mr. Brezhnev, 
laying down conditions under which peaceful 
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explosions might be conducted, have both gone 
unratified as subsequent United States adminis-
trations have called for additional measures of 
verification beyond those prrovided for in the 
treaties. Bilateral "talks about talks" in Geneva 
since July 1986, designed to find a basis for 
formal negotiations on nuclear testing, had made 
little progress with the Soviet Union considering 
that the aim of negotiations ~hould be the same 
as those of the previous trilateral negotiations- a 
complete ban on all nuclear tests. The United 
States was prepared to negotiate only on a pro-
gramme of limiting and ultimately ending 
nuclear tests, and called for verification proce-
dures which would involve each side carrying 
out a calibration experiment on the nuclear 
testing site ofthe other in order to establish close 
correlation between the true yield of a nuclear 
test and the seismic signals generated at a dis-
tance from it. 
4.31. While the United States has maintained 
that remote seismic monitoring could not 
provide certainty that a test ban was being 
respected, the weight of world scientific opinion 
has held that it would be extremely unlikely that 
any programme of nuclear tests could escape 
detection, even if a single ,test conducted in 
exceptional circumstances might theoretically 
not be distinguished from ot~er seismic signals. 
The accurate determination of the actual yield of 
a test from remote seismic signals is however 
recognised to be a less certain procedure; there 
would thus appear to be a case for on-site cali-
bration of seismic propagation conditions on the 
test site of each party if some nuclear tests are to 
be permitted. 
4.32. The Soviet Union had been very active in 
calling for a complete test ban, maintaining in 
the process a unilateral moratorium on all Soviet 
tests from August 1985 to February 1987 in the 
course of which the United States conducted 
some 23 tests. The Soviet Union resumed testing 
thereafter. Total nuclear tests of all sorts con-
ducted to the end of 1986 are 815 by the United 
States and 597 by the Soviet Union 13• 
4.33. A number of Soviet c~mcessions to meet 
the United States attitude to nuclear testing were 
confirmed at the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting 
of 17th September at whi4h a special joint 
statement was issued expre~sing agreement to 
begin "full-scale stage by stage negotiations" 
before 1st December 1987: 
" In these negotiations the sides as the first 
step will agree upon effective verification 
measures which will make it possible to 
ratify the US-USSR threshold test ban 
treaty (TTBT) of 197 4 and peaceful 
nuclear explosions treaty (PNET) of 1976, 
and proceed to negotiating further inter-
13. Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1987. 
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mediate limitations on nuclear testing 
leading to the ultimate objective of the 
complete cessation of nuclear testing as 
part of an effective disarmament process. 
This process, among other things, would 
pursue, as the first priority, the goal of the 
reduction of nuclear weapon tests and, 
ultimately, their elimination. For the 
purpose of the elaboration of improved 
verification measures for the US-USSR 
treaties of 1974 and 1976 the sides intend 
to design and conduct joint verification 
experiments at each other's test sites. 
These verification measures will, to the 
extent appropriate, be used in further 
nuclear test limitation agreements which 
may subsequently be reached. " 
(g) Negotiations on conventional forces 
and confidence-building measures 
4.34. The committee's previous report 14 has 
chronicled the state of the deadlocked MBFR 
negotiations up to March of this year when the 
committee was addressed by a number of the 
negotiators in Vienna. In this specific field, there 
is no progress to report. The follow-up con-
ference of the Conference on Security and 
Co-operation in Europe is meanwhile continuing 
in Vienna and may now be extended beyond the 
end of November, even into the beginning of 
1988. The informal mandate talks between the 
23 NATO and Warsaw Pact countries attending 
the conference are continuing in Vienna with a 
view to drawing up a mandate on negotiations 
between those countries on conventional sta-
bility in Europe. The mandate is to be appended 
to the concluding document of the present fol-
low-up conference. This approach marked 
NA TO's response to Mr. Gorbachev's speech in 
East Berlin on 18th April 1986, proposing: " sub-
stantial reduction of all components of land 
forces and tactical aircraft based in Europe, 
including the relevant parts of American and 
Canadian forces deployed there ... the scope ofthe 
reductions must obviously cover the whole of 
Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals " - a pro-
posal subsequently elaborated in the Budapest 
appeal issued collectively by the Warsaw Pact 
countries on 11th June 1986 15• 
4.35. The committee stresses that, following the 
conclusion of the expected INF agreement, the 
reduction of conventional forces and armaments 
on both sides to lower levels to provide equal 
security, and negotiations on short-range nuclear 
weapons, will become the most important arms 
control objective. At the same time it is likely to 
14. Document 1090, explanatory memorandum, paragraphs 
5.53 to 5. 78. 
15. Text of the Budapest appeal is at Appendix II to Doc-
ument 1090. 
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prove the most difficult to achieve because of the 
large number of different factors involved -
numerous conventional weapons systems; dif-
ferent types of forces; the number of different 
countries involved; the large geographical dis-
parity which leaves NATO forces almost with 
their backs to the sea while the Soviet Union 
enjoys a continuous hinterland in Europe. 
4.36. Nevertheless, some of the new attitudes of 
the Soviet Union appear encouraging, while 
others are ambiguous. Soviet military leaders 
have recognised publicly Soviet superiority in 
numbers of tanks. At the same time they have 
challenged the NATO view of Soviet superiority 
in combat aircraft, claiming that NATO is 
superior in attack aircraft while the Soviet 
Union's numerical superiority is in air defence 
aircraft. The Soviet Union has claimed that 
NATO is superior in anti-tank guided missiles -
a claim that is not borne out in the agreed NATO 
comparisons as the committee reports 
elsewhere 16• For the first time it appears that the 
Soviet Union has published its own estimates of 
the military balance in Europe 17 and spokesmen 
have referred to the need to remove " asymme-
tries " in force comparisons, and to seek " suffi-
ciency" in defence capability. Mr. Gorbachev's 
published article of 17th September, the main 
thrust of which was to reiterate a Soviet proposal 
for a global system of security in the United 
Nations framework, contains some of these 
ambiguities: 
" If there is imbalance, if disproportions 
exist, we have but to eliminate them ... the 
comparison of defence budgets? .. .! think ... 
in two or three years we could compare the 
figures which concern us and our partners, 
figures which would reflect symmetrically 
the expenditure of the parties. 
An agreement on strategic defence and on 
military sufficiency would give a strong 
impulse in the right direction. These 
notions presuppose a structure of the 
armed forces of a state sufficient to repulse 
any aggression but not great enough to 
launch an offensive. The first step to 
achieve this aim would be the withdrawal 
in depth from the national territory of 
nuclear weapons and other offensive 
weapons under adequate control so as to 
create along the frontiers under-armed 
strips and demilitarised zones between, so 
to speak, the potential adversaries. " 
4.37. The concept of" military sufficiency" is a 
welcome basis for negotiation, and the concept 
16. Threat assessment, Document 1115, 2nd November 
1987, Rapporteur: Mr. Stokes. See explanatory memo-
randum, paragraphs 5.29 to 5.32. 
17. Disarmament and Security !MEMO Yearbook 1986, pub-
lished by Novosti, Moscow, 1987. 
of partly disarmed zones in Europe should be 
carefully studied by NATO, although difficulties 
might be found because of NATO's inherently 
weak geographical position, with its lack of depth 
and reliance on United States support to offset 
the numerically superior conventional forces of 
the Soviet Union. But when Mr. Gorbachev con-
tinues, as he did in his article of 17th September, 
to talk about the liquidation of the two blocs, he 
is harking back to the policy of his predecessors 
which continually sought to secure the removal 
of United States forces from Europe: 
" In principle though it should lead to the 
dissolving of the military blocs and the 
liquidation of bases on the territory of 
foreign countries, to the repatriation of all 
forces stationed beyond their national 
frontiers. " 
It is far from clear that the Soviet Union could 
afford to withdraw all Soviet forces from the 
other Warsaw Pact countries; in any case NATO 
could not afford to accept the total withdrawal of 
United States forces from Europe. 
4.38. In the framework of the Stockholm doc-
ument of the Conference on Disarmament in 
Europe, the confidence- and security-building 
measures provided for appear to have been 
applied satisfactorily so far in 1987, the first year 
of application. A United States State Department 
report on 22nd September confirmed that a team 
of four United States officers had been able to 
observe Soviet manreuvres at the end of August 
and beginning of September. They travelled to 
Minsk in their own aircraft accompanied by 
Soviet officers and then were provided with two 
Soviet helicopters, two land vehicles and a com-
munications van to carry out inspections of 
Soviet military manreuvres. They were not 
denied any access on the grounds of" sensitive 
points " or " restricted zones " being involved, 
which the Stockholm document would have per-
mitted the Soviet Union to invoke in certain cir-
cumstances. The State Department report wel-
comed the spirit of co-operation shown by the 
Soviet military authorities which permitted 
inspections of manreuvres by a tank division and 
a motorised rifle division with a total of 16 000 
men and 425 tanks. Inspections have similarly 
been carried out by the United Kingdom in the 
Soviet Union and Soviet observers are due to 
inspect an exercise in Scotland in the autumn. 
(h) Other Warsaw Pact proposals 
4.39. The important statement of the North 
Atlantic Council adopted in Reykjavik on 12th 
June 1987, which dealt in particular with arms 
control negotiations, made no reference to the 
Warsaw Pact document on military doctrine 
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adopted in Berlin on 29th May 1987 18, no doubt 
because the 16 NATO countries had not had 
enough time to consult on a reasoned reply. 
Soviet spokesmen have stressed that the Warsaw 
Pact document contains material that is new in 
Warsaw Pact statements - in particular the 
assertion that: 
" The combat-readiness of the armed 
forces of the allied states is maintained at a 
sufficient level so as not to be caught una-
wares ... 
The Warsaw Treaty m~mber states never 
had nor have an aspiration to possess 
armed forces and armaments in excess of 
what is necessary for these purposes. Thus, 
they strictly comply with the limits of suf 
ficiency for defence and for repelling pos-
sible aggression. " (emphasis added) 
Military spokesmen have asserted that Soviet 
defence forces are henceforth to be structured on 
this basis of sufficiency. The NATO countries 
will of course remain sceptical of these claims 
while the large Soviet superiority in tanks and 
guns in particular persists. Remembering the 
Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 
and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 
1979, the allied countries will be particularly 
sceptical of the further assertion: 
"The Warsaw Treaty member states 
declare that they firmly base their interna-
tional relations on the respect for the prin-
ciples of independence and national sover-
eignty, non-use of force or threat of force, 
inviolability of frontiers and territorial 
integrity, resolution of conflicts in a 
peaceful way, non-interference in internal 
affairs, equality and other principles and 
goals envisaged by the United Nations 
Charter and the Helsinki Final Act and 
generally-recognised standards of interna-
tional relations ", 
until such time as the Soviet Union matches 
words with deeds - as for example by with-
drawing all its forces from Afghanistan. 
4.40. Nevertheless the new Soviet leadership 
under Mr. Gorbachev has undoubtedly made 
several concessions to the western position in 
different areas of disarmament negotiations and 
full opportunity should be provided for the 
Warsaw Pact to demonstrate in practice the sin-
cerity of its many proposals. In the view of the 
committee therefore NATO should now respond 
positively to the proposal in the Warsaw Pact 
Berlin document on military doctrine: 
"The Warsaw Treaty member states 
propose to the North Atlantic Alliance 
18. Texts at Appendices II and Ill. 
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member states to hold consultations with 
the aim of comparing the military doc-
trines of both alliances, analysing their 
character and jointly studying the direc-
tions of their further evolution with a view 
to removing the mutual suspiciousness 
and mistrust that have accumulated for 
years, attaining a better understanding of 
each other's intentions and ensuring that 
the military concepts and doctrines of the 
military blocs and their members be based 
on defensive principles. 
The existing imbalances and asymmetries 
in separate types of armaments and ser-
vices of armed forces and the search for 
ways of removing them on the basis of 
reductions by the side that is ahead, on the 
understanding that such reductions will 
lead to the establishment of ever lower 
levels, could also be a subject of consulta-
tions. 
The socialist member states of the treaty 
propose to hold such consultations at an 
authoritative expert level with the partici-
pation of military specialists of countries 
of both sides. They are prepared for 
holding such consultations already in 
1987. The consultations could be held in 
Warsaw or Brussels, or in each of these 
cities alternately. " 
Soviet spokesmen portray such consultations as 
a constructive preparatory measure for the future 
negotiations on conventional stability in Europe, 
the mandate for which is now being discussed 
between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries 
in Vienna. It is possible to note a few points of 
similarity between the Warsaw Pact military 
doctrine, the WEU platform on European 
security interests, and the NATO Reykjavik 
statement if only in the general concept of the 
non-use of force except in defence. There are 
equally wide divergencies in the Warsaw Pact's 
renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons, 
while the WEU platform stresses the importance 
of preventing "any kind of war", through a 
strategy of" deterrence and defence ... based on an 
adequate mix of appropriate nuclear and con-
ventional forces". Most positively however the 
six goals of arms control negotiations enu-
merated in the Warsaw Pact's military doctrine 
parallel quite closely those of the WEU platform 
and the NATO Reykjavik statement. 
4.41. Other recent Warsaw Pact proposals 
deserve to be noted, and duly replied to, even if 
they prove on examination to be unacceptable 
to NATO. They have included the Jaruzelski 
plan of 8th May 1987 for nuclear and conven-
tional disengagement in the Central European 
area - defined as the territories of countries 
which comprise the reductions area of the MBFR 
negotiations, plus Denmark and Hungary. Other 
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proposals by the GDR and Czechoslovakia for a 
300 km wide nuclear-free corridor separating the 
two sides in Europe, and by Bulgaria and 
Romania for a nuclear- and chemical-free zone 
in the Balkans are noted in the Warsaw Pact 
Berlin communique. Such proposals have not 
been favoured by the West in the past because of 
the range and mobility of such weapons based 
outside the proposed zones. 
(i) Conclusions 
4.42. Apart from the specific arms control topics 
discussed under separate headings above, there is 
a plethora of other ideas coming mostly from 
Moscow. Mr. Gorbachev has also announced 
that the Soviet Union will publish its military 
budget in terms that may be compared with 
those of other countries, when price restructuring 
permits procurement costs to be estimated realis-
tically - a process expected to take three years -
meanwhile it is recognised that such costs have 
always been excluded from the published 
budget. 
4.43. For some months, the new Soviet Defence 
Minister, General Dmitry Yazov has been pro-
posing a meeting with his United States coun-
terpart, Mr. Weinberger- originally asking for a 
meeting in the framework of the Standing Con-
sultative Commission, the bilateral commission 
established in the framework of the ABM and 
SALT treaties to discuss any points of dis-
agreement over their application. General 
Yazov's object was to discuss at the highest level 
various United States allegations concerning 
breaches of these treaties; the sec would nor-
mally meet in Geneva. Mr. Weinberger has pro-
posed a meeting in Washington or alternatively 
in New York, but according to a Pentagon 
spokesman on 6th October the meeting place had 
not been agreed. So far the two men have never 
met. 
4.44. Then in his speech in Murmansk on 1st 
October 1986, Mr. Gorbachev caused some con-
fusion in calling for the countries bordering on 
the Arctic to discuss the demilitarisation of the 
area, in particular the creation of a nuclear-free 
zone. In this context Mr. Gorbachev said the 
Soviet Union had already removed unilaterally 
its medium-range missile launchers in the Kola 
peninsula and reduced many shorter-range mis-
siles there. He offered to remove ballistic missile 
submarines from the Soviet Baltic Fleet. At the 
same time, he criticised the United States and 
NATO for intensifying military activities in the 
polar region and for constructing a new " star 
wars " radar in Greenland which he claimed was 
in violation of the ABM treaty. The fact that 
these proposals came even before a mandate had 
been agreed in Vienna for the talks on conven-
tional disarmament in Europe, caused some 
scepticism in NATO circles; Soviet spokesmen 
were later at pains to say that the proposals were 
not alternatives, that talks on reducing conven-
tional forces in Europe were still desired. 
4.45. NATO meanwhile is being left far behind 
in the new competition of ideas. It took more 
than six months for the NATO countries to agree 
among themselves even on their position con-
cerning the proper mandate for negotiations on 
conventional stability in Europe, and this was 
not because of transatlantic disagreements, but 
largely because of differences between France 
and the other NATO countries. NATO is still far 
from agreeing an actual negotiating position for 
such negotiations if and when they open, and 
another related point of disagreement again 
between some of the European countries con-
cerned, is the proper place for short-range 
nuclear missiles in future negotiations (less than 
500 km range), whether negotiations on them 
should open immediately after conclusion of an 
INF treaty, or whether any reductions in such 
missiles should only follow an agreement to 
reduce conventional disparities. 
4.46. The problem is not a lack of consultation 
in NATO - there is plenty both in the Council, 
in the high-level group, and special consultative 
group dealing with the INF negotiations and the 
deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe. 
France, apparently for historical reasons, does 
not participate in these groups although Spain 
always has done. Consultation would be 
improved if France were to join them, without 
prejudice to its status in the integrated military 
structure. 
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4.47. The immediate timetable is that of pos-
sible agreements that may be concluded during 
the lifetime of the Reagan administration. In 
addition to an INF treaty, these are quite pos-
sibly: an agreement to limit strategic nuclear 
forces by 50%; the possible ratification by the 
United States of the two nuclear test treaties -
that on the 150 kt threshold and that on peaceful 
nuclear explosions. Beyond that there could be 
some further agreement on limiting the number 
and lowering the yield of nuclear tests. As noted 
above the substantive problems of verification 
have been very largely agreed between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, but the 
negotiations on a total chemical weapons ban are 
very complex, involving many countries with a 
chemical industry. Although a full multilateral 
treaty to ban chemical weapons may not be con-
cluded before the end of 1988, it is also suggested 
that there could be a preliminary bilateral 
agreement between the Unirted States and the 
Soviet Union on the mutual declaration of the 
present levels of their chemical weapons, with 
bilateral verification of those declarations. 
4.48. The committee stresses the important role 
which the WEU Council must now play in 
harmonising the views of the' WEU countries on 
all important issues affecting European security 
and arms control, while at the same time urging 
on their NATO partners the importance of rapid 
response to Soviet initiatives, many of which 
contain very. positive concessions to long-
standing NATO proposals, while others remain a 
rehash of unacceptable proposals for dividing the 
alliance. 
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APPENDIX I 
WEU platform on European security interests 
adopted by the Council in The Hague, 27th October 1987 
(Extracts) 
II. European security should be based on the following criteria: 
APPENDIX I 
1. It remains our primary objective to prevent any kind of war. It is our purpose to preserve our 
security by maintaining defence readiness and military capabilities adequate to deter aggression and 
intimidation without seeking military superiority. 
2. In the present circumstances and as far as we can foresee, there is no alternative to the western 
strategy for the prevention of war, which has ensured peace in freedom for an unprecedented period of 
European history. To be credible and effective, the strategy of deterrence and defence must continue to 
be based on an adequate mix of appropriate nuclear and conventional forces, only the nuclear element 
of which can confront a potential aggressor with an unacceptable risk. 
3. The substantial presence of United States conventional and nuclear forces plays an irreplaceable 
part in the defence of Europe. They embody the American commitment to the defence of Europe and 
provide the indispensable linkage with the United States strategic deterrent. 
4. European forces play an essential role: the overall credibility of the western strategy of deterrence 
and defence cannot be maintained without a major European contribution not least because the conven-
tional imbalance affects the security of Western Europe in a very direct way. 
The Europeans have a major responsibility both in the field of conventional and nuclear defence. 
In the conventional field, the forces of the WEU member states represent an essential part of the 
alliance. As regards nuclear forces, all of which form a part of deterrence, the co-operative arrangements 
that certain member states maintain with the United States are necessary for the security of Europe. The 
independent forces of France and the United Kingdom contribute to overall deterrence and security. 
5. Arms control and disarmament are an integral part of western security policy and not an alter-
native to it. They should lead to a stable balance of forces at the lowest level compatible with our 
security. Arms control policy should, like our defence policy, take into account the specific European 
security interests in an evolving situation. It must be consistent with the maintenance of the strategic 
unity of the alliance and should not preclude closer European defence co-operation. Arms control agree-
ments have to be effectively verifiable and stand the test of time. East and West have a common interest 
in achieving this. 
* 
* * 
Ill. The member states of WEU intend to assume fully their responsibilities: 
(b) In the field of arms control and disarmament 
1. We shall pursue an active arms control and disarmament policy aimed at influencing future 
developments in such a way as to enhance security and to foster stability and co-operation in the whole 
of Europe. The steadfastness and cohesion of the alliance and close consultations among all the allies 
remain essential if concrete results are to be brought about. 
2. We are committed to elaborate further our comprehensive concept of arms control and disarm-
ament in accordance with the alliance's declaration of 12th June 1987 and we will work within the 
framework of this concept as envisaged particularly in paragraphs 7 and 8 of this declaration. An 
agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union for the global elimination of land-based INF 
missiles with a range between 500 and 5 500 km will constitute an important element of such an 
approach. 
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3. In pursuing such an approach we shall exploit all opportunities to make further progress towards 
arms reductions, compatible with our security and with our priorities, taking into account the fact that 
work in this area raises complex and inter-related issues. We shall evaluate them together, bearing in 
mind the political and military requirements of our security and progress in the different negotia-
tions. 
(c) In the field of East- West dialogue and co-operation 
1. The common responsibility of all Europeans is not to preserve the peace but to shape it construc-
tively. The Helsinki final act continues to serve as our guide to the fulfilment of the objective of grad-
ually overcoming the division of Europe. We shall therefore continue to make full use of the CSCE 
process in order to promote comprehensive co-operation among all participating states. 
2. The possibilities contained in the final act should be fully exploited. We therefore intend: 
-to seek to increase the transparency of military potentials and activities and the calculabthty of 
behaviour in accordance with the Stockholm document of 1986 by further (i:onfidence-building 
measures; 
-vigorously to pursue our efforts to provide for the full respect of human rights without which no 
genuine peace is possible; 
- to open new mutually beneficial possibilities in the fields of economy, technology, science and 
the protection of the environment; 
- to achieve more opportunities for the people in the whole of Europe to move freely and to 
exchange opinions and information and to intensify cultural exchanges, 
and thus to promote concrete improvements for the benefit of all people in Europe. 
* 
* * 
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APPENDIX II 
Statement on the ministerial meeting 
of the North Atlantic Council at Reykjavik 
(11th-12th June 1987) 
(Extracts) 
We reaffirm the validity of the complementary principles enunciated in the Harmel report of 
1967. The maintenance of adequate military strength and alliance cohesion and solidarity remains an 
essential basis for our policy of dialogue and co-operation - a policy which aims to achieve a progres-
sively more stable and constructive East-West relationship. 
2. Serious imbalances in the conventional, chemical and nuclear field, and the persisting build-up of 
Soviet military power, continue to preoccupy us. We reaffirm that there is no alternative, as far as we 
can foresee, to the alliance concept for the prevention of war - the strategy of deterrence, based on an 
appropriate mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces, each element being indis-
pensable. This strategy will continue to rest on the linkage of free Europe's security to that of North 
America since their destinies are inextricably coupled. Thus the United States nuclear commitment, the 
presence of United States nuclear forces in Europe 1 and the deployment of Canadian and United States 
forces there remain essential. 
3. Arms control and disarmament are integral parts of our security policy; we seek effectively veri-
fiable arms control agreements which can lead to a more stable and secure balance of forces at lower 
levels. 
4. We reiterate the prime importance we attach to rapid progress towards reductions in the field of 
strategic nuclear weapons. We thus welcome the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union now 
share the objective of achieving 50% reductions in their strategic arsenals. We strongly endorse the pre-
sentation of a United States proposal in Geneva to that effect and urge the Soviet Union to respond pos-
itively. 
We reviewed the current phase of the United States-Soviet negotiations in Geneva on defence and 
space systems which aim to prevent an arms race in space and to strengthen strategic stability. We con-
tinue to endorse these efforts. 
5. We note the recent progress achieved at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament towards a total 
ban on chemical weapons. We remain committed to achieving an early agreement on a comprehensive, 
worldwide and effectively verifiable treaty embracing the total destruction of existing stockpiles within 
an agreed timeframe and preventing the future production of such weapons. 
6. Recognising the increasing importance of conventional stability, particularly at a time when sig-
nificant nuclear reductions appear possible, we reaffirm the initiatives taken in our Halifax statement 
and Brussels declaration aimed at achieving a comprehensive, stable and verifiable balance of conven-
tional forces at lower levels. We recall that negotiations on conventional stability should be accom-
panied by negotiations between the 35 countries participating in the CSCE, building upon and 
expanding the confidence- and security-building measures contained in the Helsinki final act and the 
Stockholm agreement. We agreed that the two future security negotiations should take place within the 
framework of the CSCE process, with the conventional stability negotiations retaining autonomy as 
regards subject matter, participation and procedures. Building on these agreements we took the deci-
sions necessary to enable the High Level Task Force on Conventional Arms Control, which we estab-
lished at the Halifax ministerial, to press ahead with its work on the draft mandates to be tabled in the 
CSCE meeting and in the conventional stability mandate talks currently taking place in Vienna. 
7. Having reviewed progress in the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on 
an INF agreement the allies concerned call on the Soviet Union to drop its demand to retain a portion 
of its SS-20 capability and reiterate their wish to see all long-range land-based missiles eliminated in 
accordance with NA TO's long-standing objective. 
I. Greece recalls its positwn on nuclear matters. 
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They support the global and effectively verifiable elimination of all United States and Soviet land-
based SRINF missiles with a range between 500 and 1 000 km as an integral part of an INF agreement. 
They consider that an INF agreement on this basis would be an important element in a coherent 
and comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament which, while consistent with NATO's 
doctrine of flexible response, would include: 
-a 50% reduction in the strategic offensive nuclear weapons of the United States and the Soviet 
Union to be achieved during current Geneva negotiations; 
- the global elimination of chemical weapons; 
- the establishment of a stable and secure level of conventional forces, by the elimination of dis-
parities, in the whole of Europe; 
- in conjunction with the establishment of a conventional balance and the global elimination of 
chemical weapons, tangible and verifiable reductions of American and Soviet land-based 
nuclear missile systems of shorter-range, leading to equal ceilings. 
8. We 2 have directed the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session, working in conjunction 
with the appropriate military authorities, to consider the further development of a comprehensive 
concept of arms control and disarmament. The arms control problems faced by the alliance raise 
complex and inter-related issues which must be evaluated together, bearing in min4 overall progress in 
the arms control negotiations enumerated above as well as the requirements of alliance security and of 
its strategy of deterrence. 
9. In our endeavour to explore all opportunities for an increasingly broad and constructive dialogue 
which addresses the concerns of people in both East and West, and in the firm conviction that a stable 
order of peace and security in Europe cannot be built by military means alone, we attach particular 
importance to the CSCE process. We are therefore determined to make full use of the CSCE follow-up 
meeting in Vienna. 
The full implementation of all provisions agreed in the CSCE process by the 35 participating 
states, in particular in the field of human rights and contacts, remains the fundamental objective of the 
alliance and is essential for the fruitful development of East-West relations in all fields. 
Recalling our constructive proposals, we shall persist in our efforts to persuade the eastern coun-
tries to live up to their commitments. 
We will continue to work for a substantive and timely result of the conference. 
10. Those of us participating in the MBFR talks reiterate our desire to achieve a meaningful 
agreement which provides for reductions, limitations and effective verification, and call upon the 
Warsaw Pact participants in these talks to respond positively to the very important proposals made by 
the West in December 1985 and to adopt a more constructive posture in the negotiations. 
2. In this connection France recalled that it had not been a party to the double-track decision of 1979 and that it was not therefore 
bound by its consequences or implications. 
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APPENDIX Ill 
Document on military doctrine 
adopted by the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee 
in Berlin on 29th May 1987 
(Extracts) 
APPENDIX Ill 
The military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty, just as of each of its member countries, is subjugated 
to the task of preventing war, both nuclear and conventional. Out of the very nature of the socialist 
social system these states have never linked and do not link their future to the military solution of inter-
national problems. They declare for the solution of all disputable international problems peacefully, by 
political means. 
In the nuclear space age, the world has become too fragile for war and power politics. Humanity is 
faced with the problem of survival in conditions when huge volumes of the deadliest armaments have 
been stockpiled. A world war, the more so nuclear war, would have catastrophic consequences not only 
for the countries directly involved in the conflict, but also for the very life on Earth. 
The military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty member states is strictly a defensive one. It proceeds 
from the view that the use of the military road for resolving any disputed question is intolerable in the 
present conditions. Its essence is that: 
The Warsaw Treaty member states will never, under any circumstances, start hostilities against 
any country or an alliance of countries, unless they become the target of a military attack themselves. 
They will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. 
They have no territorial claims to any state either in Europe or outside it. 
They do not view any state, any people as their enemy. Quite the contrary, they are prepared to 
build relations with all countries without exception on the basis of mutually taking into account the 
interests of security and peaceful coexistence. 
The Warsaw Treaty member states declare that they firmly base their international relations on 
the respect for the principles of independence and national sovereignty, non-use of force or threat of 
force, inviolability of frontiers and territorial integrity, resolution of conflicts in a peaceful way, non-
interference in internal affairs, equality and other principles and goals envisaged by the United Nations 
Charter and the Helsinki final act and generally recognised standards of international relations. 
While favouring the implementation of disarmament measures, the Warsaw Treaty member 
states are compelled to maintain their armed forces in a composition and at a level that would enable 
them to repulse any attack from outside against any treaty member state. 
The combat readiness of the armed forces of the allied states is maintained at a sufficient level so 
as not to be caught unawares. In the event of an attack, they will give a devastating rebuff to the 
aggressor. 
The Warsaw Treaty member states never had nor have an aspiration to possess armed forces and 
armaments in excess of what is necessary for these purposes. Thus, they strictly comply with the limits 
of sufficiency for defence and for repelling possible aggression. 
The Warsaw Treaty member states regard ensuring the reliable security of their peoples as their 
prime duty to them. The allied socialist states do not claim greater security than other countries, but 
they will not agree to lesser security either. 
The existing military-strategic parity remains the decisive factor of preventing war. Further 
raising the level of parity does not yield, as experience shows, greater security. That is why they will con-
tinue applying efforts to maintain the balance of military force at an ever lower level. 
Under these conditions, ending the arms race and carrying out measures of real disarmament are 
acquiring truly historic significance. The states nowadays have no other path but reaching accords on 
the drastic lowering of the level of military confrontation. 
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The Warsaw Treaty member states come out resolutely from these positions. In full compliance 
with the defensive essence of their military doctrine, they are consistently pressing for the following 
principal goals: 
First. The earliest comprehensive ban on nuclear testing as a top-priority measure to end the 
development, production and perfection of nuclear arms, their stage-by-stage reduqtion and total elimi-
nation, and prevention of the spread of the arms race into outer space. 
Second. Prohibition and elimination of chemical and other types of weappns of mass annihi-
lation. 
Third. Reduction of the armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe down to the level at 
which neither side, in ensuring its defence, would have means for a sudden attack on the other side or 
for starting offensive operations in general. 
Fourth. Strict verification of all disarmament measures, based on the combination of national 
technical means and international procedures, including the establishment of corresponding interna-
tional bodies, exchange of military information and holding on-site inspections. 
Fifth. The creation in various regions of Europe and in other parts of the world of zones free of 
nuclear and chemical weapons and also zones of reduced concentration of armaments and increased 
trust, the implementation of military confidence-building measures in Europe on a mutual basis and the 
attainment of accords on such measures in other areas of the world and also on seas and oceans. The 
mutual renunciation by Warsaw Treaty member states of the use of armed force and the adoption of 
commitments to maintain relations of peace, the liquidation of military bases on the territory of other 
states; the withdrawal of troops within the confines of national borders, the mutual withdrawal of the 
most dangerous offensive types of armaments from the zone of direct contact of the two military alli-
ances and also the lowering of the concentration in that zone of armed forces and armaments to the 
minimum agreed-upon level. 
Sixth. Regarding Europe's continuing split into opposing military blocs as aqnormal, the Warsaw 
Treaty member states come out for the simultaneous dissolution of the North Atla~tic Alliance and the 
Warsaw Treaty and, as the first step, for the liquidation of their military organisations and ultimately for 
an all-embracing system of international security. 
* 
* * 
The Warsaw Treaty member states propose to the North Atlantic Alliance member states to hold 
consultations with the aim of comparing the military doctrines of both alliances, analysing their char-
acter and jointly studying the directions of their further evolution with a view to removing the mutual 
suspiciousness and mistrust that have accumulated for years, attaining a better understanding of each 
other's intentions and ensuring that the military concepts and doctrines of the military blocs and their 
members be based on defensive principles. 
The existing imbalances and asymmetries in separate types of armaments and services of armed 
forces and the search for ways of removing them on the basis of reductions by the side that is ahead, on 
the understanding that such reductions will lead to the establishment of ever lower levels, could also be 
a subject of consultations. 
The socialist member states of the treaty propose to hold such consultations at an authoritative 
expert level with the participation of military specialists of countries of both sides. They are prepared for 
holding such consultations already in 1987. The consultations could be held in Warsaw or Brussels, or 
in each of these cities alternately. 
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Amendments 1, 2 and 3 
27th November 1987 
Disarmament - reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENTS 1, 2 and 3 1 
tabled by Mr. Eisma 
1. After paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation on disarmament, add a new par-
agraph as follows: 
''Urging the United States Senate to advise and consent as a matter of urgency to the ratification 
of the INF agreement; " 
2. In paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation on disarmament, after "ABM 
treaty" insert "in its traditional interpretation ". 
3. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper on disarmament, after" ABM treaty", insert 
"in its traditional interpretation". 
l. See lOth sitting, 2nd December 1987 (amendments not moved). 
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Amendment 4 
30th November 1987 
Disarmament - reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Cou,cil 
AMENDMENT 4 1 
tabled by Mr. Soell 
4. At the end of paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper on disarmament, leave out " with 
priority to negotiations on the Central European region". 
1. See lOth sitting, 2nd December 1987 (amendment agreed to). 
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Amendments 5, 6 and 7 
30th November 1987 
Disarmament - reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENTS 5, 6 and 7 1 
tabled by Mr. Pieralli 
5. In the preamble to the draft recommendation on disarmament, place paragraph (i) after paragraph 
(vi). 
6. In paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation on disarmament, leave out 
"progress on a properly verifiable INF agreement" and insert "the agreement". 
7. In paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation on disarmament, leave out 
" should" and insert "must". 
Signed: Pieralli 
1. See lOth sitting, 2nd December 1987 (amendment 5 withdrawn; amendments 6 and 7 agreed to). 
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Amendments 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 
Disarmament - reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENTS 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 1 
tabled by Mr. Reddemann and others 
8. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation on disarmament, leave out " in 
different armaments and forces ". 
9. After paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation on disarmament, add a new 
paragraph as follows: 
"Noting in this connection that in Prague on lOth April1987 General Secretary Gorbachev con-
firmed the existence of such imbalances and asymmetries for historical and other reasons; " 
10. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper on disarmament, after" in Europe" insert 
"and the various regions concerned". 
11. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper on disarmament, after " military strategy " 
insert " and doctrine " and leave out the words to the end of the paragraph. 
12. After paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper on disarmament, add two new para-
graphs: 
"Call on the Warsaw Pact to renounce its offensive military and technical doctrine and give its 
armed forces a structure clearly designed for defensive purposes and which does not allow it to 
undertake an offensive against other countries; 
In the framework of disarmament, ensure that in each case both sides make reductions to the 
lowest level. " 
Signed: Reddemann, Wilkinson, Finsberg, Lenzer, Muller, Val/eix 
1. See lOth sitting, 2nd December 1987 (amendments 8 and 11 negatived; amendments 9 and I 0 agreed to; amendment 12 
amended and agreed to). 
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Amendment to Amendment 12 
Disarmament - reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENT TO AMENDMENT 12 1 
tabled by MM. Scheer and Stoffelen 
In amendment 12 to the draft recommendation on disarmament, after .. countries;", add a new 
paragraph as follows: 
.. Call on NATO and the Warsaw Pact to renounce offensive technical capacities in favour of the 
creation of mutual non-provocative, confidence-building defence structures; " 
l. See lOth sitting, 2nd December 1987 (amendment to amendment agreed to). 
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Document 1116, Addendum 1st December 1987 
Disarmament - reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council 
The Assembly, 
ADDENDUM TO THE REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 1 
by Mr. Scheer, Rapporteur 
Draft resolution on the INF treaty 
Endorsing the view of its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments expressed in 
Document 1116 that the INF agreement now to be signed by the United States and the Soviet Union 
should be in the long-term security interests of countries both of the alliance and the Warsaw Pact, 
To give its advice and consent to the treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces as expeditiously 
as possible; 
INSTRUCTS ITS PRESIDENT 
To transmit the text of the present resolution and the corresponding report of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments to the President of the United States Senate for the information of 
all its members. 
Explanatory Memorandum 
The draft resolution is the text of the motion for a resolution on the INF treaty tabled by Mr. 
Stoffelen and several of his colleagues and referred to the committee by the Assembly on 30th 
November 1987 (Document 1127). The committee adopted the text without amendment at its meeting 
on 1st December. 
As the subject is dealt with in its report on disarmament already before the Assembly (Document 
1116) the committee instructs the Rapporteur to present it to the Assembly. 
There is a precedent for such a text in Resolution 64 adopted by the Assembly on 6th December 
1979 which called on the United States Senate to ratify the SALT 11 treaty. 
l. Adopted in committee by 14 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Kittelmann (Chairman); MM. Fourre, de Beer (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alloncle, Mrs. Baarveld-
Schlaman, MM. Cariglia, Cox, De Decker (Alternate: Close), Fiandrotti, Fioret, Hardy, lrmer, Jung, Konen, de Kwaadsteniet, 
Mrs. Lalumiere, MM. Lemmrich, Matraja, Pecchioli, Ramaekers, Scheer, Sinesio, Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Speed, Steiner, 
Steverlynck (Alternate: Declercq), Stokes (Alternate: Wilkinson). 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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Political activities of the Council -
reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council 
REPORT' 
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee 2 
by Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
4th November 1987 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
on the political activities of the Council - reply to the thirty-second annual report 
of the Council 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur 
I. Relations between the Council and the Assembly 
II. The reactivation of WEU 
Ill. Political activities of the Council 
IV. WEU and European security 
V. Conclusions 
APPENDIX 
Dates oftransmission of annual reports of the Council, replies to Assembly recom-
mendations and answers to written questions put by parliamentarians in the last 
three years 
1. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Ahrens (Chairman); MM. Close, Burger (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts (Alternate: van der Werff), 
Bassinet, Baumel, Bianco, Dejardin (Alternate: Pecriaux), Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Hardy, Hill, Koehl, Lord Mackie of 
Benshie, MM. Martino, Masciadri, Mechtersheimer, du Monceau de Bergendal, Muller, Pontillon, Reddemann, Ruet, Rumpf, van 
der Sanden, She/ton, Spitella (Alternate: Amadel), Stoffelen (Alternate: Eisma), Vecchietti (Alternate: Pollidoro). 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the political activities of the Council -
reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering that developments in the Atlantic Alliance make it essential to strengthen its 
European pillar and that at the present juncture WEU is still the only organisation capable of forming 
this pillar; 
(ii) Considering that the way to achieve this result is through the early implementation of the Rome 
declaration and welcoming the fact that the adoption of the platform on European security interests 
marks the starting point in the effective reactivation of WEU; 
(iii) Noting with satisfaction that the platform on European security interests adopted by the Council 
on 27th October 1987 responds, in the main, to Assembly Recommendations 420, 429, 432, 438, 441, 
442 and 446; 
{iv) Welcoming the development of consultations between member countries in the framework of 
WEU and expressing its satisfaction that the Council implemented, although tardily, Article VIII, para-
graph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty for the first time in summer 1987 in the context of the Gulf 
crisis; 
(v) Regretting, however, that co-ordination of the action taken by member countries in that region 
was inadequate; 
(vi) Noting that the thirty-second annual report ofthe Council gives only a very inadequate account of 
the Council's activities in 1986; 
(vii) Regretting the Council's slowness in answering the Assembly, the ever-later dates on which it 
transmits its reports and the very inadequate information it gives; 
(viii) Noting that the informal procedure increasingly practised by the Council is not likely to alleviate 
this shortcoming; 
(ix) Stressing that the Assembly's own needs are wholly independent ofthose of the ministerial organs 
and that restructuring must not affect the independence of either the Assembly or the Office of the Clerk 
vis-a-vis the ministerial organs, 
REcOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Speed up its procedure to allow quicker transmission to the Assembly of the substantial infor-
mation it needs in order to exercise its responsibility of supervising the Council's activities under Article 
IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, respect a time-limit, under normal circumstances~ of eight weeks for 
answering questions and adopt a normal schedule of dates so that the Assembly mi8fit receive its half-
yearly reports in time for preparing useful replies; 
2. Ensure the immediate implementation of the intentions expressed in paragraph Ill (a) 4 of the 
platform which it adopted on 27th October 1987; 
3. While respecting the time-limit of 31st December 1987, take the measures to restructure the 
organs of WEU allowing these new requirements to be met and, in pursuance of this, invite the 
Assembly to comment on the draft organogram being prepared by the Secretary-General before its sub-
mission to the Council for approval; 
4. Pursue the full implementation of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, and in particular 
its paragraph 3; 
5. Examine carefully the development of bilateral co-operation between its members on security 
matters with a view to extending this co-operation to all member countries without thereby diluting the 
results of bilateral co-operation; 
6. In consultation with the Presidential Committee, ensure satisfactory co-ordination of the presence 
of ministers at Assembly sessions, and in particular the participation of the presidency in all debates on 
the Council's reports~ 
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7. Continue to give and improve information to the Assembly and the public on meetings of the 
WEU Council at the level of the enlarged Council; 
8. Keep the Assembly regularly informed of meetings and the results of the work of the special 
working group and its sub-groups; 
9. Accord the Assembly without delay the funds and staff necessary for restructuring the Office of 
the Clerk; 
10. Ensure that the Secretariat-General is in a position to assist the Council in all its activities. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur) 
I. Relations between the Council 
and the Assembly 
1. The second part of the thirty-second 
annual report of the Council having reached the 
Office of the Clerk of the Assembly only on 24th 
April 1987, it was impossible for the General 
Affairs Committee to present its reply at the first 
part of the thirty-third session and your 
Rapporteur was therefore asked to present it at 
the second part of this session. In fact, he should 
have been replying to the first part of the thirty-
third annual report, but on 1st November this 
had not yet been received by the Assembly. In 
these conditions, it is impossible to prepare a 
reply for a session starting on 30th November. 
2. Your Rapporteur can but refer to the 
General Affairs Committee's replies to earlier 
annual reports and recall that these delays make 
it difficult to hold the dialogue between the 
Council and the Assembly of which these reports 
and replies are a statutory part and should, with 
the answers to written questions by parliamen-
tarians and ad hoc written communications, 
form the major part of it. Recent experience has 
again shown how fragile is the information given 
by highly-qualified persons at " informal " 
meetings, which are on the increase, and even in 
more public speeches. Such exchanges are cer-
tainly useful but must be additional to the 
official communication of the annual report 
adopted by the seven governments and the 
replies to recommendations duly adopted by an 
Assembly which cannot delegate its powers. 
3. He notes that the annual report refers to 
" efforts to improve the formal procedure for 
exchanges with the Assembly " made by the 
Council to " expedite the replies to recommenda-
tions and written questions". Similarly, in 
regard to the annual report, the Council gives an 
assurance that it wishes " to provide the 
Assembly with the most up-to-date and complete 
information". However, these efforts do not yet 
seem to have been crowned with success since 
each year the answers to written questions are 
sent later and later and the time-limit of one 
month provided for in Rule 45, paragraph 2, of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, which 
the Council has several times said it would try to 
respect, is now never met. Replies to recommen-
dations adopted since the December 1986 
session were on the contrary, with two excep-
tions, received in time, for which tribute should 
be paid to the Council, but your Rapporteur 
finds it very hard to understand why it took 
several months to draft and adopt such a short 
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text containing so little political information as 
the thirty-second annual report of the Council. 
At the committee's request, a table showing the 
dates on which these various texts were sent is 
appended to the present report. 
4. Conversely, whatever reservations one 
may have about increasing recourse to non-
statutory procedures, they have been far more 
satisfactory. The number of ministers present at 
the second part of the thirty-second ordinary 
session of the Assembly was particularly high. 
The Assembly would have welcomed their 
presence had its normal work not been seriously 
jeopardised thereby. For budgetary reasons, it 
cannot prolong its sessions ot organise night sit-
tings. In some cases, this also prevented a real 
exchange of views with the representatives of 
governments. However, fewer ministers were 
present at the ordinary and extraordinary ses-
sions in spring 1987. Your Rapporteur believes 
the Assembly should note: 
5. (i) The almost continuous presence of 
ministers from the country having the 
chairmanship-in-office of the Council - in this 
case Luxembourg - at its sessions and their 
interventions during the debates. This is an inno-
vation which tends to give greater interest and 
weight to the Assembly's deliberations and it is 
to. be. hoped that it will be continued. 
6. (ii) The attendance of a prime minister -
Mr. Jacques Chirac- who used the tribune of the 
Assembly to present proposals on the application 
of the modified Brussels Treaty, which is entirely 
in conformity with the statute of WEU and a 
clear indication of the complementarity of gov-
ernmental and parliamentary activities. 
7. (iii) The growing number of ministers or 
secretaries of state for defence taking part in 
Assembly sessions, which is a satisfactory 
reflection of their growing participation in the 
work of the Council. 
8. (iv) The unforeseeability ofthe presence of 
ministers or secretaries of state. Your 
Rapporteur suggests that, as far as possible, the 
Presidential Committee of the Assembly should 
co-ordinate, in consultation with the Chairman-
in-Office, via the Permanent Council, the 
presence and interventions of ministers, in order 
to ensure that an adequate number of them 
attend each session. Your Rapporteur wishes to 
point out that the Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council of Ministers has special responsibility 
for relations between the Council and the 
Assembly. 
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9. (v) The role assumed by the Secretary-
General, who makes a substantial contribution 
to keeping the Assembly informed about the 
work of the Council. This corresponds to the 
wish often expressed by the Assembly to have a 
" political secretary-general " at the head of the 
ministerial organs of WEU, one of whose roles 
would be to ensure, at the side of the 
chairmanship-in-office, the representation of the 
Council vis-a-vis the Assembly. The fact that the 
Secretary-General is the only person who takes 
part in the work not only of the Permanent 
Council, but also of the enlarged Council, 
meetings of political directors, the Council of 
Ministers and the main working groups gives 
him full competence for this role. He brings out 
clearly the specific nature of WEU, quite dif-
ferent from that of the Council of Europe, since 
the Secretary-General, appointed by the govern-
ments, Chairman of the Permanent Council, has 
a very special political role at the side of the 
executive, whereas the Assembly, to which 
Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty 
assigned powers which are above all supervisory, 
must therefore benefit from full political inde-
pendence, which would not be implied if its work 
were above all consultative. This political inde-
pendence is necessarily expressed in the 
breakdown of the operating budget of the 
Assembly and in the status of the Office of the 
Clerk. 
10. (vi) The new and important role played by 
the chairmanship-in-office of the Council in the 
dialogue with the Assembly, since meetings and 
exchanges of letters with the presidency of the 
Assembly have increased, meetings with the 
Presidential Committee before and after minis-
terial meetings have been confirmed and 
exchanges with the Assembly through the inter-
mediary of its committees or directly in public 
on the occasion of the extraordinary session in 
Luxembourg have assumed new regularity and 
scope. This is perfectly normal in view of the role 
now played by the chairmanship-in-office. Your 
Rapporteur wishes to emphasise that the 
Assembly is interested in the policy of the 
Council of Ministers as such and is only indi-
rectly concerned by the views of each member 
government. This places special responsibility on 
the shoulders of the Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council. For this reason, your Rapporteur con-
siders it very desirable for the Chairman-in-
Office to participate in the Assembly's debates 
on the annual reports of the Council. 
the Assembly, on 31st August, the "guidelines 
for the press agreed upon at the close of the 
meeting". One may certainly wonder why it 
took eleven days to send this communique to the 
Assembly. But, while it was " the first time such 
a meeting has been held", it was also the first 
time the Council has informed the press - imme-
diately - and the Assembly - fairly quickly - of 
the discussions at a non-ministerial meeting. 
Your Rapporteur can only hope that this practice 
will be continued and extended and this was 
indeed confirmed following the meeting of senior 
officials on 15th September. 
12. (viii) A degree of dissonance between min-
isterial decisions as reported by the 
chairmanship-in-office and their interpretation 
at the level of the Permanent Council. Thus, in 
his statements to the Assembly meeting in 
extraordinary session on 28th April 1987, the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council referred to 
the Council's agreement to two of the Assembly's 
principal budgetary claims: separation of the 
pensions budget from the general WEU budget 
and the granting of autonomy to the Assembly in 
the use of the overall budget granted to it by the 
Council. Mr. Poos said: 
" ... [the Council of Ministers] has also 
agreed to meet your wishes in regard to 
independent budgetary management, 
within the limits of agreed appropriations. 
In regard to an increase in the ordinary 
budget, it wishes to have more time to 
consider this matter on the basis of spe-
cific data. As you can see, two of your 
three wishes have now been given a cons-
tructive answer and I personally am happy 
to be able to announce this. " 
However, the Permanent Council subsequently 
interpreted this second decision of the Council of 
Ministers in such a restrictive way as to deprive 
it of substance. 
13. This was not the first time chairmen-in-
office of the Council have made soothing 
remarks to representatives of the Assembly that 
were not to be confirmed by the Permanent 
Council. It has happened several times over 
matters relating to information given to the 
Assembly, and the thirty-second annual report 
incidentally states that the promise to transmit to 
the Assembly a declassified version of reports 
submitted to it by the agencies will not be 
respected. This promise having been made at an 
" informal " meeting at which no minutes were 
11. (vii) The innovation introduced by the taken, the Assembly is defenceless when it wishes 
Netherlands chairmanship-in-office which, at the .to insist on its application. Such practices can 
close of the meeting in The Hague on 20th but make the Assembly ask the Council to ensure 
August 1987, of a " group of senior officials from that its commitments are respected and cause the 
the ministries for foreign affairs and of defence of Assembly to approach with caution the 
the member states of WEU to consider the situ- " informal " procedure for dialogue which the 
ation in the Gulf", held in accordance with Council has an increasing tendency to substitute 
Article VIII of the treaty, sent the President of for official procedure. 
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14. Your Rapporteur has heard from several 
sources that the Council is complaining that the 
Assembly is not giving it credit for its work of 
reactivating WEU or its efforts to promote a dia-
logue with the Assembly. Your Rapporteur will 
return to what should be thought of the reacti-
vation of WEU, but he wishes here to point to a 
problem for which he can propose no fully satis-
factory solution but whose dimensions he wishes 
the Council to consider with a view to finding a 
satisfactory outcome. 
15. WEU, as moulded by the modified 
Brussels Treaty, remained fairly inactive at 
political level but carried out technical duties 
mainly in the control of armaments. The 
Assembly, assigned supervisory duties under 
Article IX of the treaty, had a relationship with 
the Council in which the formal aspect was dom-
inant. The annual report of the Council was the 
keystone. It was drafted with great care and 
studied by the Assembly in the same spirit. The 
reactivation of WEU, without wholly abolishing 
these statutory activities, reduced them to very 
little and instead developed intergovernmental 
consultations on foreign policy and defence 
matters. The Assembly welcomed this evolution 
which it had always sought in conformity with 
Article VIII of the treaty. 
16. However, the new line followed in the 
work of the Council and all its dependent organs 
such as the agencies and at the various meetings 
held in the context of WEU has led to a burst of 
ill-structured activity. Hardly any joint decisions 
were forthcoming. Generally, there have been no 
communiques, with the result that the Assembly 
has serious difficulty in grasping the true nature 
of the Council's activities, and the thirty-second 
annual report is far too brief about most ofthem 
to improve the situation. The character of 
exchanges between the Council and the 
Assembly has therefore been transformed 
without any specific agreement having been 
defined by the two WEU bodies during a period 
of trial and error and search for new procedures. 
The Council has taken refuge in informal prac-
tices and made excessive use of them, as testified 
by the preceding paragraphs. It must now be seen 
how the Assembly, while exercising all its prerog-
atives as a parliamentary assembly, can effec-
tively accomplish its duties of supervision and 
stimulus. The dialogue between the Council and 
the Assembly in the last two years has not yet 
allowed a satisfactory solution to be found to this 
point. Your Rapporteur considers this to be the 
principal cause of the uneasiness that several 
members of the Council have stressed. In this 
connection, he would refer to the very many 
questions put by the Assembly in the reports by 
Mr. Ahrens and Mr. Bianco (Documents 1078, 
1089 and 1099) which are still far from having 
been answered. 
183 
DOCUMENT 1117 
II. The reactivation of WEU 
17. Since 1984, the governments have been 
trying to redirect the activities of WEU without 
touching the modified Brussels Treaty. They 
were not anxious to embark upon the long and 
difficult task of revising the treaty which would 
have made it impossible, for several years, to 
achieve what seemed necessary, i.e. to give some 
degree of political consistency to Europe's partic-
ipation in the organisation of its security. It was 
probably a similar consideration that led the 
same governments to defer examination of the 
possible enlargement of WEU until the day reac-
tivation was complete, a decision which is 
further confirmed by the thirty-second annual 
report. However, the governments have had to 
note that institutions designed for activities of a 
different kind are now ill-adapted. 
18. Implementation of reactivation therefore 
encountered further difficulties about which the 
Council has always been discreet, but which are 
evident. On the one hand, posts in the 
Secretariat-General and the agencies were 
attributed on a very carefully studied nationality 
basis, particularly for the more senior posts. Any 
restructuring necessarily affected the proportion, 
thus giving rise to negative reactions on the part 
of countries which, rightly or wrongly, felt 
injured. On the other hand, many agency offi-
cials were highly-qualified experts, particularly 
for the control of armaments, which did not 
necessarily prepare them for. work of another 
kind. The fact that many of them were former 
officers and almost at their second retirement age 
certainly allowed the progressive recruitment of 
staff suited to the new requirements. However, 
these requirements do not yet seem to have been 
clearly defined, nor has provision been made for 
them after the transitional period that finishes at 
the end of 1987, and the annllml report informs 
us that staff recruited for the agencies were given 
only very short-term contracts, contrary to the 
policy long pursued by the co-ordinated 
organisations and the European Community. 
The purpose was to create a permanent 
European civil service independent of national 
authorities, which could not b~ expected of offi-
cials recruited for limited periods. Finally, the 
annual report refers to the high cost of sup-
pressing a grade A post whose holder had to be 
paid an indemnity for loss of job in accordance 
with the Staff Rules. It does not conceal the fact 
that it has endeavoured to limit the burden for 
governments of suppressing other posts. 
19. However legitimate these various consid-
erations may be, they made the Council avoid 
facing up to the real question, that of adapting 
WEU structures to the organisation's true activ-
ities. The result has been some confusion which 
your Rapporteur wishes to sort out, taking as a 
basis the thirty-second annual report of the 
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Council and subsequent communications from 
the Council. He submitted the following text to 
the Secretary-General of WEU before drafting 
the final version of his draft report so as to avoid 
mistakes. Your Rapporteur wishes to thank the 
Secretary-General, who has enabled him to be 
accurate in the following paragraphs, whereas the 
Council's communications to the Assembly had 
left room for much uncertainty about the nature 
and description of the WEU organs. 
20. (a) Created by Article VIII of the modified 
Brussels Treaty, the WEU Council may take the 
following forms: 
(i) Council of Ministers, cons1stmg of 
ministers for foreign affairs and, since 
October 1984, ministers of defence, 
under the chairmanship of the 
minister for foreign affairs exercising 
the chairmanship and assisted by the 
Secretariat-General. It holds at least 
one formal and, in general, one 
informal meeting each year. 
(ii) Enlarged Council, with the partici-
pation of political directors and repre-
sentatives of the ministries of 
defence. It meets in London under the 
chairmanship of the Secretary-
General. The phrase in the annual 
report indicating that two meetings of 
the enlarged Council were held in 
London on the same day, 24th 
October 1986, referred to two 
meetings which did not have the same 
participants. The morning meeting 
was held with representatives of the 
ministries of defence. It was the first 
of its kind and was specifically 
intended to prepare for the partici-
pation of ministers in the ministerial 
meeting of the Council in Luxem-
bourg by spelling out their role in the 
new WEU and the matters they were 
to consider. At the afternoon meeting, 
these representatives of the ministries 
of defence were joined by the political 
directors of the ministries for foreign 
affairs to prepare the agenda of the 
ministerial meeting. 
It is also in the context ofthe enlarged 
Council that meetings of political 
directors are held whenever necessary. 
The meetings held on 20th August 
and 14th September on the situation 
in the Gulf, in the presence of the Sec-
retary-General, come within this 
context in application of Article VIII, 
paragraph 3 of the treaty. The 
meeting on 20th August 1987 was the 
first of this kind. 
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(iii) Permanent Council, consisting of the 
ambassadors· to London and an 
official from the United Kingdom 
Foreign Office, under the chair-
manship of the Secretary-General, 
assisted by the Secretariat-General 
and responsible for co-ordinating all 
the activities of WEU. 
Your Rapporteur would like the Council to 
confirm that it does in fact consider all these 
meetings to be meetings of the Council or, 
otherwise, to explain their status and whether 
some of them should be considered " subsidiary 
bodies " as provided for in Article VIII, para-
graph 2, of the treaty. 
21. (b) Furthermore, government representa-
tives are invited to take part in: 
(i) the high-level special working group, 
consisting of experts from the two 
ministries and responsible for study-
ing matters relating to European 
security interests. This was an off-
shoot of the SDI working group whose 
task was subsequently " to develop a 
possible framework for a long-term 
analysis of the politico-strategic 
implications of conceivable develop-
ments in ballistic missile defence" 
and was then modified and extended 
on 28th April 1987. It now has three 
sub-groups: 
- the group of deputies; 
- the SDI group; 
- the Mediterranean group, which 
held its first meeting on 16th July 
1987; 
(ii) the ordinary working group of the 
Council, composed of representatives 
of the embassies in London, respon-
sible for preparing the decisions of the 
Permanent Council; 
(iii) the Standing Armaments Committee 
responsible for co-operation in arma-
ments matters whose secretariat is 
ensured by Agency Ill. It exists by 
virtue of a decision of the Council of 
1955 but did not meet in 1986 or 
1987. Some members of the Council 
consider that it not having met is tan-
tamount to the abolition of the SAC. 
The Council is certainly entitled to 
annul its 1955 decision, but it should 
do so clearly; 
(iv) two working groups dependent on the 
SAC, which continue to meet, thus 
suggesting that the SAC does still 
exist. 
22. (c) The institutions specific to WEU are, 
apart from the Council and the Assembly: 
(i) the Secretariat-General: 
(ii) three agencies for security questions. 
Their programme of work, now being 
implemented, was drawn up by the 
Council in the light of the wishes of 
the governments, for whom their 
studies are really intended. The 
Council takes note of them and com-
ments on them as necessary. No 
information has been given on any 
action taken by a government to 
follow up the studies so far trans-
mitted to them. According to infor-
mation given by the Chairman-in-
Office of the Council to the 
Presidential Committee at the close of 
the meeting of the Council of 
Ministers in The Hague on 27th 
October 1987, it had been decided to 
reduce the number of agencies to one. 
Your Rapporteur knows nothing of 
the tasks given to this single agency 
for which he believes all the problems 
raised for the three agencies still 
exist; 
(iii) the Agency for the Control of Arma-
ments whose staff are part of Agency I 
and which in fact verifies only the 
non-production and non-stockpiling 
of chemical weapons by the country 
which has undertaken not to produce 
ABC weapons on its territory. Your 
Rapporteur has no idea what is to 
become of the statute of this agency in 
the framework of the single agency 
which it was decided to set up on 27th 
October 1987; 
(iv) the international secretariat of the 
SAC, hitherto ensured by Agency Ill, 
but your Rapporteur does not know 
how it will be ensured by the single 
agency, particularly where the working 
groups are concerned. 
23. Your Rapporteur can but welcome the 
present scale of exchanges of views between gov-
ernments in the framework of WEU. However, 
compared with the number and importance of 
decisions taken by WEU, this list makes him 
wonder whether the Council has really found the 
simplest, most effective and least expensive 
means of organising these exchanges. He notes 
that many aspects of the operation of these 
bodies have never been communicated to the 
Assembly and the complication of the system 
allows the Council to evade all supervision by 
the Assembly and public opinion, which is con-
trary to the spirit and the letter of the modified 
Brussels Treaty, whose Article IX aimed specifi-
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cally at concerning public opinion with European 
consultations on security matters. 
24. The thirty-second annual report recalls 
usefully that the Council continues to consider 
this interest to be of prime im.,ortance if a moral 
crisis is to be mitigated, as this would be disas-
trous for Europe's security. Ohe of the principal 
reasons for the reactivation ~f WEU had been 
the need, noted at that time, ~o give a European 
dimension to the spirit of defence. All the gov-
ernments agreed that in this connection the role 
of the Assembly was to be essential, and the then 
French Prime Minister, Mr. Pierre Mauroy, 
stressed this forcefully in his address to members 
of the Assembly in . December 1983. The 
Assembly accepted this role but emphasised that 
it could only carry it out on two conditions: first 
that its full independence be respected and 
second that the Council, by giving it substantial 
information about its activities, become a true 
partner for it. While at the present juncture the 
first condition has been almost fulfilled, this is 
far from being the case of the second. 
25. The thirty-second annual report refers to 
the activities of the Council in informing the 
public by announcing " the setting up of a unit 
within the Political Division of the Secretariat-
General to be responsible for relations with the 
press and for providing information", also 
" responsible for answering th€t many requests by 
the public for information about the activities of 
WEU ".This is fully in line with a request by the 
Assembly but, in view of the fact that it is 
unlikely that the Council will keep the public 
better informed than the Assembly about its 
activities, your Rapporteur has every reason to 
fear that this " unit responsible for relations with 
the press" will have little to offer. What dres it 
know of meetings other than ministerial 
meetings? No communiques are issued after 
them apart, it is true, from the meetings of high-
level experts held in The Hague on 20th August 
and 14th September 1987, when a document was 
adopted and transmitted to the press by the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council. This practice 
should be pursued and generalised. 
26. Your Rapporteur assoqiates himself with 
the Council in congratulating the Secretary-
General on the considerable ~mount of work he 
does to make WEU known and make its reacti-
vation understood in both a European and 
Atlantic context. However, he notes that, for 
reasons probably due to the excessive secrecy 
with which the Council insists on surrounding 
itself and not to the Secretary-General himself, 
these communications reveal little about the 
content of the work of the Council and its 
dependent bodies. But the press and public will 
be really interested in general considerations 
only if they can be shown the full implications 
for handling topical questions. The Assembly has 
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enough experience of this to assert this view 
strongly. 
27. The Council has set its autumn 1987 
ministerial meeting as the conclusion of the tran-
sitional period for setting up new structures. On 
the one hand, it is has used this as an argument 
for refusing to consider the question of enlarging 
WEU, which arose two years ago with the candi-
dature of Portugal, and on the other for refusing 
to examine the Assembly's proposal for restruc-
turing the Office of the Clerk submitted in spring 
1987. The Assembly has already stated that it 
considers it would have been better to take an 
immediate decision on the possible enlargement 
of WEU so as to allow applicant countries whose 
accession was considered desirable to take part 
in reflection and decisions on reactivation. As it 
did not adopt this procedure, the Council, once 
the establishment of the new structures has been 
completed, will have to examine quite quickly 
how to adapt them to the requirements of an 
enlarged WEU, which means that the first transi-
tional period will be followed by a second no less 
transitional period. There is no point in stressing 
the consequences these delays have already had 
and will continue to have, in particular for the 
staff, who cannot rely on stable employment. 
28. It was even more absurd to link decisions 
relating to a reorganisation of the Office of the 
Clerk, which has a very limited impact, with a 
restructuring of the ministerial organs of WEU, 
since the latter has no implications for the 
Assembly itself. It was the announcement of 
reactivation that led to an increase in the burden 
on the Assembly services because of the new 
interest shown by the press and public in the 
activities of WEU - the thirty-second annual 
report refers to this - whereas, until now, the 
Council has done nothing of substance to 
respond to this interest. Your Rapporteur fears 
that the position adopted by the Council may be 
interpreted as a pretext concealing ill will either 
because of the budgetary implications, which are 
in reality minimum, of the Assembly's requests 
or because it does not really wish to provide the 
Assembly with means of action that would give it 
greater weight and a wider audience. 
29. According to statements made by the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council to the Presi-
dential Committee on 27th October, the main 
decisions concerning the restructuring of WEU 
were taken at the October ministerial meeting. 
The principle of the collocation ofthe ministerial 
organs having been established, it apparently 
remains on the one hand to decide in which city 
this collocation should take place - which is 
apparently no easy task - and on the other hand 
to work out the new organogram of the minis-
terial organs of WEU, which must be agreed 
upon by the Council before the end of the year 
on a report by the Secretary-General. If this is 
really the case, the way is now open for an early 
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decision on how to respond to the various appli-
cations by other countries to join WEU and an 
immediate decision on the Assembly's requests 
relating to the restructuring of the Office of the 
Clerk. 
Ill. Political activities of the Council 
30. The thirty-second annual report of the 
Council makes no distinction between political 
and defence questions, which does not facilitate 
the division of its chapters between the two com-
mittees concerned. On 3rd June 1987, the Presi-
dential Committee decided to refer to the 
General Affairs Committee the sections of the 
report on " the Council's activities relating. to 
political consultations in WEU, threats outside 
the North Atlantic Treaty area and international 
terrorism". But the report has little to say on 
these three points. 
31. (a) The question of East- West relations is 
considered solely from the point of view of dis-
armament, which concerns the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments. As the 
General Affairs Committee for its part is to 
submit a report to the Assembly on recent devel-
opments in Soviet external policy, your 
Rapporteur will not dwell on this subject. 
32. (b) The Council's activities relati11;g ~o 
political consultations in WEU are dealt with m 
Chapter II of the present report. 
33. (c) On international terrorism, the thirty-
second annual report is laconic. It includes only 
six lines on the subject, saying that the ministers 
attached importance to the fight against ter-
rorism but that " collective efforts are being 
made by WEU member countries in other inter-
national bodies". Without wishing to challenge a 
decision which seeks to associate with this fight 
as many countries as possible, your Rapporteur 
reminds the Council that it undertook to report 
to the Assembly on the application of the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty, even if this was done in 
institutions other than WEU. The Council 
should therefore say what has been done and in 
which framework. 
34. (d) On threats outside the North Atlantic 
Treaty area, the thirty-second annual report says 
nothing at all, since the Mediterranean is part of 
the North Atlantic Treaty area. However, your 
Rapporteur wishes to draw attention to the 
guidelines for the press agreed upon at the close 
of the meetings held in The Hague on 20th 
August and 14th September 1987, which were 
communicated to the Assembly by Mr. van den 
Broek, Chairman-in-Office of th~ Council, and 
the Minister's letter accompanymg the first of 
these texts. 
35. The two texts dated 31st August, reporting 
on the meeting of 20th August, give several val-
uable pointers to the way the presidency viewed 
the steps it took: 
36. (i) The letter from the Chairman-in-Office 
places the communication of the guidelines to 
the Assembly clearly in the context of a dialogue: 
it is based on the interest shown by the Assembly 
and expressed again by its President to the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council during their 
talks on 7th July on the implications for 
European security of crises occurring in other 
regions. This interest was expressed inter alia in 
Recommendation 412, adopted by the Assembly 
on 4th December 1984, on a report by Mr. 
Blaauw which recommended that the Council: 
" Afford its full support to any initiative 
by the United Nations, by Middle Eastern 
countries or by other countries to restore 
peace between Iran and Iraq and instruct 
its Chairman-in-Office to do all in his 
power to foster such an initiative. " 
Your Rapporteur feels that a further basis is 
Article IX of the treaty, which instructs the 
Council to report to the Assembly on its activ-
ities. 
37. (ii) The two texts specify that it was the 
presidency that took the initiative of convening 
the meeting on 20th August on the basis of 
Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty and 
on the decisions taken in Rome in October 1984. 
Since Article VIII of the modified Brussels 
Treaty concerns solely the activities of the 
Council, it should be deduced that the meeting in 
The Hague was a meeting of the Council, even if 
attended by senior officials from the ministries 
for foreign affairs and defence who were perhaps 
not those who usually take part in Council 
meetings. Your Rapporteur has learned that the 
Secretary-General was indeed present at the 
meeting. He assumes that it was paragraph 3 of 
Article VIII that the Council intended to apply 
on this occasion, i.e. the one which obliges the 
Council to be convened immediately at the 
request of any of its members in order to discuss 
" any situation which may constitute a threat to 
peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, 
or a danger to economic stability". Events in the 
Gulf obviously constitute such a threat and the 
press had announced that Italy and the Federal 
Republic of Germany had called for a meeting of 
the WEU Council on this matter. This is the first 
time the WEU Council has applied this para-
graph of Article VIII, although the Assembly has 
often asked that it be taken more fully into 
account, for instance during the Falklands war. 
38. (iii) The Council's decision to consider 
matters more closely in order to achieve greater 
co-operation is obviously not wholly satisfactory 
since it might have been hoped that it was 
already engaged in such co-operation. It is never-
theless a very positive factor in view of the quite 
187 
DOCUMENT 111 7 
divergent attitudes adopted beforehand by the 
members of WEU towards security in the Gulf, 
the participation of their navies in minesweeping 
operations and protection o( merchant shipping, 
their diplomatic relations or even their trade and 
sales of arms to one or other of the belligerents. 
These divergent attitudes probably explain why 
the Council has not managed to start effective 
co-operation. 
39. (iv) The adoption of guidelines for the 
press at the close of the mee~ing is also a novelty 
since this procedure had hitherto been followed 
only for ministerial meeting~. 
40. The guidelines give a few indications 
about the points on which the seven govern-
ments were able to reach agreement: 
41. (a) There was no doubt about their 
endorsement of Security Council Resolution 598 
calling upon the belligerents to put an immediate 
end to their military operations and to return to 
the status quo ante bellum. Their decision to 
support all efforts, particularly by the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, to put an end to 
the war was less foreseeable since the United 
States has proposed a boycott on Iran if the latter 
fails to comply with this resolution. It is known 
that, while Iraq has agreed • to it, Iran has still 
given no answer, so in all probability the 
question of applying sanctions will arise very 
soon. The decision " to support all efforts aimed 
at bringing the conflict to an end " apparently 
heralds the participation of all the countries in 
the boycott. 
42. (b) The statement that " Europe's vital 
interests require that freedom of navigation in 
the Gulf be assured at all times " justifies the 
measures taken or agreed upon under certain 
conditions by the United Kingdom and France 
for sweeping the mines laid by one of the bellig-
erents in the waters of the Gulf and those taken 
by France to ensure some degree of armed pro-
tection of its merchant ships in the region. It 
announces that the participants " took note " of 
these measures. It does not commit the other 
countries to act in parallel since they merely 
" strongly condemned all actions contrary to that 
principle ", which implies no effective action. 
43. The lOth September 1987 issue of De 
defensa gives useful information about the 
meeting on 20th August. While setting aside the 
proposals for the formation ~fa European mine-
sweeping force, it is reported to have allowed 
better co-ordination of action in the Gulf and to 
have enabled positions to evolve, inter alia by 
inducing Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands to 
take part in minesweeping operations in which 
France and the United Kingdom had already 
decided to take part. While confirming that it 
would not take part, the Federal Republic pro-
posed to assume responsibility in the Mediter-
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ranean for tasks which its partners could no 
longer fulfil because their forces had been sent to 
the Gulf. Finally, the United Kingdom has 
agreed to provide a:ir cover for Netherlands and 
Belgian minesweepers. Italy, however, has laid 
down a number of special conditions relating 
mainly to the length of time its warships will take 
part in minesweeping operations in the Gulf. 
44. Finally, members of the Presidential Com-
mittee were told at their meeting with the 
Council on 27th October that a third meeting on 
the situation in the Gulf was held on 14th 
October when Luxembourg, which has no means 
of taking part in naval operations, took the 
opportunity of stating that it intended to make a 
financial contribution to the minesweeping oper-
ations which now therefore associate in various 
ways all seven WEU countries. No details were 
given to the Presidential Committee about the 
means or extent of co-operation on the spot for 
reasons which can easily be understood. The 
Assembly has received no written communi-
cation on this last meeting. 
45. Obviously the Council cannot expect to 
overcome many of the differences between the 
member countries. Their geography, history and 
specific interests and the means at their disposal 
inevitably make them react in different ways to 
international crises. The role of the Council is 
first to prevent these differences endangering the 
application of the alliance based on Article V of 
the modified Brussels Treaty and then to 
ascertain the convergences that exist to allow 
Europe, speaking through WEU, to place its full 
influence at the service of international peace. 
What is known about the meetings shows that 
for the first time in the history of WEU signif-
icant results were achieved in application of 
Article VIII, paragraph 3, in The Hague on 20th 
August 1987. 
46. At its meeting on 21st September 1987, the 
General Affairs Committee was divided in its 
views on European co-operation in the Gulf. 
Some members strongly deplored the fact that it 
was not WEU that was intervening in the Gulf 
but five separate countries, each acting on its 
own behalf, and that the co-ordination of their 
forces was limited to bilateral agreements, fol-
lowing a British proposal, between the United 
Kingdom and Belgium on the one hand and 
between the United Kingdom and the Nether-
lands on the other for ensuring British air cover 
for Belgian and Netherlands minesweepers. 
Others, on the contrary, noted, with your 
Rapporteur, that while there were no WEU oper-
ations or forces in the Gulf WEU was never-
theless the framework in which the Seven had 
examined the situation in the Gulf. Each coun-
try's possibilities of action had been discussed 
and measures had been taken, admittedly 
national but nevertheless concerted, for 
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harmonised action by all WEU countries to help 
maintain freedom of navigation in international 
waters of the Gulf and neighbouring seas. The 
consultations seemed particularly positive since 
it was the first time, thirty-three years after the 
signing of the Paris Agreements, that Article 
VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels 
Treaty had been applied. 
4 7. Henceforth, co-operation on European 
security will be at the centre of political interest. 
Setting aside all other factors, your Rapporteur 
links this fact with a widespread feeling that the 
process of European integration should not stop 
at security questions. 
IV. WEU and European security 
48. Four initiatives designed to foster detailed 
consideration of the future of Western European 
security marked the end of 1986 and the 
beginning of 1987. First, there was the proposal 
by the Prime Minister of France, Jacques Chirac, 
to the Assembly on 2nd December 1986 to draw 
up a European security charter. On this proposal, 
the Council prepared a '' Platform on European 
security interests " which was adopted and issued 
at the ministerial meeting in The Hague on 27th 
October 1987. 
49. Second, on 3rd June 1987, on a report sub-
mitted by Mr. Ahrens on behalf of the General 
Affairs Committee the Assembly adopted unani-
mously Recommendation 446 asking that the 
Council: 
" Convene as swiftly as practicable a con-
ference of heads of state and of 
government of the signatory countries of 
the modified Brussels Treaty and of coun-
tries effectively determined to take part in 
a European security organisation in the 
context of the Atlantic Alliance in order to 
define jointly security requirements for the 
next ten years and the role to be attributed 
to WEU to this end. " 
Then, in a speech on 19th June 1987, Mr. 
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal 
Republic, proposed the creation of a joint 
Franco-German brigade. Finally, at the close of 
joint Franco-German manreuvres in Germany in 
September 1987, the President of the French 
Republic, Mr. Mitterrand, mentioned a plan 
which had apparently been under consideration 
by the two countries' governments since the early 
summer to set up a Franco-German defence 
council. No details were given on the aim of this 
council, but the French President said firm pro-
posals would be agreed upon in the coming 
months. The Spanish Government immediately 
announced its wish to be associated with current 
Franco-German consideration of defence 
matters. These four proposals directly concern 
WEU although so far neither Chancellor Kohl's 
proposal nor the plan for a Franco-German 
defence council seem to have been submitted to 
it officially. 
50. The Assembly had an opportunity of 
giving its opinion on Mr. Chirac's proposal in 
Recommendation 442, which it adopted in 
Luxembourg on 27th April 1987, also on a report 
submitted by Mr. Ahrens on behalf of the 
General Affairs Committee, and it is clear that 
the two questions are closely linked since it is a 
matter of determining both the terms and the 
conditions for adopting a declaration of prin-
ciples of European security. 
51. When he visited The Hague in June 1987, 
Mr. Alfred Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU, 
suggested that the summit conference proposed 
by the Assembly be held in March 1988 on 
the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the 
signing of the Brussels Treaty. According to the 
Europe Bulletin of 17th June 1987, he said on 
that occasion that changes in relations between 
the United States and its NATO allies made it 
necessary to define a European identity in 
security matters, in the context of course of 
Atlantic solidarity, which would thereby be 
enhanced. 
52. This statement provokes several com-
ments. First, the Secretary-General should be 
congratulated on the speed with which he replied 
- albeit indirectly - to Recommendation 446, 
particularly since the reply is a positive one. He 
was certainly not claiming to give the Council's 
reply to the Assembly, but it may be thought that 
he would not have been so forthright if he had 
not been aware of positive reactions on the part 
of some at least of the governments concerned. 
53. Secondly, emphasis should be laid on the 
reason he gave for this European summit 
meeting, i.e. to try to define a European identity 
in security matters because this had become 
necessary. It may be noted here that this aim cor-
responds almost exactly with that defined by Mr. 
Chirac on 2nd December 1986 and the concern 
expressed by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of Luxembourg, then Chairman-in-Office 
of the Council, on 3rd June 1987, in his speech to 
the Assembly. In accordance with Recommen-
dation 442, most of the seven governments have 
therefore apparently shown that they are pre-
pared, if not to adopt the European security 
charter proposed by Mr. Chirac, at least to agree 
on the principles ofthat security in a joint public 
DOCUMENT 111 7 
only on the eve of the ministerial meeting on 
27th October that the last obstacles to the 
adoption of a joint platform were removed. 
54. Then, while it must be quite clear to 
everyone that the aim of this definition of prin-
ciples of European security is not to weaken but 
to strengthen Atlantic solidartity, everything indi-
cates that the governments are well aware that 
there have been changes in relations between the 
United States and its allies. In determining the 
nature of this evolution, your Rapporteur notes 
several reasons for it: 
55. (a) It is clear that the concerns of 
American public opinion and, to a lesser degree, 
the priorities of United States external policy 
have evolved, particularly in the last six years. 
Greater importance is attributed to an overall 
view of American-Soviet relations, the Pacific 
and Far East questions, the search for peaceful 
solutions to Middle East conflicts, keeping Latin 
America out of East-West debates, the space 
defence of the United States and the nuclear dis-
armament of the two great powers. This reduces 
considerably Europe's place in the way Amer-
icans view their security reqruirements. 
56. (b) When he addressed the Assembly on 
2nd June 1987, the Secretany-General of WEU 
threw useful light on the approach made in Feb-
ruary 1985 by the then Under-Secretary of State, 
Mr. Richard Burt, on the examination of disarm-
ament matters in WEU. While this clarification 
shows that the Assembly was insufficiently 
informed on the subject, it is the Council that is 
to be blamed because it had until then, against all 
the evidence, denied that there had been any 
approach. This being so, the change in the 
American attitude is worth stressing since in 
April 1987 the Secretary of State, Mr. Shultz, 
asked Europeans officially for their opinion on 
the zero-zero option, whereas in February 1985 
American diplomacy was trying to avoid Euro-
peans adopting any public position on the 
current American-Soviet negotiations. The 
United States even awaited the formal agreement 
of the Federal Republic in August 1987 before 
accepting the Soviet request for the dismantling 
of the Pershing missiles deployed in the Federal 
Republic. This evolution may be interpreted as 
an expression of the wish that Europeans assume 
greater responsibility in m~tters which are of 
more special concern to them, particularly the 
conventional defence of their territory. 
document. On lOth September, De defensa 57. (c) Current prospects for the American-
announced that the Secretariat-General had Soviet disarmament negotiations have raised 
handed the Council a report on Europe's stra- questions about the evolution of the American 
tegic interests to serve as a basis for this doe- military presence in Europe in future years. It is 
ument, but it pointed out that one country, Italy, known that this question carries enough weight 
was opposed to the publication of this text, for it to have led to the resignation of General 
which would have deprived Mr. Chirac's pro- Rogers from the post ofSACEUR, which became 
posal of much of its impact. It was apparently effective at the end of June 1987. 
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58. These various factors seem to justify fully 
a search for new dimensions of European 
security that do not stop at the mere reactivation 
of WEU now taking shape but which includes a 
redefinition of the principles and requirements 
of that security which are now becoming evident 
thirty-three years after the Paris Agreements 
defined the bases for this security on practices 
which are now obsolete. In adopting Recommen-
dation 446, the Assembly's aim was probably not 
so much to fix once and for all the way to 
achieve this as to make governments start work 
on this redefinition. The address by the then 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Mr. Poos, on 
3rd June, showed that the Council has under-
stood this perfectly. 
59. But then one may wonder why the Secre-
tary-General has tried to link the holding of a 
European summit meeting with the fortieth anni-
versary of the signing of the Brussels Treaty. To 
lay too much emphasis on celebrating anniver-
saries might give the impression that WEU, 
instead of looking to the future of European 
security, is mainly looking to the past to justify 
its existence. It would be weakening the political 
impact of a European summit meeting to say 
that it was being held to commemorate an event 
and not to achieve something. This is particu-
larly true when the purpose is to celebrate the 
Brussels Treaty, since WEU today has little in 
common with the Western Union of 1948. It 
shares neither the objectives nor the means. In 
particular, it involves no military deployment of 
its own and, up to now, the reactivation of WEU 
has in no way taken such a turn. It was the Paris 
Agreements of 1954, not the Brussels Treaty of 
1948, that founded WEU and this is not without 
practical importance since the answer to the 
question of the date - 1998 or 2004 - with effect 
from which member states are authorised to 
announce a possible denunciation of the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty depends on this. The reacti-
vation of WEU obviously has meaning only if 
the organisation has the assurance that the 
member countries will remain in it for enough 
years. Thus, the end of the transitional period the 
Council fixed for reorganising WEU, the impor-
tance of the problems now raised by Europe's 
security and the changes in relations between the 
United States and its allies seem to be far more 
valid reasons for a European summit meeting 
than the celebration of a treaty which left little 
mark on history. 
60. Finally, Chancellor Kohl's proposal on 
19th June to set up a Franco-German brigade 
most probably responds to concerns not far 
removed from those expressed by Mr. Chirac 
and the WEU Assembly. Although a brigade is 
only a small military unit, this proposal in fact 
raises all the fundamental questions of European 
security. 
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61. (a) This is the responsibility of WEU 
under Protocol No. 11 to the Paris Agreements on 
the forces of Western European Union. This pro-
tocol fixes the maximum level of forces to be 
deployed on the mainland of Europe by member 
countries under the command of SACEUR and 
makes subject to " agreements within the 
organisation of Western European Union, 
having regard to their proper functions and 
needs and to their existing levels " the strength 
and armaments of " the internal defence and 
police forces " of these countries on the 
mainland of Europe. 
62. The question indirectly put by Mr. Kohl's 
proposal was whether the future Franco-German 
brigade was to be placed under the command of 
SACEUR, which would have been a major step 
towards the return of French forces to NATO 
command, or whether, on the contrary, it was to 
be placed under another command. It was in fact 
difficult to propose that a multinational force 
should be considered an " internal defence and 
police force". An answer to this question was 
given on 24th August 1987 by Mr. Giraud, 
French Minister of Defence, in reply to a written 
question put by our colleague, Mr. Koehl. The 
Minister specified that " such a unit, which it is 
agreed would be interoperable with other units of 
the Atlantic Alliance, but which would not be 
placed under NATO integrated military 
command, can represent a step forward in 
marking Franco-German solidarity vis-a-vis 
defence questions ". Hence, it would be a force 
coming under a new category not foreseen in the 
modified Brussels Treaty and whose status 
would still have to be defined. 
63. (b) In the same answer, the French Min-
ister referred to another aspect of the problem 
when he added: "We must now discuss the 
concept for the use ofthis unit. The French Gov-
ernment has pointed out that it considers it 
should not be involved in conventional-type hos-
tilities without the cover of a unit of nuclear 
deterrence. " This wording may be found sur-
prising since it is the first time, as far as your 
Rapporteur knows, that France has officially 
given its nuclear forces a role of covering con-
ventional forces and no longer a pre-strategic 
role. It may also be wondered how the words 
cover and deterrence can be associated. In any 
event, this text raises a vital question: will 
Franco-German defence be nuclear? 
64. (c) Naturally, the question of the 
command of this brigade arises. It might rotate 
between the two countries, but this would mean, 
if the principle of nuclear cover were accepted, 
that a German general might have French 
nuclear weapons at his disposal at tactical 
level. 
65. (d) In July, the Netherlands Government 
announced its intention of participating in this 
brigade. The Italian Government has announced 
a similar position. It is not out of the question 
that other WEU member countries may do 
likewise. This further complicates the matter, not 
only because problems of command and lan-
guage, already difficult to solve for two countries, 
would become almost insoluble, but also because 
of the various attitudes adopted by the WEU 
member countries towards the defence of Europe 
by nuclear means. If this brigade is to exist and 
be enlarged, it would, one way or another, be 
practically the start of a WEU deployment. 
66. These considerations lead your Rappor-
teur to express the keen hope that this matter will 
be placed before the WEU Council very soon 
since in any event this responsibility cannot be 
evaded. We should be grateful to Chancellor 
Kohl for having, by his proposal, made all the 
governments ask themselves firm, practical ques-
tions that are linked with the very concept of 
European defence. 
67. Events have left your Rapporteur just 
enough time to analyse only too briefly the 
platform adopted by the Council on 27th 
October 1987. However, he can pick out a 
number of points of interest not because they are 
new but because the text adopted by the min-
isters gives coherence to a European approach to 
security matters which had not hitherto see~ed 
very continuous in developing " a more cohesive 
European defence identity which wil.l tr~mslate 
more effectively into practice the obhgatwns of 
solidarity to which we are committed throu~ 
the modified Brussels and North Atlantic 
Treaties. " 
68. The motives for this undertaking stem 
from three quite separate considerations. One 
relates to the threat: 
"We have not yet witnessed any lessening 
of the military build-up which the Soviet 
Union has sustained over so many years. 
The geostrategic situation of Western 
Europe makes it particularly vulnerable to 
the superior conventional, chemical and 
nuclear forces of the Warsaw Pact. This is 
the fundamental problem for European 
security. The Warsaw Pact's superior con-
ventional forces and its capability for sur-
prise attack and large-scale offensive 
action are of special concern in this 
context." 
The second relates to the need for a certain 
balance within the Atlantic Alliance: 
" It is our conviction that a more united 
Europe will make a stronger contribution 
to the alliance, to the benefit of western 
security as a whole. This will enhance the 
European role in the alliance and ensure 
the basis for a balanced partnership across 
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the Atlantic. We are resolved to strengthen 
the European pillar of the alliance. " 
The third relates to the governments' concept of 
European union: 
"We recall our commitment to build a 
European union in accordance with the 
single European act, which we all signed as 
members of the European Community. 
We are convinced that the construction of 
an integrated Europe will remain incom-
plete as long as it does not include security 
and defence. 
We see the revitalisation of WEU as an 
important contribution to the broader 
process of European unification. " 
69. The instrument the governments gave 
themselves to meet this goal is the modified 
Brussels Treaty and in particular its Article V. 
This is repeated several times, inter alia in para-
graph Ill (a) 1, which specifies that: 
" ... This pledge, which reflects o~r 
common destiny, reinforces our commit-
ments under the Atlantic Alliance, to 
which we all belong, and which we are 
resolved to preserve. " 
This means that it is through the accession of 
new states to the treaty which " also envisages 
the progressive association of other states 
inspired by the same ideals and animated by the 
like determination " that the enlargement of 
WEU can be envisaged, with all the constraints 
this implies for both present members of WET! 
and the applicant countries. Although the Presi-
dential Committee has been given no text on this 
subject, it would appear t~at the C~~ncil has 
effectively spelled out 1ts conditiOns for 
accession: membership of the European Com-
munity, clear relations with NATO and absence 
of disputes with other member countries. of the 
alliance. This corresponds very largely with the 
views expressed by the Assembly since 1985, as 
does the following provision: 
"Emphasising the vit~l contribution of the 
non-WEU members <llf the alliance to the 
common security and defence, we will 
continue to keep them informed of our 
activities. " 
70. The content of the security policy pursued 
by the Seven is also specified. Its aims are first: 
" ... to prevent any kind of war. It is our 
purpose to preserve our security by main-
taining defence readiness and military 
capabilities adequate to deter aggression 
and intimidation without seeking military 
superiority", 
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then " to foster stability and co-operation in the 
whole of Europe " and, finally, " to promote 
comprehensive co-operation among all partici-
pating states " so as " to do all in our power to 
achieve our ultimate goal of a just and lasting 
peaceful order in Europe ". In order to do this: 
" ... there is no alternative to the western 
strategy for the prevention of war, which 
has ensured peace in freedom for an 
unprecedented period of European history. 
To be credible and effective, the strategy of 
deterrence and defence must continue to 
be based on an adequate mix of appro-
priate nuclear and conventional forces, 
only the nuclear element of which can con-
front a potential aggressor with an unac-
ceptable risk. 
In the conventional field, the forces of the 
WEU member states represent an essential 
part of the alliance. As regards nuclear 
forces, all of which form a part of deter-
rence, the co-operative arrangements that 
certain member states maintain with the 
United States are necessary for the security 
of Europe. The independent forces of 
France and the United Kingdom con-
tribute to overall deterrence and security. " 
This implies: 
(i) the maintenance of American forces 
in Europe while " maintaining 
coupling with the United States and 
ensuring conditions of equal security 
in the alliance as a whole ". This last 
statement seems to stem from the 
decision to develop close consulta-
tions with the United States on the 
pursuit, technical results and strategic 
consequences of President Reagan's 
SDI; 
(ii) the development of conventional 
weapons by all member countries and 
of nuclear weapons by France and the 
United Kingdom; 
(iii) " arms control and disarmament are 
an integral part of western security 
policy and not an alternative to it. 
They should lead to a stable balance 
of forces at the lowest level com-
patible with our security. Arms 
control policy should, like our 
defence policy, take into account the 
specific European security interests in 
an evolving situation. It must be con-
sistent with the maintenance of the 
strategic unity of the alliance and 
should not preclude closer European 
defence co-operation. Arms control 
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agreements have to be effectively ver-
ifiable and stand the test of time. East 
and West have a common interest in 
achieving this "; 
(iv) "the possibilities contained in the 
(Helsinki) final act should be fully 
exploited " thanks to continuing 
action in all negotiations deriving 
from the CSCE. 
71. These parts of the platform include some 
ambiguities, particularly in the juxtaposition of 
the words defence and deterrence and the 
statement that a full part must be played in dis-
armament while at the same time making an 
effort in armaments matters in order to achieve a 
balance with the Warsaw Pact, although it is not 
stated clearly whether it is a balance in Europe 
that is meant or a worldwide balance. It will 
probably be one of WEU's main tasks in future 
to examine these matters in depth and explain 
them satisfactorily. Paragraph Ill (a) 4 of the 
platform contains a real programme for the 
Council, i.e. to: 
" - ensure that our determination to 
defend any member country at its 
borders is made clearly manifest by 
means of appropriate arrangements, 
- improve our consultations and extend 
our co-ordination in defence and 
security matters and examine all prac-
tical steps to this end, 
- make the best possible use of the 
existing institutional mechanisms to 
involve the defence ministers and 
their representatives in the work of 
WEU, 
- see to it that the level of each coun-
try's contribution to the common 
defence adequately reflects its capabil-
ities, 
- aim at a more effective use of existing 
resources, inter alia by expanding 
bilateral and regional military 
co-operation, pursue our efforts to 
maintain in Europe a technologically 
advanced industrial base and intensify 
armaments co-operation, 
- concert our policies on crises outside 
Europe insofar as they may affect our 
security interests. " 
72. In this connection, your Rapporteur 
wishes to underline certain phrases which he 
believes offer useful pointers to the Seven's 
intentions. The first, where it is specified that 
Article V of the treaty implies the defence of any 
member country attacked " at its borders ", 
probably removes some uncertainty about the 
nature of France's commitment since its with-
drawal from the NATO integrated commands. 
The words " the level of each country's contri-
bution " imply a commitment which must be 
respected by each one. The reference to 
"bilateral and regional military co-operation" 
situates, in the framework of WEU, the devel-
opment of relevant Franco-German relations 
and mention of" crises outside Europe " implies 
an undertaking henceforth to apply Article VIII, 
paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty, as 
the Seven are now finally doing in the Gul£ 
Finally, the will to "make the best possible use 
of the existing institutional mechanisms " 
defines the context for the restructuring of 
WEU. 
73. In spite of the few ambiguities reported 
above, the Assembly can but welcome the 
adoption of this platform. Immediately after the 
adoption of the Rome declaration, the commit-
tee's Rapporteur, Mr. Masciadri, prepared a list 
of points in the declaration which the Council 
had drawn from Assembly recommendations. 
The list was a long one. Your Rapporteur has not 
had time to do the same for the Hague platform, 
but he feels that the contents show even clearer 
signs of what the Assembly has been recom-
mending to the Council since 1985. In spite of all 
the shortcomings noted in its relations with the 
Council, the Assembly must therefore clearly 
voice its satisfaction that, for the first time, the 
seven governments have published such a 
coherent declaration on European security. It 
now firmly hopes that these principles will be 
applied in practice in WEU. 
7 4. The adoption of the platform on European 
security interests together with Chancellor 
Kohl's proposal and the governments' reactions 
to it therefore constitute an important item on 
the agenda of the European defence debate. It is 
most desirable for our Assembly to take account 
of this in preparing the consultations advocated 
in Order 68. 
75. Your Rapporteur has also heard reports of 
two criticisms of this order in government 
circles. The first relates to the very principle of a 
meeting of persons outside governments to make 
proposals for the organisation of European 
security, whereas it should be for the govern-
ments to draw up a political programme of this 
kind. This consideration seems somewhat 
unfounded since the colloquy provided for in 
Order 68 seeks to meet the Assembly's concern 
" to play a useful part in preparing a conference 
of European heads of state and of government on 
security " and it is hard to see why the Assembly, 
whose useful role in making proposals and giving 
impetus has been stressed by the Council on 
several occasions and whose exclusive responsi-
bility was recalled in the platform of 27th 
October, should refrain from consulting in turn a 
number of persons who have concentrated their 
thoughts on the subject in question. The 
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Assembly sees this as an opportunity to pursue 
its own work in greater depth and believes this 
initiative is in no way detrimental to the govern-
ments whose political responsibilities necessarily 
limit their freedom of expression but which, on 
27th October, provided a basis for reflection 
which is extremely important for the 
Assembly. 
76. The second concern$ the date of the col-
loquy. Now that the governments have agreed on 
the text of a joint platform on European security 
and taken the necessary decisions for 
reorganising WEU, it may seem pointless to 
convene a colloquy followed by a summit 
meeting in the next few months. This argument 
is not unfounded and may lead the Assembly to 
defer the date of the colloquy that it asked the 
General Affairs Committee to organise. The 
Assembly's Presidential Committee took a 
decision in this sense on 13th October 1987. 
77. However, it is still quite clear that the 
platform of 27th October is far from exhausting 
the questions raised by Europe's security. The 
forthcoming signing of a Soviet-American 
agreement on INF - which the Assembly wel-
comes as much as the Council - will inevitably 
oblige Europe to determine the strategy of deter-
rence and defence it intends to pursue. Holding a 
conference on conventiona~ disarmament in the 
framework defined by the CSCE will oblige it to 
review the means it intends to place at the 
service ofthis strategy. The ,enlargement ofWEU 
will bring it face to face with structural problems 
and make it consider certain questions - in par-
ticular the Mediterranean - in new terms. The 
Council gives itself the duty of having each 
member country make an adequate effort for 
joint defence: the degree of effort is yet to be 
specified. This leaves the Assembly a free hand 
to organise the colloquy at an appropriate time, 
account being taken of the Council's reply to 
Recommendation 446. 
V. Conclusions 
78. The Assembly must obviously regard the 
thirty-second annual report of the Council as 
unsatisfactory because of the date on which it 
was transmitted, its contents and the meagre 
information it gives in regard to the Council's 
political activities. From information received 
unofficially, it would appear that since the Rey-
kjavik meeting the Coundl may have realised 
that there is an urgent need for European consul-
tations and that at last it may have embarked 
upon more promising and perhaps more appar-
ently intelligent activity. The reasons for this 
somewhat more encouraging impression should 
be stressed: 
(a) the declaration made in the States-
General by the Netherlands Gov-
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ernment at the time it took over the 
chairmanship-in-office of the Council 
on 1st July 1987. Inter alia, it 
undertook to meet a number of the 
Assembly's wishes and, in fact, the 
latter was informed of proceedings at 
the meeting on the Gulf held on 20th 
August. It should be recalled that the 
Assembly's principal claims, after the 
maintenance of its independence, 
relate to the information it is given 
and its budget. This declaration was 
confirmed by Her Majesty the Queen 
of the Netherlands in her speech from 
the throne on 15th September 1987. 
For the first time in history, she 
referred to the reactivation of WEU as 
follows: 
" WEU has an important role to 
play in defining the specific 
interests of European security 
within the Atlantic Alliance and in 
harmonising the standpoints on 
that issue. The Netherlands, being 
Chairman-in-Office, will give it 
full support " ; 
(b) the meeting held in The Hague on 20th 
August constituted the first application 
in thirty-three years of Article VIII, 
paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels 
Treaty. It was followed by communica-
tions to the press to which, your 
Rapporteur has noted, there was a 
worldwide response, also for the first 
time. This meeting was followed by 
two others, in September and October, 
and corresponds to what the French 
Minister of Defence, Mr. Giraud, said 
on 16th October 1987: 
" More generally, it is in Euro-
peans' interests to consult each 
other on how to handle crises 
outside Europe. In view of wors-
ening tension in the Middle East 
and the Persian Gulf, there 
would probably be only advan-
tages for the Europeans if they 
compared their analyses, 
exchanged information and 
harmonised their attitudes more 
and better than they manage to 
do at present. WEU seems the 
obvious framework for this " ; 
(c) the most important decisions taken on 
27th October on the restructuring of 
WEU to reduce the number of agencies 
to one under the closer authority of the 
Secretary-General and for it to meet 
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in the same place as the Secretariat-
General, and on the adoption, before 
the end of the year, of a new 
organogram for the WEU ministerial 
organs, demonstrate that the restruc-
turing has been achieved. This 
commits the governments to taking 
action on the Assembly's requests for 
the restructuring of the Office of the 
Clerk; 
(d) the adoption of the platform on 
European security, also on 27th 
October, provides a framework for 
subsequent work by the Council and a 
basis for the enlargement of WEU. 
Your Rapporteur wishes to stress the 
urgency of considering the more or less 
official applications for membership 
submitted so far. 
79. The absence of a Council decision was par-
ticularly scandalous in the case of Portugal, 
which applied for membership first. No reasons 
have been given for shelving this candidature 
although it is hard to see what inconvenience this 
might involve. Spain's intention of taking part in 
a " hard core " of European security is no less 
evident and its request to be associated with 
Franco-German co-operation was announced by 
Mr. Gonzales in September and October after his 
visits to France and Germany. This attitude was 
no doubt brought about by the ill will shown by 
the WEU Council towards Spanish overtures. 
The French Minister of Defence, Mr. Giraud, 
said in his speech on 16th October 1987 that 
" WEU is destined to become a cornerstone of 
European defence. Taking into account the 
defence of Europe's southern flank suggests that 
it should soon be enlarged to include Spain and 
Portugal " and it is hard to see why a country 
should continue to oppose enlargement, even if 
the accession of Greece and Turkey still seems 
impossible in present circumstances, as men-
tioned in the report by Mr. Ahrens already 
quoted. The Council's adoption on 27th October 
of principles of enlargement should allow this 
matter to be solved. On that occasion, the press 
reported that the Danish Government did not 
wish to remain outside WEU if the latter were to 
become the organisation for European security. 
There would certainly be no reason to keep that 
country out if it were prepared to subscribe to the 
Hague platform, including the commitment to 
make an adequate effort for joint defence. 
80. It is therefore in the light of what has been 
undertaken and largely achieved in 1987 rather 
than on the basis of the annual report for 1986 
that your Rapporteur proposes to accept the 
thirty-second annual report of the Council. 
APPENDIX DOCUMENT 111 7 
APPENDIX 
Dates of transmission of annual reports of the Council, 
replies to Assembly recommendations 
and answers to written questions put by parliamentarians 
in the last three years 
(a) Dates on which annual reports reached the Assembly 
Annual report for the year Reached the Office of the Clerk on 
1983 2nd March 1984 
1984 1st March 1985 
1985 20 May 1986 
1986 - First half 24 octobre 1986 
1986 - Second half 24 april 1987 
1987 - First half Not yet received 
on 2nd november 1987 
(b) Recommendations 
Recommendation Adopted Reply received on 
417 21st May 1985 23rd October 1985 
418 21st May 1985 11th October 1985 
419 22nd May 1985 23rd October 1985 
420 22nd May 1985 18th September 1985 
421 22nd May 1985 8th October 1985 
422 22nd May 1985 26th July 1985 
423 23rd May 1985 12th November 1985 
424 24th September 1985 11th October 1985 
425 2nd December 1985 28th May 1986 
426 4th December 1985 17th M¥Ch 1986 
427 3rd December 1985 16th May 1986 
428 4th December 1985 28th May 1986 
429 4th December 1985 13th May 1986 
430 4th December 1985 28th May 1986 
431 5th December 1985 27th May 1986 
432 3rd June 1986 30th October 1986 
433 4th June 1986 20th October 1986 
434 4th June 1986 27th October 1986 
435 5th June 1986 20th October 1986 
436 5th June 1986 20th November 1986 
437 5th June 1986 13th November 1986 
438 2nd December 1986 8th April 1987 
439 2nd December 1986 27th April 1987 
440 3rd December 1986 26th May 1987 
441 4th December 1986 27th April 1987 
442 27th April 1987 22nd September 1987 
443 27th April 1987 21st September 1987 
444 27th April 1987 21st September 1987 
445 28th April 1987 30th October 1987 
446 4th June 1987 24th September 1987 
447 4th June 1987 30th October 1987 
448 4th June 1987 12th October 1987 
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(c) Written questions 
Question Date of question Date of answer 
254 14th January 1985 14th May 1985 
255 5th February 1985 28th March 1985 
256 14th March 1985 Reply refused on 
26th November 1985 
257 26th July 1985 27th September 1985 
258 26th July 1985 27th September 1985 
259 26th July 1985 11th October 1985 
260 26th July 1985 11th October 1985 
261 26th July 1985 28th October 1985 
262 12th December 1985 20th March 1986 
263 8th January 1986 22nd May 1986 
264 26th February 1986 25th April 1986 
265 8th April 1986 30th July 1986 
266 30th April 1986 30th May 1986 
267 30th April 1986 22nd November 1986 
268 30th April 1986 19th June 1986 
269 30th April 1986 30th July 1986 
270 30th June 1986 26th November 1986 
271 15th July 1986 17th November 1986 
272 3rd November 1986 1st December 1986 
273 26th November 1986 21st May 1987 
274 8th April 1987 Not yet received on 
2nd November 1987 
275 27th July 1987 Not yet received on 
2nd November 1987 
276 19th August 1987 22nd October 1987 
277 21st September 1987 Not yet received on 
2nd November 1987 
278 21st September 1987 Not yet received on 
2nd November 1987 
279 30th September 1987 Not yet received on 
2nd November 1987 
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Amendment 1 
Political activities of the Council -
reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENT 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Burger and others 
30th November 1987 
1. Add the following new text at the beginning of paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper: 
"Ensure that the permanent structure ofthe ministerial organs allows the establishment of a unit 
responsible solely for implementing an active policy for informing the public and the press and " 
Signed: Burger, Knight, Chenard, Goerens, Pecriaux, She/ton, Parry, Buchner 
l. See 8th sitting, 1st December 1987 (amendment agreed to). 
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The military use of computers -
towards a joint European defence research programme 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions 2 
by Mr. Fourre, Rapporteur 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the military use of computers -
towards a joint European defence research programme 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering the converging views observed at European level on more active participation in the 
East-West dialogue and any disarmament initiatives; 
(ii) Considering the results of work conducted in the IEPG recalling the interest of a European 
defence market; 
(iiz) Considering that an essential prerequisite for a modem and competitive European defence 
industry is Europe's mastery of the whole range of microelectronics; 
(iv) Considering the conclusions drawn in the report "Towards a stronger Europe", indicating 
Europe's relatively weak position as compared with its main competitors in certain areas of defence 
electronics and specifically microelectronics; 
(v) Considering the close relationship in research and development between military and civilian 
microelectronics; 
(vi) Noting the striking contrast between the repeated public announcements of the WEU member 
countries' determination to take the necessary steps in the European Community to strengthen Europe's 
own technological capability and achieve the creation of a technological community on the one hand 
and the endless bickering leading to an unsatisfactory agreement on a European framework programme 
for 1987-91 on the other hand; 
(viz) Considering that the early harmonisation of national operational requirements and the 
interoperability of the military computer systems are of primordial importance, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Stop making solemn statements on the determination of the WEU member countries to create a 
technological community for as long as their action is turned in the opposite direction, and instead: 
{a) attach higher priority to IEPG co-operative technology projects than has been the case 
hitherto; 
(b) convince member countries of the need to increase the budget for the European framework 
programme and for Esprit in particular; 
(c) pay attention to the risks stemming from the protection of American and Japanese markets 
which calls in question the rules of international trade and threatens Europe's legitimate 
interests; 
{d) make a major effort to harmonise national operational requirements for military computer 
systems; 
2. Initiate a joint European defence research programme associating round the WEU member coun-
tries all the Western European countries wishing to take part. 
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Draft Order 
on the military use of computers -
towards a joint European defence research programme 
The Assembly, 
Convinced that the importance of a well-developed data-processing industry cannot be overesti-
mated, 
INSTRUCTS the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions 
To examine in greater detail ways of protecting markets and civil and military interchange in key 
sectors of technology: 
- by comparing the United States, Japan and the WEU member countries; 
- by proposing suitable solutions for developing a competitive European industry, particularly in 
areas of high technology such as microelectronics. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Fourre, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. In May 1985, the Assembly adopted a rec-
ommendation on the military use of computers 
(Recommendation 419). In the accompanying 
report (Document 1007), it was pointed out that 
military computers have been prime movers for 
the development of civil computer industries. 
Western Europe was lagging behind its main 
competitors, the United States and Japan. For 
that reason the Assembly strongly recommended 
a number of measures to stimulate and improve 
Europe's competitiveness in the field of micro-
electronics for military applications. 
2. The Council, in its reply to Recommen-
dation 419 (communicated on 23rd October 
1985), showed sincere interest in the questions 
raised by the Assembly. Your Rapporteur has 
also ascertained with satisfaction that in the 
Western European countries there is a growing 
awareness of the importance of microelectronics 
as a key element in economic success. Nor can it 
be denied that some co-operative efforts are 
being attempted. 
3. But these efforts are no more than modest. 
Grumbling and almost a year late, in September 
1987 the European Council adopted a framework 
programme for research for the five-year period 
1987-91 with a budget of about 6.48 billion ECU, 
slightly more than the 5.9 billion ECU it was 
willing to spend in 1987 to finance the overpro-
duction of milk. This five-year 6.48 billion ECU, 
or annual 1.3 billion ECU, budget pales into 
insignificance compared with the annual 50 
billion ECU budget which member states are 
spending for national research programmes. 
Technology programmes in the IEPG framework 
obtain even less funding. The efforts of Europe's 
competitors are increasing and are far more 
effective, while Europe itself continues to be split 
up into separate national markets, its individual 
countries often preferring to promote national 
champions. 
4. At the moment, much is being said about 
restructuring and rationalising European arma-
ments production. In the IEPG, ministers of 
defence " expressed their determination to 
develop an action plan for a step by step 
approach towards an open European market for 
defence equipment", as recently as June 1987 at 
their Seville meeting. It is your Rapporteur's 
firm conviction that ministers are not prepared 
to act immediately and firmly to improve Europe's 
semiconductor industry, give a boost to the 
IEPG co-operative technology projects, broaden 
them and establish a common defence tech-
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nology research programme with common 
funding. They would be better advised to 
descend from their heights, cut out much of their 
fine talk, and devote some energy to actively 
developing at least the basic necessities of a truly 
European defence industry. Semiconductors are 
rightly called the crude oil of the twenty-first 
century. Electronics technology will be decisive 
for future defence equipment. 
5. In particular, the WEU member countries 
are well placed to promote a reappraisal of 
Europe's activity in military computing and 
microelectronics. In this report, a brief review 
will be made of the situation in this field, leading 
to a recommendation tailored to WEU's respon-
sibilities. 
11. Developments in military research 
6. In this chapter, some important develop-
ments will be mentioned, but your Rapporteur 
lays no claim to presenting an exhaustive survey. 
Recalling that: 
" The economy of the country of origin 
has a competitive advantage if it can fore-
stall its competitors in the use of more 
sophisticated tools with a better per-
formance. Because of the rapid evolution 
of data-processing and performances, this 
advantage may be decisive, for instance in 
the speeds of progression relating to the 
most advanced scientific research: if 
Europe lags a few months behind the 
United States in introducing new genera-
tions of supercomputers, this may lead to 
a serious shortfall in the ability of 
European research teams to carry out 
certain work 1, 
his intention is rather to make the reader aware 
of the fact that in research gigantic leaps forward 
are being made, particularly in electronics, where 
the United States is very much in the lead, as the 
following examples will show. 
Very-high-speed integrated circuits (VHSIC) 
7. In Document 1007, mention was made of 
the VHSIC programme (paragraphs 79-83), ini-
tiated in 1978 by the United States Department 
of Defence. This initiative started with the will to 
take advantage of trends in the powerful corn-
l. Francis Lorentz, Director-General of the Bull Group: 
L'enjeu informatique. 
' 
mercia1 semiconductor industry. On the other 
hand, the Pentagon was firmly convinced that 
the system development community tended to 
use older proven technology in military devices, 
which in fact required state-of-the art, advanced 
technology. This situation was made particularly 
acute because of the increased efficiency of the 
Soviets to transfer technology to their semicon-
ductor industry and into Soviet military systems. 
Furthermore, there was a reduced interest in 
industry to address specific military require-
ments due to the diminishing role of the military 
on the market place at that time. 
8. Phase 1 was initiated in 1981 and centred 
on reducing the minimum transistor size to 
1.25 micron, 25 MHz clock speeds and a pro-
cessing throughput of 5 x 1011 Gate-Hertzjcm2, 
which means 108 operations per second. Phase 2, 
started in October 1984, was aimed at minimum 
feature size of 0. 5 micron, 100 MHz clock speeds 
and a throughput of 1013 Gate-Hertzjcm2, or 109 
operations per second. This phase is scheduled 
for completion in 1989. Phase 3, running parallel 
with the other two, is a collection of research and 
development efforts in support of the main pro-
gramme. 
9. Of the 28 different types of Phase 
1 microcircuits proposed, 24 have been success-
fully produced. In 1983, the Pentagon launched 
its VHSIC technology insertion programme to 
encourage military services to seek applications 
where the new devices might be retrofitted into 
existing hardware to achieve higher performance, 
greater reliability and reduced size, weight or 
power consumption. Since then, more than 40 of 
these programmes have been funded in areas 
such as guidance and control, communications, 
radar and electronic warfare. The contractors 
have also been encouraged to prepare specifi-
cation sheets that are sufficiently detailed for use 
by systems designers. 
10. It should be mentioned that the companies 
which took part in Phase 1 and were not selected 
for Phase 2 nevertheless continued their research 
and development in VHSIC without government 
funding because they did not want to lag behind 
their competitors. 
11. It is estimated that the United States Gov-
ernment has funded about $500 million in the 
VHSIC programme so far. 
12. To give one example of the situation in 
Europe, mention should be made here of France, 
which has said it is spearheading research in this 
field with its CITGV (circuits integres a tres 
grande vitesse) programme, set up by the defence 
ministry's procurement office (DGA). Here the 
three leading companies Thomson-CSF, 
Electronique Serge Dassault and Matra Harris 
Semiconductors have developed or, in the case 
of Matra, produced a chip with 2 micron devices. 
They are working currently on chips with 1.25, 
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1.2 or 1 micron devices. Matra is hoping to bring 
out its 1 micron device chip in 19892 when the 
Americans will complete their VHSIC Phase 
2 programme with a 0.5 micron device chip. This 
means that even a highly-advanced European 
programme is lagging at least two years 
behind. 
Microwave/millimetre-wave monolithic integrated 
circuits (MIMIC) 
13. This programme was launched by the 
United States Department of Defence in 1986. 
14. The MIMIC programme was set up when 
it was realised that, with advances in signal-
processing speeds made possible by VHSIC tech-
nology, the major bottleneck had become the 
performance, cost and reliability of analogue 
microwave subsystems used in electronic warfare 
and radar systems. 
15. One promising potential advantage of 
MIMIC technology is that it could significantly 
reduce the cost of the analogue portion such as 
the multifunction active-aperture phased-array 
antennas of EW and radar systems by elimi-
nating the expensive, time-consuming adjust-
ments and " tweaking " required when sub-
systems are built using individual components. 
16. This could also lead to reducing the cost of 
the so-called "smart munitions" that use 
millimetre-wave guidance systems. The SDI 
organisation has also shown interest in using 
MIMIC in its spaceborne radar equipment. 
17. The MIMIC programme will focus on the 
use of gallium arsenide (GaAs) integrated cir-
cuits. GaAs technology has been around for 
more than twenty years but it lagged behind 
silicon devices because of the difficulties of 
working with this material. GaAs only made the 
transition from discrete devices to ICs during the 
past ten years, something silicon did thirty years 
ago. 
18. GaAs is inherently about six times faster 
than silicon and offers the potential of reduced 
power requirements and lower thermal dissi-
pation. Furthermore it has a higher maximum 
operating temperature and is said to be resistant 
to radiation. 
19. At the moment GaAs wafers are still 
between 70 and 250 times more expensive than 
the same size silicon wafers, which causes their 
current application exclusively in military 
equipment and in the competition between the 
United States and Japan for the next generation 
of supercomputers, which explains the interest of 
the Pentagon and especially the Defence 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). 
2. Air and Cosmos monthly, May 1987. 
DOCUMENT 1118 
The goals of the MIMIC effort is to have GaAs 
integrated circuits ready for technology insertion 
during the early 1990s. Among the applications 
currently planned are: 
(1) ultra-reliable radar for the United 
States Air Force's advanced tactical 
fighter (A TF); 
(2) airborne shared aperture radar for the 
United States Navy's ATF; 
(3) communications terminals for the 
Milstar satellite network; 
(4) sensor-fused munitions such as the 
Sadarm anti-armour system; 
(5) wideband jammers such as the air-
borne self-protection jammer (ASPJ); 
( 6) anti-radiation missiles, 
Harm and Sidearm; 
including 
(7) precision-guided munitions, such as 
the terminally-guided warhead for the 
multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS). 
DARP A's strategic computing programme 
(United States) 
20. Work on the strategic computing pro-
gramme of the defence advanced research 
projects agency (DARPA) (Document 1007, par-
agraph 78) is steadily advancing. Initially, 
DARPA had chosen three specific applications, 
which were autonomous systems, a pilot's asso-
ciate and a navy battle management system. 
21. The autonomous land vehicle project is 
making progress. Future efforts of this project 
will focus on the reduction of the number of crew 
members on the M-1 main battle tank along with 
increased attention for other tasks such as 
mission planning and doubling the probability of 
a first round hit through a gunner's assistant. 
22. The navy's battle management pro-
gramme using a natural language interface has 
performed its first demonstrations but admit-
tedly is scarcely out of the egg. In addition to this 
original programme, which started in 1983, 
DARPA recently mentioned three new applica-
tions in its second strategic computing pro-
gramme plan, which are: 
- an autonomous smart weapons pro-
gramme; 
- an army air/land battle management 
system; 
- a radar and photo imagery analysis pro-
gramme. 
23. The air/land battle envisages new opera-
tional concepts which emphasise deep strikes 
into enemy territory. These would require com-
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manders to take very rapid decisions on the basis 
of very large amounts of information com~ng 
from airborne and ground-based sensors whtch 
report electronics, signals and imagery intelli-
gence. Here again, more and more important ele-
ments of command and control functions are 
likely to be taken over by automated procedures 
or expert systems (see also paragraphs 43-50). 
24. SDI is clearly thought to be another field 
of application for results of this DARPA research 
programme. The SDI system must react so 
rapidly that it will have to rely almost completely 
on automated systems. 
25. The United States strategic computing 
programme has an annual budget of about $150 
million. 
Supercomputers 
26. In April this year, the first ETA-10 
supercomputer, made by ETA Systems Inc., a 
subsidiary of Control Data Corp., was installed 
at Florida State University. In full operation it 
will theoretically be able to perform 10 billion 
calculations per second, 10 times the current 
limit. In building the ETA-10, extensive use has 
been made of large-scale integration, the even 
more dense packing of circuits on each chip's 
wafer of silicon. 
27. At present, about 200 supercomputers are 
installed in the world, but analysts expect the 
number to increase to about 1 000 in the early 
1990s. 
28. Very powerful supercomputers are used 
for such military purposes as cracking codes and 
designing weapons systems. For this reason 
many United States officials consider t~e~ to b.e 
the most important tool of the future, wtth tmph-
cations for United States national security. It is 
no wonder, therefore, that the same officials are 
very worried about the progress of Japan in the 
supercomputer market. While Japan had no part 
in the world market for supercomputers in 1980, 
it had 40% in 1986. Europe has not yet produced 
any supercomputers. 
29. Among the most advanced super-
computers produced in the United States are 
those manufactured by Cray Research Inc., such 
as the Cray X-MP/416 and the Cray 11. Today, 
100% of the memory capacity of these machines 
is derived from Japanese-manufactured semi-
conductors, and 10% of the logic elements are of 
corresponding origin. As Japanese firms evolve 
from the role of merchant semiconductor manu-
facturers into computer/telecommunications 
system builders, it would not be an illogical stra-
tegic business policy to delay release of the most 
advanced chips to competitors in the systems 
market, including those residing in the United 
States. Even if foreign manufactured chips are to 
be available to United States manufacturers, it 
would appear likely that these chips will be a gen-
eration behind those which foreign semicon-
ductor manufacturers elect to incorporate in 
their own system-level products 3• 
30. Currently, Cray Research Inc. is devel-
oping its next generation supercomputer, Cray 
Ill, which is expected to be available on the 
market in 1990. This supercomputer will be 
based on digital gallium arsenide integrated cir-
cuits. 
31. In September 1987, Cray announced that 
it had stopped its MP project, saying that it grew 
beyond the original vision, both in terms of 
technological risk and budget. The MP 
supercomputer scheduled to be introduced in 
1990 was designed to be four times as powerful 
as Cray's next generation Cray Ill. The MP is a 
parallel processor, which splits up a problem into 
many parts and uses a number of processors 
working simultaneously to come up with a 
solution. 
32. Parallel machines are expected to be 
extremely important in the future, especially 
because they promise much greater performance 
than the classical sequentially operating com-
puters. Actually, DARPA is supporting partially 
the development of the RP 3 parallel processor 
by IBM and New York University which will 
serve as a testbed for various kinds of parallel 
architectures. At the moment, however it is too 
early to predict which kind of parallel archi-
tecture will be dominant or what performance 
levels are likely to be found in future years. So 
far, parallel hardware has always fallen short of 
performance expectations. Here, it should be 
kept in mind that mere processing speed, which 
currently attains astonishingly high figures, is not 
the sole determinant of a computer's per-
formance capabilities. Computer performance is 
also dependent on memory size and the speed 
with which data flow from the computer's 
memory to the computational units inside the 
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machine. Moreover, the development of 
software applicable to the parallel machines will 
require a major effort, if one bears in mind that it 
has taken more than thirty 
1 
years to build up 
today's base of sequential software. 
Software and standard common computer lan-
guage 
33. In Document 1007, a section was devoted 
to software and the Ada and LTR computer lan-
guages. It need not therefore be explained in 
detail that the ability of military computers to 
function in a coherent and timely fashion is 
largely a function of software. In fact, experts 
agree that the rate at which software can be 
developed and deployed will ultimately 
determine the speed with which computer 
systems penetrate and tran$form warfare. An 
ever-larger share of total information system cost 
has to be spent on computer programmes. 
According to the United States Department of 
Defence, half of the purchase cost of an average 
on-board computer for military aircraft is for 
software, while software costs are responsible for 
about 80% of the life-cycle cost of the system. 
34. The United States Department of Defence 
spent $10 billion on software for fiscal year 
1985 alone. In 1990, this sum will already 
amount to $30 billion, which is $90 million a 
day. 
35. Ada, the software language of French 
origin which became Afi1erican national 
standard through the Department of Defence, 
has since been extended to other United States 
Government agencies such as the Federal A vi-
ation Agency and NASA space station project. 
Sales of programmes written in Ada were at 
about $200 000 in 1985, but are expected to rise 
to $1.6 billion in 1988 and to $15 billion in 1991. 
36. Table 1 hereafter 4 pro tides a clear illus-
tration of the expected growth of Ada applica-
tions in the United States. 
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37. Japan, m an effort led by NTT and 
Mitsubishi, is at present engaged in a major 
3. Report of the United States Defence Science Board Task 
Force on Defence Semiconductor Dependency, page 66. 
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software production automation effort, also 
based on Ada. 
4. "Air and Cosmos monthly", September 1987. 
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38. Recently, the European Space Agency 
(ESA) chose Ada for all its big future projects. 
39. Even if Europe was previously well-placed 
in this sector, this situation has changed radi-
cally. The United States is now holding 50% of 
the world market, with a two-thirds share of the 
European market. 
Susceptibility to nuclear explosions 
40. With the increasing high dependency of 
western defence systems on electronics it is not 
without interest to note that within 3 to 
5 nanoseconds a single high-altitude nuclear 
explosion could disable virtually every kind of 
unprotected electronic circuit. Without effective 
countermeasures, the nuclear electromagnetic 
pulse (NEMP) resulting from an explosion of 10 
to 50 megatons at 400 kilometres above the 
ground could render useless every electronic 
device within an over 300 kilometres radius. 
Computer and telecommunications switching 
circuits and volatile semiconductor memories 
would be most vulnerable. Damage to crucial 
weapons control systems could be irreversible 
within the limited time available to respond. 
41. The abovementioned explosion is 
"clean" and creates no shock wave or fallout. 
For this reason, some military strategists regard a 
NEMP attack as non-nuclear, not necessarily 
inviting nuclear retaliation, which further 
increases its probability. 
42. All contracts of the United States and 
Western European departments of defence 
already include specifications for NEMP pro-
tection in all weapons, avionics and communica-
tions systems. 
Ill. Applications of advanced microelectronics 
technology in defence systems 
43. Advanced microelectronics are at present 
used in very many areas. Information technology 
has a place in all defence systems and now offers 
unlimited possibilities. Your Rapporteur wishes 
to present a few significant examples. 
Command, control, communications and intelli-
gence (C3I) 
44. With the present electronic means of data-
processing, military commanders are able to lead 
a battle in real time, without any significant 
delay between discovery of information, 
assembly, transmission, assessment, taking the 
provoked decision and the transmission and 
reception of the ensuing order. This whole new 
complex of events, taking place at practically the 
same time, is designated C3I (command, control, 
communications and intelligence). 
States Department of Defence for the European 
theatre, this real time battle management would 
be performed with the help of many integrated 
systems, among which are mentioned: 
- the 18 Boeing E-3A AWACS aircraft, 
which are able to direct the battle from 
the air within a radius of several hun-
dreds of kilometres with automatic 
data-transmission between aircraft and 
ground through the joint tactical infor-
mation distribution system (JTIDS) 
which interconnects the American 
ground and air forces in Europe; 
- the 42 Boeing JST ARS (joint surveil-
lance and target attack radar system) 
aircraft of the United States army which 
will be the equivalent of AWACS for 
detecting ground movements and will 
also ensure real-time data-transmission. 
Smaller versions of this system will be 
used for interventions in restricted 
areas; 
- the NATO identification system (NIS) 
will automatically distinguish between 
friend and foe aircraft. In 1985, 
agreement was reached within NATO to 
develop this system. This is one of the 
programmes actually funded by the 
1985 Nunn amendment; 
- the position location reporting system 
(PLRS) which should allow each vehicle 
or aircraft equipped with it to be located 
with a precision of 15 to 25 metres; 
- the mobile subscriber equipment 
(MSE), being introduced in 1987, which 
gives the United States army mobile 
integrated communication at army 
corps level, similar to the Franco-
Belgian RIT A system. 
46. It will however not be easy to fulfil this 
C3I system completely, because of the lack of 
software to allow the integration of all these mil-
itary communication systems on a European 
scale. 
4 7. Meanwhile, a number of Western 
European nations have started to introduce or to 
develop their own C3I system. According to a 
long-standing and much cherished European tra-
dition, all these systems are different. Among 
others there are Heros for West German forces, 
Wavell/Ptarmigan for the British, Catrin and its 
subsystems for the Italian and Sacra for the 
French. 
48. In 1989, French, West German, United 
Kingdom and United States army staff cells will 
make an attempt to intemperate their C3I 
systems, of which only one will by then be fully 
45. According to an extensive manreuvre fielded at the tactical level. Success in this 
control system (MCS) designed by the United interoperation attempt might be a first step to 
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achieve a NATO battlefield information col-
lection and exploitation system (BICES), which 
aims at improvements in the collection, fusion 
and dissemination of intelligence information by 
the interconnection of all national and NATO 
systems already fielded, under development or 
planned. 
49. BICES was accepted in June 1986 by the 
NATO tri-service group as an outline NATO 
staff target and now is a programme under the 
provisions of the 1985 Nunn amendment. 
50. The goals set for BICES are initial opera-
tional capability by 1992 and full operational 
capability by the year 2000. 
51. The budget involved in C3I is rising 
sharply over the years and should not be under-
estimated. The United States Department of 
Defence is planning to spend approximately 
$150 billion during the five-year period 1986-90, 
an 80% increase compared to the $83 billion it 
spent during the years 1981-85. 
Guidance of weapons systems 
52. An excellent example of the use of com-
puters and other advanced technology is a 
highly-sophisticated guidance system for 
stand-off tactical missiles which should allow 
pilots to attack a ground target without having it 
in sight. This new system combining holography 
and optical computing is currently being 
developed by the United States Air Force 
armament division together with private com-
panies. In an operational system, a holographic 
or three-dimensional image will be stored in the 
missile and the seeker will use an optical com-
puter to compare the image with what it is 
receiving from the missile's active sensors. Holo-
grams are three-dimensional images created by 
using a laser to split the original image and 
recombine it. 
53. In an optical computer, light is used 
instead of wires to transmit the information. 
Because light can cross itself without shorting 
out, the optical computer can process the entire 
image in a very small space, which means it can 
fit into a missile. 
54. The holographic images in this case are 
created from infrared images, using standard 
images and backgrounds which are selected from 
a data base and extensively processed by com-
puter. 
55. A final day and night operational system 
could be ready for deployment around 1995. 
Automatic target recognition 
56. Image-processing technology, which com-
bines microchips resulting from the VHSIC pro-
gramme with a computer architecture called 
parallel-processing, is now being used to develop 
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important new tactical capabilities for pin-
pointing and destroying targets. This system is 
called automatic target recognition (ATR). 
57. Martin Marietta, one of the companies 
involved in the A TR development, is making 
use of geometric arithmetic parallel processors 
(GAPP) to analyse images provided by electro-
optical sensors. Because GAfPs can be intercon-
nected and are able to process data in parallel -
unlike conventional computers which process 
data serially - there is an unprecedented progress 
in speed. Martin Marietta is developing a mini-
ature computer of a 10 x 10 x 6 inch size which 
will be able to perform more than 400 billion 
operations per second when equipped with 
GAPPs. It is said that while a human pilot takes 
12 seconds for target recognition under 
favourable conditions, an A TR system could do 
it in 0.03 to 0.1 seconds under any conditions. 
Logistics, supply, planning and maintenance of 
weapons systems 
58. In this field again, a Pentagon initiative, 
the computer-aided logistic support project, is a 
framework for a series of innovative pro-
grammes where computers are the main tool to 
help the armed forces meet their requirements 
for the future. Among these programmes should 
be cited here: the integrated maintenance infor-
mation system (IMIS). In wa:rttime, several types 
of aircraft may be operating from one forward air 
base, while not enough manpower is available to 
provide a specialist for each type of aircraft. The 
same ground crew should therefore be capable to 
repair different types of aircraft. With IMIS it 
should be possible to condense diagnostic and 
repair instruction manuals in~o a mobile, auto-
mated computer display about the size of a 
briefcase which can be used by maintenance per-
sonnel working on the flight line at austere air-
fields. The mechanic will be able to plug the 
computer into the aircraft to diagnose the 
problem, learn the best way to repair it and 
receive a list of the necessary parts involved. By 
feeding directly off the ¥rcraft's databus 
network, the computer can use the aircraft's own 
sensors and computer as well as its own diag-
nostic capabilities to locate problems. 
59. Another programme is aiming at the cre-
ation of a data base of the logistics experience 
gained from previous wars and experience in 
simulated wartime situations. By putting these 
facts together, the armed servide involved should 
be able to predict what might occur and then 
have the right thing in the right place at the right 
time. 
60. The last of these programmes to be men-
tioned here is project crew chief, in which com-
puter specialists are working with field techni-
cians to help engineers design equipment with 
maintenance features in mind. 
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61. The way so-called artificial intelligence can 
be used to help improve battle management is 
clearly demonstrated in the following example: 
For its air/land battle management doctrine, the 
United States Army would like to have a system 
which can automate planning of the manreuvre 
control functions at corps and division levels, 
and do the same for artillery fire control 
planning at the corps level. 
62. Eventually, it is hoped to see artificial 
intelligence applied to planning all the army's 
air/land battle functions on all staff levels. This 
will enable commanders to act far more quickly 
by slashing the time necessary for preparing and 
distributing operations orders. This would 
encompass the corps, division, brigade and bat-
talion levels, all of which have staffs to do 
advance planning and the five functions that the 
army considers crucial to air/land battle man-
agement doctrine: 
- manreuvre control; 
- artillery fire control; 
- air defence; 
- intelligence electronic warfare and com-
bat service or logistical support. 
63. At present, it can take twelve hours to plan 
an engagement at the corps level and six at a 
division, while a company or battery may have 
only forty-five minutes to prepare. One reason it 
takes so long is that information arteries are 
clogged. More than 500 messages and sensor 
reports per hour flood into each command staff 
section during intense engagement and fewer 
than 20% can be fully processed. An artificial 
intelligence system could be developed to 
process this information. 
Integrated electronic warfare system 
64. A very important field of application for 
both VHSIC and MIMIC technology will be the 
integrated electronic warfare system (INEWS). 
65. The United States Air Force and Navy 
have both started developing new tactical 
fighters, known respectively as the advanced tac-
tical fighter (ATF) and the advanced tactical air-
craft (AT A). At the moment, Lockheed and 
Northrop are competing for the ATF order, 
while NorthropjGrumman and McDonnell 
Douglas/General Dynamics teams are competing 
for the AT A order. 
66. With a view to providing an efficient elec-
tronic warfare system for these future tactical 
fighters, both services have started the INEWS 
programme. 
67. INEWS should include several functions 
previously performed by separate systems or not 
performed at all: 
- radar/threat warning (also locating and 
identifying enemy aircraft); 
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- missile detection and warning; 
- jamming of enemy communications 
and data links; 
- laser radiation detection and warning; 
- jamming against anti-aircraft missiles; 
- navigation and identification communi-
cations; 
- infrared signals searching and tracking. 
68. MIMIC technology is expected to yield 
very significant cost reductions in the technology 
needed for expendable or semi-expendable active 
decoys, the latter being towed behind an aircraft 
to attract radar-guided anti-aircraft missiles. 
69. MIMIC should accelerate the devel-
opment of active aperture phased array radars 
for EW applications. Application ofVHSIC tech-
nology has already shown that it can provide 
significant volumetric savings in jamming pods, 
thus making room to add capabilities to such 
systems to meet new threats. Moreover it offers 
significantly greater reliability for the system. 
70. At present it is not yet quite clear whether 
the INEWS programme will meet its goal of pro-
duction by mid-1993. In the short term, 
however, experts foresee great opportunities in 
using the results of VHSIC and MIMIC pro-
grammes in the INEWS development to upgrade 
existing EW systems. 
71. In June 1986, two teams were selected 
from the five contenders in Phase lA of the pro-
gramme. These teams, Sanders Associates/General 
Electric and TRWjWestinghouse, each received 
a contract of $48.3 million for Phase lB. It is 
thought that each of these teams is investing 
another $48.3 million in the programme. Phase 
lB should end by late 1989 when the winner 
should begin full-scale development. 
IV. Europe's defence electronics 
industry, a sector under threat 
72. Given the often publicly confessed deter-
mination of governments and politicians at all 
levels to stimulate arms co-operation, restructure 
the market and maybe even the industry for 
defence equipment, it is not surprising that this 
subject is often examined in the media. 
73. There is one outstanding report, however, 
which provides a fairly accurate and reliable, 
sometimes even ruthless, assessment of the capa-
bilities of the European defence industry. This 
report, "Towards a stronger Europe", was 
written by the European Defence Industry Study 
Team (hence the name EDIS report) by order of 
the Defence Ministers of the Independent 
European Programme Group (IEPG) and pre-
sented to them m December 1986. An 
assessment of the technological threat facing 
Europe's defence industry is made in enclosure 
3 of volume 2 of the EDIS report, a special study 
by General Technology Systems Ltd .. In para-
graphs 73 to 91, your Rapporteur will rely on the 
findings of this study. 
74. The EDIS report has made it clear that 
Europe's defence industry is performing very 
well in practically all sectors of equipment except 
in electronics, guided missiles and materials. 
Unfortunately enough, these are key sectors for 
many if not all future developments of defence 
equipment. 
Electronics 
75. There is a European lag in microelec-
tronics, particularly in high-speed very large-
scale integration (VLSI) systems, in some aspects 
of advanced optoelectronics and in the har-
nessing of computer software and hardware to 
systems. 
76. This is a fast-developing and intensely 
competitive sector of both civil and military 
industries with the same basic technology but 
different applications. There is a major threat to 
European electronics industries given the rapid 
pace of development and the speed with which 
the United States and Japan can move from 
development to marketable systems. Even the 
survival of this sector of European industry 
could be at stake if no appropriate measures are 
taken. 
77. Electronics is an essential enabling tech-
nology which pervades all modern defence 
weapon and operational systems. Its prime man-
ifestation is in the collection, transfer and pro-
cessing of information. Advances in electronics 
technology and its closely-related field of infor-
mation technology (IT) have had the greatest 
impact of all technological advances on the 
nature of warfare in modern times. Countermea-
sures to the transfer of information give rise to 
the rapidly-growing field of electronic warfare. 
The integration of the gathering of information, 
its processing, the formulation of required action 
and its communication to field units, etc., all 
through electronics based means, give rise to the 
C 3I (command, control, communication, intelli-
gence) concepts of the prosecution of warfare. 
Microelectronics 
78. This underlying circuit and component 
technology provides the capability for handling 
large quantities of information and the prose-
cution of electronic processes within a very small 
physical space and with the consumption of very 
small quantities of electrical energy per oper-
ation. The inherent small-scale geometry of such 
multi-circuit components also allows speeds of 
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operation not possible with previous discrete 
component assemblies. Microelectronics has not 
only reduced size, weight and power require-
ments but also made possible advances in all 
aspects of electronics applications not previously 
feasible. Though microelectronics is largely con-
cerned with multiple circuits on single " chips " 
(of silicon or GaAs for example) for digital or 
analogue processing operations, the topic is 
allied to optoelectronic deviaes such as lasers for 
launching signals along fibre-optic transmission 
lines, detector arrays, phase splitters, etc. and 
millimetric circuits. 
Digital computers 
79. These are a ubiquitous element of most 
modern electronic-based military systems, 
including navigation, weapon aiming, missile 
guidance, communications, for data-processing 
on all weapon platforms, in semi-autonomous or 
autonomous weapons, image-processing and 
recognition, expert systems, artificial intelligence 
applications, robotics, etc. 
Systems integration 
80. To perform their military functions, elec-
tronic (and other) equipments have to be linked 
together as overall, fully-integrated systems. The 
construction of a system occurs at several dif-
ferent levels. For example, in an aircraft, the avi-
onics including navigation, weapon aiming, 
weapon management, flight instruments, 
autopilot, A-1 radar, optoelectronic sensors, radar 
warning receiver displays, communications, etc., 
may all be linked together by a digital databus. 
Similar systems, but of greater complexity 
because of the wider range of weapons and 
sensors, are integrated as A-1 0 systems on 
surface warships and submarines. At a higher 
level, an area air defence system requires the 
linking of surveillance radars, ground-based 
missile systems, air interceptors and central 
control stations. Systems architecture design and 
the reliability of the resulting software are criti-
cally important to the sucdessful operation of 
such systems at all levels of complexity. 
81. The EDIS report concludes that even ifthe 
IEPG member states, both individually and col-
lectively, are aware of the importance of elec-
tronics as a key element in eaonomic success and 
both national and industrial'research and devel-
opment investment in Europe in this field is 
high, many still consider it to be inadequate to 
meet the challenge of its competitors. 
82. It further identified some areas in the elec-
tronics field where Europe has a particularly 
weak performance. Europe is lagging in the 
development of advanced ' high-speed multi-
current chips and application specific integrated 
circuits (ASIC) for military use. 
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83. Europe is said to be ahead of its compet-
itors in battlefield communications systems but 
there is doubt whether it can match United 
States competence in large-scale strategic systems 
of the class of the joint tactical information dis-
tribution system (JTIDS) as deployed with the 
Boeing E-3A AWACS aircraft. 
84. In software and systems architecture, 
though Europe has developed considerable 
expertise, there is a need to build up a sounder 
base in large scale systematisation and adoption 
of common standards. 
85. In general, there still remains a depen-
dence upon United States sources for certain 
electronic components required for incorpo-
ration in indigenous European designs which can 
inhibit their sales to third countries. 
86. The digital computation field is also iden-
tified as an important European weakness. 
Otherwise competitive equipments and systems 
design are not always adequately supported by 
their dedicated computational capability. 
87. For the future, the competitive threat from 
the United States in the field may be expected to 
increase, as advances in information technology, 
high-speed digital devices (the United States 
VHSIC programmes, for example, and GaAs 
technology) have an impact on new products and 
systems. 
Guided weapons 
88. For obvious reasons, the development of 
guided weapons is largely dependant on new 
developments in microelectronics, radar, opto-
electronics, millimetric wave techniques and 
image and signal processing. Especially the new 
generation of smart weapons, a fire and forget 
category will, among other things, require 
complex computational capability in a very 
small space. As a result of its greater funding, the 
United States certainly has a technological lead, 
particularly in sensors and computation capa-
bility for the new generation of smart guided 
weapons. 
89. The EDIS report concluded that, though 
Europe has a good technology base in practically 
all techniques required, the massive United 
States effort on these topics could have severe 
implications for the future competitiveness of 
European technology in weapon system guidance 
- the key to weapon effectiveness. The present 
and future European position is weakened not 
only by the impact of new technological 
advances in the electronics-based fields but also 
by the fragmentation of effort arising from the 
development and production of internally, 
directly competitive weapon sytems. 
90. The ability of the United States, as a 
nationally-integrated defence entity, to concen-
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trate on a relatively limited number of types, 
compared with the competitive diversity of types 
produced by individual European countries, is a 
significant advantage enjoyed by the United 
States. 
91. At this moment, there are some examples 
of successful European co-operation in this field, 
such as the HOT anti-tank missile and the 
Roland surface-to-air missile, both by the 
Franco-German firm Euromissile. On the other 
hand, it remains to be seen if the complementary 
United States-European development of the 
AMRAAM (advanced medium-range air-to-air 
missile) and ASRAAM (advanced short-range 
air-to-air missile) missiles will fulfil expectations. 
At present, the ASRAAM, being developed as a 
European joint venture, is said to be about five 
years behind the United States AMRAAM time-
table. 
Materials technology 
92. Materials technology finds application 
across all defence equipment sectors. It should be 
noted that the present wave of advances in elec-
tronics is almost wholly dependent on materials 
technology, primarily in the area of semicon-
ductor materials such as silicon, gallium 
arsenide, III-V alloys, etc. In Europe, several suc-
cessful research programmes in this field have 
been conducted, which made it approach the 
United States lead. On the other hand, Europe is 
lagging in much of the manufacturing technology 
associated with the exploitation of the properties 
of these materials. 
V. The semiconductor industry 
93. In the introduction to this report, semi-
conductors have already been referred to as the 
crude oil of the twenty-first century. A rapid 
examination of technical developments in recent 
years is convincing proof of this: 
- 1947: Transistor effect - starting point 
of a gigantic technological revolution; 
- 1950-60: Industrialisation of this 
invention and start of the industrial 
informatics era; 
- 1960-70: Industrialisation of integrated 
circuits. Intelligence reserved for large 
systems; 
- 1970-80: Birth of large-scale integration 
(LSI). Microprocessors. Each transistor 
is measured in microns; 
- Today: Very-large-scale integration 
(VLSI) and very-high-scale integrated 
circuits (VHSIC); 
- Tomorrow: Volumetric integration. 
Bioe1ectronics. 
Indeed they are the crude oil of modern industry, 
providing the building blocks for developments 
in new electronic components, the replacement 
of out-of-date devices and at the same time 
inducing the growth of new electronic-based 
industries. Semiconductors are the main gene-
rators of product innovation and development. 
This has been the main reason for many govern-
ments to have stressed the need to assist in the 
development of a local industry, based in par-
ticular on the premise that technical ability in 
semiconductor production and innovation 
ability in the industry are necessary in order to 
be at the leading edge of potential downstream 
growth industries which are semiconductor 
intensive. Unfortunately enough, European gov-
ernments have been very late in realising this. 
94. The following table 5 provides a revealing 
picture of the developme~t of the. relati.ve 
position of Western Europe m companson With 
the United States and Japan regarding the world 
production of integrated circuits: 
Shares in world production 
of integrated circuits 
(percentages) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
us ........... 68.2 68.8 73.3 71.6 69.5 67.8 
Western Europe 6.7 6.2 5.8 6.3 5.9 5.6 
Japan ......... 17.8 18.0 19.8 20.7 23.4 25.4 
TOTAL ........ 92.7 93.0 98.9 98.6 98.8 98.8 
1984 1985 
66.9 66.8 
5.4 5.1 
26.4 26.7 
98.7 98.6 
95. Figures in this table are calculated on the 
concept of the home base of the producing firms. 
The trends shown in this table, where the 1983 to 
1985 figures are estimates, have not improved 
for Europe since then. According to the February 
1987 report of the United States Defence Science 
Board Task Force on defence semiconductor 
dependency, figures are much worse for the 
United States share in the worldwide semicon-
ductor market. The report says that the United 
States share dropped from 67% in 1975 to 50% in 
1986 while Japan went from 25% in 1975 to 39% 
in 1986. The Japanese gain was at the expense of 
both European and United States 
semiconductor-chip-only producers. With a 
share of 5.9% of world integrated circuit pro-
duction in 1982, Western Europe's share in 
world integrated circuits consumption was 20%. 
The share of Western Europe in the world's 
semiconductor production was 12.3% in 
1978 and 8.5% in 1982. 
96. The next table 6 gives a development of the 
world top list of semiconductor industries (by 
5. Source: The semiconductor industry, trade-related issues, 
OECD 1985. 
6. Source: Report of the United States Defence Science 
Board Task Force on Defence Semiconductor Dependency. 
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sales volume), with the figure for 1986 based 
upon industry estimates. 
World top list of semiconductor producers 
1975 1980 1986 (est.) 
Texas Texas NEC J 
Instruments USA Instruments USA Hitachi J 
Fairchild USA Motorola USA Toshiba J 
National USA Philips NL Texas 
Motorola USA NEC J Instruments USA 
Philips NL National USA Motorola USA 
Intel USA Toshiba J Fujitsu J 
Hitachi J Philips NL 
Intel USA Intel USA 
Fairchild USA Matsushita J 
Siemens FRG National USA 
97. The situation in the European semicon-
ductor industry is paradoxical, because,. as so 
often parochial considerations yet agam are 
' . . 
stronger than the urge for mtegratwn. 
98. Instead of offering the industry a large and 
unified market to achieve the scale needed for 
high-volume production which is considered. a 
key to leadership in this sector, the market has m 
practice become regionalised. This was mainly a 
consequence of national policy efforts,. concerned 
to build up a broadly-based semiconductor 
industry. In the meantime, high common 
external tarifs at European Community level and 
national policies to foster domestic industries 
and reduce the technological gap between 
European producers and the United States ~nd 
Japan led to the installation in Europe ?\foreign, 
mainly United States, producers or JOint ven-
tures. 
99. European producers have extensive ties 
with United States and Japanese semiconductor 
producers mainly to obtain access to their output 
and process technology and to widen their 
product base. For too long there has been. an 
evident lack of close inter~firm co-operatiOn 
between European firms which will likely retard 
the growth of a locally-based European semicon-
ductor industry. 
100. Agreements between E111ropean firms and 
their United States and Ja~anese partners to 
allow European firms to remain or become 
serious competitors can onl~ be considered a 
stopgap and one of many factors in he.li?ing the 
reinforcement of internation~l competitiveness. 
The European industry has a weak record for the 
exploitation of innovations, particularly in 
standard products. 
101. Europe as a whole, admittedly, has not 
given up. The European Community has set up 
the Esprit programme and a number of related 
programmes. These programmes will be dis-
cussed in Chapters VI and VII. 
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102. In the meantime, the European semicon-
ductor industry has not been idle. In April 1987, 
Thomson-CSF of France and STET, the Italian 
state telecommunications enterprise, announced 
that they would form a joint venture between 
their civilian semiconductor divisions Thomson 
Semi-conducteurs and SGS Microelettronica. 
This joint venture would be the second largest 
Western European manufacturer of semicon-
ductors with expected sales of more than $800 
million and 3.2% of the world market. First in 
Western Europe is Philips-Signetics with a sale of 
$1.36 billion in 1986. 
103. Siemens AG of West Germany recently 
unveiled samples of a four-million-bit memory 
chip which it is developing together with Philips 
NV of the Netherlands. 
104. Even so, these efforts have not been 
enough by far to ensure a confortable position 
for the European semi-conductor industry well 
into the next century. In September 1987, the 
EECA (European Electronic Component Manu-
facturers' Association) published a white paper 
calling for action by the European Communities 
with "well-directed policies, in the creation of 
unified European home markets and in the 
starting of projects that lead to new manufac-
turing technologies and products". 
105. Among other things it asked more specifi-
cally for a concentrated research and devel-
opment effort that is selectively deployed and 
effectively subsidised, quoting Esprit, Eureka 
and Race as examples. It thought rigorous mea-
sures were needed not only because the market 
for integrated circuits is growing and has a prom-
ising future but also because the market position 
of the major competitors is not yet established. 
Furthermore, it pointed out that the Far East is 
clearly aiming at the conquest of overseas 
markets with huge new production facilities 
which could lead to world-wide overcapacity, 
while the United States is gradually leaning 
towards protectionism. 
106. The EECA recognised that the European 
integrated circuit industry receives substantial 
government support, but says that this support is 
much less effective than in the United States or 
Japan for two main reasons. The first is that 
" too many small sums are spread over too many 
small projects and over too many countries. And 
they are, further, unevenly distributed. For 
example, support in the United Kingdom is less 
than one third of that in Germany and France". 
The other is that " it is mainly research projects 
that are subsidised and only recently has the 
need for support that leads to manufacturing 
technologies and manufacturable products been 
recognised ". 
107. On two recent occasions, events in the 
United States semiconductor business have 
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caused the greatest concern in the Pentagon. The 
first time was when in 1986 the Japanese com-
puter giant Fujitsu Ltd. announced that it was 
planning to take over Fairchild Semiconductor 
Corp. in California. Fairchild, a pioneer in the 
chip industry, is particularly known for emitter-
coupled logic chips, a special type of semicon-
ductor which is widely used in large mainframes 
and supercomputers. The Reagan administration 
at that time also expressed its determination to 
ensure that the United States electronics 
industry, particularly makers of leading-edge 
technology, vital for the military world, would 
not become dependent on Japanese-owned semi-
conductor manufacturers 7• At the same time, it 
showed annoyance with the outcome of an 
agreement between the United States and Japan 
in July 1986 regarding trade in semiconductors. 
This five-year accord called for both govern-
ments to set up a price-monitoring system to 
prevent Japanese manufacturers from dumping 
their chips on the United States market. It also 
required the Japanese Government to make 
efforts to give United States microchips wider 
access to the Japanese market. In February 1987, 
American manufacturers charged that their Jap-
anese counterparts were wilfully subverting the 
agreement. In retaliation, the United States 
imposed 100% tariffs on some Japanese elec-
tronics, which incidentally after a few months 
were cancelled again. 
108. Great concern was also expressed on the 
second occasion by big computer manufacturers 
in the United States, while the Pentagon and the 
CIA warned against threats to national security 
when, at the end of 1968, GCA Corp. was in 
heavy financial trouble. GCA Corp. is among the 
last American makers of " wafer steppers ", 
which are essential machines for a semicon-
ductor production line. These machines are 
optical devices which expose the pattern of cir-
cuitry on silicon chips, aligning each layer of 
gates and transistors within a hundred thou-
sandth of an inch. 
109. Many of its customers said that GCA had 
lost tremendous ground to Nikon Inc., Canon 
Inc., and the ASM division of Philips NV, 
implying that the centre of development of state-
of-the art technology for making semiconductors 
is no longer in the United States. 
110. In a recent CIA report it was concluded 
that without such technology, United States 
companies could face extraordinary difficulty in 
designing submicron circuits - those in which 
the lines of circuitry are less than 25 thousandths 
of an inch wide. Achieving such submicron 
scales is considered critical to the design of 4 and 
7. As a result of government and private industry efforts, 
Fairchild Semiconductor Corp. was sold by its owner 
Schlumberger Ltd. to National Semiconductor in October 
1987. 
16-megabit memory chips and complex micro-
processors. 
111. In February 1987, the United States 
Defence Science Board Task Force on semicon-
ductor dependency released a report which con-
cluded that the United States was rapidly losing 
manufacturing capability in integrated circuits. It 
viewed the growing dependence on foreign 
sources of semiconductors as a national problem 
of concern to both the Defence Department and 
the economy of the whole nation. 
112. The report also provided a comparison of 
American and Japanese chip technologies. Japan 
was found ahead in all types of memory chips, 
which store and retrieve data, and gaining 
quickly in the American strongholds of micro-
processors and other logic chips, which perform 
calculations and execute programmes. Fur-
thermore it found that Japan held a lead in 
gallium arsenide technology, increasingly used 
by the defence industry instead of silicon chips 
for optical sensors and high-speed semicon-
ductors. 
113. The report established slim American 
leads in several processing technologies and 
computer-aided engineering, critical to chip 
design, although the Japanese led in packaging 
and testing of semiconductors. In general, the 
report stated that the United States chip tech-
nology was steadily deteriorating relative to the 
technology in Japan. 
114. The Defence Science Board Task Force 
called the difference in industrial practices and 
structure between the United States and Japan 
the major reason for the relative inadequacy of 
technology development in both countries. From 
1970 through 1985, Japanese companies 
invested 35% of sales in plant and equipment 
compared with 20% for United States com-
panies. In research and development the ratio 
was 13% to 10%. 
115. According to the Japan Electronics 
Industry Association, Japan's semiconductor 
imports from the United States in 1985 totalled 
$63 million against exports of $169.3 million. 
Japan has captured more than one-third of the 
world market for semiconductors. Capital 
investment by the top nine Japanese semicon-
ductor manufacturers totalled $2.5 billion in 
1984. 
116. For the development of basic technology, 
Japan organised co-operative arrangements 
avoiding duplication, many of them under the 
co-ordinating leadership of the Ministry oflnter-
national Trade and Industry (MITI) or Nippon 
Telephone and Telegraph (NTT). In the appli-
cation of the resulting technology to products, 
the companies compete again. It should be noted 
that this Japanese system is not unlike the 
European Esprit system. Japan, however, unlike 
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Europe, does not have to count with the cher-
ished but expensive European hobbies such as 
nationalistic rivalries, a segrqgated international 
market and duplication or even multiplication of 
research. 
11 7. The Defence Science Board called for the 
creation of a government-ind¥stry consortium to 
focus on advanced manufacturing techniques in 
order to restore the United States edge in semi-
conductor technology. This consortium should 
be formed by private semicol.1lductor companies, 
capitalised with about $2501 million and sup-
ported by $200 million per year in Defence 
Department contracts. 
118. Also in February 1987, the largest United 
States manufacturers of computer chips and 
semiconductor manufacturing equipment agreed 
to create a company, Sematech, aimed at 
improving domestic competitiveness to overturn 
Japanese domination in this lkey industry. 
119. Sematech (Semiconductor manufacturing 
technology consortium) has three specific tasks: 
to conduct research and development on 
advanced semiconductor manufacturing tech-
niques, to test and demonstrate these techniques 
on a pilot production line and to adapt those 
techniques to the manufacturing of a wide 
variety of products. At this time, a six-year pro-
gramme is envisaged starting in late 1987 and 
ultimately aimed at developing manufacturing 
technology for feature sizes of0.35 micron with a 
total budget of$1.5 billion. For the $250 million 
annual budget, funding is sought from the 
federal, state and local governments and from 
the participating private companies. The United 
States Senate has already voted $125 million rep-
resenting the Federal Government share for 
1988 and 1989. 
VI. National and regional policies 
Europe 
120. Well aware of the technological threat, 
Europe has started a wide variety of programmes 
on virtually all levels of co-operation to face it. 
In this section of the report, an attempt will be 
made to provide a survey of these pro-
grammes. 
The European Community 
121. To meet the technological challenge on the 
world market, the European Community has 
established a " framework prqgramme " for pre-
competitive research in a number of important 
areas. Of special interest for the subject under 
consideration are Esprit (European strategic pro-
gramme for research in information technol-
ogies) and Race (Research and development in 
advanced communications technologies in 
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Europe), even if they are both of a purely civilian 
nature. 
Esprit 
122. On 28th February 1984, the European 
Council adopted the first phase of the Esprit pro-
gramme, a strategic programme designed to give 
the Community a fundamental technological 
basis. The programme was conceived for a 
ten-year period with three main objectives: 
- to provide the European information 
technology industry with the basic tech-
nologies it needs to meet the compet-
itive requirements of the nineties; 
- to promote European industrial 
co-operation in information tech-
nology; 
- to contribute to the development of 
internationally-accepted standards. 
For the first five-year phase of the programme an 
overall effort of 1 500 million ECU was foreseen, 
50% of which was to be borne by the research 
budget of the Community. The programme is 
implemented by means of a public call for pro-
posals, which is based upon an annual up-dated 
work programme adopted by the Council. 
123. Esprit offers an opportunity for European 
countries and laboratories to launch interna-
tional co-operative research and development 
activities in order to maximise the effective man-
agement of similar research. The programme is 
focused on microelectronics, software tech-
nology, advanced information-processing, office 
systems and computer integrated manufacturing. 
The European Community as one of the 
co-financers is able to eo-direct the nature of 
research. Participating private companies share 
costs, while results of research must be shared 
with due regard for rights of the investors proper. 
An important feature of Esprit is the creation of 
an advanced electronic network to enable 
exchange of information between all participants 
in the programme, which in the long term should 
be part of a network spread over the whole Com-
munity with a permanent interest for all 
researchers in the European Community. In 
Esprit, the development of advanced chips to 
keep up with the United States and Japan is esti-
mated to be of the greatest importance. 
124. It is hoped that in November 1987 the 
European Council will finally adopt Phase 2 of 
the Esprit programme within the new research 
framework programme for the years 1987-91. 
The total European Community budget for this 
second five-year phase, which will actually start 
in spring 1988, should amount to 1.6 billion 
ECU, while another 1.6 billion ECU should be 
contributed by the participating industry. The 
purpose will be to double research and devel-
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opment capacity thanks to a number of research 
workers carrying out joint work, who may 
number 5 500 by 1990. 
Resource estimates 
(Community contribution in million ECU) 8 
1984/86 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993+ 
Acuvities - - 263.5 465 404 137.5 330 -
second phase (1987-1991) 
Activities 560 173.5 16.5 - - -
first phase lii 984-1988) 
Grand total 560 9 173.5 280 465 404 147.5 330 
Payment credits 
Grand total ~63.6 9 187.4 174.5 373 430 311.5 310 300 
Total 
160( 
75C 
2 350 
2 35C 
125. In December 1986, the European Com-
mission presented a report to the Council with 
an assessment of the progress and the result of 
the first phase of Esprit so far. It was said in the 
report that Esprit had succeeded in promoting 
trans-European co-operation between infor-
mation technology organisations. Apart from 
universities and research institutes, 240 different 
industrial companies are participating in 
201 projects, with an estimated 2 900 researchers 
involved. More ambitious research projects of 
broader scope had been instituted and their exe-
cution was accelerated. Specific results with 
major industrial impact had already been 
achieved. One of these results was a demon-
strator of a 10 k array bipolar chip, comparable 
with the best available in the world, for which 
Siemens was building a new 100 million ECU 
production line. In another project, six major 
European computer companies (Bull, GEC, ICL, 
Nixdorf, Olivetti and Siemens) are co-operating 
with the goal of producing software faster, safer 
and more efficiently than the current state of the 
art. 
126. In the microelectronics subprogramme, 
activities are concentrated on two main themes, 
vital for a competitive position of Europe to 
supply its information technology industry. 
These themes are: 
- computer-aided design (CAD) to 
provide fast, easy-to-use tools to design 
integrated circuits (ICs) tailored to spe-
cific needs; 
- processing technology to provide the 
technological capability of manufac-
turing ICs notably in the more prom-
ising sectors of digital signal-processing, 
very-high-speed applications and optical 
transmission. 
8. Calculated on the basis of a 50% contribution to research 
and development projects. The resources for accompanying 
measures and personnel are allocated proportionally to the 
research and development sectors. 
9. Including commitment and payment appropriations 
carried over. 
127. In the research programme for comple-
mentary metal oxide semiconductors (CMOS) 
technology running parallel with the CAD pro-
gramme dedicated goals should result in pro-
duction use of 1.25 micron device chips early in 
1988 and of 1 micron device chips early in 1990. 
128. Other areas of specific interest covered by 
Esprit programmes are to be found in the 
advanced information-processing (AlP) sub-
programme, which includes projects for digital 
image-processing, speech-processing and optical 
processing. In this framework, parallel pro-
cessing should also be mentioned, as this subject 
is also the focus of main efforts in the United 
States (DARPA) and Japan (fifth-
generation programme) in order to design new 
computer architectures. In Esprit, most work on 
parallel architectures is carried out in a project 
with Philips, AEG, Bull, CSELT and Nixdor£ 
The Commission concluded that the AlP 
projects in Esprit currently play an important 
part in international discussions, but in the 
meantime called for closer co-operation among 
projects and quick exploitation of results. 
129. Note should also be taken of the inevitable 
spin-off from Esprit in respect of normalisation, 
a particularly important area where, in spite of 
the amount of work done, much ground remains 
to be covered. 
Race 
130. Race, the programme for research and 
development in advanced telecommunications 
technologies, deals with advanced research into 
optical fibres and optoelectronic technology. 
Among other things it will pave the way to 
video-telephones. One of its most important 
aims is the setting up of networks of compatible 
equipment throughout Europe. 
131. In its proposal to the Council to establish 
the Race programme the Commission stated that 
telecommunications is a very important sector 
with in 1985 a world-wide turnover of 40 billion 
ECU with revenues in the service sector of 
around 200 billion ECU. Moreover the Com-
mission made it clear that the availability of tele-
communications infrastructure will in a very 
high degree be determining for the location of 
future activities with a high added value. 
132. It is estimated that, in the European Com-
munity alone, in the next ten years around 500 
billion ECU will be invested in telecommunica-
tions infrastructure, services and terminal 
equipment. In the next twenty years the 
investment is estimated at 1 500 billion ECU. 
133. In the period 1987-91, the European Com-
munity will finance a maximum of 500 million 
ECU in this Race programme - instead of the 
850 million ECU proposed by the Commission -
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DOCUMENT 1118 
as contributions in the financing of activities of a 
precommercial and standardising nature. 
Delta 
134. The programme Delta (developing 
European learning thrQ'ugh technological 
advance) will receive 20 million ECU from the 
Communities ( 50o/o of the e~timated cost) for its 
eighteen-month developing phase. Delta should 
be the link between education and learning pro-
grammes in technology in Esprit and Race. 
Brain 
135. Another programme, Brain (basic research 
in adaptive research and neurocomputing), is in 
the process of being set up. At the beginning of 
1987, the European Commission invited prom-
inent European scientists to prepare a research 
programme on artificial intelligence and more 
specifically on so-called " adaptive " intelligence. 
In fact, it is aimed at developing computers 
which will not only - as normally is the case -
act in sequences, but will use parallel channels 
and call on their memory to deal with new situa-
tions. It is proposed that Brain be financed in the 
framework of the European ~esearch stimulation 
programme ("Europe for re$earchers ", adopted 
in 1984 for the years 1985-Sa) and be granted 20 
million ECU to start it in 1987-88. 
Outside the European Community 
Eureka 
136. A programme of a different nature is 
Eureka, involving projects close to producing 
marketable products or concepts. Eureka was 
launched in 1985 on a French initiative, in which 
are now participating all member countries of 
the European Community plus Austria, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and 
Turkey. Eureka programmes are clearly 
industry-led with the companies themselves 
judging the market opportunities to be aimed at. 
In the long term it is hoped to reduce subsidies to 
a minimum and other public aid to Eureka, 
which still provide 39o/o ofthe financial resources 
of the programme. Computer technology, 
research in new materials and communication 
technology are still among · the sectors repre-
sented, but the last meeting of participating 
countries at ministerial level in September 
1987 clearly indicated a shift away from the 
emphasis given to telecommunications and 
information technology when Eureka started. 
137. Acceptance of Eureka projects by min-
isters in their half-yearly meeting does not mean 
that a budget is assured. Each national gov-
ernment after official approval has to assess if 
and how it will subsidise the projects from its 
own national budget. 
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138. After the last meeting of ministers of the 
nineteen participating countries in Madrid in 
September 1987, approval was given to a total of 
165 projects. All in all, a total number of 600 
industries, universities and research institutes 
are now engaged in the Eureka framework, with 
an investment budget of nearly 4 billion ECU. 
IEPG - co-operative technology projects 
139. In 1985 the ministers of defence of the 
IEPG countries (i.e. all the European members of 
NATO) identified several crucial technology 
fields for co-operative technology projects 
(CTPs). They agreed in principle on government 
funding for these projects. According to the EDIS 
report the fields identified are: 
- high-speed microcircuits and associated 
materials; 
- application of specific integrated cir-
cuits; 
- sensors; 
- data-processing; 
- robotics; 
- intelligent knowledge-based systems; 
- systems engineering and integration 
(including software); 
- smart weapons; 
- advanced design and processing 
systems: computer guided design 
(CAD); computer-integrated manufac-
turing systems (CIM); flexible manufac-
turing systems (FMS); computer-aided 
manufacturing (CAM) and computer-
aided testing (CAT); 
- advanced materials. 
Agreements between co-operating countries are 
established in a memorandum of understanding. 
Within the framework of such an agreement each 
country is responsible for the accomplishment of 
its own task. To date, most research and devel-
opment projects under the responsibility of the 
IEPG Panel Ill, such as image-processing and the 
development of integrated software programme 
support, are in a pre-development phase. Some, 
such as microwave integrated circuits and GaAs 
analogue monolithic integrated circuits are in the 
development phase. 
Bi- or multilateral co-operation agreements 
140. Apart from the abovementioned 
co-operative projects or programmes in an 
institutionalised framework, there are in Europe 
a large number of co-operative ventures between 
two or more countries, or between private com-
panies in different countries, in civilian as well as 
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in military information technology or specifically 
microelectronics. 
141. A recent example which should be men-
tioned here is Franco-German co-operation to 
develop an avionics system for the PAH/HAP 
helicopter. 
National programmes 
142. It is not exaggerated to say that virtually 
each country in Western Europe is sustaining 
one or more research programmes in infor-
mation technology. Among the big programmes, 
there is not one of an entirely military nature. 
143. Although all European nations well realise 
that the size of their national markets will not 
allow them to meet the massive cost of research, 
development and marketing required to create 
and maintain a strong position in the interna-
tional market for information technology, they 
still allocate most of their money to national pro-
grammes. The natural bias to maintain a 
national industry at whatever cost is not the only 
reason. Another key reason is that they want to 
sell their country and its industry as an effective 
and desirable partner in Europe,. without which 
they would be unable to secure a fair return from 
programmes such as Esprit10• 
United Kingdom 
144. Curiously enough, in the 1950s it was the 
United States company Texas Instruments that 
established a plant in the United Kingdom to 
meet the British military requirements in inte-
grated circuits. Later, many efforts were made to 
develop a British capability in this area. There 
are now several programmes including MISP 
and Alvey. MISP (microelectronics industry 
support programme) is aimed at stimulating the 
microelectronics industry in a commercial envi-
ronment. Its objectives include the expansion of 
production of standard types of integrated cir-
cuits and the development of design and manu-
facturing capability for the design and manu-
facture of integrated circuits for specific uses. 
Over the years 1978-90 a total budget of 
£175 million has been allocated to this pro-
gramme. The Alvey programme is much more 
ambitious. It is a five-year programme ( 1983-88) 
with a £300 million contribution by the gov-
ernment, £40 million of which is being con-
tributed by the Ministry of Defence, while the 
other £260 million is contributed by the 
Department of Trade and Industry and the 
Science and Engineering Research Council. 
Industry should contribute the other £250 
million of the total budget proposal for the pro-
gramme. The five main key sectors covered by 
Alvey are: very large-scale integration, software 
10. See: Information Technology - a plan for concerted 
action, pages 43-44. 
engineering, intelligence knowledge-based 
systems, systems architecture and man/machine 
interface. 
145. Even if Alvey is a programme of pre-
competitive research, many products and pro-
cesses resulting from it are already on sale or in 
commercial use. The programme consists of 
some 200 industry-led co-operative projects. Of 
these projects, mention is made here of the 
1-micron CMOS-SOS whole process, which pro-
vides radiation chips, in demand for the space 
and defence market throughout Europe and the 
United States. In another project, 1.25 micron 
technology recently came into full production. 
Ella, a behavioural language improved with 
Alvey support, will now be adopted and 
standardised for all United Kingdom computer-
aided design (CAD) systems. Among the speech-
and image-processing projects, there is one for 
object identification from 2D images, with the 
aim to develop methods of automatically finding 
and identifying objects in images of complicated 
scenes, which has apparent applications in sur-
veillance for security and defence. 
Federal Republic of Germany 
146. In recent years, the Federal Republic has 
increased its efforts to strengthen its position in 
semiconductor production through enhancing 
research and development. In a three-year 
( 1982-84) special programme for microelectronic 
applications, the development of marketable 
products incorporating microelectronics was 
financed with DM 450 million. For the period 
1984-88 a further DM 500 million was allocated 
to develop the microelectronic industry's capa-
bility in submicron technology for integrated cir-
cuits. It should be mentioned that, especially in 
the Federal Republic, there is great reluctance to 
label research and development projects as 
defence-oriented. In 1981, only 9% of gov-
ernment expenditure on research and devel-
opment was openly defence-related. 
147. In Germany, a working group composed 
of representatives of industry and the scientific 
world recently published its report on the direc-
tives for information technology policy until 
2000. This working group concluded that the 
completion of a European internal market is of 
primordial importance. 
148. Moreover, it emphasised that the gov-
ernment has an important role to play in sup-
porting industry to allow it to find its place in the 
important strategic markets of the future in 
information technology. To this end, it estimates 
that the German Government should spend at 
least DM 1 billion annually. 
149. The working group considered that the 
many programmes and public discussions, which 
have been dragging on for years, have not 
managed to convince parliaments, governments, 
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economists and public opinion of the real 
dimension of the problem, the extent of the 
efforts necessary and information technology's 
vast potential for innovation. 
150. On European research programmes such 
as Esprit, it stated that at the moment these 
projects very often involve time-consuming 
administrative procedures, although in such 
projects time is a decisive factor for success. 
France 
151. France has chosen to encourage its elec-
tronics industry along the " filiere " approach, 
pertaining to all economic activities in this area, 
integrated on the basis of markets, technology 
and capital structure. The overall programme, 
with a total funding effort of,F 140 billion over a 
five-year (1983-87) period is called Mission 
Filiere Electronique. Some 46% was to be pro-
vided by the government (including research 
grants by the armed forces and the telecommuni-
cations administration), almost 40% by French 
firms and only 14% by foreign firms. In practi-
cally each sub-sector the government set out to 
create one or two national champions, which 
absorbed the bulk of government funds, incorpo-
rating the activities of the other French elec-
tronic firms. The major French industrial groups 
in the electronics field were nationalised, which 
facilitated the whole process. 
152. The purpose of this effort is to reinforce 
areas in electronics where it is believed France is 
relatively strong, such as telecommunications 
and software, and to catch up in areas where 
French industry is weak. Included is a pro-
gramme to encourage the use of microelectronics 
(PUCE). 
153. There is also the CITGV (circuits integres 
a tres grande vitesse) programme, set up by the 
Defence Ministry's procurement office (DGA), 
in which a 2 micron device chip has already been 
produced, while production of a 1 micron chip 
should be started in 1989. In 1987, the French 
Government budget for research and devel-
opment was estimated at F 80.2 billion, of which 
F 30.7 billion or 38.3% was spent by the Ministry 
of Defence. 
154. At a recent colloquy organised by the 
General Secretariat for National Defence 
(SGDN) in France, it became clear that the 
French Delegation nationale pour l'armement is 
trying to work out a Eureka programme for mil-
itary research. This programme might be based 
on Articles 24 and 30 of the single European act. 
Italy 
155. In Italy, a development programme for 
electronics for the years 1982-87 included an 
allocation for the integrated Circuits industry. At 
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the outset a budget of $157 million 
foreseen. 
A small country: the Netherlands 
was 
156. In September 1987, the Dutch Gov-
ernment published its annual policy review for 
technology which mentioned several pro-
grammes in the information technology field. 
The innovation-oriented research programme 
for integrated circuit technology (1985-92) for 
strategic research in universities has a Fl 
27.2 million budget. The promotion programme 
for research and education in universities 
( 1986-90) has an allocation of Fl 132.2 million. A 
five-year (1984-88) information technology pro-
motion plan with a government funded budget 
of Fl 1. 7 billion covers a vast range of activities 
from education to product innovation. Of the 
annual total budget for 1987 for technology pro-
grammes of Fl 2.2 billion, including Fl 
112 million for defence-oriented research, about 
Fl 370 million is being spent on information 
technology policy. 
Japan 
15 7. There is no doubt that in technology Japan 
is an important competitor for Europe. In 1985, 
it spent $35 billion on research and devel-
opment, virtually all in the civilian sector (99%), 
while 71% of this amount came from private 
funds. Nevertheless, there is an extremely close 
relationship between the private sector and the 
state, in particular the Ministry of International 
Trade and industry (MITI), which co-ordinates 
policy and has a long-established tradition of 
preventing foreign penetration. 
158. It should be noted here that the Japanese 
electronics industry recently had to cope with a 
very serious setback caused by the rising value of 
the yen. Following the decision of the Group of 
Five in September 1985 to lower the value ofthe 
United States dollar, the yen rose from 240 yen 
to the dollar at that time to about 140 yen to the 
dollar in May 1987. Most of Japan's trade con-
tracts in this sector are drawn up in dollars. In 
1986 the majority of electronics companies con-
sequently had to face a 50% drop in sales results 
compared to 1985. 
159. A United States-Japan semiconductor 
arrangement was concluded in September 1986, 
with Japanese business interests making sub-
stantial concessions. Despite the fact that certain 
anese Government, this centre encourages 
smoother relations among various national semi-
conductor industries and provides easier access 
for foreign companies wishing to market elec-
tronic devices and components in Japan. 
160. The main feature of Japanese strategy in 
developing new electronics technology is the 
establishment of flexible co-operative projects 
associating many firms while at the same time 
encouraging the exchange of research staff 
between private laboratories. Among recent 
research and development programmes are the 
supercomputer project (1982-90), the optoelec-
tronics project (1980-91) and the new function 
elements project (1982-89) with a proposed gov-
ernment funding of 66 billion yen in total. Basic 
research in the application of sophisticated inte-
grated circuits is included in these projects. For-
tified integrated circuits for extreme conditions 
and composite semiconductors using alternate 
layers of gallium arsenide and aluminium 
arsenide are among the projects. It needs no 
explanation that all these projects seem to be 
extremely well adapted for advanced military 
applications. The leading Japanese microelec-
tronics companies are heavily involved in the 
abovementioned projects. 
161. At the moment a number of companies 
are jointly studying an entirely new computer 
architecture which might become a new world 
standard. This project, "Tron ", is aimed at 
devising interchangeable modular systems that 
could serve as basic units for ultra high-speed 
computers. 
162. In 1987, Japan made the first decision to 
start its Human Frontier programme, which is 
still in a very early stage. Human Frontier is con-
centrated on study of the human machine and 
biological systems: molecular biology and the 
transformation of energy, thought and the trans-
mission of information and associated technol-
ogies at the cellular and molecular level. The 
budget for this programme totals 200 000 million 
yen for ten years (approximately 1 100 million 
ECU). In 1987, the sum of 197 million yen 
(approximately 1.1 million ECU) was earmarked 
for the project's feasibility study. It is thought 
that such research can lead to industrial applica-
tions in the fields of new materials, artificial 
intelligence and pharmaceuticals, among 
others. 
sectors initially objected to this arrangement, 163. In the meantime, since the end of January 
Japanese semiconductor companies strove to 1987, Japanese officials have been presenting 
respect its provisions. On 4th March 1987, the their programme to members of the interna-
international semiconductor co-operation centre tional scientific community whom they are 
(INSEC) was established to promote greater inviting to participate. Scientists from European 
co-operation in developing semiconductors and institutions have shown their interest in these 
in marketing foreign-made semiconductors in proposals. Some experts in Europe have 
Japan. Funded by Japanese semiconductor corn- expressed their fear that Japan, through an inter-
panies, several foreign companies and the Jap- national programme, could easily benefit from 
218 
the results of European and United States basic 
research. 
164. Even if these are all civilian-oriented 
activities, its influence in advanced defence tech-
nology should not be neglected. Through its 
increasing dominance of civil markets in microe-
lectronics Japan is gradually depriving Europe of 
its capability in this field. Japanese strength in, 
for instance, high-speed multicircuit chips and 
optoelectronics could give them a lead in a wide 
range of military equipment. Japan also started a 
programme of intelligent knowledge base 
systems (IKBS) which will bring it level with the 
United States and Europe in systems research 
and development. Even now, United States and 
European defence manufacturers rely heavily on 
Japanese components and are starting to pur-
chase subsystems. 
United States 
165. During the 1950s and 1960s demand in 
electronics and later microelectronics resulting 
from procurement by the Department of Defence 
and NASA was an important factor in the devel-
opment of this sector of industry because they 
were willing to pay high prices and it helped 
companies to attain a sufficient level of pro-
duction. This demand certainly accelerated the 
introduction of some innovations. The relative 
importance of military and space procurement 
declined as new commercial areas emerged and 
product prices began to fall. 
166. In the United States semiconductor 
market for example, in the early 1960s 70% of 
demand was military as opposed to 30% com-
mercial, while in the late 1980s only 10% is mil-
itary and 90% commercial. However, the size of 
the United States military market is still consid-
erable compared to Europe or Japan: in 1982, the 
10% share of military consumption in semicon-
ductor end-use in the United States was equiv-
alent to about 28% of European and 10% ofJap-
anese consumption. 
167. After a decade of low-level United States 
Government activity in the microelectronics 
industry in the 1970s, it became active again in 
the early 1980s to meet its own requirements and 
those of the industry. 
168. A change in the antitrust policy covering 
all sectors ofthe economy encouraged microelec-
tronics companies to co-operate in increasingly-
expensive research and development. Through 
international action, the government tried to 
influence foreign government policies towards 
their industries through a combination of 
bilateral discussions and multilateral actions. 
169. It need not be explained here that one of 
the main goals of the strategic defence initiative 
programme started in 1983 was to give massive 
new impetus to developments in advanced elec-
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tronics. Furthermore, the Department of 
Defence, continuing its expenditure through pro-
curement, started several comprehensive 
research and development ])rogrammes, in par-
ticular VHSIC (phases I and 11), MIMIC and the 
strategic computing programme, each of which 
has been mentioned earlier in this report. Early 
in 1987 it was estimated that since its modest 
start in 1979, the Pentagon had invested approxi-
mately $500 million in the VHSIC programme 
but a few hundred million dollars more will be 
spent up to 1990. The annual expenditure of 
VHSIC is approximately equivalent to between 
7-10% of total semiconductor industry research 
and development expenditure (excluding con-
tract research and development for government 
agencies) 11 • For the first five years ofthe MIMIC 
programme, the government budget will . be 
about $13 7 million, while government fundmg 
for the first five years of the strategic computing 
programme, launched in 1983, was estimated at 
another $500 million. In paragraphs 114 and 
115 of this report, mention has been made of the 
establishment of the Sematech company, which 
is not only defence-orient~d and which now 
seems to be well under way with government 
support. 
170. In a detailed analysis of the impact of the 
VHSIC programme on industry research and 
development by the United States National 
Research Council it was said that even when 
VHSIC was directed towards military goals, "it 
appears that the activity stimulated by the 
VHSIC programme will... actually strengthen the 
United States non-military very large-scale inte-
gration component and equipment industry". 
1 71. Of a total Department of Defence budget 
for 1987 of $281.7 billion, $36.9 billion was allo-
cated for research, development, test and evalu-
ation. 
VII. Conclusions 
1 72. In the early 1980s Europe had finally 
understood that in information technology it was 
threatened seriously enough JJy its main compet-
itors, the United States and Japan, to justify spe-
cific concerted action. It was realised that the 
sum of European efforts would amount to more 
than the aggregate of individual national or 
company efforts. 
173. Today, the European electronics industry 
is lagging still further behin~ the United States 
and Japan, as can be seen from the trend of the 
trade balance (deficit of $1. S billion in 1979 and 
$12 billion in 1984). Similarly, 30% of the data-
processing industry's market is in Europe and 
11. See report: The Semiconductor Industry, OECD, Paris 
1985, page 64. 
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European industry accounts for 7 to 8% of pro-
duction. 
174. European industry has little place in the 
larger markets. As they control only a third of 
their own market, the principal firms seem very 
small and unassuming compared with their 
American and Japanese competitors (the leading 
European firm is twelfth on the world scale). 
This is in spite of some degree of national protec-
tionism which, contrary to a widespread view, is 
rife in all countries, particularly the United 
States. 
175. The American effort, made mainly by 
manufacturers, receives considerable assistance 
from the Federal Government (subsidies of 
$4 billion between 1980 and 1984, of which 95% 
went to four firms) and, in particular, more dis-
creet assistance from Defence Department 
markets and military research efforts ( +80% 
between 1980 and 1985). 
176. Europe's weakness in this area stems from 
the fact that the European market is a mosaic of 
national markets. It is difficult for European 
firms to accede to the homogenous American 
market but the European market is not really 
accessible either because of different standards 
and certain still strong protectionist practices. 
177. Currently, as a result of many considera-
tions there are two main programmes of a dif-
ferent nature which are expected to stimulate the 
competitiveness of Europe's information tech-
nology industry. 
178. The first is " Esprit " a European Com-
munity programme involving projects of a 
precompetitive or technological standard-setting 
character, entirely dedicated to information tech-
nology. 
179. The second is "Eureka", embracing the 
European Community member countries and 
five other Western European countries and 
involving projects close to producing marketable 
products or concepts. 
180. Both these programmes officially are said 
to be purely civilian, but it is thought that a 
number of the projects approved or under devel-
opment will also have possible military applica-
tions. In Eureka, an estimated 30% of the first 
hundred projects approved could be used in mil-
itary applications. 
181. Apart from these two civilian pro-
grammes, the IEPG has established the 
co-operative technology project (CTP) scheme 
which should address many defence information 
technology questions. The CTPs are intended to 
operate in the precompetitive phase, with partici-
pation and funding comparable to the system 
used for Eureka, on an a la carte basis. At the 
moment it is virtually impossible to judge the 
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effectiveness of these projects as they are all in a 
very early stage of development. 
182. It is your Rapporteur's opinion that 
Western European nations are still spending too 
much on purely national programmes. This 
policy has resulted in disasters like the British 
GEC A vionics Nimrod AEW Mk-3 airborne 
early-warning programme on which more than 
$1.3 billion was spent over a nine-year period 
before the government decided to select its main 
competitor, the Boeing E-3A AWACS. Likewise 
France, which has gone to great lengths to 
maintain an independent national military air-
craft industry, is now facing difficulties following 
the lack of orders for the Mirage 2000 which may 
also have repercussions on its defence electronics 
industry. 
183. Certainly, more should be spent on collab-
orative information technology programmes, but 
there is not one widely-accepted model for such 
programmes. In Europe, leading companies and 
countries in this field are ever more reluctant to 
follow the European Esprit solution. They prefer 
national programmes, bi- or multilateral 
co-operation on a more informal basis or in the 
loose Eureka framework. 
184. As lessons may be drawn from this Esprit-
Eureka controversy, it may be useful to list the 
main complaints, advantages and drawbacks of 
both programme structures and then make a 
choice regarding the best course to be followed 
for improving the competitiveness of Europe's 
defence information technology industry. 
Comparison between the Esprit and Eureka struc-
tures 
Esprit 
185. Each year, the allocation of subsidies to 
specific programmes is subject to political whims 
and the parochial wish of member countries to 
get a fair share. 
186. According to some leading industries, too 
much money is spent in countries with a less-
developed electronics industry. 
187. Precompetitive and basic research to 
which Esprit is limited is not the main weakness 
of Europe. 
188. Participation in Esprit implies an obli-
gation to publish the results of research, which is 
an advantage for the scientific world to some 
extent but also means that leading companies do 
not participate in Esprit with their strategic 
research programmes. 
189. Decisions are made at a snail's pace 
because of friction between the European Com-
mission and the Council. The budget is far from 
sufficient to meet the goals set. 
190. Since the beginning, in 1984, many other 
programmes related to information technology 
have been established within the European Com-
munity. As a consequence, too many parties are 
involved in shaping policy. 
191. Among the advantages of the Esprit 
model, it should certainly be mentioned that 
companies will more readily tackle technologies 
that are too advanced for commercial appli-
cation or too expensive for the research to be 
done at company expense. 
192. Esprit may also have reduced duplication 
in research: it certainly has stimulated interna-
tional co-operation between companies and it 
helps to create an open internal European 
market. 
Eureka 
193. In the much less compulsory structure of 
Eureka, there is no working programme estab-
lished by industry and governments, nor is there 
an extensive bureaucracy. Because funding is on 
a project-by-project basis, no participant, 
country or industry takes the risk that its money 
will be used for other than its own programme. 
Another advantage of the Eureka structure is that 
the constraint of government calculations to 
determine fair returns, which may slow down 
considerably the implementation of projects, is 
avoided. 
194. Participants may choose their own 
partners for each project, thus ensuring that 
results will be shared exclusively between 
them. 
195. In view of this, it is not difficult to see the 
disadvantages: countries with a less-developed 
technology industry do not benefit from the 
majority of the programmes; there is no tech-
nology transfer to smaller companies; univer-
sities and research institutes are less involved 
and programmes are more market-oriented. 
196. One could conclude that the Eureka 
structure has nothing to do with a European 
approach but that it is rather a public market-
place fostering bi- or multilateral co-operation. 
197. It seems quite clear that Eureka could be 
the easiest way to achieving quick results, espe-
cially for countries and companies which still 
think they can catch up while protecting their 
national and private interests. But then it should 
be kept in mind that Eureka does next to nothing 
to change the old-fashioned and completely out-
of-date structures of separate markets, relations 
between national governments and their 
favourite industries and other nationalistic 
hobby-horses. Eureka does not recognise that the 
key problem for a modem technology policy is 
not that of generating new ideas, of which there 
has never been a lack in Europe, but rather of 
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facilitating their rapid diffusion and widespread 
use. Long-term growth of any modem economy 
depends mainly on the capacity to deploy tech-
nological capabilities across a broad spectrum of 
economic activities. 
198. These key problems are far better 
addressed in the framework, programme of the 
European Community, with Esprit in the fore-
front. The framework programme should cer-
tainly secure more support from member coun-
tries, as it should be the indispensable main 
thrust for Europe's future industrial capacity. 
This programme recognises the need for wide-
spread dissemination of technological capabil-
ities throughout industry and addresses the key 
issues of such a policy: a strong institutional 
mechanism for technology transfer; an education 
and training system; a call for industrial 
standardisation; a network of co-operative 
research. Finally, it fits in with the concept of an 
open internal market in Europe by 1992. It is, 
however, clearly a drawback that for political 
reasons Esprit was limited to precompetitive 
research. More market-oriented research and 
development projects should be tackled in Phase 
II of Esprit, but that has no~ been decided yet. 
199. Moreover, no sufficiently satisfying results 
can be expected from the- E~prit programme if 
European countries continue 'to refuse to allow it 
a substantial budget. A budget of 1.6 billion ECU 
for Esprit Phase II, a five year programme, is 
quite inadequate for forcing a breakthrough for 
Europe's competitiveness in the world market. 
Aims 
200. Priority must continue to be given to 
strengthening European industry and capability. 
This means that various kinds of alliance must 
be formed and co-operation developed based on 
complementarity which will allow our industries 
to co-operate with American or Japanese indus-
tries at the same technological level. There must 
also be official assistance from several sectors to 
encourage predominantly intra-European 
co-operation and the op~ning of national 
European armaments markets. 
201. It should be noted, ho~ver, that if Europe 
abides by its confessed determination to have a 
modem and competitive defep.ce industry, it will 
also have to set up more amtlitious research and 
development programmes ~or defence elec-
tronics. The co-operative tecllnology projects are 
certainly a step in the right direction and should 
be continued. As progress so far seems to have 
been rather slow, their base should be broadened 
and given new impetus, as has been recom-
mended in the "Towards a stronger Europe" 
report. To a great extent, these CTPs have the 
same advantages as Eureka, but they also suffer 
from the same disadvantages which in the long 
run may be counterproductive to the estab-
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lishment of a strong European defence industry. 
A proportion of existing national defence 
research funds should therefore be diverted to 
establish a common budget for a common 
defence technology research programme, initially 
limited to precompetitive general research and 
enabling technologies, but gradually also tackling 
more market-oriented research. Thus a first step 
would be taken towards a joint European defence 
research programme associating around the 
WEU member countries any other European 
countries wishing to take part. 
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APPENDIX I 
The twenty-five largest computer manufacturers 
Manufacturer 
IBM 
Digital Equipment 
Sperry 
Burroughs 
Fujitsu 
NCR 
NEC 
Control Data 
Hewlett-Packard 
Siemens 
Hitachi 
Olivetti 
Wang Laboratories 
Xeros 
Honeywell 
Groupe Bull 
Apple Computer 
AT and T 
TRW 
Matsushita 
Toshiba 
Philips 
Nixdorf 
ICL 
Northern Telecom 
$1 = DM 2.94 
Source : Datamation. 
Country Turnover 1985 $ billion 
(USA) 48 554.0 
(USA) 7 029.4 
(USA) 4 755.1 
(USA) 4 685.3 
(J) 4 309.5 
(USA) 3 885.5 
(J) 3 761.8 
(USA) 3 679.7 
(USA) 3 675.0 
(FRG) 3 265.0 
(J) 2 885.4 
(I) 2 518.2 
(USA) 2 428.3 
(USA) 1 959.0 
(USA) 1 951.9 
(F) 1 794.5 
(USA) 1 753.8 
(USA) 1 500.0 
(USA) 1 450.0 
(J) 1447.6 
(J) 1 409.0 
(NL) 1 365.6 
(FRG) 1 339.9 
(GB) 1 330.8 
(CND) 1 240.8 
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APPENDIX 11 
Public funding of research and development 
by socio-economic objective 
Total defence 
1982 1983 
Germany 744.8 840.3 (a) 
France 2 946.1 3 046.7 
United Kingdom 3 501.0 3 912.2 
Italy 156.9 215.8 
Spain 49.7 50.7 
Netherlands 51.1 46.1 
Turkey NA NA 
Belgium 3.6 1.9 (a) 
Denmark 0.7 0.8 (a) 
Norway 33.1 44.9 
Greece NA 0.5 (a) 
Portugal NA NA 
7 487.0 8 159.9 
us 22 070.0 24 936.0 
European figure as % of US 34% 
Source : OCDE/STIID Data Bank - July 1986 
Notes: 
(a) Change in definition: Figures not strictly comparable with preceding year. 
(b) Provisional. 
NA - Not available. 
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Million dollars - current prices 
1984 
900.4 
3 384.9 
4 261.5 
362.0 
59.9 
51.3 (a) 
NA 
1.6 (b) 
2.7 
47.7 
5.1 (a) 
NA 
9 077.1 
29 287.0 
31% 
DOCUMENT 1118 
APPENDIX Ill 
World computer market in 1985 
(Expenditure and offer) 
Others 
United States American constructors 
Japanese 
Europeans 
World expenditure : $130 billion 
Source : IDC 1986 
World offer : $130 billion 
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European armaments co-operation -
reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions 2 
by Mr. Bassinet, Rapporteur 
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Draft Recommendation 
on European armaments co-operation -
reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council 
The Assembly, 
(i) Noting that ever since the Rome declaration in October 1984 the Council as a whole and its 
members individually have stated that WEU should provide political impetus to the development of 
European co-operation in armaments matters; 
(ii) Dissatisfied that during the three years that have elapsed since October 1984 the Council has 
failed to provide proof of this much-vaunted political impetus, notwithstanding the primordial role of 
the WEU countries in the IEPG, their geographical and military position and the size of their defence 
industry; 
(iii) Recalling the final communique of the IEPG ministers' meeting held in Seville on 22nd June 
1987, in which the ministers endorsed the long-term objectives ofthe European defence industry study 
(EDIS) report and expressed their determination to develop an action plan for a step-by-step approach 
towards an open European market for defence equipment; 
(iv) Considering that neither the division of work between the Standing Armaments Committee and 
the IEPG, dating from 1978, nor the agreement regarding co-operation between the presidency of the 
IEPG and the Secretary-General of WEU, dating from 1986, are being observed; 
(v) Considering that the IEPG ministers have declined to establish an international secretariat for 
the IEPG, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Take the lead in implementing the action plan for an open European market for defence 
equipment as recommended by the EDIS report by committing its members to reach agreement on 1 
common operational requirements for each major piece of defence equipment they will need from now 
on; 
2. Conclude its three-year reflections and deliberations on the reorganisation, future role and tasks 
of the SAC and Agency Ill and instruct the new ministerial organs to conduct studies connected with the 
IEPG ministers' decision to develop an action plan for a step-by-step approach towards an open 
European market for defence equipment; 
3. Increase its efforts to guarantee that appropriate international bodies and national administra-
tions provide all the information needed by the body which takes over to conduct its studies; 
4. Ensure that the division of work between the SAC and the IEPG dating from 1978, if considered 
obsolete, is replaced by an up-to-date agreement and that the 1986 co-operation agreement between the 
presidency of the IEPG and the Secretary-General of WEU is observed; 
5. Arrange for the presidency of the IEPG to address the Assembly once a year to inform it about 
developments in European armaments co-operation. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Bassinet, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. The need for armaments co-operation in a 
European framework is so well-known, so rarely 
opposed and so frequently endorsed in public by 
politicians that one might even wonder why a 
report is again being devoted to the subject. 
2. However, for several reasons your 
Rapporteur takes the view that it is necessary to 
follow developments on this issue closely. 
3. First and foremost, encouraging lip service 
as an expression of sincere intentions and 
maybe even of political will is frequently paid to 
the cause of armaments co-operation while the 
practical outcome of all this verbosity is still 
rather disappointing. 
4. Secondly, the WEU Council and its indi-
vidual members are continually talking about the 
important role WEU can play or the political 
impetus it can give to the process of armaments 
co-operation while in practice carefully 
refraining from giving these statements any sub-
stance or follow-up. 
5. Thirdly, the Assembly wishes to show its 
deep interest in this matter, thus hoping to help 
the Council to persevere with attaining the 
ultimate goal. 
6. This report will not describe directly the 
problems of co-operation because this has been 
done with great skill and relentless sophistication 
by the European defence industry study (EDIS) 
team in its report "Towards a stronger 
Europe " 1 written by order of the IEPG and pre-
sented to it in December 1986. 
7. Neither will it dwell on all too widely-
known reasons for Europe to rationalise its 
defence efforts through closer co-operation in 
arms procurement. A recent study by the United 
States National Academy of Science estimates 
that the waste devolving from duplication of 
efforts through Europe's failure to co-operate for 
government procurement amounts to some $35 
billion a year. There is no need to explain that 
significant reductions in nuclear weapons 
deployed in Europe or the elimination of certain 
categories of nuclear weapons will only produce 
new arguments for the same cause of co-
operation 
8. The main purpose of this report is to try to 
compare and assess recent official statements, to 
point out certain developments and finally to 
I. Henceforth referred to as the EDIS report. 
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make some modest and feasible suggestions for 
useful work in this area that could be done by 
WEU without duplicating the work of other 
existing bodies. 
II. Activities of WEU 
(a) The Council 
9. In its Rome declaration of 27th October 
1984, the Council called attention to WED's 
ability to give political impetus to the devel-
opment of European co-operation in armaments 
questions (paragraphs 7 and 8). 
10. Ever since, the Council as such and its 
members have been unable to stop talking about 
the political impetus of WEU in this area. 
11. In Bonn, the Council instructed the Per-
manent Council to present proposals in time for 
the next meeting to help provide the necessary 
political impetus for, and pra~tical contributions 
to, the various efforts unde11taken in this field, 
including those carried out by bodies such as the 
IEPG and the CNAD (Conference of National 
Armaments Directors) (final communique of the 
meeting in Bonn, 22nd and 23rd April 1985, 
paragraph 9). 
12. Apparently, the Permanent Council failed 
to make proposals that could rise to the daring 
expectations of the Council, because in the 
communique issued after the Venice meeting the 
ministers only " underlined the importance of 
co-operative efforts designed to help strengthen 
their defence capabilities". They" welcomed the 
progress which had been made in the IEPG ". 
Furthermore, probably to make things sound 
slightly more positive, they requested that 
studies be undertaken on the management of 
resources and the implications of rising defence 
costs (final communique of the meeting in 
Venice, 29th-30th April 1986). 
13. An indication of the meaning of these 
studies may be found in the reply of the Council 
to Recommendation 436 (18th November 1986). 
In paragraph 2 of this reply~ the Council drew 
attention to the activities of the IEPG and the 
CNAD. It said that Agency IH should maintain 
contact with these groups and " thus contribute 
to the role recognised for WEU by the ministers, 
namely to provide political impetus to bodies 
concerned with arms co-operation such as the 
IEPG and the CNAD ".A refined and subtle var-
iation of the same theme was provided in the 
reply of the Council to Written Question 271 
(17th November 1986). 
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14. In its reply to Recommendation 432 (17th 
October 1986) the Council again mentioned that 
" in the field of arms co-operation WEU's 
objective is to help maintain the political 
impetus for the work of the IEPG and to con-
tribute substantively in support of it, wherever 
possible ". 
15. In an effort to be more definite on this 
subject the ministers, after their Luxembourg 
meeting, " stated their resolve to continue their 
efforts towards the establishment in Europe of 
the technological and industrial base necessary to, 
ensure the development of a strong and compet-
itive European armaments industry, this being 
an important aspect of Europe's contribution to 
defence. In this connection, they reaffirmed the 
importance they attach to the generation of more 
and more systematic collaboration in the field of 
conventional armaments " (final communique of 
the meeting in Luxembourg on 27th-28th April 
1987). This statement was quoted in paragraph 3 
of the reply of the Council to Recommendation 
440 (26th May 1987). 
16. But even if for a less favourable observer 
the enthusiasm and unambiguousness in the 
written statements of the Council seem to be 
slackening, its individual members and other 
ministers in member states have apparently 
increased their promising statements. 
17. At the December 1986 session of the 
Assembly Mr. Jacques Chirac, Prime Minister of 
France, stated that in arms co-operation, WEU 
had special political potential and a specific and 
important part to play alongside the IEPG. Lord 
Trefgarne, Minister of State for Defence Pro-
curement of the United Kingdom, said that 
WEU should be a ginger group - a catalyst for 
decisions - even if some of those by their nature 
had to be taken elsewhere. Mr. Spadolini, Min-
ister of Defence of Italy, was even more specific, 
urging that WEU: " should commit itself actively 
in three directions: first, concerted efforts by our 
defence ministers to improve conventional 
defences by means of long-term programmes 
based on the use of advanced technology; 
second, the creation of European research and 
development agencies in the key sector of 
defence production; third, the pursuit of an 
industrial defence policy based on common 
European rules and practices for purchases and 
supplies". He was convinced that " in all these 
three directions WEU can do a great deal by 
establishing procedures aimed at co-ordination 
and agreement on financial, legal and techno-
logical matters". 
18. Mr. Fischbach, the Luxembourg Defence 
Minister, gave a detailed explanation of the 
future role of defence ministers in WEU. 
According to Mr. Fischbach, one of the topics 
these ministers want WEU to consider is that of 
European co-operation in arms production, rela-
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tions with the IEPG, the allocation of resources 
to defence and the exchange of information on 
long-term defence programmes and defence 
strategies. 
19. At the June 1987 session of the Assembly, 
Mr. Fischbach gave the most recent information 
on consultations between defence ministers. The 
representatives of the WEU defence ministers 
met several times in 1987 to discuss co-operation 
in arms procurement and the management of 
defence resources. Quite logically, they agreed 
that WEU should not duplicate work being done 
elsewhere, for example in the IEPG and the 
CNAD. Its work should be directed to concepts 
rather than to operational matters. They also 
agreed that the defence ministers were concerned 
with political as well as technical matters. 
Having stated this, Mr. Fischbach once more 
emphasised the political role which the defence 
ministers must play in WEU concerning the 
management of resources in particular. 
20. Mr. Fischbach then pointed out that he 
and all his colleagues shared the view that it was 
WEU's business to provide the necessary 
political stimulus for the partners in the IEPG to 
discuss concrete projects placed before the 
Council of Ministers. 
21. It is far from easy to draw clear conclu-
sions from all these declarations. It seems some-
times as if the Council has been moving up and 
down on the waves of the IEPG tide. The 
Council may have mentioned the need for 
political impetus by WEU when it was disap-
pointed by negative developments in the IEPG 
and may have tried to diminish WEU's role 
when the IEPG was making enough progress. 
22. Taking into account the most recent state-
ments of several ministers, including Mr. 
Fischbach's explanation at the June 1987 session, 
the prevailing opinion at the moment may well 
be that WEU can provide political stimulus for 
arms co-operation in the IEPG. This conclusion 
is in line with the state of affairs in the IEPG 
which, as will be demonstrated elsewhere in this 
report, is not altogether satisfactory. 
23. What should WEU do in arms 
co-operation to give it the long-awaited political 
impetus? On the political level, at least two sug-
gestions can be made. 
24. The first suggestion requires concerted 
action by both the Council and the Assembly of 
WEU. It is to make it standard procedure for the 
Chairman of the IEPG to address either the 
plenary Assembly or a meeting of the Committee 
on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace 
Questions and the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments of WEU once a year, to 
present a progress report on armaments 
co-operation in the IEPG. The Assembly would 
not object if the Chairman were a minister from 
a non-member country of WEU. On the con-
trary, that might even be a twofold advantage. It 
would on the one hand be an opportunity for a 
non-WEU minister to become acquainted with 
WEU and its institutions, while on the other 
hand the Assembly, showing its deep interest in 
European armaments co-operation, would thus 
be able to encourage the minister concerned. 
Moreover, it could enhance public awareness of 
the useful activities of the IEPG. For implemen-
tation of this suggestion, all that is needed is an 
invitation to the IEPG Chairman from the 
Assembly and eventually a unanimous recom-
mendation of WEU defence ministers to con-
vince a non-WEU Chairman of the IEPG to 
present a report to the Assembly. 
25. The second suggestion is more compli-
cated and requires action by the Council only. It 
is that WEU member countries really take the 
lead in implementing the action plan for an open 
European market for defence equipment as rec-
ommended by the EDIS report. 
26. WEU ts indeed the organisation 
pre-eminently suitable for providing such far-
reaching political impetus because its members 
include all the European countries which 
maintain forces in the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the two European nuclear powers. 
Furthermore, WEU countries have always been 
at the source of any major European arms 
project as their defence industries are the most 
developed of the IEPG. They are a relatively 
small, homogenous group of countries which 
makes it generally easier to reach an agreement 
on drastic measures. In fact, drastic measures are 
required to restructure the European defence 
market. 
27. The very loose structure of the IEPG 
allows its member countries to move at exactly 
their own speed because co-operation takes place 
on a case-by-case basis, each member country 
being completely free to participate or to 
abstain. 
28. However unbelievable it may seem, after 
nearly forty years of allied efforts, it would be a 
tremendous first step forward if the WEU 
member countries of the IEPG could commit 
themselves to reach agreement on common oper-
ational requirements for each major item of mil-
itary equipment they may need from now on. If 
only this and no more could be achieved, it 
would set an excellent example for the other 
IEPG nations. 
29. Few objections could be raised to any 
measures taken in this direction since, in prin-
ciple, it does not affect any of the so dearly cher-
ished national defence industries, unless certain 
member states argue that so far they have been 
tuning their operational requirements to the 
needs and possibilities of the national industries 
before adapting them to the threat assessment. 
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30. Recent examples where the needs of a 
branch of the national armaments industry have 
played a major part in government decisions to 
favour national or less-international solutions 
are France's decision to develop and produce its 
own combat aircraft based on the Rafale and the 
British decision to favour the utility version of 
the EH-101 instead of the NH-90. 
31. Nor would this step affect the 
long-standing objective of the IEPG to support 
the development of the industrial and techno-
logical basis of member countries with less-
developed defence industries, which was reaf-
firmed in the recent Seville communique of the 
IEPG ministers. 
(b) The Standing Armaments ~ommittee (SAC) 
and Agency 11,1 
32. In his address to the Assembly on 1st June 
1987, the Secretary-General of WEU mentioned 
that well-proven and successful practices of other 
European organisations are now also being 
adopted in Western European Union. Those 
responsible in the WEU capjtals, he continued, 
whether they be ministers, political directors or 
experts, are meeting for regular, in-depth consul-
tations. These structures provide a focal point 
where views on security are coming close 
together and reflect common, longer-term basic 
positions. The Assembly recognises that these 
meetings on an intergovernmental level are 
essential. It also recognises that the adminis-
trative services in London and Paris - according 
to the Secretary-General - are there to service 
these meetings so that they can be as effective as 
possible. 
33. But the Assembly is surprised that during 
the three years that have elapsed since the Rome 
declaration the Council has failed to make any 
effective use of its administrative services in 
Paris, i.e. the agencies. Even at this moment, fol-
lowing the meeting of the Council of Ministers 
on 27th October in The Hague and with the tran-
sitional period practically at an end, not all the 
decisions required to implement the envisaged 
reorganisation have been taken. 
34. Also through a multitude of developments 
in international security policy, WEU is playing 
a new role among other organisations. No 
wonder the Secretary-General mentioned that 
WEU has adopted policies of consultation which 
have been well-proven and successful in other 
European organisations. WEU has, however, 
clearly forgotten to adopt one feature of the 
utmost importance, that of a well-organised, 
sufficiently-manned and properly equipped 
administration. It is quite natural that the WEU 
ministers do not favour a large, top-heavy 
administration. High-level officials in national 
administrations for obvious reasons do not like 
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international staff unless they are very discreet, 
low-level, obedient and powerless. But in their 
fervour to prevent the setting up of any adminis-
tration large enough to do more than routine 
preparation of meetings and to prevent the 
agencies from doing useful work they have 
missed an opportunity. 
35. The record of the Council's dealings with 
the agencies since the Rome declaration is easily 
described. In April 1985 it was decided that, 
in the framework of a comprehensive 
reorganisation of the existing ministerial institu-
tions in Paris, new structures would be estab-
lished under the collective title " Agencies for 
security questions". Meanwhile, the Standing 
Armaments Committee (SAC) was retained, 
while the duties of its abolished International 
Secretariat were assigned to Agency Ill. This 
Agency Ill was to assist the Council and to 
conduct studies at its request on co-operation in 
armaments questions. The new agencies have 
been operational since the beginning of 1986 and 
they have conducted a number of studies, 
including studies on several issues connected 
with arms co-operation. 
36. According to the second part of the thirty-
second annual report of the Council, Agency Ill 
has been tasked to study defence technology 
from specific viewpoints such as the impact of 
SDI or the constraints at national level on tech-
nology transfers between the Seven. Further-
more, it will have to draw up inventories of the 
various policies on co-operative equipment pro-
grammes and defence technology. 
37. The SAC did not meet in 1986. In its 
annual report, the Council mentions dryly that 
the SAC's future role in the reactivated WEU 
will be determined by the outcome of the Coun-
cil's deliberations on how WEU could provide 
political impetus in armaments co-operation, in 
accordance with the Rome declaration and the 
Bonn communique. 
38. Agency Ill has continued the routine 
activities of the SAC and its subsidiary working 
groups. Furthermore, it attended the annual 
meeting of the FINABEL Co-ordinating Com-
mittee and was represented at meetings of the 
Conference of National Armaments Directors at 
NATO Headquarters in Brussels in February, 
April and October. 
39. In a surprisingly lucid statement as part of 
its reply to Recommendation 436 (18th Nov-
ember 1986), the Council said that Agency Ill 
should maintain contact with the IEPG and the 
CNAD in order to be able to draw on their 
analyses and conclusions in its own studies, and 
to avoid unnecessarily duplicating their work. 
The agency should thus contribute to the role 
recognised for WEU by the ministers, namely, to 
provide political impetus to bodies concerned 
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with arms co-operation such as the IEPG and the 
CNAD. 
40. Consideration of three years' reflection by 
the Council with a view to avoiding WEU's 
activities overlapping with those of the IEPG 
and the CNAD and to devising a useful role for 
Agency Ill and the SAC shows that the results 
can only be called extremely feeble. The Assem-
bly does understand that it is a difficult exercise, 
as the Council pointed out in its reply to Written 
Question 271 (17th November 1986), but, with 
positive political will, more could have been 
done. 
41. Officially, a note from the Council 
regarding the division of work between the SAC 
and the IEPG, communicated to the Assembly 
on 23rd February 1978 (Document 769), is still 
valid today. It seems however that the arrange-
ments which were made on that occasion to 
ensure efficient liaison between WEU and the 
IEPG are no longer respected. 
42. In December 1985 and January 1986, Mr. 
Cahen, the Secretary-General, discussed co-
operation between the IEPG and WEU in regard 
to European armaments co-operation with the 
outgoing and incoming presidency of the IEPG, 
respectively the Dutch Minister of Defence and 
Secretary of State for Armaments and the 
Spanish Minister of Defence. At the December 
1985 discussion, the Director of Agency Ill was 
also present. 
43. In a letter to the President of the Assembly 
dated 26th February 1986 (Document 1063, 
Appendix Ill) the Secretary-General mentioned 
the results of these talks. He wrote that: " Both 
the Spanish Minister of Defence and his Nether-
lands colleague showed their interest in the 
driving role which Western European Union and 
its member countries can play in the Inde-
pendant European Programme Group. The 
Spanish minister agreed that it was important to 
maintain the necessary contacts in order to avoid 
duplication and to promote worthwhile 
co-operation. In this spirit he said that, as the 
Netherlands presidency had already done, he 
would be happy for the Chairman of the IEPG 
and the Secretary-General of WEU to meet peri-
odically and for the Director of WEU's Agency 
Ill for the development of co-operation in the 
field of armaments to hold regular meetings with 
the Chairman of the IEPG national armaments 
directors and the Chairmen of the IEPG panels, 
particularly Panel Ill, whose responsibilities 
would make such contacts especially useful. 
44. However, even after this agreement had 
been confirmed by the national armaments 
directors at their IEPG meeting in spring 1986, it 
has as yet come to nothing. The Assembly thinks 
that now that more than a year has elapsed the 
agreed procedures should be carried into effect 
without further ado. To complete this network of 
contacts, the Council, in agreement with the 
IEPG, should also arrange for Agency Ill to be 
represented at IEPG meetings at national arma-
ments director level in the same way as is already 
the case at FINABEL Co-ordinating Committee 
and CNAD meetings. 
45. As regards the studies conducted by 
Agency Ill, also in its capacity as international 
secretariat of the SAC, the Council's attitude is 
ambiguous. On 20th March 1986, in its reply to 
Written Question 262, the Council said that the 
SAC and Agency Ill were "preparing concrete 
proposals in order to provide the necessary 
political impetus for, and practical contribution 
to, the various efforts undertaken in the field of 
armaments co-operation, including those carried 
out by the IEPG ". In the thirty-second annual 
report, their work on these proposals is no longer 
mentioned. Has it been interrupted after the 
further examination of the mandates in the latter 
half of 1986? 
46. On 17th November 1986 the Council, 
answering Written Question 271, said that it was 
to undertake a process of reflection on ways of 
enhancing collaboration between the SAC and 
Agency Ill so that the SAC can help to identify 
areas of research relevant to WEU. Only at the 
end of the transitional period, i.e. 31st December 
1987, could any final conclusions be drawn. In 
the same reply, it was stated that the SAC would 
meet in the not too distant future. The thirty-
second annual report mentions in rather omi-
nous words that " a process of reflection is also 
under way on the role and future tasks of the 
SAC". 
47. At the time of writing, the SAC has not 
met since 25th October 1985 and it seems that 
nobody in the Council wants to speak openly 
about its role and future tasks. If the Council 
does want to abolish the Standing Armaments 
Committee, it is of course entitled to do so, but 
then it should take the necessary steps to make 
it clear to everybody concerned, including the 
Assembly. 
48. The Assembly can but think that the 
Council has only limited interest in the progress 
and final results of studies conducted by Agency 
Ill. Mandates are continuously under review or 
threatened with review. Very often it turns out 
that the Agency has no access to data of pri-
mordial importance for these studies while 
requests to governmental organisations on a 
national or international level are answered 
reluctantly or negatively. 
49. It is true that Mr. Cahen, the Secretary-
General, in a letter to the President of the 
Assembly on 17th March 1986, promised that 
the agencies would establish links with the 
appropriate international bodies and with natio-
nal administrations in order to guarantee the 
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availability of the information necessary for 
them. But until now there have been only few 
positive results stemming from this initiative. 
Typical of the current situation is Lord 
Carrington's answer to a question put by Mr. De 
Decker at the December 1986 session of the 
Assembly. Mr. De Decker had asked why the 
ministerial organs, especially the technical 
agencies of WEU, sometimes appeared to be 
unable to obtain the information they needed to 
discharge their functions either from the NATO 
Secretariat-General or from NATO and SHAPE 
Headquarters. Lord Carrington answered that he 
did not know of anything ever having been 
refused that was asked of him by the Secretary-
General of WEU, but if one of the sixteen 
member countries of NATO objected to a piece 
of information being passed on to WEU it would 
be impossible to pass it on. In practice, this is 
often so when information is, asked of other, and 
also national, administrations. It seems that not-
withstanding the persistent efforts of the Secre-
tary-General of WEU to achieve increased effec-
tiveness and the endeavours of the Council to 
ensure that the agencies have greater access to 
the sources of confidential information which are 
essential for the proper execution of their man-
dates, Agency Ill is encountering persistent 
problems in this field. 
50. According to the Chairman-in-Office, the 
Council at its meeting in The Hague on 27th 
October 1987 reached a consensus on the prin-
ciple that the three existing agencies should be 
merged into one under the closer authority of the 
Secretary-General and located in the same place 
as the Secretariat-General. The actual location is 
to be decided later, but a new organogram of the 
merged agencies is to be adopted before the end 
of 1987. 
51. The Assembly is firmly convinced that the 
new single agency can play a useful role in 
armaments co-operation and standardisation at 
the present juncture. According to the Secretary-
General, this was affirmed by the national arma-
ments directors when they had a meeting with 
him last May in particular on this subject. When 
they were asked however what exactly this role 
should be, they said they preferred to decide on a 
case-by-case basis. 
52. Here again, the usual reluctance of all 
established administrations to lose control of any 
subject they want to keep in their own hands can 
be clearly felt. They skilfully fend off every 
attempt to undermine their iJlterests. But it is the 
view of the Assembly that European arms co-
operation is precisely an issue where dedicated 
attention and profound study by persons with 
fewer national ties could result in proposals to 
the Council which would launch the necessary 
measures. 
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53. At their Seville meeting, the IEPG min-
isters of defence decided not to establish a per-
manent secretariat. The final communique 
issued after this meeting, however, makes it clear 
that a considerable amount of work will have to 
be done as a consequence of the EDIS report. 
The Assembly is convinced that much of this 
work could very well be done by the new agency 
along the lines set out by Mr. Fourre in a 
question he put to the Council on 8th April 1987 
(Written Question 274). The same subject was 
pursued in a question put by Mr. van der Werff 
on 27th July 1987 (Written Question 275) on the 
results of the Seville meeting in particular. 
Ill. The Independent European Programme 
Group (IEPG) 
54. The defence ministers of the thirteen 
member countries met in Seville on 22nd June 
1987 under the chairmanship of the Spanish 
Defence Minister, Narcis Serra. In this chapter, 
several of the ministers' decisions will be quoted 
and commented upon 1• 
(a) The European defence industry study 
55. At that meeting they discussed among 
other things the report "Towards a stronger 
Europe " of the independent study team which 
they had established to make proposals to 
improve the competitiveness of the European 
defence industry. This study, called the EDIS 
report, argues that Europe's international com-
petitiveness can best be secured at international 
level by opening up Europe's internal armaments 
market to a much greater degree of cross-
boundary trading and by increasing co-operative 
activity between European industries and 
European governments, particularly in defence 
research. 
56. In their final communique, the ministers 
endorsed the long-term objectives of the EDIS 
report and expressed their determination to 
develop an action plan for a step-by-step 
approach towards an open European market for 
defence equipment. 
57. While this decision in itself raises confi-
dence and a step by step approach cannot be con-
sidered unreasonable in view of its ensuing con-
sequences for the European defence industry, 
there is a lurking danger. The fact is that the min-
isters instructed their national armaments 
directors to draw up an action plan for the min-
isters to consider at their next meeting. Mean-
while however, the ministers stressed the impor-
tance of wide consultation, especially with 
1. Appendix 11 shows the tasks of the different IEPG bodies 
under the responsibility of national armaments directors. 
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European industry, in developing such an action 
plan. 
58. It is precisely this last phrase which raises 
doubts as to the serious determination of the 
ministers to go ahead as quickly as possible with 
improving the structure of Europe's defence 
industry. The commitment ofthe national arma-
ments directors to wide consultation means that 
all organisations, administrations and industries 
will be involved. There can be no doubt·that new 
recommendations and alternative proposals will 
be suggested by those who were not consulted or 
by those whose suggestions were not adopted by 
the EDIS team. It seems quite natural that such a 
duplication of the work of an independent study 
team by the national armaments directors, who 
are national representatives bound by their 
office, will considerably weaken the recommen-
dations of the EDIS team and that much pre-
cious time will again be lost. Elsewhere in this 
report (see paragraph 52) it is suggested that the 
WEU ministerial organs should be instructed to 
conduct studies connected with the IEPG min-
isters' decision to develop the abovementioned 
open European market for defence equipment. 
59. Here it should be mentioned that at the 
Delegation generale pour l'armement (DGA) in 
France consideration is being given to the pos-
sible creation of a military Eureka. The idea is to 
have a military version of the civil model by 
obtaining Community financing for certain 
upstream programmes initiated by laboratories 
and industry. A military Eureka would be based 
on the creation of specialised European consortia 
which would be the prime contractors for each 
new programme on the lines of economic 
interest groups such as Airbus industrie or 
Arianespace. The reason given is that the intro-
duction of the single market in Europe in 1992 
will disturb the national structure of the arma-
ments industry by allowing all suppliers access to 
public markets and even to national military 
markets which are now protected. In France, it is 
stressed that the cost of armaments research and 
development is high; furthermore, very rapid 
technological developments lead to a steady, sig-
nificant rise in these costs. Consequently, in all 
probability co-operation agreements will be 
increasingly inevitable for the development of 
major items of equipment. Co-operation pro-
grammes are also a means of offering more 
outlets for equipment while limiting compe-
tition. 
(b) Research and technology 
60. There was another interesting paragraph in 
the Seville communique, concerning research 
and technology, which reads as follows: 
" Ministers underlined the importance of a 
greater co-ordination of national research 
and technology efforts in Europe. They 
directed that efforts should be made to 
increase the number of co-operative 
technology projects (CTPs), including 
wherever possible technology demon-
strators and agreed that research 
co-operation needed to be developed on a 
systematic basis, concentrating upon areas 
of technological priority. Ministers also 
welcomed a report on the second Con-
ference of Directors of Research and Test 
Establishments, whose work could form a 
basis for increased co-operation in the use 
of existing facilities and in the planning of 
new investments. " 
61. As this subject has been partly dealt with 
in an earlier report and recommendation of the 
committee (Document 963 and Recommen-
dation 400, adopted by the Assembly in 
November 1983) your Rapporteur would like to 
pay closer attention to it. 
62. The EDIS report stressed that for military 
research and development, Europe is investing 
only about one-third of the United States figure. 
It recommended that Europe maintain a research 
programme which provides for a fully compre-
hensive technology base and that it address as a 
matter of priority the areas of weakness, iden-
tified in the same report. The report recognised 
the co-operative technology projects (CTPs) ini-
tiative as a useful step, but recommended that it 
be broadened and given new impetus. In the 
EDIS team's view the most important step to be 
taken to secure a significant improvement in the 
value obtained from research budgets would be 
to establish a common European research pro-
gramme, as this would be the only possible way 
to achieve a high degree of co-ordination of 
research activities. This common research pro-
gramme should be limited to general research 
and allow new technologies. Such a programme 
· should be supported by a common budget, 
starting at, for example, 100 million ECUs per 
year and gradually rising to a maximum of 
500 million ECU s per year. Moreover, your 
Rapporteur believes that for the 
research-development-test sector member states 
must adopt a selective approach to the techno-
logical courses to be explored. An exhaustive 
approach would be conceivable only in the 
framework of research specialising in a small 
number of areas, which is possible only if there is 
true European armaments co-operation. 
63. It should be noted here that in his 
December 1986 address to the Assembly, Lord 
Carrington, Secretary-General of NATO, on the 
. same lines stressed the need for European 
research and development establishments, 
multinationally paid for and multinationally 
manned, in the key equipment sectors. 
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64. The most detailed statement by the 
Council of WEU on this issue can be found in 
the final communique of its meeting in Bonn on 
22nd and 23rd April 1985, where the ministers, 
noting the increasing importance of technology, 
also affirmed the member states' determination 
to take the necessary measures within the 
European Communities to strengthen Europe's 
own technological capacity and thus achieve the 
creation of a technological cQmmunity. 
65. On this subject, the Council, at its Luxem-
bourg meeting on 27th and 28th April 1987, 
briefly stated the ministers' " resolve to continue 
their efforts towards the establishment in Europe 
of the technological and industrial base necessary 
to ensure the development of a strong and com-
petitive European armaments industry ". 
66. A comparison between the Bonn 
statement and the recent Luxembourg statement 
clearly shows that the ministers' determination 
to achieve the creation of a technological com-
munity has diminished considerably. This 
reflects the alarmingly negative developments 
taking place in the European Community pro-
grammes for research and development in the 
civilian technological sector. 
67. The European Commission has had to sur-
mount unparalleled difficulties in having its 
framework programme 1987-91 for research 
approved by the Council. For this five-year pro-
gramme, the Commission had proposed a budget 
of 7. 7 billion ECU s. There were rumours that the 
Federal Republic and the United Kingdom in 
particular preferred to spend their money on 
national research programmes. France, in prin-
ciple not unwilling to agree to the Commission's 
proposals, initially opted for solidarity with the 
Federal Republic and the United Kingdom, but 
later agreed to a compromis~. negotiated by the 
Belgian presidency, and was soon followed by 
the Federal Republic. 
68. The compromise, reached in March 1987, 
to which eleven member states but not the 
United Kingdom agreed, involved a dotation of 
5.4 billion ECUs for the years 1987-91. The 
United Kingdom Government wanted a sum of 
about 400 million ECUs less. On 23rd July 1987, 
however, the United Kingdom lifted its veto and 
the Council accepted the earlier compromise 
without discussion. There will now be a dotation 
of 5.396 billion ECUs for the five-year pro-
gramme plus 1.084 billion ECUs for programmes 
already agreed upon or under way. 
69. The only conclusion the Assembly would 
like to draw here is that in the IEPG as well as in 
the European Community there is obviously still 
a lack of political will and courage to develop the 
common European technological programmes 
which are so badly needed to prevent Europe 
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soon becoming increasingly dependent on the 
United States and Japan in this area. 
70. The Committee on Scientific, Techno-
logical and Aerospace Questions, concerned 
about these negative developments, is planning 
to hold a colloquy in London in spring 1988 on 
European co-operation in armaments research 
and development. At this colloquy, the com-
mittee will try to emphasise strongly the need for 
common programmes. 
(c) Support for countries with 
less-developed defence industries 
71. The defence ministers in Seville repeated 
that it was a long-standing objective of the IEPG 
to support the development of the industrial and 
technological bases of member countries with 
less-developed defence industries (LDDI) in 
order that they may be able to participate as 
partners in co-operative projects and contribute 
more effectively to the defence capability of the 
alliance. 
72. The ministers agreed to a number of mea-
sures to improve this support in practice. One of 
these measures mentioned in the final 
communique was: " in order to encourage the 
development of competitive industries and to 
make the best use of the resources available to 
the IEPG countries as a whole, conditions will be 
created to allow appropriate industries from the 
LDDI countries to compete more successfully in 
the national procurement projects of other 
nations and for orders under collaborative pro-
grammes. The participation of industries from 
LDDI countries in joint ventures will also be 
encouraged. " 
73. It will be very interesting to hear from the 
Council the exact nature of the conditions 
referred to in this decision. It looks, however, as 
if here the conditions which are going to be intro-
duced are precisely those which have been the 
main cause of the serious disease of Europe's 
defence industry which the IEPG now is trying to 
control. 
74. The Assembly welcomes one of the other 
decisions taken within the same framework, i.e.: 
" Arrangements will be made to stimulate the 
participation of the LDDI countries in 
co-operative research and technology projects in 
order to give them access to the latest defence 
technology. " 
(d) Equipment co-operation 
75. The ministers stated that since their last 
meeting in April 1986 staff targets had been 
agreed upon: a medium surface-to-air missile 
(MSAM), an active dipping sonar, light support 
weapons, a coastal minesweeper and microwave 
landing systems. 
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(e) General conclusion 
76. It cannot be denied that the IEPG is a very 
useful forum where ministers show their will to 
achieve positive developments in armaments 
co-operation. Nevertheless, many high-level 
persons in closely-connected organisations and 
industries willingly recognise that not enough 
progress is being made by far. The Assembly is 
well aware that in these matters the ministers 
concerned are divided between conflicting 
interests. But more painful and politically 
unpopular measures have to be taken in the 
fairly near future if ministers really wish to attain 
the goal they say they are aiming at. 
IV. The 1985 Nunn amendment 
77. In the autumn of 1985, the United States 
Congress adopted an amendment to the National 
Defence Authorisation Act for fiscal year 1986, 
sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn, William Roth 
and John Warner, setting aside $200 million, 
specifically and exclusively to be used for 
co-operative research and development projects 
for defence equipment with other members of 
the North Atlantic Alliance. At the same time, an 
amount of $50 million was made available for 
co-operative testing of allied defence equipment. 
This initiative certainly is an unequivocal 
Atlantic endorsement of armaments 
co-operation as a vehicle for achieving the 
modernisation of NATO conventional forces 
through equitable burden-sharing among 
members of the alliance. Furthermore, it is com-
pletely in accordance with the conventional 
defence improvement (CDI) effort, adopted by 
the North Atlantic Council to restore the con-
ventional force balance between NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact. 
78. Projects under this initiative are to be joint 
efforts, established by formal agreement between 
the United States and one or more of the other 
NATO nations, while United States funds for 
such projects are to be spent in the United States. 
Candidate projects may be bi- or multilateral. 
Understandably enough, bilateral projects tend 
to be favoured, as they are easier to negotiate and 
to manage. In practice, however, the majority of 
the projects are multilateral. 
79. The most appealing and innovative 
feature of this Nunn initiative is the deliberate 
objective of having participating industries and 
countries involved at the research and devel-
opment stage at the very outset so that any 
project could grow up on a co-operative basis 
from the beginning. 
80. Also, in European arms co-operation pro-
grammes, there has been the specific and widely-
recognised complaint that they begin too late in 
the process, when various defence contractors 
have already made large investments in the same 
kind of project and too many people in both pol-
itics and administration have become closely 
involved. 
81. The IEPG nations proposed six candidates 
for co-operation, out of which four eventually 
received Nunn funding in 1986: the 155mm 
autonomous precision-guided munition, the 
NATO frigate replacement, the NATO identifi-
cation system and surveillance and target acqui-
sition which is embodied in the American, 
British and French airborne radar demonstrator 
system. 
82. There should certainly be no doubts about 
the positive intentions behind this Nunn initi-
ative, but the success of it should also give 
European governments a warning. In this case a 
realistic programme, backed by enough money 
and also made attractive by early involvement in 
the research and development stage, attracted 
many European countries and funds right from 
the beginning. If IEPG does not want to be out-
stripped by appealing transatlantic initiatives, it 
should really act quickly and courageously. WEU 
member countries, with their hard core of 
Europe's defence industry, should take the lead 
without delay if they do not wish to be the losers 
in arms co-operation. 
83. Even within NATO there is some concern 
that the member states are focusing too much 
attention on the Nunn projects, while there are a 
lot of other co-operative projects that are just as 
important but not visible. A drawback of the 
Nunn projects was to focus attention exclusively 
to the detriment of other, European, projects. 
V. European helicopter programmes 
84. This subject was dealt with extensively in 
a recent report by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of 
this committee (Document 1077, November 
1986). Here, it should be enough to mention only 
the current position or latest developments in 
these programmes. 
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in-flight shooting in all weather and day and 
night conditions. Visionics will be mast-
mounted in the anti-tank version, which will be 
equipped with air-to-air missiles derived from 
the Matra Mistral. The anti-tank version will ini-
tially be equipped with Hot anti-tank missiles. 
Later, it will be equipped with a new-generation 
fire-and-forget anti-tank missile, called Trigat. 
This Trigat missile will be developed by France, 
the Federal Republic and the United Kingdom. 
An intergovernmental agreement on this subject 
will be signed in October 1987. The Federal 
Republic is planning to order 212 anti-tank heli-
copters (PAH). France will order 140 anti-tank 
helicopters and 75 anti-helicopter-helicopters 
(HAP), a one-man machine. 
(b) Anglo-/talian EH-101 
86. The first EH-101 had its roll-out at Yeovil 
on 7th April1987, while the fllfst flight took place 
on 9th October 1987. Full-climate certification of 
the civil/military utility aircraft is planned for 
September 1991. 
87. Canada is likely to be the first foreign cus-
tomer, with an order of about 50 EH-101 heli-
copters in the naval version, following the results 
of the Canadian navy's new shipborne aircraft 
competition. It is expected that the British Royal 
Navy will order 50 and the Italian navy 42 
EH-101 in the naval version. The British general 
staff have made a reappraisal of their future tac-
tical troop transporter helicopter requirements 
and as a result settled for the utility version of 
the EH-101 instead of the NH-90. Consequently, 
the British Ministry of Defence ordered 25 utility 
EH-lOls for the army in April 1987. It is said 
that even this additional order is not sufficient 
for Westland to bridge the gap until the EH-101 
production line starts up in the early 1990s. 
Westland and Agusta, the manufacturers, expect 
eventual sales to be at least 1000 military and 
civil EH-lOls. 
(c) NH-90 
88. A feasibility and predefinition study was 
conducted by the five imitial participating 
(a) Franco-German PAH/HAP battlefield helicopter nations, France (Aerospatiale), the Federal 
Republic (MBB), Italy (Agusta), the Netherlands 
85. On 16th July 1987, the French and West- (Fokker) and the United Kingdom (Westland), 
German Ministers of Defence announced that in from September 1985 to November 1986. As a 
November 1987 their countries would sign a result of this study, a choice was made for a fly-
final agreement concerning the production of a by-wire helicopter with mission weights of7.5 to 
common battlefield helicopter for both armies, 9 metric tons, depending on whether the NH-90 
to come into service after 1997. This will be a is used for the tactical transport helicopter 
helicopter with 5.4 tonnes start weight, twin- mission or the NATO frigate helicopter role. The 
engined with a crew of two people in tandem helicopter will be powered by two Rolls-Royce 
seats. The helicopter will be equipped with Turbomeca RTM-322 or General Electric 
European-made visionics and optronics for CT-7-6 turboshaft engines. In December 1986, 
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these five nations gave approval for the defi-
nition phase to be launched on 1st May 1987. 
The start of the definition phase was delayed in 
April 1987 after the announcement by the 
United Kingdom Government that it had 
decided to withdraw officially from the pro-
gramme. In June 1987, however, the four 
remaining partners reached an agreement on a 
new division of tasks. This was followed by the 
launching of the definition phase on 5th June 
1987. The development phase will be launched 
at the end of 1988 with the first flight expected to 
take place at the end of 1991 and first deliveries 
in 1995. NATO requirements are estimated at 
700 NH-90 helicopters. Export and civilian ver-
sions included, the producers hope to sell more 
than 1000 helicopters by the year 2005. 
(d) Tonal A-129 Mk 2 light attack helicopter 
89. The four partners - Westland (38%), 
Agusta (38%), Fokker (19%) and Casa (5%)- are 
continuing the feasibility and cost studies, which 
should be concluded by the end of 1988, and will 
then proceed to the definition phase. The pro-
gramme is managed by the Joint European Heli-
copter Company, established in Rome. However 
little has been settled about the Tonal configu-
ration, it will certainly have to be able to carry a 
full day- and night-sighting system, an adequate 
number of Trigat anti-tank missiles and other · 
operational sytems, including electronic counter-
measures. The requirements of the participating 
nations are now estimated at 125 for the United 
Kingdom, 90 for Italy and 70 each for the Neth-
erlands and Spain. According to the present 
schedule, the first flight should take place in 
1991, and the helicopter will come into service in 
1995. 
IV. Future European fighter aircraft 
90. A full report by Mr. Wilkinson (Document 
1037, November 1985) was submitted to the 
Assembly two years ago. Since then, there have 
been new developments which will be mentioned 
below. It should be noted, however, that the 
current situation is still far from clear. 
(a) European fighter aircraft (EFA) 
91. At the Farnborough air show in September 
1986, British Aerospace presented its experi-
mental aircraft programme (EAP) fighter, a dem-
onstrator which is being used as an airborne 
testbed in the development programme for the 
EFA. 
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92. Meanwhile, the companies participating in 
the EFA programme, British Aerospace, MBB, 
Dornier, Aeritalia and Casa, had established 
Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug GmbH in Munich. At 
the time of writing (August 1987) officials of 
Eurofighter and Panavia (the producer of 
Tornado) are exploring a possible restructuring 
of the EF A programme under the existing 
Panavia management organisation in order to 
eliminate redundant staff and to take advantage 
of Panavia's co-operative project experience. 
Since February 1987, representatives of the four 
participating governments have been grouped in 
the NATO European Fighter Management 
Agency (NEFMA). 
93. With a view to developing the EJ-200 
engine for the EFA, Rolls-Royce (United 
Kingdom), Motoren- und Turbinen Union 
(Federal Republic), Fiat Aviazione (Italy) and 
Sener {Spain) have formed the Eurojet con-
sortium. 
94. At this moment two consortia are com-
peting for the radar equipment. A Ferranti-led 
consortium is developing the entirely European 
ECR-90 radar, while the other consortium with 
AEG and Hughes is developing a special version 
of the Hughes APG-65 radar. 
95. Each country is participating in the 
EF A development programme proportionally 
according to the number of aircraft it is expecting 
to buy, i.e. Federal Republic and United 
Kingdom 33% each (250 aircraft), Italy 21% 
(between 150 and 200 aircraft) and Spain 13% 
(between 75 and 100 aircraft). 
96. It should be noted that some partners have 
expressed their concern over rising costs in the 
programme. In the United Kingdom, budget 
constraints might force the RAF to halve its 
initial requirement of about 260 aircraft, while 
the ground attack version of the EF A could be 
abandoned in favour of the McDonnell Douglas/ 
British Aerospace Harrier GR Mk 5. In the 
Federal Republic many questions are being put 
about the rising costs of the programme. Just 
when the budget is becoming tighter, the EF A 
programme needs more funding and is having to 
compete for it with other programmes. 
97. Originally, the deadline for beginning full-
scale development had been fixed at spring 1986, 
but in the meantime there have been important 
delays. The definition phase has been extended 
into a definition refinement and risk reduction 
phase, which will continue until January 1988 
and perhaps longer. 
98. At the time of writing, the EFA is expected 
to enter into service in early 1998, three years 
later than initially planned. 
(b) Ra/ale future combat aircraft 
99. After long hesitation, the French Gov-
ernment in June 1987 ordered the development 
of a future combat aircraft for the French forces, 
to be derived from the Dassault-Breguet Rafale 
demonstrator. This future combat aircraft, also 
called avion de combat europeen (ACE), with an 
empty weight of 8.5 tons, will be powered by two 
SNECMA M-88 engines now being developed. 
The French Government is said to attach the 
greatest importance to the use of stealth tech-
niques, which make its detection by enemy radar 
difficult. The ACE should make its first flight in 
1990 and enter into service in 1996. 
100. It is hoped in France that it will be pos-
sible to produce the ACE in co-operation with 
other countries, especially Belgium, Denmark, 
the Netherlands and Norway, which will have to 
replace their F-16As and did not join the EFA 
programme. Export to other countries is also 
envisaged. For this purpose, Dassault-Breguet, 
Thomson, SNECMA, and Electronique Serge 
Dassault set up ACE International, a company 
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which IS actively seeking international 
partners. 
101. There are problems, however, concerning 
the replacement of the French carrier-based 
fighters Etendard, Super-Etendard and Crusader. 
Dassault-Breguet is developing a naval version 
of the ACE, the a vi on de collllbat marine (ACM), 
which will not be ready until 1996, while the 
expected service life of the Crusaders will expire 
in 1993. French defence officials now say that a 
decision to upgrade the Crusaders or to buy the 
American F/A-18 Hornet must be made by 1988. 
102. Dassault-Breguet will meet heavy compe-
tition from the United States since General 
Dynamics has proposed an upgraded version of 
the F-16, called Agile Falcon, which could be 
produced jointly with other allied users, among 
which the four abovementioned European 
nations. At the same time, McDonnell Douglas 
is actively seeking buyers for the Super Hornet, 
an improved and more manreuvrable version of 
the F/A-18. Both these initiatives are strongly 
supported by the United States Defence 
Department. 
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APPENDIX I 
Programmes under the Nunn initiative 
Ada project support environment: United States, Canada, United Kingdom, France, West 
Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Italy. 
Airborne stand-off radar demonstrator system (ARDS): United States, United Kingdom, France. 
Multi-functional information distribution system (MIDS): United States, Canada, United 
Kingdom, France, West Germany, Belgium, Norway, Italy. 
155 mm autonomous precision guided munition: United States, Canada, United Kingdom, France, 
West Germany, Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Turkey. 
NATO identification system (NIS): United States, Canada, United Kingdom, France, West 
Germany, Belgium, Norway, Italy, Greece, Turkey. 
Modular stand-off weapon: United States, Canada, United Kingdom, France, West Germany, 
Spain, Italy. 
Advanced sea mine: United States, United Kingdom. 
Enhanced fighter manreuvrability: United States, West Germany. 
Advanced short take-off and vertical landing technology: United States, United Kingdom. 
Battlefield information collection and exploitation system (DICES): United States, United 
Kingdom, Italy, Spain. 
HAWK mobility enhancement: United States, Netherlands. 
NATO frigate replacement- 1990s (NFR 90): United States, Canada, United Kingdom, France, 
West Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Spain, Italy. 
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Panel I 
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APPENDIX II 
Tasks of the different IEPG bodies under the responsibility of national 
ar~a~ents directors 
Identifies opportunities for co-operation. Once an opportunity is identified, an explanatory group 
is set up to try to draw up an outline European staff target (OEST). 
Panel !I 
Its main task is to oversee the project groups which are responsible for launching concrete projects 
and steering them through the stages of feasibility, development and production. Some projects are 
developed from OESTs agreed in Panel I, others are introduced into the IEPG at a later stage. 
Panel Ill 
Responsible for the procedures which govern co-operation within the IEPG. In recent years, Panel 
Ill, through one of its sub-groups, has also taken on responsibility for co-operation in defence research 
and technology, by establishing the co-operative technology projects (CTPs). Also, as a result of the last 
IEPG ministerial meeting in Seville, Panel Ill has seen its activities enlarged with the creation this year 
of a new sub-group to monitor the implementation, as well as to identify new measures to allow those 
nations with less-developed defence industries (LDDI) to participate more fully in the European 
armament activities, and with the creation of three ad hoc groups to draft an action plan on EDIS 
(European defence industry study). 
Staff group 
Based in Brussels, it provides a forum for co-ordination among IEPG nations between meetings 
of ministers and NADs, particularly with regard to the transatlantic dialogue, and it has an important 
role in making preparations for high-level meetings. 
European defence industry group (EDIG) 
Constituted by industrialists, it is an advisory body which collaborates with the IEPG giving 
advice on industrial subjects. 
Task force C3 
This non-permanent group has been established to study the possibility of developing a 
" European data distribution system " (EDDS) to cope with the existing needs in the field of command, 
control and communications (C3). 
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Amendments 1 and 2 
European armaments co-operation -
2nd December 1987 
reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENTS 1 and 2 1 
tabled by MM. Bassinet and Fourre 
1. After paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows: 
"Welcoming the organisation in 1988 of a first European defence study session to advance 
knowledge of the European dimensions of security matters; " 
2. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows: 
'' Instruct the Secretariat-General to ensure periodical meetings of European defence study ses-
sions and to co-ordinate national initiatives in this connection with a view to setting up a 
European defence research institute as soon as possible. " 
1. See 12th sitting, 3rd December 1987 (amendments agreed to). 
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Document 1120 
DRAFT SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY BUDGET 
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE 
5th November 1987 
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1987 1 
submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 2 
by Mr. Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur 
APPENDICES 
I. Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Assembly, 15th July 
1987 
II. Letter from the President of the Assembly to the Secretary-General, 27th July 
1987 
1. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Linster (Chairman); Mr. Sinesio (Alternate: Gianotti), Mrs. Pack (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. 
Beysen (Alternate : Ramaekers), Mrs. Blunck (Alternate : Ahrens), MM. Bohl, Chartron, Declercq, Dhaille, Dame Peggy Fenner, 
MM. Ferrari Aggradi, Freeson (Alternate: Woodall), de Jong, Klejdzinski, Morris, Oehler, Pollidoro, Rathbone, Rauti, Worrell 
(Alternate: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman), Mr. Zierer. 
N.B. : The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in Italics. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
1. In his letter dated 15th July 1987 (reference VII.37, see Appendix I) the Secretary-General of 
WEU informed the President of the Assembly of the Council's discussions on the implementation of the 
decision taken by the ministers in Luxembourg on 28th April1987. He said the Council has noted" that 
the separation of the pensions budget from the operating budget would release an amount which, for 
1987, might allow it to consider agreeing to a supplementary budget of not more than F 250 000 ". 
2. This second supplementary budget for the financial year 1987 has been prepared for the specific 
purpose of meeting this decision by the Council. It takes account of the Assembly's needs that could not 
be covered in the ordinary budget although they had priority in the framework of the Assembly's activ-
ities for 1987. This supplementary budget amounts to F 178 230 and does not use the entire sum ofF 
250 000 made available to the Assembly by the Council. The fact is that at this stage of the financial year 
it is difficult to implement programmes held over for financial reasons or new programmes requiring 
lengthy preparation and many contacts. This is the case, for instance, of the visit to Iceland and Canada 
by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. When the Presidential Committee authorised 
this visit, planned some time earlier subject to the possibility of financing it, only the visit to Canada 
proved feasible, the visit to Iceland having been cancelled by the Icelandic authorities because of unfore-
seeable circumstances that had occurred in the meantime. 
3. The sums requested relate to three heads in the budget, i.e. Heads I, II and V. 
4. A sum ofF 35 000 has been included under Sub-Heads 1, 2 and 3 of Head I for the creation, as 
from 15th October 1987, of a grade B3 post of bookkeeper. In his letter to the Secretary-General dated 
27th July 1987 (see Appendix II), the President of the Assembly stressed that the protracted absence for 
health reasons of the Assembly's only accountant had brought about a crisis which, in spite of the efforts 
made by the staff of the Office of the Clerk, could but jeopardise the running of the administrative 
service. The creation of the Grade B3 post of bookkeeper therefore seems a vital necessity. 
5. Supplementary credits have been requested under Head II, as follows: 
- in Sub-Head 7 (F 60 000) and Sub-Head 9 (F 15 000) for interpretation expenses for carrying 
out the programme of work of the various committees, approved by the Presidential Com-
mittee. This includes the visit by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to 
Canada which was held over; 
- in Sub-Head 8 (F 30 000) to allow the Office of the Clerk to recruit between now and the end of 
the year the temporary staff needed to operate the administrative service in view of the 
problems set out above, to assist in the private office of the President and to meet the require-
ments of the committee service (including the organisation of a colloquy to be held in London 
early next year). 
6. Finally, a sum ofF 40 000 has been requested under Sub-Head 24 of Head V to meet expenditure 
relating to journeys and visits by the President in the exercise of his duties and the protocol visits he is 
to make to the authorities of the WEU member countries following his election. 
7. The total supplementary budget amounts to F 180 000 which, in view of an increase in receipts of 
F 1 770 (contribution of the new grade B3 official to the pension scheme), represents an increase in con-
tributions by member countries of F 178 230. 
8. As a result of the proposed new credits set out in the present supplementary budget, the 
Assembly's financial position for 1987 is modified as follows: 
Operating budget Pensions budget TOTAL 
Estimates for 1987 
(1st revision) ................ 17 120 975 1 057 050 18178025 
Supplementary estimates ..... 180 000 - 1 770 178 230 
New total for 1987 .......... 17 300 975 1 055 280 18 356 255 
Budget for 1986 ............. 16 572 000 546 700 17 118 700 
Modified increase in the 1987 
budget compared with 1986 .. 4.39% 93.02% 7.22% 
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Budget estimates of the Assembly 
for the financial year 1987 (second revision) 
Heads and sub-heads 
Head I - Permanent staff 
SuB-HEAD: 
1 - Basic salaries ......................... . 
2 - Allowances ........................... . 
3 - Social charges ........................ . 
4 - Expenses relating to the recruitment and 
departure of permanent officials ....... . 
5 - Medical examination ................. . 
Total ................................ . 
Head /1- Temporary staff 
SuB-HEAD: 
6 - Staff recruited for sessions ............. . 
7 - Interpretation staff required for Assembly 
work between sessions ................ . 
8 - Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk 
9 - Social charges ........................ . 
Total ................................ . 
Head Ill - Expenditure on premises and 
equipment 
SuB-HEAD: 
10 - Share of joint expenditure on the Paris 
premises ............................. . 
11 - Hire of committee rooms ............. . 
12 - Technical and other installations for 
Assembly sessions .................... . 
13 - Various services for the organisation of 
sessions .............................. . 
14 - Maintenance of the premises of the Office 
of the Clerk .......................... . 
15 - Purchase or repair of Office furniture .. . 
16 - Purchase of reproduction and other office 
equipment ........................... . 
17 - Hire and maintenance of reproduction and 
other office equipment ................ . 
Total ................................ . 
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Budget 
for 1987 -
(1st revision) 
7 180 000 
1 329 900 
1 379 700 
25 000 
8 000 
9 922 600 
2 111 875 
456 000 
50000 
87 000 
2 704 875 
450 000 
15 000 
345 000 
45 000 
18 000 
28 000 
32 300 
366 700 
1 300 000 
Supplementary 
budget 
26000 
4000 
5 000 
-
-
35 000 
60000 
30000 
15 000 
105 000 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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Budget 
for 1987-
(2nd revision) 
7 206 000 
1 333 900 
1 384 700 
25 000 
8 000 
9 957 600 
2111875 
516 000 
80 000 
102 000 
2 809 875 
450 000 
15 000 
345 000 
45 000 
18 000 
28 000 
32 300 
366 700 
1 300 000 
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Heads and sub-heads 
Head IV- General administrative costs 
Sus-HEAD: 
18 - Postage, telephone, telex and transport of 
documents ........................... . 
19 - Duplication paper, headed writing paper 
Budget 
for 1987 -
(1st revision) 
480 000 
Supplementary 
budget 
Budget 
for 1987-
(2nd revision) 
480 000 
and other office supplies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258 000 - 258 000 
20 - Printing and publication of documents . . 1 190 000 - 1 190 000 
21 - Purchase of documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 000 - 60 000 
22 - Official cars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 000 - 115 000 
23 - Bank charges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 500 - 500 
r---------~~--------_,----------~ 
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 103 500 - 2 103 500 
Head V - Other expenditure 
Sus-HEAD: 
24 - Travelling and subsistence allowances and 
insurance for the President of the 
Assembly, chairmen of committees and 
rapporteurs .......................... . 
25 - Expenses for representation ............ . 
26 - Committee study missions ............ . 
27 - Official journeys of members of the Office 
of the Clerk .......................... . 
28 - Expenses of experts and the auditor .... . 
29 - Expenditure on information ........... . 
30 - Expenses for political groups .......... . 
31 - Contingencies and other expenditure not 
elsewhere provided for ................ . 
32 - Non-recoverable taxes ................ . 
Total ................................ . 
OPERATING BUDGET •.••.....•..•....•... 
RECEIPTS ...•...............•.........• 
NET TOTAL OPERATING BUDGET .•....•....• 
PENSIONS .................•............ 
RECEIPTS ....••..•.........•..•....••.. 
NET TOTAL PENSIONS BUDGET ..•........... 
NET TOTAL BUDGET .........•.......•.... 
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130 000 
200 000 
5 000 
350 000 
70000 
311 000 
311 000 
3000 
20000 
1400 000 
17 430 975 
310 000 
17120975 
1 486 050 
429 000 
1 057 050 
18 178 025 
40000 
40000 
180 000 
180 000 
1 770 
- 1 770 
178 230 
170 000 
200 000 
5000 
350 000 
70000 
311000 
311 000 
3 000 
20000 
1440 000 
17610975 
310 000 
17300975 
1 486 050 
430 770 
1 055 280 
18 356 255 
APPENDIX I DOCUMENT 1120 
APPENDIX I 
Letter from the Secretary-General to 
the President of the Assembly, 15th July 1987 
Dear President, 
Thank you for your letter of22nd June 1987 enclosing a note on the application ofthe principle of 
the Assembly's budgetary autonomy. The Council notes that the funds available to WEU come from 
contributions by member countries. It has to take account of the fact that in attributing financial means 
to international organisations, the governments of member countries have a degree of responsibility 
regarding supervision of the management of resources. 
Bound by this principle, the Council read with the closest attention this note which very usefully 
clarifies a number of questions. It was taken especially into account in the deliberations of the Council 
on the implementation of the conclusions reached by the Ministers on 28th April last on separating the 
pensions budget from the operating budget of the Assembly as well as the latter's budgetary autonomy. 
On this question, the Council agrees that, for the management of its future budgets, the Assembly 
may transfer funds between Heads II, Ill, IV and V without the prior agreement of the Council being 
necessary. Such agreement will be necessary, however, for any transfer concerning Head I. All the other 
procedures relating to the establishment of the budget and its management remain unchanged. 
The overall budget of the Assembly, without pensions, will of course have to take account of the 
growth rate accepted by the seven member countries. 
In this light, the presentation by the Assembly of detailed draft budgets remains as before and it is 
consequently more than desirable for a representative of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly to be 
able to continue to take part in meetings of the Budget and Organisation Committee when these drafts 
are examined. 
Supplementary budgets are necessarily subjected to the same procedures as ordinary budgets. 
The calculations made by the Council allow it to note that the separation of the pensions budget 
from the operating budget would release an amount which, for 1987, might allow it to consider agreeing 
to a supplementary budget of not more than F 250 000. 
The restructuring of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly - which had already been set out in a 
letter and a memorandum from your predecessor - falls within the context of Head I of the budget. 
Having examined these documents, the Council decided " that the proposals contained in the document 
(memorandum) need to be considered as part of the review, during the transitional period, of the 
structure of the whole organisation, and cannot therefore be tackled separately". I had the honour to 
inform Mr. Jean-Marie Caro of this in a letter dated 23rd February and to specify, in another dated 28th 
May, that " this decision remains fully valid for all the governments and was in no way modified at the 
lunch of the Ministers on 28th April". 
In these conditions, the possible creation of new posts can be contemplated only in the framework 
of the structure of the whole organisation. Likewise, pending a decision on the new table of estab-
lishment, all the promotions made must be considered as measures taken in a personal capacity. 
The Council keenly hopes that these clarifications will allow a harmonious application of the con-
clusions reached by the Ministers on 28th April, and this to the satisfaction of the Assembly, and will 
allow the positive nature of its relations with the latter to be strengthened. 
Mr. C. GoERENs, 
President, 
Assembly of Western European Union 
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Yours sincerely, 
Alfred CAHEN 
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Sir, 
APPENDIX II 
Letter from the President of the Assembly to 
the Secretary-General, 27th July 1987 
APPENDIX II 
Thank you for your letter of 15th July 1987 further to my letter of 3rd June and the notes on the 
Assembly's budgetary autonomy that I sent you on 5th and 22nd June. It has been examined attentively 
by the Presidential Committee, which agreed unanimously to make the following remarks. 
The Assembly's steering body can but agree on the need for government supervision of the man-
agement, in international organisations, of funds vo!ed by parliaments. It considers, however, that 
application of this principle should be reconciled with the fact that the establishment, by the modified 
Brussels Treaty, of a parliamentary body in WEU would lose its justification and meaning if the 
Assembly did not have political independence, the implications of which at the level ofbudgetary man-
agement were set out in the memorandum of 22nd June. 
The Assembly therefore expresses its satisfaction at the recognition, in the framework of its bud-
getary autonomy, ofthe possibility oftransferring funds between Heads II to V of its budget without the 
prior agreement of the Council. In regard to Head I, it should be pointed out that since these amounts 
are attributed to permanent staff they cannot in principle be increased or reduced during the financial 
year. 
Unlike the ministerial organs of WEU, the Assembly cannot allow posts to remain vacant, 
thereby increasing the amounts available for its work, since such a practice would be contrary to the 
rules governing the establishment of its budget. For the same reasons, it cannot reduce its work in order 
to create a post not included in the budget. Hence no transfer of funds should be considered between 
heads relating to the activities of the Assembly and those relating to the remuneration of its permanent 
staff except for technical adjustments involving minor amounts. 
The urgent issue now facing the Assembly is that of the shortcomings in the present structure of 
the Office of the Clerk. The Assembly considers that the specific problems still to be solved cannot 
remain outstanding pending " the review, during the transitional period, of the structure of the whole 
organisation". Indeed, the Assembly is at present without an accountancy service due to the protracted 
absence for health reasons of its only accountant. The inadequate number of staff in the administrative 
service has already been amply emphasised. The crisis that was to be feared has occurred. In spite of the 
efforts made by the staff of the Office of the Clerk, the absence of an accountant is now jeopardising the 
running of this service. The creation of the grade B3 post ofbookkeeper that the Assembly hoped to be 
able to fill on 1st September of this year therefore seems a vital necessity. 
By underlining the urgency of finding a solution to this problem, the Presidential Committee is 
not renouncing the creation of other posts. This matter will be dealt with as a whole when the budget fo·r 
the financial year 1988 is prepared. Head I of that budget will be based on the note relating to the 
structure of the Office of the Clerk. 
The Presidential Committee wishes to stress again the importance of one aspect of this structure. 
This is the sharing out of the duties of assistant to the Clerk between an assistant responsible for political 
matters and the committees and an assistant responsible for administrative and financial matters, both 
at grade A6. The Council agreed to the appointment of two assistants to the Clerk with this grade in 
1981. When the present holder of the post of assistant responsible for political matters retires at the end 
of this year, the Secretary of the General Affairs Committee, who will replace him in that capacity, 
should be given the same grade. 
The Assembly also wishes to raise again the question of methods of calculating the overall 
amount of its budget. There is too often a considerable difference between the theoretical growth rate of 
the overall budget which should in principle compensate for the effects of expected inflation and the real 
growth rate in the cost of services and equipment paid for by the Assembly. If such a difference occurs 
several years running, as has already happened in the past, it results in a substantial reduction in the 
overall budget in real terms. 
The case this year is that a 2% growth rate was fixed for calculating the Assembly's operating 
budget following the separation of the pensions budget, although it is apparent that price increases in 
France will be far higher than this rate. 
The Assembly therefore considers that the problem of fixing the nominal growth rate of its overall 
budget without pensions remains and should be studied in depth. 
H.E. Mr. Alfred CAHEN, 
Secretary -General, 
Western European Union 
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I have the honour to be, 
Sir, 
Your obedient Servant, 
Charles GoERENS 
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Draft second supplementary budget of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 
Opinion of the Council 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Opinion of the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee 
(Document C-B (87) 16) 
Opinion of the Council (Letter from the Deputy Secretary-
General of WEU dated 20th November 1987) 
Table showing modifications approved by the Council 
Secretary-General's note 1 
WEU Assembly second supplementary budget for 1987 
1. The WEU Assembly second supplementary budget for 1987 (Assembly document A/WEU/BA 
(87) 12) was distributed under reference B (87) 24 and was examined by the Budget and Organisation 
Committee at its meeting on 11th, 12th and 13th November 1987 (BR (87) 3, 11- to be circulated). 
2. It is recalled that the first supplementary budget was the subject of document C-B (87) 
12 forwarded to the Council for approval on 7th October 1987. The following figures summarise the 
effect of both budgets: 
Operating Pensions Total budget budget 
(F) (F) (F) 
1987 approved estimates ...................... 16 654 375 942 000 17 596 375 
First supplementary budget 0 0 0 •• 0 •• 0 0. 0 ••• 0. 0. 466 600 115 050 581 650 
Sub-total • 0 ••• 0 0 0 •• 0 0. 0 0 •••• 0 0 0 0 •••• 0 0 ••• 17120975 1 057 050 18 178 025 
Second supplementary budget •• 0 0 0 •••• 0. 0 •••• 180 000 (-) 1 770 178 230 
New total for 1987 ....................... 17 300 975 1 055 280 18 356 255 
Totals for 1986 0 0 ••• 0 0 0 •••• 0 0. 0 0 ••••• 0 0 •• 16 572 700 546 000 17 118 700 
Increase for 1987 
over 1986 ••••••• 0 •••• 0 ••••••••• 0. 0 ••• 0 0 0 0 •• 0 4.39% 93.02% 7.22% 
3. The second supplementary budget's explanatory memorandum recalled that the Council had 
agreed to grant the Assembly additional funds of not more than F 250 000 as a result of the ministerial 
decision to allow the separation of the pensions budget for the purpose of zero-growth considerations. 
The memorandum gave reasons for the fact that the Assembly was not asking for the full amount but 
only F 178 230. 
4. Members of the Budget and Organisation Committee could not contest the Assembly's justifi-
cation for this budget, but observed that the Council's willingness to grant the additional F 250 000 had 
to be considered in the light of the amount ofF 581 650 sought in the first supplementary budget. The 
combined increase ofF 759 880 had certainly not been anticipated and was substantially in excess ofthe 
increase intended by the Council. The committee felt obliged, therefore, to seek some reductions in this 
second supplementary budget. 
1. Document C-B (87) 16, 16th November 1987. 
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5. The committee's recommendations were as follows: 
Head I - Permanent staff 
Delegates could not support the proposal to increase the permanent establishment by one 
B3 (book-keeper) as from 15th October and recommended the withdrawal of the total of F 35 000 in 
Head I foreseen for this post. The Assembly's representative observed that a consequence would be the 
elimination of the sum ofF 1 770 by which pension income would otherwise be increased in the pension 
section of the budget. 
The committee agreed to re-examine this proposal in the context ofthe 1988 budget (see C-B (87) 
15). 
Head II- Temporary staff 
The committee proposed to reduce the amounts sought as shown below: 
Sub-Head 7- Interpretation staff 
Reduce by F 10 000 from F 60 000 to F 50 000. 
Sub-Head 8- Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk 
Reduce by F 20 000 from F 30 000 to F 10 000. 
Sub-Head 9- Social charges 
Reduce by F 5 000 from F 15 000 to F 10 000. 
The total reductions in Head II amounted to F 35 000. 
Head V - Other expenditure 
Sub-Head 24- Travelling and subsistence allowances for the President, chairmen of committees, 
etc. 
The committee proposed a reduction ofF 10 000 from F 40 000 to F 30 000. 
The total of these reductions in Heads I to V came to F 80 000, amending the total requested 
therein from F 180 000 to F 100 000. That figure, after taking out the additional pension income 
foreseen (F 1 770) that was associated with the new B3 post, also represented the amended total of the 
Assembly's second supplementary budget as recommended by the Budget and Organisation Com-
mittee. 
6. The effect of the foregoing amendments proposed by the committee on the Assembly's 
1987 budget is as follows: 
Operating Pensions Total budget budget 
(F) (F) (F) 
Total after first supplementary budget •••• 0 •••• 17 120 975 1 057 050 18 178 025 
Amended second supplementary budget ........ 100 000 - 100 000 
Amended total for 1987 •••• 0 0 ••• 0 ••••• 0. 0 0. 0. 17 220 975 1 057 050 18 278 025 
Increase 1987/1986 ........................... 3.91% 93.60% 6.77% 
7. The following figures summarise the 1987 increases for all of the WEU budgets: 
Sections A Section B A+B Assembly Combined 
total 
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
With pensions •••••• 0 ••••• 2.30 8.21 6.23 6.77 6.37 
Without 
pensions 0. 0 ••••• 0 ••••••• 0. (-) 0.26 4.86 3.10 3.91 3.34 
Note: The London percentages exclude the effect of sums that were brought forward in the 1987 revised budget from 1986 when 
they were unspent (cf. C-B (87) 10). 
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8. Subject to a United Kingdom reserve that applies to both of the Assembly's supplementary 
budgets, the committee could recommend the Council to approve the second supplementary budget as 
amended to F 100 000. 
9. The Council's approval will be sought at its next meeting on 19th November 1987. 
Sir, 
* 
* * 
London, 20th November 1987 
I have the honour to inform you that the Council has approved the revised budgets of the 
Assembly for 1987 given in documents C-B (87) 12 and 16. 
I enclose copies of these documents. 
Mr. G. MouuAs, 
Clerk of the Assembly of 
Western European Union 
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I have the honour to be, 
Sir, 
Your obedient Servant, 
H. HOLZHEIMER 
Deputy Secretary-General 
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Draft second supplementary budget of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 
Heads and Sub-Heads 
Head I - Permanent staff 
SuB-HEAD: 
1 - Basic salaries .......................... . 
2 - Allowances ............................ . 
3 - Social charges ......................... . 
4 - Expenses relating to the recruitment and 
Draft budget 
for 1987 
(second revision) 
7 026 000 
1 333 900 
1 384 700 
Reductions 
in accordance 
with the Council's 
opinion 
-26 000 
- 4000 
- 5 000 
Draft second budget 
for 1987 
(reduced) 
7 180 000 
1 329 900 
1 379 700 
departure of permanent officials.......... 25 000 - 25 000 
5 - Medical examination .................... l-----8.:........:.0..:..00.:........:.-+--------+-----=8:._0:._0:....:0'-----l 
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 957 600 - 35 000 9 922 600 
Head II- Temporary staff 
SuB-HEAD: 
6 - Staff recruited for sessions .............. . 
7 - Interpretation staff required for Assembly 
2 111 875 2111875 
work between sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 516 000 - 10 000 506 000 
8 - Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk 80 000 - 20 000 60 000 
9 - Social charges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 000 - 5 000 97 000 
~-----+------~-----~ 
Total........................ . . . . . . . . . . 2 809 875 - 35 000 2 774 875 
Head Ill - Expenditure on premises and 
equipment 
SuB-HEAD: 
10 - Share of joint expenditure on the Paris 
premises .............................. . 
11 - Hire of committee rooms ............... . 
12 - Technical and other installations for 
Assembly sessions ..................... . 
13 - Various services for the organisation of ses-
sions ................................. . 
14 - Maintenance ofthe premises ofthe Office of 
the Clerk .............................. . 
15 - Purchase or repair of office furniture .... . 
16 - Purchase of reproduction and other office 
equipment ............................ . 
1 7 - Hire and maintenance of reproduction and 
450 000 
15 000 
345 000 
45 000 
18 000 
28 000 
32 300 
450 000 
15 000 
345 000 
45 000 
18 000 
28 000 
32 300 
other office equipment .................. l-----=-3-=-66.:........:.7..:..00"'"--+--------+-'----3:....:6:....:6:._7:._0:....:0.:........:.-l 
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 300 000 - 1 300 000 
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Heads and Sub-Heads 
Head IV- General administrative costs 
SuB-HEAD: 
18 - Postage, telephone, telex and transport of 
documents ............................ . 
19 - Duplication paper, headed writing paper 
and other office supplies ............... . 
20 - Printing and pubication of documents ... . 
21 - Purchase of documents ................. . 
22 - Official cars ........................... . 
Draft budget 
for 1987 
(second revision) 
480 000 
258 000 
1 190 000 
60000 
115 000 
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Reductions · 
in accordance 
with the Council's 
opinion 
-
-
-
-
-
Draft second budget 
for 1987 
(reduced) 
480 000 
258 000 
1 190 000 
60000 
115000 
23 - Bank charges ........................... f---------'----'-+------+----...::....::._--1 500 - 500 
Total ................................. . 
Head V - Other expenditure 
SuB-HEAD: 
24 - Travelling and subsistence allowances and 
insurance for the President of the Assembly, 
chairmen of committees and rapporteurs .. 
25 - Expenses for representation ............. . 
26 - Committee study missions .............. . 
27 - Official journeys of members of the Office 
of the Clerk ........................... . 
28 - Expenses of experts and the auditor ..... . 
29 - Expenditure on information ............ . 
30 - Expenses for political groups ............ . 
31 - Contingencies and other expenditure not 
elsewhere provided for ................. . 
32 - Non-recoverable taxes .................. . 
Total ................................. . 
OPERATING BUDGET .......................... . 
RECEIPTS ..................................•.. 
2103 500 - 2 103 500 
170 000 -10 000 160 000 
200 000 - 200 000 
5 000 - 5 000 
350 000 - 350 000 
70000 - 70000 
311 000 - 311 000 
311 000 - 311 000 
3000 - 3 000 
20000 - 20000 r------+------,_ _____ ~ 
1 440 000 -10 000 1 430 000 
17610975 -80 000 17530975 
310 000 - 310 000 r------+-------,_ _____ ~ 
17 300 975 -80 000 17 220 975 NET ToTAL OPERATING BuDGET ................. f------=--=...:......::.---=--+-----=-~.:....:...--+----=-----=-..:.....:.._:.__-l 
PENSIONS .................................... . 1 486 050 - 1 486 050 
RECEIPTS ....................................• 430 770 - 1 770 429 000 r------+-------,_ _____ ~ 
1 055 280 + 1 770 1 057 050 GRAND TOTAL ................................ f--------+-------+-------1 
NET TOTAL BUDGET .......................... . 18 356 255 -78 230 18 278 025 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
1. General and political considerations 
1. In Luxembourg on 28th April 1987, following recommendations by the Assembly, the Council of 
Ministers gave a favourable opinion on the Assembly's budgetary autonomy and decided to separate the 
pensions budget from the operating budget. 
2. The Council subsequently reverted to the first point and specified that in managing its budgets the 
Assembly was entitled to transfer sums between Heads II, Ill, IV and V without prior agreement but 
that even in that case budgets would have to be set out in a detailed manner in accordance with the pro-
cedure in force. 
3. According to the Council, this autonomy may not be extended to Head I(" Permanent staff") 
which is the context for the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk. The latter should be considered in 
the context of WEU as a whole on the occasion of the reassessment study of which the ministerial 
organs were the subject. 
4. In view of the Council's decisions, the Presidential Committee pointed out that: 
- Assembly budgets would continue to be presented as in the past following the usual criteria, 
which correspond perfectly to the need for clarity and accuracy in budget management; 
- autonomy in the management of Head I was in fact a false problem since, once the Office ofthe 
Clerk had been restructured, the amount and management of credits under this head would 
depend solely on Council decisions relating to salary scales to be applied to permanent staff. 
Indeed, the Assembly could neither leave posts vacant to increase sums available for its activ-
ities nor reduce its activities in order to create a post not included in the budget since such a 
practice would be contrary to its own rules concerning the preparation and management of its 
budget; 
- the only question therefore was one of weaknesses in the present structure of the Office of the 
Clerk and the problems thus raised could not remain unsolved for long. 
5. In accordance with the abovementioned remarks - which have been brought to the attention of 
the Council - the Presidential Committee decided to include in the draft budget for 1988 all the pro-
posals necessary for completing the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk as set out in the document of 
9th October 1986, approved on 4th November 1986 (see Appendix I). 
6. The creation of new posts, which is the subject of these proposals, largely justifies the increase in 
the budget for 1988 compared with the budget approved for 1987, as will be specified in the next 
chapter. But your Rapporteur wishes here and now to stress that in the present situation - marked by a 
growth in the activities of WEU which have taken a turn in a new direction, the interest shown by a 
growing number of foreign governments in its work, the concern shown by the parliaments of various 
Western European countries not to be left out of the Assembly's debates and the ever-larger amount of 
space that WEU is being given in the press - the Assembly intends to continue to play the political role 
of supervision, advice and stimulus assigned to it by Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty. It is this 
determination that underlies the present draft budget. 
7. In the operating budget (the pensions budget will be considered subsequently), compared with the 
revised budget for 1987 (see Appendix VI), there is an increase of: 
- 9.02% if total expenditure is considered; 
- 9.47% if the net totals are compared (expenditure less receipts). 
8. This increase is higher than the foreseeable inflation rate in 1988. It should be pointed out that the 
creation of new posts alone represents an increase of 5. 7% in expenditure. This confirms that, disre-
garding exceptional expenditure connected with the creation of new posts and the repercussions of the 
three-yearly adjustment in staff salaries, the utmost rigour has been applied to budget estimates for 
1988 and that the greatest possible cost-effectiveness has been sought. 
9. Moreover, it should be pointed out that the question of the growth rates applicable to Assembly 
budgets and to the budgets of the ministerial organs is still open, the Council not yet having taken a 
decision on the proposal by Mr. Poos, former Chairman-in-Office of the Council. The Assembly has 
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raised the matter, which is not without importance, on many occasions because it is liable to have a con-
siderable effect on the activities ofthe organs concerned. Experience in 1987 shows the validity of all the 
arguments put forward: with the rate of 2% agreed upon by the Council as the zero growth rate, it is now 
generally felt that the inflation rate in France will reach 3.5% by the end of the year while certain cate-
gories of Assembly expenditure (e.g. the cost of servicing equipment) have already, following the freeing 
of prices, risen by about 30%. 
10. It seems that it will be even more difficult to estimate the zero growth rate for 1988 because ofthe 
complexity of the present economic and political situation. Your Rapporteur is therefore unable to cal-
culate the disparity between the growth rate in the Assembly's budget for 1988 and the zero growth rate. 
He can but repeat what Sir Dudley Smith wrote in the explanatory memorandum for 1987, i.e. once the 
restructuring of the Office of the Clerk has been completed and once the budget has been adjusted on the 
basis of true requirements, the evolution of Assembly budgets will become normal again and thus 
remain within the limits of the growth rate fixed by the Council for all the WEU organs. Your 
Rapporteur adds the wish that following the Presidential Committee's firm approach to the Council the 
latter will be able to find a satisfactory solution to the problem of the growth rate as soon as possible and 
that the Assembly's budgetary debates will thus be able to return to their normal purpose, i.e. to 
financial matters rather than to relations with the Council. 
2. Restructuring of the Office of the Clerk 
11. The restructuring of the Office of the Clerk started in 1986 with the regrading, approved by the 
Council, of the post of head of the research service and Secretary of the Committee for Parliamentary 
and Public Relations from grade A3 to A4. 
12. It was continued in 1987 with the adoption of the following provisions immediately after the 
extraordinary session in Luxembourg on the basis of statements by the Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council to the Assembly: 
- regrading of the post of assistant to the Clerk for political affairs from grade A5 to A6; 
- regrading of the post of assistant to the Clerk for administrative and financial affairs from grade 
A5 to A6; 
- promotion on a personal basis of the head of the press and external relations service from grade 
A5 to A6; 
- regrading of the post ofhead ofthe translation and publications service from grade A4 to A5; 
- regrading of two posts ofbilingual shorthand-typist from grade B3 to B3/B4 and promotion of 
their respective holders. 
13. In spite of the extremely small financial implications of these provisions since all but one of the 
officials concerned were already at the ceiling of their grades, the Council considered the regrading of the 
abovementioned posts to be a measure that consisted solely of promotions on a personal basis pending a 
decision on a new organogram. The Assembly can but confirm that the structure of the Office of the 
Clerk corresponds to its organisati()n and methods of work and that it cannot possibly await the revision 
of the structure of the ministerial organs. Decisions on this subject have become a matter of priority, 
particularly in the administrative and accounting service in which a crisis arose because of the pro-
tracted absence of its only accountant. The creation of a new grade B3 post of bookkeeper was therefore 
included in the draft second supplementary budget for 1987 as being a vital necessity (cost in 1988: 
F 175 000). 
14. The process of restructuring the Office of the Clerk reaches completion in the present draft 
budget, which contains the following proposals for the creation of posts: 
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Financial implications 
Grade Duties (salaries, allowances and 
employer's social contributions) 
(F) 
A2 Head of the private office of the President 290 000 
A2 Controller - deputy to the head of the administrative and 
financial service 340 000 
B3 Assistant to the Committee for Parliamentary and Public 
Relations 2oo ooo 
830 000 
The relevant justification is given in the note on the structure ofthe Office of the Clerk at Appendix I. 
3. Operational expenditure 
15. There is an increase of 4.77% under Head 11 ("Temporary staff") compared with the revised 
1987 budget. The salaries of staff recruited for the various services during sessions, the scales of which 
are subject to the same increases as those of permanent staff, are charged to this head. 
16. Estimates under Sub-Head 7 ("Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between ses-
sions") are slightly lower than in the revised budget for 1987. It is considered, in fact, that the possibility 
of drawing up in advance a complete programme of work for both parts of the year on the basis of 
known credits will allow implementation of a very stringent policy for recruiting interpreters meeting 
the concern to reduce to the minimum the cost of organising interpretation teams. 
17. Estimates under Sub-Head 8 ("Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk") are F 50 000 lower 
than in the previous budget since account has been taken of the fact that the creation of new posts will 
allow the recruitment of temporary staff from outside to be limited. 
18. There is an increase of 1.90% compared with 1987 in the total for Head IV" General adminis-
trative costs " due to application of the principle of renewing the credits for this year, subject to a very 
small increase in the light of inflation. 
19. Conversely, there is an increase of 5% in estimates under Head V" Other expenditure". The sub-
heads under this head are strictly linked with the Assembly's activities, e.g. travelling expenses of the 
President of the Assembly and rapporteurs (Sub-Head 20), travelling expenses of members of the Office 
of the Clerk (Sub-Head 27), expenditure on information (Sub-Head 29) and expenses for political groups 
(Sub-Head 30). This increase takes account of the financial implications of the intensification in the 
Assembly's activities. 
4. Expenditure on premises and equipment 
20. Maintenance of the premises assigned to the Office of the Clerk of the Assemtily comes under the 
general programme for the seat ofWEU in Paris drawn up by the WEU agencies. Estimates of expend-
iture are therefore calculated in agreement with the agencies. 
21. The five-year programme for modernising equipment is given at Appendix V. Apart from the pur-
chase of electronic scales, which will allow postal charges to be calculated more accurately, in 1988 this 
programme merely renews current hire and maintenance contracts and makes provision for the 
replacement of office furniture. 
22. In 1987 the Assembly was faced with a considerable rise in the cost of contracts for maintaining 
reproduction machines due to the policy of higher rates applied by the firm concerned. Negotiations on 
this subject allowed the Assembly to obtain lower rates than those initially charged. Estimates for 
1988 are based on these rates. 
23. It should be pointed out that the programme for modernising equipment was completed in 1987. 
It has allowed large savings in other sectors of expenditure, an improvement in the working conditions 
of the staff and increased efficiency. The establishment of a new modernisation programme will depend 
on the possibility of obtaining additional premises. As Sir Dudley Smith wrote in his report last year, 
priority should be given to this problem. 
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5. Summary of operating budget estimates 
24. A summary of operating budget estimates for 1988 (expenditure and receipts) is given at 
Appendix VII. The implications of each head for total expenditure and the total net budget (expenditure 
less receipts) are shown. For the purposes of comparison, data relating to the revised budget for 1987 are 
given in the same table. 
6. Pensions 
25. The problem of pensions was finally solved by the Council's decision to separate the pensions 
budget from the operating budget. Your Rapporteur can but welcome this decision, taken at a time 
when the Assembly's pensions budget is increasing steadily, as shown at Appendix VIII. It would have 
been impossible for the Assembly to meet this increase in 1988 from savings in the operating budget 
without its activities being jeopardised. 
PART I Operating budget 
Section A: 
Head I: 
Head Il: 
Head Ill: 
Head IV: 
Head V: 
Section B: 
Summary of estimates of expenditure and receipts 
for the financial year 1988 
Details Expenditure 
Expenditure 
Permanent staff 11 313 000 
Temporary staff 2 944 000 
Expenditure on premises and 
equipment 1 287 000 
General administrative costs 2 143 500 
Other expenditure 1 512 000 
Receipts 
19 199 500 
NET TOTAL 
19 199 500 
PART 11: Pensions budget 
Section A: Expenditure 
Head I: Pensions, allowances and social 
charges 2 396 000 
Section B: Receipts 
2 396 000 
NET TOTAL 
2 396 000 
NET TOTAL BUDGET 
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Receipts 
260 000 
260 000 
18 939 500 
19 199 500 
478 000 
478 000 
1 918 000 
2 396 000 
20 857 500 
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Budget estimates 
PART I: OPERATING BUDGET 
Section A - Expenditure 
Head I - Permanent staff 
Estimates Revised Expected Actual 
Sub-Heads for budget expenditure expenditure 
1988 for 1987 in 1987 in 1986 
Sub-Head 1 - Basic salaries 7 895 000 7 206 000 7 206 000 6 863 397 
Sub-Head 2 -Allowances: 
2.1. Expatriation allowance 740 000 
2.2. Household allowance 325 000 
2.3. Allowance for children and 
other dependent persons 365 000 
2.4. Rent allowance 40000 
2.5. Education allowance 65 000 
2.6. Allowance for language courses 2 000 
2. 7. Overtime 50000 
2.8. Home leave 20000 
1 607 000 1 333 900 1 333 900 1 254 607 
Sub-Head 3 - Social charges: 
3. 1. Social security 1 070 000 
3.2. Supplementary insurance 325 000 
3.3. Provident fund 151 000 
1 546 000 1 384 700 1 384 700 1 282 261 
Sub-Head 4 - Expenses relating to the recruit-
ment and departure of permanent 
officials 
4.1. Travelling expenses of candi-
dates for vacant posts 5 000 
4.2. Travelling expenses on arrival 
and departure of permanent 
officials and their families 15 000 
4.3. Removal expenses 120 000 
4.4. Installation allowance 117000 
257 000 25 000 25 000 131190 
Sub-Head 5 - Medical examination 8 000 8 000 8000 6 140 
TOTAL OF HEAD I 11313000 9 957 600 9 957 600 9 537 595 
Explanations 
Sub-Heads 1 and 2 
Estimates under these two sub-heads cover emoluments (basic salary and allowances) paid to per-
manent staff in accordance with Chapter Ill of the Staff Rules of the Office of the Clerk of the WEU 
Assembly. They are calculated on the basis of global salaries in application of the scales in force on 
1st July 1986 1, adjusted in accordance with an expected increase of 5% as from 1st July 1987 and 4% as 
from 1st July 1988. Adjustments taken into account amount to F 724 000. 
1. These scales are worked out by the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts and approved by the WEU 
Council and the councils of the other co-ordinated organisations (NATO, OECD, Council of Europe, ESA}. In accordance with the 
committee's report, salaries are adjusted with effect from 1st July of each year. Furthermore, should the cost of living between 1st 
July and 31st December rise by more than 3% a corresponding percentage adjustment is made. (This threshold, initially 2%, was 
raised to 3% in the 191st report). 
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The organogram ofthe Office ofthe Clerk is given at Appendix 11. A list of officials, showing their 
grades and duties, is given at Appendix Ill. This appendix also shows proposed changes compared with 
the financial year 1987. Justification for these changes is given in the explanatory memorandum. 
Sub-Head 3 
Estimated expenditure for " Social charges " is based on commitments stemming .from: 
- application of the social security agreement signed between Western European Union and the 
Government of the French Republic on 2nd June 1979 (Sub-Head 3.1) 2 ; 
- application of the convention on complementary collective insurance (Sub-Head 3.2) 3 ; 
- application of Article 27 of the Staff Rules providing for the employer's contribution to the 
Provident Fund, amounting to 14% of basic salary, for staff not affiliated to the pension scheme 
(Sub-Head 3.3). 
Sub-Head 4 
Estimates under this sub-head take account of the retirement of a grade A non-French official, the 
recruitment of his replacement of the same nationality and the recruitment of two other officials, who 
will probably also not be French nationals. 
Sub-Head 5 
The sum requested is to cover the cost of the medical check-up which all members of the staff 
must undergo under Article 9 of the Staff Rules. Medical check-ups for WEU staff in Paris are carried 
out at the OECD medical centre. 
Head II - Temporary staff 
Estimates Revised Expected Actual 
Sub-Heads for budget expenditure expenditure 
1988 for 1987 in 1987 in 1986 
Sub-Head 6 - Staff recruited for sessions of the 
Assembly 
6.1. Sittings service 1 072 000 
6.2. Interpretation service 401 000 
6.3. Translation service 772 000 
6.4. Other services 40000 
2 285 000 2111875 2 150 000 1 928 591 
Sub-Head 7 - Interpretation staff required for 
Assembly work between sessions 500 000 516 000 516 000 481 642 
Sub-Head 8 - Temporary staff for the Office of 
the Clerk 30 000 80 000 80 000 89 448 
Sub-Head 9 - Social charges 
9.1. Insurance for temporary staff 
other than interpreters 4000 
9.2. Provident fund for inter-
preters 120 000 
9.3. Insurance for interpreters 5 000 
129 000 102 000 102 000 87 601 
TOTAL OF HEAD 11 2 944 000 2 809 875 2 848 000 2 587 282 
2. Under this agreement, WEU staff benefit from the French general scheme, with the exception of family allowances and old-age 
pensions. 
3. Under this convention, WEU staff benefit from complementary insurance in the event of sickness or temporary or permanent 
disability. Furthermore, in the event of the death of an insured person, the insurance company pays a lump sum to the benefici-
aries he has named. 
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Explanations 
Sub-Head 6 
Estimates under this sub-head relate to: 
(a) Salaries and, where appropriate, per diem allowances, allowances for travelling time and the reim-
bursement of travelling expenses of temporary staff recruited for sessions (sittings, interpretation and 
translation services). A list of such staff, showing their respective duties and salaries, is given at 
Appendix IV. 
Salaries are calculated in accordance with scales in force on lst July 1986 in the co-ordinated 
organisations (on the basis of salaries paid to permanent staff of comparable grades), adjusted in the 
same way as for permanent staff, the rate of increase being 7.1 %. These adjustments amount to 
F 134 000. 
In application of the agreement signed between the co-ordinated organisations and the Interna-
tional Association of Conference Interpreters (IACI), the salaries of interpreters are calculated on the 
basis of the scale in force for grade L4.8 staff, plus 6%. 
(b) Lump-sum payments made to staff recruited for various services during sessions (doctor, post 
office technician, typewriter mechanic, etc.). 
Sub-Head 7 
This sub-head shows the sums paid to interpreters recruited for simultaneous interpretation at 
meetings of parliamentarians between sessions (salaries and where appropriate per diem allowances, 
travelling time and travelling expenses). 
Estimates are based on a total of 150 working days (of which 100 in Paris and 50 elsewhere). Sal-
aries and working conditions are the same as for interpreters recruited for sessions (c£ Sub-Head 6). 
Their salary adjustment for 1988 amounts to F 28 000. 
Sub-Head 8 
Estimates under this sub-head relate to the salaries of additional staff of all grades which the 
Office ofthe Clerk may have to recruit in 1988. They include an overall sum for sa.aries, possible trav-
elling expenses and insurance. The sum requested is far lower than in 1987 since it is expected that fewer 
staff will have to be recruited from outside due to the creation of two new grade B3 posts proposed in 
the budget. 
Sub-Head 9 
Estimates under this sub-head correspond to the following social charges: 
Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters 
Staff recruited for Assembly sessions are insured with the Van Breda insurance company against 
the risks of death, accident or sickness, 60% of the premium being paid by the Office of the Clerk and 
40% by staff. 
Provident fund for interpreters 
In accordance with the agreement between the co-ordinated organisations and the IACI, WEU 
has to pay into the conference interpreters' fund or, where appropriate, another provident fund, a contri-
bution of 14%, which is added to a contribution of 7% by interpreters. 
Insurance for interpreters 
A Lloyds insurance policy, taken out through the intermediary of Stewart Wrightson in London, 
covers interpreters for accidents, sickness and temporary or permanent disability preventing them from 
working. The premium of 1.1% oftheir fees (lower rate) is divided between the Office of the Clerk (0.7%) 
and the interpreters (0.4%). 
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Head Ill- Expenditure on premises and equipment 
Estimates Revised Expected Actual 
Sub-Heads for budget expenditure expenditure 
1988 for 1987 in 1987 in 1986 
Sub-Head 10 - Share of joint expenditure on 
the Paris premises 418 000 450 000 430 000 389 788 
Sub-Head 11 - Hire of committee rooms 15 000 15 000 - -
Sub-Head 12 - Technical and other installa-
tions for Assembly sessions 365 000 345 000 360 000 350 397 
Sub-Head 13 - Various services for the organi-
sation of sessions 45 000 45 000 45 000 43 514 
Sub-Head 14 - Maintenance of the premises of 
the Office of the Clerk 18 000 18 000 8000 1 242 
Sub-Head 15 - Purchase or repair of office fur-
niture 43 000 28 000 40000 31 360 
Sub-Head 16 - Purchase of reproduction and 
other office equipment 11 000 32 300 25 000 113 671 
Sub-Head 17 - Hire and maintenance ofrepro-
ducti on and other office 
equipment 372 000 366 700 380 000 311 325 
ToTAL oF HEAD Ill 1 287 000 1 300 000 1 288 000 1 241 297 
Explanations 
Sub-Head 10 
Sums requested under this sub-head cover the Assembly's share of joint expenditure on the Paris 
premises. They are lower than in 1987 because the cost of replacing the telephone switchboard was paid 
in full in 1987. 
The director responsible for co-ordinating the Paris agencies manages the programme for such 
expenditure, to which the Assembly contributes 30%, 70% being met by the agencies. 
Sub-Head 11 
For meetings outside Paris, Assembly bodies normally have committee rooms with simultaneous 
interpretation equipment made available to them by the national delegations concerned. However, in 
certain cases the Assembly may have to pay for the hire of a room or the cost of installing portable inter-
pretation equipment in rooms not so equipped. Sums requested under this sub-head are to allow the 
Assembly to cover such expenditure if necessary. 
Sub-Head 12 
As its title indicates, this sub-head relates to expenditure for the installation of simultaneous inter-
pretation equipment, telephone booths, telex, two metal-detecting doors necessary for improving 
security measures, screens, etc., in the premises of the Economic and Social Council during Assembly 
sessions. 
Estimates take account of the foreseeable rise in the cost of services. 
Sub-Head 13 
Expenditure under this sub-head relates to contracts for the provision of various services during 
Assembly sessions (removal of equipment, cleaning of premises loaned by the Economic and Social 
Council, etc.). 
The estimate remains unchanged compared with the previous financial year. 
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Sub-Head 14 
The same sum is requested as for the previous financial year to allow minor repairs to be carried 
out to the premises of the Office of the Clerk. 
Sub-Heads 15, 16 and 17 
Sums under these sub-heads are justified by the five-year modernisation and maintenance pro-
gramme for equipment given at Appendix V to this budget. Criteria governing the preparation of this 
programme are shown in the explanatory memorandum. 
Head IV- General administrative costs 
Estimates Revised Expected Actual 
Sub-Heads for budget expenditure expenditure 
1988 for 1987 in ~987 in 1986 
Sub-Head 18 - Postage, telephone, telex and 
transport of documents 490 000 480 000 480 000 505 836 
Sub-Head 19 - Duplication paper, headed writ-
ing paper and other office sup-
plies 264 000 258 000 258 000 252 899 
Sub-Head 20 - Printing and publication of 
documents 1 214 000 1 190 000 1 150 000 1 124 128 
Sub-Head 21 - Purchase of documents 60000 60000 60000 51 320 
Sub-Head 22 - Official cars 115 000 115 000 140 000 170 061 
Sub-Head 23 - Bank charges 500 500 500 212 
TOTAL OF HEAD IV 2 143 500 2 103 500 2 088 500 2 104 456 
Explanations 
Sub-Head 18 
The increase ofF 10 000 as compared with 1987 is calculated on the basis of an average inflation 
rate of 2%, this being the minimum foreseeable, and takes account of the fact that the increase in the 
Assembly's work will involve a considerable increase in the cost of the various means of communi-
cation. Expenditure relating to the use of the telefax installed by the ministerial organs in Paris are 
charged to this article. 
Sub-Head 19 
In spite of the considerable increase in reproduction work, the increase in the estimate as com-
pared with 1987 is slight and is mainly due to the variation of prices in this sector. 
Sub-Head 20 
Estimates under this sub-head take into account the expected increase in costs (2%). 
Sub-Head 21 
Estimates under this sub-head remain unchanged compared with the previous financial year. 
Sub-Head 22 
Expenditure relating to the hire of a chauffeur-driven car when the President is in Paris and the 
cost of servicing, repairs and insurance in respect of the official car are charged to tl!tis sub-head. With 
the years, these expenses are constantly growing, the official car having been registered in 1981. Its 
replacement will be proposed in 1989. 
Estimates for 1988 remain unchanged compared with 1987 as it is expected that there will be less 
need to hire a car for the President of the Assembly. 
Sub-Head 23 
The estimate of F 500 remains unchanged. 
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Head V - Other expenditure 
Estimates Revised Expected Actual 
Sub-Heads for budget expenditure expenditure 
1988 for 1987 in 1987 in 1986 
Sub-Head 24 - Travelling and subsistence allo-
wances and insurance for the 
President of the Assembly, 
chairmen of committees and 
rapporteurs 170 000 170 000 170 000 81 797 
Sub-Head 25 - Expenses for representation 210 000 200 000 200 000 185 823 
Sub-Head 26 - Committee study missions 5 000 5 000 - 7 408 
Sub-Head 27 - Official journeys ofmembers of 
the Office of the Clerk 380 000 350 000 350 000 315 378 
Sub-Head 28 - Expenses of experts and the 
auditor 70000 70000 40000 56 403 
Sub-Head 29 - Expenditure on information 327 000 311 000 311 000 278 126 
Sub-Head 30 - Expenses for political groups 327 000 311 000 311 000 300 000 
Sub-Head 31 - Contingencies and other expen-
diture not elsewhere provided 
for 3 000 3 000 - 978 
Sub-Head 32 - Non-recoverable taxes 20000 20000 20000 20 809 
TOTAL OF HEAD V 1 512 000 1 440 000 1 402 000 1 246 722 
Explanations 
Sub-Head 24 
The cost of travelling and subsistence allowances for members of the Assembly is borne by gov-
ernments as are those of members of the Bureau and Presidential Committee. 
The Assembly bears the cost of travelling and subsistence allowances for the President of the 
Assembly on official visits and of rapporteurs and, when appropriate, committee chairmen insofar as 
these visits are connected with the preparation of a report or the running ofthe Assembly. Journeys by 
committee chairmen and rapporteurs are subject to approval by the Presidential Committee. 
Estimates take account of the expected increase in the Assembly's work in 1988 (see explanatory 
memorandum) and of the foreseeable rise in per diem allowances and travelling expenses. 
Sub-Head 25 
The increase of 5% compared with the 1987 budget, based on experience, is due mainly to the 
foreseeable rise in the cost of meals in different types of restaurant in the Paris area. 
Sub-Head 26 
Sums under this sub-head are to cover extraordinary expenditure linked with committee study 
missions. 
On the basis of experience, the same amount has been requested as last year. 
Sub-Head 27 
The 8.57% increase in sums requested for 1988 compared with last year is justified by: 
- the increase in per diem allowances approved by the Council with effect from 1st July 
1987 (224th report of the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts); 
- the increased activities of the Assembly which require more frequent travel by members ofthe 
Office of the Clerk for organising and holding meetings and visits of the various Assembly com-
mittees. 
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Sub-Head 28 
The same amount has been requested as for 1987. 
Sub-Head 29 
An increase of 5% over sums granted for 1987 has been included to take account of the increase in 
representation and travelling expenses. 
Sub-Head 30 
The estimate under this sub-head is divided between the political groups. By decision of the Presi-
dential Committee, each group has an equal fixed share and a further sum in proportion to the number 
of members listed. 
Sub-Head 31 
There is no change in the estimate for this sub-head as compared with 1987. 
Sub-Head 32 
The same amount is requested as for 1987. 
PART 1: OPERATING BUDGET 
Section B - Receipts 
Estimates Revised Expected Actual 
for budget recctipts receipts 
1988 for 1987 in 1987 in 1986 
Sales of publications 50 000 50 000 40 000 30 512 
Bank interest 200 000 250 000 100000 129 456 
Social security reimbursements 10000 10 000 20000 3 055 
Levy on basic salaries of Grade A officials - 32 912 
TOTAL RECEIPTS 260 000 310 000 160000 195 935 
Explanations 
Estimates for the sale of publications, bank interest and social security reimbursements are calcu-
lated on the basis of experience. It is expected that there will be a decrease in bank interest due to a fall 
in interest rates applying to deposits. 
In accordance with the decisions of the Council, no levies are planned on the basic salaries of 
grade A officials. 
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PART 11: PENSIONS BUDGET 
Section A - Expenditure 
Head I- Pensions, allowances and social charges 
Estimates Revised 
Sub-Heads for budget 
1988 for 1987 
Sub-Head 1 - Pensions and leaving 
allowances 
1.1. Retirement pensions 1 885 000 
1.2. Invalidity pensions 218 000 
1.3. Survivors' pensions 50000 
1.4. Orphans' or dependants' 
pensions -
1.5. Leaving allowances -
2 153 000 1 373 000 
Sub-Head 2 - Family allowances 
2.1. Household allowances 90000 
2.2. Children's and other 
dependants' allowances 53 000 
2.3. Education allowances 42000 
185 000 80 650 
Sub-Head 3 -Supplementary insurance 58 000 32 400 
TOTAL OF HEAD I 2 396 000 1 486 050 
Explanations 
Sub-Heads 1 and 2 
In 1988, the Assembly will be paying ten pensions, as follows: 
- eight old-age pensions; 
- one invalidity pension; 
- one survivor's pension. 
Expected Actual 
expenditure expenditure 
in 1987 in 1986 
1 373 000 903 721 
80 650 59 242 
32400 21428 
1 486 050 984 391 
Estimates for expenditure under these two sub-heads are calculated in accordance with the provi-
sions of the pension scheme rules. 
Sub-Head 3 
Pensioners are insured against the risk of sickness in accordance with Article 19bis of the col-
lective convention in force. 
Estimates for expenditure under this sub-head correspond to the proportion of the premium paid 
by the Assembly. 
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PART II: PENSIONS BUDGET 
Section B - Receipts 
Estimates Revised Expected Actual 
for budget receipts receipts 
1988 for 1987 in 1987 in 1986 
Contributions by permanent officials 478 000 430 770 430 770 407 839 
478 000 430 770 430 770 407 839 
Explanations 
Estimated receipts are calculated on the basis of contributions to the pension scheme paid by per-
manent staff of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly (7% of basic salary) affiliated to the pension 
scheme. 
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APPENDIX I 
Note on the structure of the Office of the Clerk 
(adopted by the Presidential Committee on 4th November 1986) 
In Rome in 1984, the Council agreed upon a number of measures to be taken to enhance the role 
played by WEU in Europe. Apart from activating the Council, it planned to intensify contacts between 
the Council and the Assembly and expressed the wish that the Assembly develop its dialogue with other 
parliaments and parliamentary institutions and with the public. Meetings between the Council and 
various Assembly bodies have in fact developed. The media's interest in the Assembly has increased 
considerably. The participation of the President and members ofthe Assembly and even of members of 
the Office of the Clerk in colloquies, meetings and lectures of all kinds has likewise increased. The 
Assembly's relations with a number of non-member countries have been extended significantly. 
Consequently, the President of the Assembly said the will to give new life to WEU should lead to 
an improvement in the Assembly's methods of work. The Assembly is backed by a secretariat of twenty-
seven permanent officials who provide assistance for the presidency, the committee secretariat, external 
relations, the translation and publication of the Assembly's Official Proceedings, committee reports and 
various other documents and, finally, the administrative organisation and financing of the work of the 
Assembly and its committees, including setting up the sittings service and recruiting temporary staff. 
Since the number of this staff was considered clearly insufficient, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration and then the Presidential Committee adopted a draft budget providing for the cre-
ation of a grade A2 post of deputy to the Head of the Administration Service, a grade B3 post of book-
keeper and a grade B3 post of assistant. 
The purpose of the present memorandum is to define, in a spirit of stringent economy, the 
structure the Office of the Clerk should have if it is to be better able to carry out the tasks assigned to it. 
* 
* * 
In accordance with the Charter, the Clerk provides the Assembly and its committees with such 
secretariat and other assistance as they may require. 
The Office of the Clerk, which was set up for this purpose, consists of five services: 
- the committee service, to which the research service is attached; 
- the administration and finance service; 
- the press and external relations service; 
- the translation and publications service; 
- the sittings service. 
Emphasis should be laid on the extent to which economical solutions have been sought in 
organising the Office of the Clerk. 
The Clerk is directly responsible for the sittings service and ensures personally the secretariat of 
the Bureau, the Presidential Committee and the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges. 
In the exercise of his duties, he is assisted, when necessary, by two deputies. 
The abolition of the hors cadre post of Clerk Assistant at the end of 1980 made it necessary to 
organise the Office of the Clerk so as to allow the smooth running of the Assembly secretariat and conti-
nuity in the exercise of the duties carried out by the Clerk. It was therefore decided in 1981 to share the 
duties of deputy to the Clerk between two officials, the head of the committee service for the Clerk's 
responsibilities relating to the committee secretariats and the head of the administration and finance 
service for those relating to administrative assistance to the Assembly and its committees. 
To take account of the increased responsibilities of these two officials, the Bureau decided to 
regrade their posts from grade A5 to grade A6. 
However, the Council granted these two regradings in a personal capacity only and has not yet 
agreed to their being granted to other officials since the departure of those concerned. 
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Administratively speaking, it would nevertheless be logical for each grade to be linked to duties 
and, when an official leaves, for the relevant grade to be passed on to his successor. 
* 
* * 
Maintenance of the two grade A6 posts originally granted by the Council to offset the loss of an 
hors cadre post and to take account of the new breakdown of the duties of deputy would therefore put an 
end to a deterioration in the structure of the Office of the Clerk which is particularly unjustifiable when, 
for reasons of economy, each deputy fulfils several duties. 
The deputy in charge of the committee service is at present secretary to the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments. He co-ordinates the activities of the committee secretaries and 
supervises the research service. His responsibility for the harmonious running of the work of the com-
mittees is vital in the absence of the Clerk. 
The deputy in charge of the administration and finance service ensures the searetariat of the Com-
mittee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and assumes responsibility for pttotocol and security 
matters. The diversity of the tasks assigned to him is set out in the enclosed note on the organisation of 
the Office ofthe Clerk. The inadequate number ofstaffin this service in view ofthe considerable growth 
in the volume of work imperils the smooth running of the work of the Assembly and its committees. 
Two of the three posts requested in the 1987 budget are therefore intended to remedy this situation. 
Two other heads of service play a major role in the Office of the Clerk. The responsibilities ofthe 
head of the information service were extended to external relations because of the growth in the 
Assembly's relations not only with the media but also with the authorities of member countries and a 
number of organisations. However, it is not proposed to regrade this post to A6. 
It was in fact in a personal capacity that in 1984 a promotion to grade A6 was requested by the 
Bureau for Mr. Borcier, head of the press and external relations service. This is an exceptional case. The 
promotion of Mr. Borcier would be recognition of his acknowledged position in the press and media 
world. His successor would obviously be recruited at grade AS. 
The head of the translation and publications service, apart from his linguistic duties as a reviser, 
is responsible for a considerable amount of administrative work including running a team oftemporary 
translators working from the five official languages of member states into English and French and the 
organisation of printing work. It should be noted that the head of the translation service in the 
Secretariat-General of the Council has a grade LS, although he does not appear to have the same admin-
istrative responsibilities. 
This post is the only grade A post for which a regrading is requested, the Bureau having con-
sidered that this post should be regraded from A4 to AS. 
Finally, the sittings service being the direct responsibility of the Clerk, it is referred to here only as 
a reminder. However, stress should be laid on the importance of the role played by the head of the 
administration service in the recruitment of temporary staff and in the administrative organisation of 
the sittings service and the role of the head of the translation service after the session in revising the 
work ofthe offices which prepare the minutes, verbatim report and amendments and in editing the final 
version of the Official Proceedings. 
The President of the Assembly notes that there is a gap in the structure of the Office of the Clerk 
thus defined. Unlike his colleagues in the other European assemblies, he is not assisted in the exercise of 
his mandate by a private office. Yet he is endeavouring to develop the activities of the Assembly and to 
extend its audience. He has therefore had to increase and intensify his relations with the authorities of 
member countries, international organisations, associations and the media. As he is unable, in the Office 
of the Clerk, even by calling upon the devotion of its officials, to obtain the intensive, continuing 
co-operation required by the exercise of the presidential mandate, he considers there are grounds for the 
Assembly asking again for the creation of a post of head of the private office, which had already been 
proposed but which the Council had refused. In a spirit of economy, this post might be given a grade A2. 
* 
* * 
In Recommendation 433, the Assembly asked the Council to arrange for dual grading at all levels 
of the hierarchy. 
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The organogram of the Secretariat-General and the agencies shows that the ministerial organs 
have started to apply this principle. There is no reason why this should not also be done in the Assembly 
secretariat. 
Priority should be given to applying it to all grade B staff. 
Note has to be taken of the change in the qualifications required of assistants in the committee 
service, the press service and the translation and publications service. They were formerly bilingual 
shorthand-typists but have now had to master word-processing techniques which allow Assembly docu-
ments to be printed directly from texts which have been recorded on disks and prepared for printing 
with an appropriate coding system. The substantial savings made in the cost of printing are due to the 
assistants having mastered these word-processing techniques. The services rendered should be 
recognised by regrading their posts to B3/B4 which would allow promotions to be granted to the most 
experienced assistants who have been at the ceiling of their grades for a long time. 
The dual-grading principle should also be applied to grade B4 staff(B4/5/6) to take account ofthe 
changes in the extension of the tasks assigned to assistants who are both the most experienced and 
capable. 
Staff policy is to adapt the Office ofthe Clerk to the tasks assigned to it by the Assembly. It seeks 
to compensate for the small number of posts available in relation to the tasks to be carried out by 
recruiting officials of a high standard and assigning a wide range of duties to each of them, particularly 
the duties of colleagues of the same or a higher grade when they are absent. For instance, when the grade 
B official responsible for the mail and archives service is absent grade C staff replace her for some of her 
duties. 
Such a policy means recruiting officials of a high standard and being able constantly to rely on 
their devotion in order to allow the Assembly to carry out the tasks it has set itself in the best possible 
conditions in order to meet the requirements of European security. 
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Grade 
H. C. 
A6 
A5 
A4 
A2 
A2 
B6 
B4 
B3 
B3 
B3 
C6 
C4 
APPENDIX Ill 
Recapitulation of changes in the staff of the Office of the Clerk 
proposed in the 1988 budget 
1988 Revised Duties budget budget for 1987 
Clerk 1 1 
Assistants to the Clerk 2 2 
Counsellors 4 41 
First secretaries 2 2 
Controller ; Head of private office 2 -
Translators ; Documentalist 3 3 
Chief accountant 1 1 
Qualified assistants 7 7 
Accountant 1 1 
Bilingual Shorthand-typists 4 3 
Switchboard operator 1 1 
Head of reproduction department 1 1 
Assistants in reproduction department 2 2 
31 28 
APPENDIX Ill 
+or-
-
-
-
-
+2 
-
-
-
-
+ 1 
-
-
-
+3 
1. One of these posts has been given a grade A6 on a personal basis until the retirement of its holder on 31st January 1988. 
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APPENDIX IV 
Salaries of staff recruited for Assembly sessions 
1. Sittings service 
Daily 
Duties Number No. of remu- Total Total days neration F F 
F* 
Counsellors to the President of Assembly ........ 1 a 16 870 13 920 
lb 18 1483 26 694 40 614 
Heads of sections .............................. 1 a 8 875 7000 
2b 10 1 356 27120 
1 a 8 1 236 9 888 44008 
Sergeant-at-arms ............................... lb 16 1 215 19 440 19440 
Parliamentary secretaries ....................... 2a 8 751 12 016 
2b 10 1 215 24300 36 316 
i 
Precis writers ................................. 3a 8 751 18 024 
3b 10 1 215 36 450 54474 
Verbatim reporters ............................ 7a 8 1 101 61 656 
14 b 10 1 215 170 100 231 756 
Assistants ..................................... 10 a 8 361 28 880 
2a 16 361 11 552 
1 a 22 361 7942 
lb 18 693 12474 
lb 12 693 8 316 
23 b 10 693 159 390 
6b 10 747 44820 273 374 
Head ushers .................................. 1 a 10 339 3 390 
1 a 24 339 8136 
Ushers: 
Security control ............................. 5a 8 308 12 320 
Sittings office ............................... 4a 8 308 9 856 
4b 10 640 25 600 
Messengers .................................. 3a 10 308 9 240 
Cloakroom attendant ........................ 1 a 8 308 2464 
Offset-assemblers .............................. 13 a 10 308 ~0040 
mechanic ............................... 1 a 8 308 2464 113 510 
115 813492 
Adjustment for 1988 (+ 7.1%) .............................................. 58000 
871 492 
Travelling expenses ........................................................ 200000 
1 071 492 
Rounded up to 1072 000 
* In accordance with scales in force on lst July 1986. 
a. Recruited locally. 
b. Recruited outside Paris. 
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2. Interpretation senice 
Duties Number No. of Total days F 
Interpreters ................................. Sa 8 360 000 6b 10 
14 
Adjustment for 1988 ....................................................... 25 560 
385 560 
Travelling expenses ........................................................ 15 000 
400 560 
Rounded up to 401000 
a. Recruited locally. 
b. Recruited outside Paris. 
N.B.: On 1st July 1986, the daily remuneration of interpreters amounted to F 2 460. In addition, interpreters recruited outside 
Paris are entitled to payment for time spent in travelling (half a day each way F 769), a daily allowance (per diem) corresponding 
to that of a Grade lA permanent official, plus reimbursement of their travelling expenses. 
3. Translation senice 
Daily 
Estimate 1 Duties Number remuneration Total 
F F 
Revisers .................... 3a 971 78 225 
4b 1 584 158 400 236 625 
Translators .................. 3a 761 57 075 
5b 1 374 171150 228 225 
Assistants ................... 5a 361 63 175 
2a 415 29050 
4b 693 97020 
2b 747 52290 241 535 
28 706 385 
Adjustment for 1988 ....................................................... 50 153 
756 538 
Travelling expenses ........................................................ 15 000 
771 538 
Rounded up to 772 000 
1. Based on 25 days for revisers and translators and 35 days for assistants. 
a. Recruited locally. 
b. Recruited outside Paris. 
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Ref. 
No. 
1 
} 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
APPENDIX V 
Five-year modernisation and maintenance programme for the equipment 
of the Office of the Clerk 
(The estimates given may fluctuate with the trend of prices) 
Modernisation and Budgets Equipment 
equipment programme 1988 1989 1990 
A. Reproduction 
equipment 
1 RX 1045 photocopier Hire (rate blocked until April 
1989): F 1 713 per month 
Maintenance (indexed rate) 
F 1 690 per month 
Total: F 3 403 per month 40 836 13 612 
Hire and maintenance of a new 
photocopier (type RX 1065), with 
improved performance, as from 
May 1989 47100 70600 
RX 3107 photocopier Property of the Assembly. 
Maintenance (blocked rate): 
F 210 per month. 2 520 2 520 2 520 
3 Gestetner offset 1 type 311 (1984). 
machines Maintenance (indexed rate). 7 560 7 560 7 560 
1 type 329 ( 1985). 
Maintenance (indexed rate). 5 125 5 125 5 125 
1 type 339 ( 1986). 
Maintenance (indexed rate). 6 060 6060 6060 
3 Gestetner 1 Gestetner PM/9 ( 1980). Main-
electrostatic tenance (annual indexed rate). 1200 1200 1 200 
stereotypers 1 Gestetner DT 1 (1985). 
Maintenance (annual indexed 
rate). 1 300 1 300 1 300 
1 Gestetner 100 PM. 
Maintenance (annual indexed 
rate). 2 700 2 700 2 70~ 
1 Gestetner 1 00 Purchased in 1978, this machine 
binding machine is in good condition. 
Maintenance (annual indexed 
rate). 1200 1 200 1200 
1 Logabas-Ordina 7630 Purchased in 1977, this machine 
assembling machine is serviced when required, since 
with stapling the cost of a maintenance 
machine contract is exorbitant. The 
estimate is based on experience. 5 000 5000 5000 
1 AM International Property of the Assembly. 
addressograph 5000 Maintenance (indexed rate). 3 623 3 623 3 623 
1 Fortematic 655 This machine is serviced when 
paper-cutting required. A single annual service 
machine is enough to keep it in good 
working order. 700 700 700 
1 Orpo-Planax Property of the Assembly. 
binding machine Normal maintenance by the staff 
concerned is enough to keep it in 
good working order. 
1 Orpo-Planax Property of the Assembly. 
binding machine Normal maintenance by the staff 
concerned is enough to keep it in 
good working order. 
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1991 1992 
70600 70 600 
2 520 2 520 
7 560 7 560 
5 125 5 125 
6060 6060 
1200 1200 
1 300 1 300 
2 700 2 700 
1200 1200 
5000 5000 
3 623 3 623 
700 700 
DOCUMENT 1121 
Ref. 
No. 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
Equipment 
B. Typewriters and 
calculators 
(a) Office of the Clerk 
7 Olivetti ET 121 
electronic typewriters 
1 Olivetti ET 221 
electronic typewriter 
1 Olympia SGE 51 
long-carriage 
electric typewriter 
(French keyboard) 
1 IBM electric 
typewriter with 
(French keyboard) 
3 Olivetti calculating 
machines 
(b) For use during 
sessions 
6 Olympia SGE 51 
electric typewriters 
(2 English keyboards 
4 French keyboards) 
4 RX 60 15 electronic 
typewriters 
(English keyboards) 
3 Olivetti electronic 
typewriters 
- 1 ET 121 (English 
keyboard) 
- 2 ET 109 (Italian 
keyboards) 
21 Olympia 
mechanical 
typewriters 
( 19 with English 
keyboards, 2 with 
French keyboards) 
Modernisation and 
equipment programme 
Purchased between 1981 and 
1983, these typewriters are in 
very good condition. 
Purchased in 1983, this type-
writer 1s m very good 
condition. 
This machine is are of the old 
stock and will remain in service 
as long as possible. 
This machine is part of the old 
stock and will remain in service 
as long as possible. 
These machines are in good 
working order. 
These machines are part of the 
old stock and are assigned to 
national delegations. 
These machines were purchased 
in 1986 and are assigned to 
session services. 
Assigned to the sittings office. 
Assigned to the Italian Dele-
gation and the Italian summary 
reporters in replacement of two 
other Olivetti electric typewriters 
no longer in stock. 
Purchased between 1966 and 
1979, these typewriters are used 
only occasionally because they 
are old models and the staff are 
no longer used to working on 
such machines. It is planned to 
keep the best of them in reserve 
in case of electricity cuts. 
20 Electronic typewriters To meet the requirements of the 
various services during Assembly 
sessions, and subject to the pos-
sible purchase of other type-
writers, the following hire pro-
gramme is envisaged for each 
session: 
- 13 machines with English key-
APPENDIX V 
Budgets 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
boards 14 200 14 200 14 200 14 200 14 200 
- 15 machines with French key-
boards. 13780 13780 13780 13780 13780 
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Ref. Modernisation and Budgets 
No. Equipment equipment programme 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
(c) Maintenance and 
repairs 
21 All typewriters and calculators 
are serviced twice a year, before 
each session, by a mechanic 
recruited for the purpose. 
However, a lump sum should be 
earmarked for possible repairs at 
other times. 7 000 7 000 7000 7 000 7 000 
B. Miscellaneous 
equipment 
22 2 UHER 5000 Purchased in 1971 and 1987, 
dicta phones these dictaphones are in good 
1 Sony BM 80 condition. It is not planned to 
replace them in the period 1988-
1992. 
23 11 Grundig Stenorette Purchased between 1963 and 
dicta phones 198 7, these dictaphones are in 
good condition. It is not planned 
to replace them in the period 
1988-1989. 
24 1 Grand jean Purchased in 1974, this machine 
stenotyping machine is in good working order. 
25 Provision for an overall sum in 
the budget for possible repairs to 
equipment in this category. 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 
25 bis Alcatel CT2 electronic These scales will replace the very 
scales old Testut-Dayton scales, which 
are inaccurate, and will allow 
postal charges to be calculated 
very accurately. 11 000 
D. Word processors 
and computers 
26 8 word processors/ These have been hired on a five 
computers year leasing basis. The two 
contracts expire in December 
1989 and September 1991 respec-
tively. 
1 Olivetti ETS 2010 Cost of hire. 206 000 206 000 82000 61 000 
1 Olivetti M 24 Maintenance contract (indexed). 48 600 48 600 48 600 48 600 48 600 
E. Office furniture 
27 Various offices Purchase of computer desks for 
staff using word processors. 18 000 
28 Various offices Replacement of various items of 
furniture 25 000 20000 20000 20000 20000 
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Breakdown by budget classification 
Budget classification Ref. No. Budgets 
Head Sub-Head in programme 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Ill 15. Purchase or repair of office furniture 27 18 000 
28 25000 20000 20000 20000 20000 
43000 20000 20000 20000 20000 
Ill 16. Purchase of reproduction and other 
office equipment 25 bis 11 000 11000 11 000 11 000 11 000 
Ill 17. Hire and maintenance of reproduction 
and other office equipment 1 40 836 60 712 70600 70600 70600 
2 2 520 2 520 2 520 2 520 2 520 
3 18 745 18 745 18 745 18 745 18 745 
4 5 200 5 200 5 200 5 200 5 200 
5 1 200 1200 1200 1200 1200 
6 5000 5000 5000 5000 5 000 
7 3 623 3 623 3 623 3 623 3 623 
8 700 700 700 700 700 
20 27 980 27 980 27 980 27 980 27 980 
21 7000 7000 7000 7000 7 000 
25 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 
26 254 600 254 600 130 600 109 600 48 600 
371404 391 280 277 168 256 168 195 168 
Rounded up 372 000 392 000 278 000 257 000 196 000 
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APPENDIX VI 
Trend of the Assembly budget from 1987 to 1988 
1987 1987 (1st %b-a 1988 %c-b and 2nd revision) a ! b 
a b c 
A. Operating budget 
Head I. Permanent staff 9 456 000 9 957 600 + 5.30 11313000 + 13.61 
Head II. Temporary staff 2 704 875 2 809 875 + 3.88 2 944 000 +4.77 
Head Ill. Expenditure premises 
and equipment 1 300 000 1 300 000 - 1 287 000 - 1.00 
Head IV. General administrative 
costs 2 103 500 2 103 500 - 2 143 500 + 1.90 
Head V. Other expenditure 1 400 000 1440 000 + 2.85 1 512 000 + 5.00 
Total expenditure 16 964 375 17610975 + 3.81 19 199 500 + 9.02 
Receipts 310 000 310 000 - 760 000 - 16.12 
Net Total 16 654 375 17 300 975 + 3.88 18 939 500 + 9.47 
B. Pensions budget 
Pensions and leaving allowances 1 351 000 1 486 050 + 9.99 2 396 000 + 61.23 
Receipts 409 000 430 770 + 5.32 478 000 + 10.96 
Net Total 942 000 1 055 280 + 12.02 1 918 000 + 81.75 
GRAND NET TOTAL (A+ B) 17 596 375 18 356 255 + 4.31 20 857 500 + 13.62 
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APPENDIX VII 
Percentage of credits under the various heads of the operating budgets for 1986 (revised) 
and 1987 compared with the total of these budgets 
Revised budget for 1987 1988 
%of %of 
Amount Amount 
A B A B 
A. Operating budget 
Head I. - Permanent staff 9 957 600 56.54 57.55 11 313 000 58.92 59.73 
Head II. - Temporary staff 2 809 875 15.96 16.24 2 944 000 15.33 15.54 
Head Ill. - Premises and equipment 1 300 000 7.38 7.52 1 287 000 6.70 6.80 
Head IV. - General administrative 
costs 2 103 500 11.94 12.16 2 143 500 11.17 11.32 
Head V. - Other expenditure 1 440 000 8.18 8.32 1 512 000 7.88 7.98 
ToTAL A (expenditure) 17610975 100.00 101.79 19 199 500 100.00 101.37 
Receipts 310 000 1.79 260 000 1.37 
ToTAL B (net) 17 300 975 100.00 18 939 500 100.00 
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APPENDIX VIII 
Trend of the pensions budget 
(1984 = 100) 
Year Net total Index 
1984 336 000 100 
1985 300 500 89 
1986 546 000 162 
1987 942 700 280 
1988 1 918 000 574 
N.B. Until 1983, receipts exceeded expenditure. 
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WEU Assembly budget for 1988 
1. The WEU Assembly budget for 1988 (Assembly document A/WEU/BA (87) 13) was circulated to 
the Budget and Organisation Committee on 22nd October 1987 under reference B (87) 25 and was 
examined during the committee's meeting on 11th, 12th and 13th November 1987 (BR (87) 3, 11- to be 
circulated). 
2. As presented, the 1988 estimates were as follows: 
Operating budget ....................................... . 
Pensions budget ........................................ . 
Total ........................................ ··········· 
F 18 939 500 
1 918 000 
F 20 857 500 
These figures resulted in increases over the total for 1987 (from the Assembly's second supplementary 
budget for 1987) of 9.47% for the operating budget and 13.6% for the total. 
3. The Budget and Organisation Committee's conclusions and recommendations are summarised 
below: 
General observations 
All delegations reaffirmed their commitment to the " zero-growth " principle to be applied to all 
of the budgets ofWEU. One delegation stressed that this consideration was of particular importance this 
year, in the case of the Assembly, because agreement to separate the pensions budget in this context had 
been conditional upon the Assembly adhering to zero growth for its operating budgets in the future. 
Staffing proposals 
Delegates observed that the creation of three new posts was proposed and that these had earlier 
been included in the Assembly's restructuring suggestions. It was recalled that the Council had informed 
the Assembly that the question of restructuring the Office of the Clerk could only be considered in the 
wider context of staffing changes that would affect the whole of WEU as a part of the reactivation 
process. The Council had not yet completed the necessary studies, contrary to what appeared to be the 
Assembly's impression, and, in consequence, delegations could not agree to the inclusion of these posts 
in the 1988 budget. 
It was also noted that the budget included estimates for an additional post in grade 
B3 (bookkeeper) which had been rejected in the study of the Assembly's second supplementary budget 
for 1987. 
I. Document C-B (87) 15, 13th November 1987. 
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The committee concluded that the credits foreseen for all four posts should be withdrawn without 
prejudice to eventual decisions that may be taken when the Council is able to conclude its wider study of 
the future staffing needs of WEU. 
The Assembly's representative said that the total net cost ofthese four posts was F 1108 000, but 
there would be a loss of income in the pensions budget of F 38 000. 
Other expenditure 
In their discussions on other expenditure chapters, delegations made the following recommenda-
tions: 
Head I/ - Temporary staff 
' The Assembly's representative sought to re-establish the credit under Sub-Head 8 to its 1987level 
ofF 80 000. In the budget it was shown to have been reduced by F 50 000 to F 30 000. He pointed out, 
however, that this reduction in the item for temporary staff had been made on the assumption that the 
Assembly would be given the extra posts requested for the permanent establishment. They had been 
refused so there would still be a need for temporary staff. 
Only one delegation was opposed to restoring the amount of F 50 000 under this heading. 
Head V - Other expenditure 
After a long debate, the committee agreed to recommend that the total of this head be reduced by 
F 42 000. The Assembly could decide which sub-heads should be modified. 
4. As a result of the foregoing proposals, it was noted that the estimates would be amended as 
follows: 
Head I .................. . 
Head II ................. . 
Head V ................. . 
Pensions ................ . 
Total ................... . 
The budget totals would then be: 
Operating budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 18 939 500 
Pensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 918 000 + 
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 20 857 500 
The increases over 1987 would be: 
Operating budget 
- F 1108 000 
+ 50 000 
42000 
-FllOOOOO 
+ 38 000 
- F 1 062 000 
1 100 000 
38 000 
1 062 000 
3.59% 
Pensions budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85.35% 
Total budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.31% 
= 
17 839 500 
1 956 000 
19795500 
5. One delegation pointed out that inflation in France in 1988 was, on a generol estimate, expected 
to be around 2.5%. The above reductions had brought the Assembly's operating bud et increase down to 
3.59% (from 9.47%) but that still did not meet the zero-growth requirement. Attemp s to obtain a further 
~eduction were abandoned when it became evident that there could be no unanimo s agreement on this 
ISSUe. 
6. The committee could finally recommend the Council to give a favourable opinion on the 
Assembly's budget for 1988, as amended above, but subject to a United Kingdom reserve. 
7. The Council's opinion will be sought at the next meeting to be held on 19th November. It is 
recalled that this opinion should be conveyed to the Assembly before the next pdrt-session opens on 
30th November. 
* 
* * 
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London, 20th November 1987 
Sir, 
I have the honour to inform you that the Council has examined the budget of the WEU Assembly 
for 1988 and, in accordance with the procedure for approval in force, expressed a favourable opinion on 
this amended budget as given in document C-B (87) 15. 
I enclose copies of this document. 
Mr. G. MouuAs, 
Clerk of the Assembly of 
Western European Union 
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I have the honour to be, 
Sir, 
Your obedient Servant, 
H. HOLZHEIMER 
Deputy Secretary-General 
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Draft budget of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1988 
Heads and Sub-Heads 
Head I - Permanent staff 
SuB-HEAD: 
1 - Basic salaries .......................... . 
2 - Allowances ............................ . 
3 - Social charges ......................... . 
4 - Expenses relating to the recruitment and 
Draft budget 
for 1988 
(initial) 
7 895 000 
1 607 000 
1 546 000 
Modifications 
in accordance 
with the Council's 
opinion 
- 695 ooq 
- 185 000 
- 125 000 
Draft budget 
for 1988 
(reduced) 
7 200 000 
1 422 000 
1 421 000 
103000 departure of permanent officials . . . . . . . . . . 257 000 - 154 000 
5 - Medical examination ................... "!-----=-8....:0....:0_0_+--------+----8c........;_O...:.OO.;___-l 
Total.................................. 11313000 -1108000 10205000 
Head Il- Temporary staff 
SuB-HEAD: 
6 - Staff recruited for sessions .............. . 
7 - Interpretation staff required for Assembly 
2 285 000 2 285 000 
work between sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 500 000 - 500 000 
8 - Temporary staff for the Office ofthe Clerk 30 000 + 50 000 80 000 
9 - Social charges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 000 - 129 000 
1-------+-------~-----, 
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 944 000 + 50 000 2 994 000 
Head Ill- Expenditure on premises and 
equipment 
SuB-HEAD: 
10 - Share of joint expenditure on the Paris 
premises .............................. . 
11 - Hire of committee rooms ............... . 
12 - Technical and other installations for 
Assembly sessions ..................... . 
13 - Various services for the organisation of ses-
sions ................................. . 
14 - Maintenance of the premises of the Office of 
tlie Clerk .............................. . 
15 - Purchase or repair of office furniture .... . 
16 - Purchase of reproduction and other office 
equipment ............................ . 
1 7 - Hire and maintenance of reproduction and 
418 000 
15 000 
365 000 
45 000 
18 000 
43000 
11000 
418 000 
15 000 
365 000 
45 000 
18 000 
43 000 
11000 
other office equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372 000 - 372 000 
1-------+--------~------, 
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 287 000 - 1 287 000 
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Heads and Sub-Heads 
Head IV- General administrative costs 
SuB-HEAD: 
18 - Postage, telephone, telex and transport of 
documents ............................ . 
19 - Duplication paper, headed writing paper 
Draft budget 
for 1988 
(initial) 
490 000 
Modifications 
in accordance 
with the Council's 
opinion 
Draft budget 
for 1988 
(reduced) 
490 000 
and other office supplies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264 000 - 264 000 
20 - Printing and pubication of documents . . . . 1 214 000 - 1 214 000 
21 - Purchase of documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 000 - 60 000 
22 - Official cars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 000 - 115 000 
23 - Bank charges ........................... 1-----5_00_-+--------+-----50_0----t 
Total.................................. 2 143 500 - 2 143 500 
Head V - Other expenditure 
SuB-HEAD: 
24 - Travelling and subsistence allowances and 
insurance for the President of the Assembly, 
chairmen of committees and rapporteurs .. 
25 - Expenses for representation ............. . 
26 - Committee study missions .............. . 
27 - Official journeys of members of the Office 
of the Clerk ........................... . 
28 - Expenses of experts and the auditor ..... . 
29 - Expenditure on information ............ . 
30 - Expenses for political groups ............ . 
31 - Contingencies and other expenditure not 
170 000 
210 000 
5 000 
380 000 
70000 
327 000 
327 000 
15 000 
10000 
10000 
7 000 
155 000 
210 000 
5 000 
370 000 
60000 
320 000 
327 000 
elsewhere provided for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 000 - 3 000 
32 - Non-recoverable taxes ................... I-------'--2-'-0-'-0-=-00-'---+--------+---2=-0=--=-00:...:0=------! 
Total.................................. 1 512 000 - 42 000 1 470 000 
OPERATING BUDGET . . . • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 199 500 - 1 100 000 18 099 500 
RECEIPTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260 QQQ - 260 000 
r---------~r---------~--------'--~---; 
GRAND TOTAL . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 939 500 - 1 100 000 17 839 500 
r---------~r---------~-----------; 
PENSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 396 000 - 2 396 000 
RECEIPTS ..................................... l----4_7_8_0_00_-+-_-__ 3_8-"0-'-0-'-0~ ___ 44_0:.......:...00.:....0~ 
NET TOTAL PENSIONS BUDGET . . . . . • . . . • . . . . . . . . 1 918 000 + 38 000 1 956 000 
r---------~r---------~-----------; 
NET ToTAL BuDGET . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . 20 857 500 - 1 062 000 19 795 500 
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WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION 
Platform on European security interests 
The Hague, 27th October 1987 
1. Stressing the dedication of our countries to the principles upon which our democracies are based 
and resolved to preserve peace in freedom, we, the Foreign and Defence Ministers of the member states 
of WEU, reaffirm the common destiny which binds our countries. 
2. We recall our commitment to build a European union in accordance with the single European act, 
which we all signed as members ofthe European Community. We are convinced that the construction of 
an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence. 
3. An important means to this end is the modified Brussels Treaty. This treaty, with its far-reaching 
obligations to collective defence, marked one of the early steps on the road to European unification. It 
also envisages the progressive association of other states inspired by the same ideals and animated by 
the like determination. We see the revitalisation of WEU as an important contribution to the broader 
process of European unification. 
4. We intend therefore to develop a more cohesive European defence identity which will translate 
more effectively into practice the obligations of solidarity to which we are committed through the mod-
ified Brussels and North Atlantic Treaties. 
5. We highly value the continued involvement in this endeavour of the WEU Assembly which is the 
only European parliamentary body mandated by treaty to discuss all aspects of security including 
defence. 
* 
* * 
I. Our starting point is the present conditions of European security. 
1. Europe remains at the centre of East-West relations and, forty years after the end of the second 
world war, a divided continent. The human consequences of this division remain unacceptable, 
although certain concrete improvements have been made on a bilateral level and on the basis ofthe Hel-
sinki final act. We owe it to our people to overcome this situation and to exploit in the interest of all 
Europeans the opportunities for further improvements which may present themselves. 
2. New developments in East-West relations, particularly in arms control and disarmament, and 
also other developments, for example in the sphere of technology, could have far-reaching implications 
for European security. 
3. We have not yet witnessed any lessening of the military build-up which the Soviet Union has sus-
tained over so many years. The geostrategic situation of Western Europe makes it particularly vul-
nerable to the superior conventional, chemical and nuclear forces of the Warsaw Pact. This is the funda-
mental problem for European security. The Warsaw Pact's superior conventional forces and its 
capability for surprise attack and large-scale offensive action are of special concern in this context. 
4. Under these conditions the security of the Western European countries can only be ensured in 
close association with our North American allies. The security of the alliance is indivisible. The part-
nership between the two sides of the Atlantic rests on the twin foundations of shared values and 
interests. Just as the commitment of the North American democracies is vital to Europe's security, a 
free, independent and increasingly more united Western Europe is vital to the security of North 
America. 
5. It is our conviction that the balanced policy of the Harmel report remains valid. Political soli-
darity and adequate military strength within the Atlantic Alliance, arms control, disarmament and the 
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search for genuine detente continue to be integral parts of this policy. Military security and a policy of 
detente are not contradictory but complementary. 
* 
* * 
11. European security should be based on the following criteria: 
1. It remains our primary objective to prevent any kind of war. It is our purpose to preserve our 
security by maintaining defence readiness and military capabilities adequate to deter aggression and 
intimidation without seeking military superiority. 
2. In the present circumstances and as far as we can foresee, there is no alternative to the western 
strategy for the prevention of war, which has ensured peace in freedom for an unprecedented period of 
European history. To be credible and effective, the strategy of deterrence and defence must continue to 
be based on an adequate mix of appropriate nuclear and conventional forces, only the nuclear element 
of which can confront a potential aggressor with an unacceptable risk. 
3. The substantial presence of United States conventional and nuclear forces plays an irreplaceable 
part in the defence of Europe. They embody the American commitment to the defence of Europe and 
provide the indispensable linkage with the United States strategic deterrent. 
4. European forces play an essential role: the overall credibility of the western strategy of deterrence 
and defence cannot be maintained without a major European contribution not least because the conven-
tional imbalance affects the security of Western Europe in a very direct way. 
The Europeans have a major responsibility both in the field of conventional and nuclear defence. 
In the conventional field, the forces of the WEU member states represent an essential part of the 
alliance. As regards nuclear forces, all of which form a part of deterrence, the co-operative arrangements 
that certain member states maintain with the United States are necessary for the security of Europe. The 
independent forces of France and the United Kingdom contribute to overall deterrence and security. 
5. Arms control and disarmament are an integral part of western security policy and not an alter-
native to it. They should lead to a stable balance of forces at the lowest level compatible with our 
security. Arms control policy should, like our defence policy, take into account the specific European 
security interests in an evolving situation. It must be consistent with the maintenance of the strategic 
unity of the alliance and should not preclude closer European defence co-operation. Arms control agree-
ments have to be effectively verifiable and stand the test.oftime. East and West have a common interest 
in achieving this. 
* 
* * 
Ill. The member states of WEU intend to assume fully their responsibilities: 
(a) In the field of western defence 
1. We recall the fundamental obligation of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty to provide all 
the military and other aid and assistance in our power in the event of armed attack on any one of us. 
This pledge, which reflects our common destiny, reinforces our commitments under the Atlantic 
Alliance, to which we all belong, and which we are resolved to preserve. 
2. It is our conviction that a more united Europe will make a stronger contribution to the alliance, to 
the benefit of western security as a whole. This will enhance the European role in the alliance and ensure 
the basis for a balanced partnership across the Atlantic. We are resolved to strengthen the European 
pillar of the alliance. 
3. We are each determined to carry our share of the common defence in both the conventional and 
nuclear field, in accordance with the principles of risk- and burden-sharing which are fundamental to 
allied cohesion: 
- in the conventional field, all of us will continue to play our part in the on-going efforts to 
improve our defences; 
- in the nuclear field also, we shall continue to carry our share: some of us by pursuing appro-
priate co-operative arrangements with the United States; the United Kingdom and France by 
continuing to maintain independent nuclear forces, the credibility of which they are deter-
mined to preserve. 
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4. We remain determined to pursue European integration including security and defence and make a 
more effective contribution to the common defence of the West. 
To this end we shall: 
- ensure that our determination to defend any member country at its borders is made clearly 
manifest by means of appropriate arrangements, 
- improve our consultations and extend our co-ordination in defence and security matters and 
examine all practical steps to this end, 
- make the best possible use of the existing institutional mechanisms to involve the defence min-
isters and their representatives in the work of WEU, 
- see to it that the level of each country's contribution to the common defence adequately reflects 
its capabilities, 
- aim at a more effective use of existing resources, inter alia by expanding bilateral and regional 
military co-operation, pursue our efforts to maintain in Europe a technologically advanced 
industrial base and intensify armaments co-operation, 
- concert our policies on crises outside Europe in so far as they may affect our security interests. 
5. Emphasising the vital contribution of the non-WEU members of the alliance to the common 
security and defence, we will continue to keep them informed of our activities. 
(b) In the field of arms control and disarmament 
1. We shall pursue an active arms control and disarmament policy aimed at influencing future 
developments in such a way as to enhance security and to foster stability and co-operation in the whole 
of Europe. The steadfastness and cohesion of the alliance and close consultations among all the allies 
remain essential if concrete results are to be brought about. 
2. We are committed to elaborate further our comprehensive concept of arms control and disarm-
ament in accordance with the alliance's declaration of 12th June 1987 and we will work within the 
framework of this concept as envisaged particularly in paragraphs 7 and 8 of this declaration. An 
agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union for the global elimination ofland-based INF 
missiles with a range between 500 and 5 500 km will constitute an important element of such an 
approach. 
3. In pursuing such an approach we shall exploit all opportunities to make further progress towards 
arms reductions, compatible with our security and with our priorities, taking into account the fact that 
work in this area raises complex and inter-related issues. We shall evaluate them together, bearing in 
mind the political and military requirements of our security and progress in tne different negotia-
tions. 
(c) In the field of East-West dialogue and co-operation 
1. The common responsibility of all Europeans is not to preserve the peace but to shape it construc-
tively. The Helsinki final act continues to serve as our guide to the fulfilment of the objective of grad-
ually overcoming the division of Europe. We shall therefore continue to make full use of the CSCE 
process in order to promote comprehensive co-operation among all participating states. 
2. The possibilities contained in the final act should be fully exploited. We tnerefore intend: 
- to seek to increase the transparency of military potentials and activities and the calculability of 
behaviour in accordance with the Stockholm document of 1986 by further confidence-building 
measures; 
- vigorously to pursue our efforts to provide for the full respect of human rights without which 
no genuine peace is possible; 
- to open new mutually beneficial possibilities in the fields of economy, technology, science and 
the protection of the environment; 
- to achieve more opportunities for the people in the whole of Europe to move freely and to 
exchange opinions and information and to intensify cultural exchanges, 
and thus to promote concrete improvements for the benefit of all people in Europe. 
* 
* * 
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It is our objective to further European integration. In this perspective we will continue our efforts 
towards closer security co-operation, maintaining coupling with the United States and ensuring condi-
tions of equal security in the alliance as a whole. 
We are conscious of the common heritage of our divided continent, all the people of which have 
an equal right to live in peace and freedom. That is why we are determined to do all in our power to 
achieve our ultimate goal of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. 
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I. Activities of the Council and its Secretariat-General in London 
(Period covered: first half of 1987) 
1. Organisation 
(i) In the period under review, the Council 
met in ministerial session on 27th and 28th April 
in Luxembourg, under the Chairmanship of Mr. 
Jacques F. Poos and Mr. Marc Fischbach, the 
Luxembourg Ministers for Foreign Affairs and 
the Armed Forces respectively. 
In their communique, ministers stressed 
the important role of WEU in the development 
of a European union, an important stage in 
which was the signature of the single European 
act. They emphasised the importance of further 
strengthening the European component of the 
North Atlantic Alliance: the alliance needs a 
strong and united Europe which jointly analyses 
and defines more clearly its security interests. 
(ii) The Permanent Council met fourteen 
times during this period. The meeting on 6th 
April was an" enlarged" session with the partici-
pation of political directors of ministries for 
foreign affairs and senior representatives of 
defence ministries. It focused on discussion of 
topical questions, and preparation of the minis-
terial meeting. 
The Permanent Council has devoted an 
increasing proportion of its work to co--
ordinating the activities of the various working 
groups. This results mainly from new initiatives 
in WEU reactivation, aimed at widening consul-
tation within the organisation on matters 
affecting European security. 
As part of this consultation process, 
political directors of the Seven met twice in the 
first half of this year in the margins of meetings 
of the political committee of the Twelve. 
(iii) In the same context, the special working 
group, comprising representatives of foreign and 
defence ministries responsible for security 
affairs, met eight times in London and twice in 
Luxembourg (on the occasion of the Ministerial 
Council) during the reporting period. Deputies to 
these representatives met seven times, discussing 
inter alia SDI and the drafting of the report on 
European security interests. 
(iv) Representatives of both foreign and 
defence ministries normally attend these 
meetings, thus implementing the concept of 
complementarity and sustaining WEU as the 
only European forum for such joint consider-
ation of security matters. This ensures the full 
and continuing involvement of defence ministers 
in the work of the organisation. But a number of 
meetings have been of more specific interest to 
the defence side: 
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- on 21st May, representatives of national 
armaments directors met to discuss 
European armaments co-operation and 
WEU; 
- other defence ministry representatives 
met on 23rd January in Luxembourg 
and on 29th May in London to 
exchange views both on the 
optimisation of defence ministers' par-
ticipation and, more specifically, on the 
subject of management of defence 
resources. 
The results of their work have been sub-
mitted to the Council. 
(v) The Council's ordinary working group met 
nineteen times to prepare Council replies to 
recommendations and written questions from 
the Assembly and also the second part of the 
thirty-third annual report of the Council to the 
Assembly. Other ad hoc tasks were given to it by 
the Council to enable the latter to give an 
opinion on documents on which the widest pos-
sible consensus had already been reached. 
(vi) The Secretary-General has, in addition to 
its other activities, continued to play a vital part 
in the reactivation process by supporting and 
serving the Permanent Council and the above 
groups on a daily basis. 
(vii) The agencies, in close contact with the 
secretariat, have provided the Council with 
studies and work which they have been man-
dated to carry out. The Assembly was informed 
of this work in a letter from the Secretary-
General dated 24th March 1987 1• 
(viii) At their meeting in Luxembourg on 28th 
April1987, ministers heard a report by the presi-
dency on the reorganisation of the intergovern-
mental structures of WEU. They pointed out 
that the measures still to be taken should be spec-
ified by 31st December 1987 and that the pos-
sible collocation of the ministerial organs in one 
capital should also be contemplated. They there-
fore instructed the Permanent Council to present 
them with definitive proposals at their autumn 
meeting. 
2. WEU and European security 
(i) Ministers at Luxembourg in April em-
phasised the role of WEU as a forum in which 
European security interests could be analysed 
1. See Annex II. 
and more clearly defined. In this way, it con-
tributes to the process of European construction 
and to strengthening the European component of 
the AtlantiC Alliance. This is particularly im-
portant in view of current developments in 
East/West relations and their implications for 
European security. 
(ii) Ministers took note of an interim report 
on European security interests, which had been 
prepared in accordance with the mandate given 
by the Ministerial Council at its informal session 
in Luxembourg on 13th and 14th November 
1986. 
They mandated the Permanent Council to 
finalise this report and, on this basis, to draw up 
a common document identifying the principles 
of European security with a view to its exami-
nation, possible adoption and publication, at 
their next ministerial meeting in The Hague. 
(iii) Developments in the United States-USSR 
negotiations on strategic and intermediate 
nuclear forces were followed closely in the Coun-
cil's discussions on topical questions - in par-
ticular, those developments relating to a possible 
effectively verifiable agreement to eliminate on a 
global basis United States and Soviet land-based 
INF above the 500 km range. Ministers fully sup-
ported United States efforts to conclude such an 
agreement. 
In this context, they recalled that the zero 
option in the field of land-based intermediate-
range nuclear missiles had been formally pre-
sented by the United States as long ago as 1981. 
They added that if the achievement of an 
agreement proved possible, this would be as a 
result of the constructive approach and the stead-
fastness of the western allies concerned and 
underlined that any arms control agreement 
should meet the fundamental security require-
ments of the West. 
(iv) Ministers at Luxembourg recalled their 
serious concern at the existing Soviet superiority 
in shorter-range intermediate nuclear missiles 
and the requirement not to neglect this in any 
INF agreement. In this context, they noted that 
the Soviet Union had, in response to earlier pro-
posals tabled by the United States, recently made 
statements on these missiles, the content of 
which should be carefully studied as soon as they 
were clarified in writing. They underlined the 
importance of ongoing consultations with the 
alliance. 
The acceptance by Mr. Gorbachev on 28th 
February 1987 of the zero option as formulated 
in November 1981 by Mr. Reagan was extended 
the following July to missiles with a range of 500 
to 1 000 km and to the SS-20s sited in Asia. The 
Council's discussions of this " double-zero 
option " will be referred to in the second part of 
the Council's thirty-third report. 
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(v) On that occasion, ministers reaffirmed 
that there is for the foreseeable future no alter-
native to the western concept for the prevention 
of war, which must continue to be based on an 
appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear 
forces which together provide a credible 
deterrent against all forms of aggression. They 
stressed the need to maintain ~he effectiveness of 
this strategy through the linkage of Europe's 
security to that of North America. Ministers 
re-emphasised the essential character of the com-
mitment of the United States and Canada. The 
presence of United States nuc;lear forces and the 
North American conventional troops in Europe 
remains indispensable for the security of the 
whole alliance. 
(vi) Ministers also stressed their determination 
to intensify their efforts to strengthen stability 
and security in the whole of Europe, through 
increased openness and the establishment of a 
verifiable, comprehensive and stable balance of 
conventional forces at lower levels. They recalled 
the Brussels declaration of 11th December 
1986. 
During the first six months of the year, 
discussions within the allian<J:e came to fruition 
in the form of the decisions reached by the North 
Atlantic Council at its ministerial meeting on 
12th June 1987. The allies at .Reykjavik agreed to 
develop further their comprehensive concept of 
arms control and disarmament and to work 
within the framework of this concept as 
envisaged in particular in paragraphs 7 and 8 of 
the alliance's declaration of 12th June 1987. 
3. SDI 
During the period covered, the special 
working group completed its task of preparing a 
report analysing the politico-strategic implica-
tions of the current research programmes into 
strategic defence systems. This report was pre-
sented to ministers at Luxembourg. They took 
note of it and instructed the special working 
group to continue to examine the implications of 
ballistic missile defence within the framework of 
its reflections on the problems affecting security 
interests in Western Europe. 
4. European armaments co-operation and WEU 
On 21st May, the representatives of the 
national armaments directors met to discuss 
European armaments co-operation. They agreed 
that their work in this connection should be done 
on an ad hoc basis. The Council will draw con-
clusions from the institutional point of view, 
notably with respect to the SAC and Agency Ill. 
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5. Security in the Mediterranean 
Following the ministers' decision taken in 
Luxembourg in November 1986 to pursue their 
reflections in WEU on security in the Mediter-
ranean, the French and Italian delegations drew 
up a preliminary study which was submitted to 
the ministers at their meeting in April. The min-
isters took note of the study and instructed the 
Permanent Council to set up, under its authority, 
a group of experts for which the preliminary 
work would provide a basis for reflection. 
This group held two meetings in the 
second half of 1987, which will be mentioned in 
the second part of the Council's thirty-third 
annual report. 
6. Information of the press and public 
Both media and public have shown a 
growing interest in WEU in the first part of this 
year, particularly during ministerial meetings 
and Assembly sessions. 
The Secretary-General played a full part in 
the dissemination of public information through 
his participation in public seminars, and by 
delivering speeches and publishing articles. 
He was assisted in this by a press and 
information unit in the secretariat set up to 
promote contacts with the media. It provided 
information and documentation for the Secre-
tariat-General and the permanent representa-
tives in London and also met requests for infor-
mation about WEU. 
II. Relations between the Council and the Assembly 
The Council, concerned to promote 
informed debate of relevant defence and security 
issues and public awareness, attaches particular 
importance to its dialogue with the Assembly. 
This was demonstrated during the Luxem-
bourg presidency by the participation of the 
Foreign Minister and Minister for the Armed 
Forces in the extraordinary and ordinary ses-
sions of the Assembly on 28th April and from 1st 
to 4th June 1987. 
Various aspects of the dialogue between the Council 
and the Assembly in the first half of 1987 
1. The following documents were transmitted to 
the Assembly: 
(i) Second part of the thirty-second annual. 
report of the Council to the Assembly on its 
activities, covering the period 1st July to 31st 
December 1986. 
(ii) The Council's replies to Recommenda-
tions 438 to 441 which the Assembly adopted 
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during the second part of its thirty-second 
ordinary session. 
(iii) The Council's reply to Written Question 
273. 
2. Meetings between representatives of the 
Council and the Assembly bodies 
(i) lOth March in Luxembourg: meeting 
between the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, 
the Luxembourg Foreign Minister, Mr. Poos and 
the President of the Assembly, Mr. Caro. 
(ii) 31st March in Paris: meeting between the 
Chairman-in-Office, Mr. Poos, and the Assembly 
Presidential Committee. 
(iii) 28th April in Luxembourg: Mr. Poos, 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council and Luxem-
bourg Foreign Minister and Mr. Fischbach, Lux-
embourg Minister for the Armed Forces met the 
Assembly at its extraordinary session. 
(iv) 1st to 4th June in Paris: first part of the 
thirty-third ordinary session of the Assembly. 
Speeches by MM. Poos and Fischbach and dis-
cussion. 
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Communique issued at the close of the ministerial meeting 
of the Council of Western European Union 
Luxembourg, 27th-28th Apri/1987 
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1. WEU foreign and defence ministers met in Luxembourg on 28th April 1987. Their discussions 
continued the process of joint reflection on security matters initiated in 1984. They recalled the impor-
tance of the Rome declaration and the communiques of Bonn in 1985 and Venice in 1986. 
2. Ministers stressed the important role WEU can play in the development of a European union, an 
important stage in which was the signature ofthe single European act. They emphasised the importance 
of further strengthening the European component of the North Atlantic Alliance. The alliance needs a 
strong and united Europe which jointly analyses and defines more clearly its security interests. They 
intend to develop WEU further as a suitable forum to this end. Such a development will also serve the 
interests of all the allies. The defence of a free Europe is also the defence of North America. 
3. Their overriding objective remains to strengthen peace in freedom and to prevent any kind of war 
or intimidation by military means. They reaffirmed that there is for the foreseeable future no alternative 
to the western concept for the prevention of war, which must continue to be based on an appropriate 
mix of conventional and nuclear forces which together provide a credible deterrent against all forms of 
aggression. They stressed the need to maintain the effectiveness of this strategy through the linkage of 
Europe's security to that of North America. Recalling the indivisible nature of security in the North 
Atlantic Treaty area, ministers re-emphasised the essential character of the commitment ofthe United 
States and Canada to the defence of Europe. The presence of United States nuclear forces and the 
presence of United States troops in Europe remain indispensable for the security of the whole alliance. 
4. In this context, ministers recalled the importance of the contribution made b)( the seven member 
countries of WEU to alliance defence capabilities. They stressed that a strong conventional component 
is a fundamental prerequisite for an effective defence of Western European territory. 
They recalled that five member states provide delivery systems and the facilities for nuclear 
weapons which remain under United States control. They acknowledged the contribution made by 
France's and Britain's independent nuclear forces to the western deterrent by increasing the uncertainty 
in the mind of a potential aggressor. 
5. The considerations stated above remain fully valid in the context of the current evolution in 
East-West relations. 
All aspects ofthe East-West dialogue affect the security interests of Europe. WEU ministers reite-
rated their wish to see Western Europe continue to participate actively in the development of this dia-
logue and to shoulder its responsibilities fully. The member governments of WEU fill continue, while 
retaining strong defences, to strive to develop co-operation and dialogue with Eastern European coun-
tries. 
6. Ministers underlined their determination to make full use of the CSCE foflow-up meeting in 
Vienna for progress in all fields. In this context, they reaffirmed their commitment to all the provisions 
of the Helsinki final act and the Madrid concluding document. The balanced applic~tion ofthese provi-
sions is the prerequisite for a more constructive development of East-West relations in all fields, 
political and military as well as economic and technological, and in the field of human rights and con-
tacts. Each step towards the free movement of individuals and ideas allows prO(feSs towards over-
coming the division which continues to affect Europe and towards building a stable p·amework of peace 
and security in Europe. 
7. Arms control and disarmament efforts aimed at effectively verifiable agreements leading to a 
stable balance of forces at lower levels are an integral part of westel,"n security policy. A successful 
outcome of the current East-West negotiations depends on the continued solidarity between Europe and 
the United States. 
Ministers noted with satisfaction that conditions and prospects for dialogue between East and 
West on arms control had improved. A recent expression of this improvement was the intensification of 
the negotiations in Geneva between the United States and the Soviet Union, as evidenced by the visit of 
Secretary of State Shultz to Moscow. Ministers expressed the hope that the prospects for progress would 
be confirmed and would materialise in agreements which would ultimately reduce the hitherto undimin-
ished threat represented by the Soviet military capability. 
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8. Ministers wished to recall that the basic proposal in the field of land-based intermediate-range 
nuclear missiles was formally presented by the United States as long ago as 1981. If the achievement of 
an agreement proves possible, this will be as a result of the constructive approach and the steadfastness 
of the western countries concerned. They underlined that any arms control agreement should meet the 
fundamental security requirements of the West. 
Ministers examined with interest the growing possibility of an agreement aimed at the total elimi-
nation of American and Soviet longer-range intermediate land-based nuclear missiles, which should be 
effectively verifiable. They fully support the United States efforts for its conclusion. 
Ministers recalled their serious concern at the existing Soviet superiority in shorter-range interme-
diate nuclear missiles and the requirement not to neglect this in any INF agreement. In this context, 
they noted that the Soviet Union had, in response to earlier proposals tabled by the United States, 
recently made statements on these missiles, the content of which should be carefully studied as soon as 
they are clarified in writing. They underlined the importance of ongoing consultations with the alliance. 
9. Underlining the great importance which they attach to progress also being made in the field of 
strategic weapons, ministers reiterated their support for United States proposals for a 50% reduction of 
Soviet and American strategic offensive forces as a matter of priority. As for negotiations on space and 
defence systems, every effort must be made in Geneva to arrive at agreement on the relationship 
between United States and Soviet strategic offensive weapons and defensive systems with the aim of 
strengthening strategic stability. 
10. Ministers reiterated that reductions in nuclear weapons would ,increase the importance of 
removing the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact and eliminating chemical weapons, given the 
need for a stable balance at all times. 
They underlined the need to focus on the problems arising from geostrategic asymmetry and the 
Warsaw Pact's capability for surprise attack or for the initiation of a large-scale offensive action. 
11. Ministers stressed their determination to intensify their efforts to strengthen stability and 
security in the whole of Europe, through increased openness and the establishment of a verifiable, com-
prehensive and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels. They recalled the Brussels decla-
ration of 11th December 1986. They expressed their hope that the informal discussions taking place in 
Vienna in a constructive atmosphere would, within a reasonable time, lead to an agreement allowing the 
opening of new negotiations on conventional arms control in Europe aimed at eliminating existing dis-
parities. 
They recalled at the same time their determination to strive for the continuation of the conference 
on confidence and security-building measures in Europe. 
Only a stable East-West balance of forces at each stage of the arms control process can ensure 
security in Western Europe. 
12. Ministers also underlined their commitment to the conclusion of a comprehensive and effec-
tively verifiable, global ban on chemical weapons. 
13. Ministers stated their resolve to continue their efforts towards the establishment in Europe of the 
technological and industrial base necessary to ensure the development of a strong and competitive 
European armaments industry, this being an important aspect of Europe's contribution to defence. In 
this connection, they reaffirmed the importance they attach to the generation of more, and more sys-
tematic, collaboration in the field of conventional armaments. 
14. Ministers took note of an interim report on European security interests in the present strategic 
context. This report was prepared in accordance with the mandate set out at the informal ministerial 
meeting of the WEU Council in Luxembourg on 13th and 14th November 1986. 
They mandated the Permanent Council to finalise this report and, on this basis, to establish a 
common platform for identifying the principles of European security with a view to its examination, 
possible adoption and publication. 
15. Ministers took note of the report prepared by the special working group analysing the politico-
strategic implications of the current research programmes on strategic defensive systems. They 
instructed the special working group to continue to examine the implications of ballistic missile defence 
within the framework of its reflections on the problems affecting security interests in Western Europe. 
16. With regard to the problems of security in the Mediterranean, ministers took note of the draft 
outline study prepared jointly by France and Italy which, in conformity with their decision of 
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November 1986, would provide a basis for reflection by a group of experts acting under the authority of 
the Council. 
17. Ministers noted with satisfaction that the reactivation of the organisation, which allowed for a 
close association of the foreign and defence ministers, had become a reality. They heard a report by the 
presidency on the reorganisation of the intergovernmental structures of WEU. 
They pointed out that the measures still to be taken should be specified by 31st December 1987 
and that the possible collocation of the ministerial organs in one capital should also be contemplated. 
They therefore instructed the Permanent Council to present them with definitive proposals at their 
autumn meeting. 
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Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Assembly 
concerning the agencies 
Dear President, 
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24th March 1987 
The purpose of my letter dated 17th March 1986 was to inform you about the staff and activities 
of the agencies for security questions. During the latter half of 1986, the Council undertook a fresh 
examination of their mandates and has instructed me to notify you of the following clarifications: 
Agency I will focus its activities on two main areas: 
- the first relates to the proposals concerning verification put forward in the context of current 
arms control negotiations; 
- the second relates to Soviet tactics towards Western European countries concerning arms 
control and disarmament issues. 
The Permanent Council has also requested that the agency follow changes in the Soviet positions 
on disarmament and arms control. 
Agency // has been tasked to continue its reflections on resource management - by analysing 
national defence budgets - and on the non-military aspects of the threat, as well as to examine how 
public opinion in the member countries of WEU perceives the strategic balance. 
With particular regard to resource management, the agency is studying methods of achieving 
genuine comparability of criteria between the western countries, and the rational management of 
defence budgets. The analysis of these budgets is under way. 
Agency Ill has been tasked to study defence technology from specific viewpoints such as the 
impact of SDI and the influence of various factors on transfers of technology involving the Seven. 
Furthermore, Agency Ill will draw up inventories of the various policies on co-operative 
equipment programmes and defence technology. 
A process of reflection is also under way on the role and future tasks of the Standing Armaments 
Committee. 
The mandates given to the agencies may be revised once the governments have reached an 
agreement on their final structure. 
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Revision of the Rules of Procedure 
MOTION FOR A DECISION 1 
tabled by Mr. Pannella and others 
The Assembly, 
DECIDES 
To add a new Rule 37 bis as follows: 
Joint Group 
Representatives and substitutes who are not members of a political group shall form a single Joint 
Group. 
The Joint Group shall appoint, from among its members, two representatives to the Presidential 
Committee without the right to vote. 
Explanatory Memorandum 
Our Rules of Procedure make no provision for the position of representatives and substitutes who 
are not members of the political groups provided for in Rule 37. In accordance with the solution 
adopted by several national parliaments, the undersigned representatives and substitutes propose that 
our Assembly make provision for the automatic creation of a Joint Group. We specify (as is the case in 
the Rules of Procedure ofthe Italian Parliament) that this is a" single" Joint Group to exclude all possi-
bility of several such groups. 
The existence of a Joint Group is in the institutional interests of the Assembly to allow it to work 
better and to allow representatives and substitutes who are not members of a political group to make 
their full contribution. 
Finally, to take account of the political differences existing in the Joint Group, we propose that 
two of them be appointed to attend meetings of the Presidential Committee, but without the right to 
vote. 
Signed: Pannella, Malfatti, Pieralli, Nata/i, Sarti, Fassino, Filetti, Stegagrzini, Greco, Parisi, 
Martino, Fioret 
1. See 6th sitting, 30th November 1987 (motion referred to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges). 
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Written Questions 274 to 279 and replies of the Council 
QUESTION 274 
put by Mr. Fourre 
on 8th April 1987 
At the end of 1986, the group of wise men 
which the IEPG asked to give an opinion on the 
competitivity ofthe European industrial network 
in the armaments sector published its report. 
Inter alia, it concluded that it was necessary to 
make a permanent administrative structure 
available to the IEPG ministers of defence. 
Considering that: 
1. paragraphs 4 and 10 of the 1955 
decision setting up a Standing Arma-
ments Committee make it possible to 
associate any member country of the 
Atlantic Alliance with the work of and 
agreements and arrangements drawn up 
in that body. The economic and 
juridical study of the armaments sector 
of WEU member countries' industry 
benefited at the start from co-operation 
between the IEPG and the SAC, as did 
the study on the armaments industry in 
Japan by the former international secre-
tariat, thus showing the possibility of 
conducting such studies in this 
framework where NATO observers can 
follow the operation directly; 
2. such co-operation might give Spain, 
which now has the chairmanship-in-
office of the IEPG, an opportunity of 
co-operation leading towards accession 
to WEU; 
3. it would be for the Council to make the 
necessary arrangements for the partici-
pation of interested non-WEU member 
countries in such activities; 
4. the Assembly, through the intermediary 
of its liaison subcommittee on the joint 
production of armaments, would 
thereby have a means of making a 
direct contribution to a debate to which 
the growing need to develop conven-
tional weapons and the breakthrough of 
emerging technology should give a new 
dimension, 
would the Council be prepared to propose that 
the European members of the Atlantic Alliance 
save setting up a new European administrative 
structure by making the SAC, which has a secre-
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tariat in Agency Ill, responsible for co-ordinating 
and conducting studies which would be useful 
for the work of the IEPG? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 9th November 1987 
and received at the Office of the Clerk 
on 13th November 1987 
The Council shares the interest shown by 
the honourable member in the IEPG and, in this 
connection, would recall the Rome declaration 
of October 1984 in which ministers affirmed, as 
regards armaments co-operation, that WEU 
should play an active role in providing political 
impetus by supporting all co-operative efforts, 
including those of the IEPG and the CNAD. 
As indicated in its reply to Recommen-
dation 438, the Council has decided to undertake 
a process of reflection on how best to perform 
this role. However, final conclusions could be 
drawn only at the end of the transitional period. 
The representatives of the national armaments 
directors took the same view when they agreed, 
during their exchange of views on 21st May last, 
that WEU's role and tasks in this area (European 
arms co-operation) had to be specified before the 
question of structures could be broached. 
They also noted that the IEPG - and not 
WEU - was competent for specific co-operation 
projects and that any duplication of effort 
between these two bodies had to be avoided. 
The possibility of WEU conducting 
studies for the IEPG could be examined by the 
Council if the IEPG makes such a request. 
The specific shape and modalities of 
co-operation between the two organisations 
depend upon the future role, structure and tasks 
of the agencies and the SAC, which are now 
under consideration. 
QUESTION 275 
put by Mr. van der Wer/1 
on 27th July 1987 
According to press reports, on 22nd June 
1987 the IEPG adopted an action plan for setting 
up a European market for defence equipment in 
order to improve co-operation between its 
members by establishing greater interoperability 
between military equipment and making intra-
European armaments co-operation more com-
petitive. 
Can the Council say: 
1. whether, in application of paragraph 
9 of the communique it issued in Bonn 
on 23rd April 1985, the SAC will be 
asked to co-operate in a practical 
manner in this plan; 
2. whether it is at last in a position to 
answer written question 274 on the 
activities of the SAC put to it by Mr. 
Fourre on 8th April 1987; 
3. whether, in application of paragraph 10 
of the decision of 1955 setting up the 
SAC, the agency providing the secre-
tariat of the SAC will be asked to 
pursue on behalf of the SAC its work on 
the armaments sector of European 
industry; 
4. what action has been taken on its reply 
to Written Question 271 in which, on 
17th November 1986, it accounced that 
" the SAC will meet in the not too 
distant future "; 
5. whether the SAC has submitted a half-
yearly progress report on its activities 
since 31st May 1986 in accordance with 
paragraph 9 of the Council decision of 
1955? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 9th November 1987 
and received at the Office of the Clerk 
on 13th November 1987 
1. In the preparation of the report" Towards 
a stronger Europe ", the IEPG Independent 
Study Team were in touch with WEU, in par-
ticular Agency Ill. IEPG ministers discussed the 
report at their June 1987 meeting and decided to 
develop an action plan for a step-by-step 
approach towards an open European market for 
defence equipment. If the IEPG, which has a 
wider composition than WEU makes a request 
for WEU to play a role in such a process, the 
Council will of course consider it. 
2. The reply to question 274 has been for-
warded to the Assembly. 
3. Representatives of national armaments 
directors of the Seven met in Ma" 1987 to 
discuss WEU's role in the field of armaments 
co-operation and agreed that WEU could 
provide the necessary political impetus. 
A clearer picture of the tasks of the 
agencies for security questions, including the 
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question of any possible future role of the SAC, 
will appear on completion of the reorganisation 
process. 
Given this situation, the SAC itself has not 
been convened since its meeting of October 
1985. However, a half-yearly report on the activ-
ities of its sub-groups has been submitted in 
accordance with Article 11 of the Council's 
decision of 7th May 1955. 
QUESTION 276 
put by Mr. Wilkinson 
on 19th August 1987 
What steps is the Council taking to concert 
the policies of the member countries of WEU 
with a view to maintaining their joint security 
interests in the Arab/Iranian Gulf? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to tu Assembly 
on 22nd September 1987 
and received at the 0/fiee of the Clerk 
on 25th September 1987 
In view of the developments in the Gulf, 
senior officials from the Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs and Defence of the member states of 
WEU met in The Hague on 20th August 1987 at 
the invitation of the Netherlands, which cur-
rently holds the WEU presidency. The 
Chairman-in-Office informed the President of 
the Assembly about this meeting in a personal 
communication. 
The meeting was called in order to discuss 
the different aspects of the situation in the Gulf 
area. 
Member countries ofi WEU agreed that 
Security Council Resolution 598 should be fully 
implemented forthwith so as to bring the conflict 
between Iraq and Iran to an ~nd, and stated that 
they would continue to support all efforts aimed 
at achieving this. In this context, they reiterated 
their support for the efforts of the Secretary-
General of the United Nations. 
Furthermore, they agreed that Europe's 
vital interests required that freedom of navi-
gation in the Gulf be assurejd at all times. The 
member states strongly contiemned all actions 
contrary to that principle. 
The thorough and useful discussions con-
tributed to a harmonisation of views. It was 
decided to continue to consult each other and 
exchange information in ord~r to develop further 
their co-operation. To this end a further meeting 
was held in The Hague on 15th September. 
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QUESTION 277 
put by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg 
on 21st September 1987 
When did the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee last meet? Has its report of that meeting 
yet been made public? When is it next scheduled 
to meet? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 9th November 1987 
and received at the Office of the Clerk 
on 13th November 1987 
The Standing Armaments Committee last 
met on 25th October 1985. 
In view of their restricted nature, the half-
yearly reports submitted by the Standing Arma-
ments Committee to the Council are not made 
public. 
No date has been set for a next meeting 
since, as has been stated in earlier replies to 
Written Questions 270, 271, 274 and 275, the 
role of the SAC and armaments co-operation in 
the framework of WEU is currently under 
review. 
QUESTION 278 
put by Mr. Pecriaux 
on 21st September 1987 
The Council informed the President of the 
Assembly of proceedings at the intergovern-
mental consultations held in The Hague on 20th 
August 1987 on matters relating to security in the 
Gulf. 
Was this meeting followed by other con-
sultations? Where and when? 
Did the agenda include consideration of 
factors other than the use of military means in 
the Gulf? If so, what were they? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 13th November 1987 
and received at the Office of the Clerk 
on 16th November 1987 
and by a third on 14th October 1987. Ministers 
also had discussions on this subject at their 
meeting on 26th-27th October. All these 
meetings took place in The Hague. 
On 15th September, officials exchanged 
views on recent developments and noted the 
decisions taken by some member countries to 
commit naval forces to the Gulf region. They 
decided to continue to meet, to exchange infor-
mation and to discuss related issues. On 14th 
October, they discussed in particular how to 
improve their contacts in order to enhance 
co-ordination at the practical/technical level. 
Ministers on 27th October agreed that close con-
sultation between the capitals of those countries 
with forces in the Gulf should continue on both a 
political and technical level. Daily contact 
between locally deployed forces was essential. 
The Assembly has in all cases been 
informed of the outcome of these meetings, the 
last occasion ofwhich was at the end of the min-
isterial meeting in The Hague when the presi-
dency formally briefed the Presidential Com-
mittee of the Assembly. 
QUESTION 279 
put by Mr. De Decker 
on 30th September 1987 
Now that the United States and the Soviet 
Union are about to conclude a treaty banning 
INF (intermediate nuclear forces), is the Council 
considering including in the draft declaration on 
the principles of European security now being 
studied a provision reserving the rights and 
interests of the WEU member countries in regard 
to the possibility of equipping themselves with 
this category of armaments themselves in the 
future? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on I st December 1987 
If the specific point raised by the Hon-
orable Parliamentarian was not dealt with as 
such in the platform on European security 
interests which was adopted after his question by 
the Ministerial Council ofWEU on 27th October 
at The Hague, he will find certain reference ele-
ments in this text regarding the determination of 
WEU member states to carry out their share of 
the common defence in both the conventional 
and nuclear fields, in accordance with the prin-
The 20th August meeting concerning ciples of risk and burden-sharing which are fun-
matters relating to security in the Gulf was fol- damental to allied cohesion (see, in particular, 
lowed by a similar meeting on 15th September Sections II, 4 and II a, 3). 
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Document 1126 26th November 1987 
Action by the Presidential Committee 
REPORT 
submitted on behalf of the Presidential Committee 
by Mr. Valleix, Vice-President of the Assembly 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. Administrative questions 
11. Political activities of the Presidential Committee during the interstssion 
APPENDICES 
I. Note by the President of the Assembly on the Assembly's budgetary autonomy, 
16th June 1987 
11. Note by the President of the Assembly on the application of the principle of 
the Assembly's budgetary autonomy, 22nd June 1987 
Ill. Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Assembly, 23rd 
November 1987 
1. Like the Council, the Assembly must 
always be able to take the measures necessary to 
ensure the continuity of its action. In application 
of Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Pro-
cedure, it gives the Presidential Committee the 
task of acting on its behalf in the period between 
sessions. 
2. Because of the reactivation of the Council 
and the WEU ministerial organs, the Presidential 
Committee's role of permanent Assembly body 
has been exercised regularly and no longer excep-
tionally since the Rome declaration. 
3. Meetings of representatives of the seven 
governments in the context of WEU are now 
more numerous and more varied. To ensure con-
tinuity of the dialogue between the two sides of 
WEU between sessions, the Assembly, which 
usually holds only two part-sessions a year, has 
therefore had to authorise the Presidential Com-
mittee to keep itself informed of the Council's 
activities and to comment or give encour-
agement on its behalf. 
4. The Presidential Committee has therefore 
tightened its links with the Council and above all 
with the Chairman-in-Office whose role has been 
strengthened considerably since the Rome decla-
ration. The now regular meetings between the 
presidency of the Council and the Presidential 
Committee, first before meetings of the Council 
at ministerial level and then at the close of those 
meetings, henceforth form part of the permanent 
attributions of the Presidential Committee. 
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5. To report on the exercise of these attribu-
tions, the Presidential Committee has to submit 
a progress report to the Assembly at each part-
session. This is no longer a r~flection of positions 
it has had to adopt in handJing new and highly 
topical matters but rather an expression of the 
concern to show that its actipn between sessions 
corresponds to the guidel,nes laid down by 
Assembly votes. 
* 
* * 
6. In the Presidential C<)mmittee's action, it 
is customary to distinguish between the exercise 
of its administrative resp~nsibilities and the 
political dialogue that it I conducts with the 
Council on behalf of the Assembly. The dis-
tinction is less marked whern it is seen that the 
Presidential Committee's administrative, and 
above all budgetary, action translates political 
views which have been held by the Assembly 
since the outset with praiseworthy perse-
verance. 
7. The period of reorganisation we have just 
been through has allowed the Presidential Com-
mittee to reaffirm two prinqiples which are fun-
damental to the concept the Assembly has 
always had of its role. The first principle is that 
of the political independence underlying the 
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Charter of the Assembly which was acknow-
ledged in the message from the Council quoted 
in the preamble to the Charter. 
8. The Assembly cannot, however, play its 
twofold role of political stimulation and super-
vision if it cannot rely on the material bases for 
its political independence. As the President of 
the Assembly said a few months ago in a letter to 
the Secretary-General, autonomous budgetary 
management is, for the Assembly, the corollary 
of the principle of political independence insofar 
as this autonomy makes it possible for the 
Assembly to organise its activities in the light of 
its aims within the framework of the budget 
granted to it by the governments. 
9. When the principle of the Assembly's 
budgetary autonomy, announced by the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, had to be 
interpreted, the President of the Assembly, in 
notes to the Secretary-General which were 
approved unanimously by the Presidential Com-
mittee, did his utmost, while upholding the 
Assembly's prerogatives, to avoid disputes and 
eliminate false problems. 
10. He showed specifically that a distinction 
must be drawn between two categories of 
financial means that the Assembly needs in order 
to fulfil its tasks. 
11. A first category concerns the permanent 
staff of its secretariat whose organogram was set 
out in a note on the structure of the Office of the 
Clerk adopted by the Presidential Committee at 
the end of last year. Appropriations for staff are 
determined by statutory provisions and are 
carried over from year to year. There is therefore 
no question of making transfers between these 
heads and those relating to the work of the 
Assembly, either in one direction or in the other. 
For that reason, when the Council decided to 
apply to WEU staff the measures taken in the 
framework of the co-ordinated international 
organisations to adapt staff salaries to the 
inflation rate recorded, the Presidential Com-
mittee submitted a supplementary budget with 
the consent of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration and in the context of 
the mandate to negotiate with the Council under 
Assembly Order 65. 
12. In this budgetary category, the Council 
accepted on a personal basis only the promotions 
linked with the regrading of posts in the 
framework of the organogram approved by the 
Presidential Committee and refused to take into 
account in the draft budget for 1988, which it has 
nevertheless adopted, the creation of four posts 
that would have completed this organogram. 
13. The Council persists in deferring consider-
ation of the Assembly's organogram until it is 
able to take a decision on the structures of the 
organisation as a whole. 
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14. Here it should be made clear that it is for 
the Assembly to organise its secretariat in the 
light of its activities. This is a corollary of its 
political independence. The Presidential Com-
mittee defined the duties of members of the 
Office of the Clerk and the organisation of its ser-
vices so as to make the most rational use of the 
very reduced resources at the Assembly's dis-
posal for its growing tasks. Thus, it drew up the 
organogram which, apart from the four posts to 
be filled, has already been implemented. A 
feature of this organogram is that, following the 
abolition of the post of Clerk Assistant, the 
duties of assistant to the Clerk have been shared 
between two grade A6 officials, one responsible 
for political questions, the other for adminis-
trative questions. Therefore, on the departure of 
Mr. Whyte, who now carries out the duties of 
assistant for political questions and head of the 
committee service, Mr. Burgelin is to take over 
his duties and grade, as the President of the 
Assembly stressed. 
15. The Presidential Committee obviously 
recognises that the four posts needed to allow the 
Assembly secretariat to work in normal condi-
tions can be created only when the Assembly 
obtains the necessary funds. It hopes an early 
decision will be taken on this matter and that it 
will no longer be necessary to raise budgetary 
matters which might lead to controversy detri-
mental to the organisation. 
16. The second budgetary category covers the 
appropriations directly earmarked for the 
Assembly's activities. Since the Council has 
recognised the Assembly's right to make 
transfers between the relevant heads of the 
budget, the Presidential Committee noted with 
satisfaction that the Assembly has therefore 
obtained recognition of its autonomy in the 
management of its administrative expenditure 
which is the condition for the free exercise of its 
supervisory role. 
17. These amounts, included in Heads 11 to V 
of the budget, were the subject of a second sup-
plementary budget adopted by the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration and the 
Presidential Committee in order to complete 
certain operations that had had to be suspended 
for lack of funds. The Council had announced 
that it was prepared to approve a supplementary 
budget of not more than F 250 000 to take 
account of the fact that the pensions budget has 
now been separated from the Assembly's oper-
ating budget. 
18. The Presidential Committee regrets that of 
this amount the Council finally granted the 
Assembly only a supplementary F 100 000. 
19. Since the Presidential Committee, in 
agreement w1th the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration, submitted two sup-
plementary budgets this year, it is gratifying that 
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg has tabled an amendment 
to the Assembly's Rules of Procedure with a 
view to specifying the legal framework for 
arrangements made by the Presidential Com-
mittee on behalf of the Assembly. The prepa-
ration of supplementary provisional statements 
of expenditure is an urgent measure that the 
Presidential Committee, even without a mandate 
from the Assembly, must be able to take in the 
period between sessions to ensure the smooth 
running of the administration. It is correct for 
the Rules of Procedure to stipulate unambi-
guously that there is a legal basis for this tech-
nical measure which reserves the Assembly's 
rights since the latter has to ratify it. 
20. Finally, it should be recalled that the Pres-
ident of the Assembly again raised the question 
of the total Assembly budget, stressing that the 
principle of zero growth constantly reaffirmed by 
the Council seems particularly incompatible with 
the reactivation of WEU and the Assembly's 
growing activities since there is often a large gap 
between estimated and actual inflation rates, i.e. 
the increase in the cost of goods and services 
paid for by the Assembly. The recurrence of this 
gap for several years results in a progressive 
reduction in the Assembly's budget in constant 
terms. This problem therefore remains. 
II. Political activities 
of the Presidential Committee 
during the intersession 
21. Fortunately, the dialogue between the 
Presidential Committee and the Council did not 
deal only with budgetary matters. 
22. The political dialogue with the Council 
was in fact the Presidential Committee's main 
concern during the period between the part-
sessions this year. 
23. Following now well-established procedure, 
shortly after his election the President of the 
Assembly had talks with the Chairman-in-Office 
of the Council, Mr. van den Broek, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, and the Min-
ister of Defence of the same country, Mr. van 
Eekelen. The two ministers then received the 
Presidential Committee twice for exchanges of 
views on matters on the agenda of the ministerial 
meeting. 
24. The first exchange of views, held before 
the ministerial meeting, allowed the Presidential 
Committee to recall the Assembly's views on the 
preparation of the European security charter, to 
which the Assembly attaches the greatest impor-
tance, the restructuring of WEU and the 
reorganisation of the agencies. The Assembly 
considers this should help to improve their effi-
ciency and strengthen the organisation. 
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25. In the discussions on enlargement, the 
Presidential Committee reminded the Council of 
the importance the Assembly attaches to Por-
tugal, which applied formallr for membership a 
long time ago, being admitteq to the organisation 
as soon as possible and to the case of Spain being 
considered without delay. 
26. Here it should be recalled that it was 
decided to invite the PortuWJese Assembly and 
the Spanish Cortes to be represented in the WEU 
Assembly by a delegation of ~bservers consisting 
of their delegation to the Assembly of the 
Council of Europe. At its request, Portugal has 
been provisionally authorised to appoint a dif-
ferent delegation of observers but of the same 
number as its delegation to the Council of 
Europe. 
27. The other member ' countries of the 
Atlantic Alliance had already been authorised to 
be represented by two observers. The WEU 
Assembly therefore grants Portugal and Spain a 
status that constitutes a step towards accession. 
28. On the Gulf question and member coun-
tries' naval task forces in tihe area, the Presi-
dential Committee expressed satisfaction at the 
way the Assembly was kept informed of the 
matter. It stressed that the Assembly wished to 
continue to ·receive information from the 
Council allowing it to follow developments so as 
to be able, as it hopes, to give its support. 
29. Finally, the Presidential Committee 
stressed the importance of examining recent 
developments in Soviet policy, which is often 
difficult to interpret, so that Europe may be 
better able to assess their implications for its 
security. 
30. The Presidential Co;· mittee considered 
that the talks with the presid ncy allowed a frank 
and detailed discussion but. revealed the diffi-
culty the Council was having jn agreeing on suffi-
ciently forceful measures. 
31. The meeting of the Presidential Com-
mittee with the presidency following the minis-
terial meeting in The Hag~ on 27th October 
allowed it to confirm the prpgress made and to 
assess how much ground still had to be covered. 
The results of the ministerial meeting will be 
analysed by the rapporteurs presenting their 
committee's replies to the annual report of the 
Council. 
32. I shall therefore confine myself to 
recording the Presidential Committee's imme-
diate reactions. It first considered that the talks 
which had just been held were very useful and 
showed how much progress the Council had 
made towards the reactivation of WEU. 
33. The platform published by the Council has 
the merit of being the first attempt to define 
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Western Europe's security interests. The prin-
ciples thus defined now have to be implemented. 
I feel an encouraging sign is the application, for 
the first time since WEU was formed, of the pro-
visions of Article VIII of the modified Brussels 
Treaty concerning threats to peace. In the Gulf, 
Europe has to face up to a situation which consti-
tutes a particular threat to its vital economic 
interests. It is to be hoped that in disarmament 
matters, now the hub of East-West negotiations, 
Europe will manage to speak with a single voice 
to express the solidarity imposed by its geo-
graphical situation. 
34. To act, WEU must be efficient. The Presi-
dential Committee therefore expressed the wish 
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that the Council's decisions on the structure and 
seat of the ministerial organs of WEU be applied 
swiftly, since the Council must be able to give 
greater cohesion to the security policies of the 
European countries which have taken on particu-
larly constraining defence commitments and par-
ticularly important military responsibilities. This 
is the price at which the European component of 
the Atlantic Alliance can make its voice heard. 
35. The Presidential Committee for its part 
will continue, outside sessions, to act as 
spokesman for the European assembly with 
defence responsibilities and thus ensure con-
tinuous parliamentary support for all efforts to 
give Europe more body and more soul. 
APPENDIX I DOCUMENT 1126 
APPENDIX I 
Note by the President of the Assembly · 
on the Assembly's budgetary autonomy 
16th June 1987 
1. The nature of the WEU Assembly's bud-
getary autonomy can be deduced from the 
political autonomy that is an essential condition 
of its action. 
* 
* * 
2. The Assembly's mandate is indirectly 
defined in Article IX of the modified Brussels 
Treaty which makes it compulsory for the 
Council to present a report on its activities. It is 
in the spirit of these provisions that the Council 
answers recommendations and written questions 
addressed to it by the Assembly. 
3. It cannot therefore be considered that the 
Council has no commitments to fulfil vis-a-vis 
the Assembly. The Council probably does not 
have to conform to the recommendations 
addressed to it but it has the duty to take them 
into account, if only to express its opinion on 
them. 
4. The various changes that have occurred in 
the nature of the Council's activities have not 
reduced the Assembly's task. On the contrary, 
the Rome declaration of October 1984 recalls the 
importance of the WEU Assembly " which, as 
the only European parliamentary body man-
dated by treaty to discuss defence matters, is 
called upon to play a growing role ". 
* 
* * 
5. In carrying out its task, the WEU 
Assembly autonomously determines its methods 
of work, draws up its agenda and organises its 
plenary sessions, committee meetings, meetings 
with the Council and colloquies. 
It is assisted by a secretariat which, unlike 
that ofthe Assembly of the Council of Europe, is 
self-dependent and has staff rules separate from 
those of the ministerial organs. It shares its work 
out among the members of the Office of the 
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Clerk and recruits staff on the basis of criteria of 
competence and nationality that it alone deter-
mines. 
6. To finance its activities, the Assembly has 
the following resources: 
- sums granted in its budget in the light of 
the Assembly's proposals and after dis-
cussion in the Council; 
- expenditure borne by the parliaments of 
member countries: travelling expenses 
of members of the Assembly on the 
occasion of plenary sessions and com-
mittee meetings, whether held at the 
seat of the Assembly or elsewhere, 
expenditure involved in the 
organisation of colloquies, meetings, 
etc.; 
- the proceeds of the sale of Assembly 
publications. 
7. The Assembly's autonomy of action 
requires autonomy in the management of its 
resources. It was in this spirit that the Charter 
and Rules of Procedure made the President of 
the Assembly responsible for budgetary man-
agement. This is also why t~e Assembly has its 
own auditor verify that the budget is managed 
correctly and the approval of the Assembly is 
sought each year. 
* 
* * 
8. Recognition of the Assembly's autonomy 
to manage its budget within the limit of 
resources available being implied by the very 
nature of its mandate, the Assembly had for 
many years been insisting that it should be 
responsible for allocating appropriations to the 
various heads of its budget. It is therefore particu-
larly satisfied that the principle of its autonomy 
in budgetary management has been recognised 
and wishes the methods of applying this prin-
ciple to be specified, due account being taken of 
its specific driving and supervisory role. 
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APPENDIX II 
Note by the President of the Assembly 
on the application of the principle 
of the Assembly's budgetary autonomy 
22nd June 1987 
The decision taken in Luxembourg meets 
a long-standing claim by the Assembly in 
recognising the principle of its right to autono-
mous budgetary management. The total amount 
of the Assembly budget can be determined only 
as a result of discussions between the Council 
and the Assembly. 
The question of autonomous budgetary 
management for the Assembly originated in the 
contradiction between the Assembly's freedom 
of action under Article IX of the modified 
Brussels Treaty and the constraints of the provi-
sions applied to procedure for adopting its 
budget. 
Its freedom of action was recognised by 
the then Chairman-in-Office of the Council 
during the first session of the Assembly. Mr. 
Spaak said: " The Council of the union has not 
wished to force its views upon you. On the con-
trary, we have been determined to leave you the 
greatest possible freedom ... We consider that the 
organisation and working methods of the 
Assembly and the nature of its relations with 
other assemblies are matters for its own decision, 
within the framework of the agreements setting 
up the Western European Union." 
Conversely, the procedure imposed on the 
Assembly for adopting its budget includes a 
detailed study by government financial experts 
of the reasons for a specific estimate being 
included in a specific sub-head of its draft 
budget. 
The decision taken in Luxembourg meets 
the need to remove this contradiction. 
To study the effects, a distinction must be 
drawn in the Assembly budget between, on the 
one hand, a fixed proportion corresponding to 
the financial implications of the structure of the 
Office of the Clerk and, on the other, appropria-
tions for activities defined in an annual pro-
gramme of work. 
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The present structure of the Office of the 
Clerk was established in accordance with deci-
sions taken by the Presidential Committee in 
1981 and 1986. An essential feature is the 
division of the duties of assistant to the Clerk 
between two grade A6 officials. The four 
remaining posts will be filled when the Assembly 
obtains the necessary sums. 
This fixed part of the budget, to be 
renewed from year to year, is subject to appli-
cation of decisions taken in the framework of the 
co-ordinated international organisations and the 
provisions of the Staff Rules of the Office of the 
Clerk. 
Conversely, some flexibility is essential in 
managing the parts of the budget corresponding 
to the financing of the Assembly's work. By allo-
cating to the various heads and sub-heads 
expenditure implied by its programme, the 
Assembly makes estimates designed to make its 
action possible, not to place constraints upon it. 
According to the Rules of Procedure of the 
Assembly, the budget is above all an estimate of 
expenditure. It is subject to modification in the 
course of implementation due to unforeseeable 
events such as the rise in the cost of certain ser-
vices or the impossibility of carrying out certain 
plans. If no offset were possible between over-
spending and savings, the Assembly would, 
because of the inadequacy of sums under certain 
sub-heads becoming apparent during the 
financial year, have to cancel part of its pro-
gramme of work which, because of the close cor-
relation of expenditure, would involve non-use 
of sums under other sub-heads. 
It thus appears that freedom to manage its 
own budget is, for the Assembly, a condition for 
the rational organisation of its work. 
APPENDIX Ill 
Dear Mr. President, 
APPENDIX Ill 
Letter from the Secretary-General 
to the President of the Assembly 
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London, 23rd November 1987 
In your letter dated 27th July 1987 1, you have made some interesting remarks and given explana-
tions of matters which have been and still are of considerable importance for the Assembly and have 
received the repeated attention of the Council. 
I would think that on the matter of budgetary autonomy and of the pensions budget, the 
Assembly has, this year, made considerable and remarkable progress, bearing in mind that these subjects 
are almost as old as the organisation and the pension scheme themselves. Consolidation and the gaining 
of experience with the new situation would now seem to be the next step. 
The restructuring of the Office of the Clerk is still a matter on which the Council has not yet been 
able to come to a conclusion. As was explained in my letters of23rd February 1987 and 29th May 1987, 
the proposals for new posts and the regrading of posts in order to arrive at a new organogram were to be 
considered during the review of the whole of the organisation. This has, however, not yet been con-
cluded and since these questions are, in the eyes of the Council, intimately linked, a decision on the 
Assembly's proposals will only be possible somewhat later. 
The problem of the growth rate to be applied to the operational budgets is also long-standing, and 
has been raised in meetings of the Budget and Organisation Committee repeatedly. The Council in its 
reply to Recommendation 445 considers that, when all the budgets of WEU are prepared, the growth 
rate applicable should remain at zero in real terms, based on the rates of inflation in France and the 
United Kingdom, as officially forecast. 
Mr. C. GOERENS, 
President of the Assembly 
of Western European Union 
Yours sincerely, 
Alfred CAHEN 
1. ReJ?roduced at Appendix 11 to the draft second supplementary budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the 
financial year 1987 (Document 1120). 
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Document 1127 1st December 1987 
The INF treaty 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 1 
tabled by Mr. Stoffelen and others 
The Assembly, 
Endorsing the view of its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments expressed in Doc-
ument 1116 that the INF agreement now to be signed by the United States and the Soviet Union should 
be in the long-term security interests of countries both of the alliance and the Warsaw Pact, 
URGES THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 
To give its advice and consent to the treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces as expeditiously 
as possible. 
INSTRUCTS ITS PRESIDENT 
To transmit the text of the present resolution and the corresponding report of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments to the President ofthe United States Senate for the information of 
all its members. 
Signed: Sto.ffelen, van der Sanden, Hardy, Malfatti, de Beer, Ahrens, Linster, Pack, Hennicot-
Schoepges, Staels-Dompas, Cox, Pieralli 
1. See 6th sitting, 30th November 1987 (motion referred to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments). 
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Document 1128 1st December 1987 
Amendment of the Charter of the Assembly 
MOTION TO AMEND THE CHARTER 1 
tabled by Mr. Pannella and others 
The Assembly resolves to amend Article VIII as follows: 
Leave out paragraph (a), and insert: 
"The draft budget of the Assembly shall be drawn up by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration in consultation with the Presidential Committee. 
This draft budget shall be submitted to the Council which may make comments in the form of 
amendments thereto. 
Thus amended, the draft budget shall be re-examined by the Assembly in accordance with the fol-
lowing procedure: 
- if the Council has not amended the draft budget, it shall be agreed to by the Assembly by simple 
majority; 
- if the Council has amended the draft budget, the Assembly may ratify it by simple majority or 
itself amend the draft budget as amended by the Council. Any amendment to the Council's 
amendments to the draft budget must be approved by an absolute majority. 
The budget thus adopted shall be proclaimed adopted by the President, who shall communicate it 
to the Council. " 
Signed: Pannella, Fioret, Stegagnini, Parisi, Sa/vi, Sarti, Malfatti, Pack, Tummers, Natali, Fourre, 
Steiner, Fiandrotti, Pieralli, Greco, Cannata, Taramelli, Gabbuggiani, Martino, Close, Fassino, Irmer, 
Hitschler 
1. See 8th sitting, 1st December 1987 (motion referred to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges). 
311 
IMPRIMERIE 0 ALENCONNAISE 
Rue Edouard-Belin: 4e trimestre 1987 
N° d'ordre: 9594 
PRINTED IN FRANCE 
